RENDERED: AUGUST 26, 2021 TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky 2020-SC-0067-DG
KEENELAND ASSOCIATION, INC. APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS V. NO. 2018-CA-1393 FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT NO. 17-CI-03068
ROY J. PRATHER AND APPELLEES NANCY PRATHER
AND 2020-SC-0075-DG
SALLEE HORSE VANS, INC. APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS V. NO. 2018-CA-1393 FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT NO. 17-CI-03068
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE HUGHES
REVERSING
During the 2016 September Yearling Sale at Keeneland, a horse broke
loose from its handler and headed toward pedestrians who were crossing a
path between barns. One pedestrian, Roy J. Prather, fell while attempting to flee and fractured his shoulder. Prather and his wife, Nancy Prather, filed suit
in Fayette Circuit Court alleging various negligence claims against Keeneland
and Sallee Horse Vans, Inc., the transportation company that agreed with the
horse’s purchaser to transport it to its destination. Keeneland and Sallee
argued that the Prathers’ claims were barred by Kentucky Revised Statute
(KRS) 247.402, a provision of the Farm Animals Activity Act (FAAA) that limits
the liability of farm animal activity sponsors and other persons as to claims for
injuries that occur while engaged in farm animal activity.
Finding the FAAA applicable, the trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of Keeneland and Sallee. On appeal, the Court of Appeals raised a new
legal theory sua sponte and reversed the trial court’s decision. Noting that in a
separate statute the legislature recognized the sale of race horses as integral to
horse racing activities and that horse racing activities are specifically exempted
from the FAAA, the appellate court concluded the trial court erroneously
dismissed the Prathers’ claims. On discretionary review, we reverse the Court
of Appeals and reinstate the order granting summary judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Roy J. Prather visited Keeneland during the 2016 September Yearling
Sale event. Sales events involve an enclosed sales pavilion where the auctions
occur and a separate “backside” where horses are stalled, shown to prospective
purchasers, and loaded and unloaded into horse vans as they come and go
from the premises. Prather was at Keeneland as an employee of Indian Charlie,
an independent satirical newspaper containing information and advertisements
2 relating to the thoroughbred industry. His sole purpose for being at the sales
event was distributing the newsletters from his employer. Prather parked at
Keeneland’s track kitchen, received a batch of the newsletters, and proceeded
across the premises, passing out newsletters at various sale barns along the
way.
By way of background, once a horse is purchased in the Keeneland sales
pavilion, the purchaser must arrange for transport of the horse off the
premises. A purchaser can approach the van table and select a transportation
company to move the horse. Typically, a number of different transportation
companies work the Yearling Sale, companies such as Appellee Sallee Horse
Vans, Inc. During the Yearling Sale, Sallee utilizes independent contractors,
called shankers or handlers, who are responsible for getting a horse from its
specific barn and taking it to the appropriate horse van. Elizabeth Sadler, a
corporate representative for Sallee, testified by deposition that they do not
document which handler walks a horse from the barn to its vans for transport,
but that a Sallee employee called a dispatcher ordinarily maintains records of
which handlers worked on a given sale day.1
On the day of his fall, Prather returned to the kitchen to get more
newsletters and on his way back toward the track he and others were stopped
1 Sadler testified that typically horse handlers are familiar with the horse
industry. When there is a horse sale, they contact various horse transport companies, like Sallee, and ask whether help is needed. If help is needed, the handler is instructed to go to the sale and check in with the dispatchers. Sallee has a dispatcher present at Keeneland who determines whether a handler will work for Sallee during the sale.
3 by a Keeneland crossing guard at a designated horse crossing path so a
handler could lead a horse into a van for transportation off the premises.
Prather did not know the name of the handler he saw leading the horse but
testified by deposition that Prather believed he saw the handler with Sallee
employees earlier in the day and thus assumed the handler was working for
Sallee. After the horse crossed the path and left the immediate vicinity the
crossing guard permitted Prather and others to proceed along their path. As
the horse was entering the loading chute, the horse broke free from its handler.
Someone yelled “loose horse,” causing Prather to turn around and observe the
horse moving in his direction. As Prather turned to move away from the horse
he alleges that he felt a “push” on his shoulder and he fell over, fracturing his
shoulder. Prather could not explain what caused him to fall, but said the
horse was close enough to him that he assumed the horse kicked him. One of
the crossing guards radioed for help and an ambulance transported Prather to
the hospital.2
On August 25, 2017, Prather and his wife, Nancy Prather, filed a
complaint in the Fayette Circuit Court against Keeneland and Sallee. His
claims included various forms of negligence based largely on alleged
deficiencies in the horse and pedestrian routing on the backside of the track
and the actions or omissions of Keeneland’s security personnel. The complaint
2 In his deposition Prather stated that three Keeneland crossing guards were in the vicinity when his injury occurred, but only identified two of the crossing guards by name.
4 also included allegations that Sallee failed to properly secure the horse while
leading it to the loading dock.
On June 21 and July 25, 2018, Sallee and Keeneland filed separate
motions for summary judgment under the FAAA. KRS 247.401-.4029. The
FAAA recognizes that there are inherent risks associated with farm animals,
including horses, that are beyond the reasonable control of farm animal
activity sponsors, professionals, or other persons. The FAAA was enacted “to
aid courts and juries in defining the duties of persons responsible for farm
animals to others who have chosen to participate in farm animal activities.”
KRS 247.4013. As such, KRS 247.402 bars certain claims arising from farm
animal activities.
Specifically, Keeneland argued that the Prathers’ claims are barred under
the FAAA because Keeneland is a “farm animal activity sponsor” and Prather is
a “participant in farm animal activities” whose injury resulted from the
“inherent risks of farm animal activities” within the meaning of KRS 247.4015.
Sallee filed a similar motion for summary judgment asserting it is a “farm
animal professional” according to KRS 247.4015(6)(a) and is engaged in farm
animal activity under KRS 247.4015(1). Sallee also asserted that Prather was
engaged in farm animal activity under KRS 247.4015(1) and (10) by being a
spectator who placed himself in immediate proximity to the activity or by being
a participant. Prather opposed the motions for summary judgment by alleging
he was not a “participant” under the FAAA and that summary judgment was
premature because discovery was ongoing.
5 The trial court conducted a hearing and orally concluded that the FAAA
applied, barring the Prathers’ claims. The trial court held that Prather was a
participant in the activities and that his injury was a result of the inherent
risks in horse sale activities. A written order granting summary judgment to
Keeneland and Sallee was entered but it did not contain any additional
findings.
Prather appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court order
granting summary judgment on different legal grounds than those advanced by
Prather. The Court of Appeals applied the horse racing activity exception, KRS
247.4025(1), which states that horse racing activities are exempt from the
FAAA. The Court of Appeals concluded that the September Yearling Sale at
Keeneland constituted a horse racing activity, relying on KRS 230.357, a
provision in a separate chapter of KRS which pertains to the sale of race horses
and outlines various statutory requirements to effectuate the sale of a race
horse. The Court of Appeals reasoned that “[b]y placing KRS 230.357 within
the statutory framework regulating race and show horses, we believe the
legislature recognized the sale of race horses as being integral to horse racing
and, in fact, innately intertwined therewith.” On this analysis, the Court of
Appeals held the FAAA is inapplicable and does not bar the Prathers’ claims
against Keeneland or Sallee.
Having granted discretionary review, heard oral arguments and carefully
considered the record, we reverse the Court of Appeals. Given the undisputed
facts and applicable law, the trial court properly granted summary judgment.
6 ANALYSIS
In granting summary judgment, the trial court issued oral findings that
the FAAA applies to Keeneland and Sallee, that Prather was a participant in
farm animal activity and that the risks that led to Prather’s injury were
inherent in the activity. We consider first whether the FAAA applies to
Keeneland, Sallee and Prather, and then determine whether summary
judgment was appropriately granted.
I. The FAAA Applies to Keeneland, Sallee and Prather.
This case turns on the interpretation of the FAAA, which provides limited
liability for those engaged in farm animal activities. “[I]f a statute is clear and
unambiguous and expresses the legislature’s intent, the statute must be
applied as written.” Hall v. Hosp. Res., Inc., 276 S.W.3d 775, 784 (Ky. 2008).
“The words of the statute are to be given their plain meaning unless to do so
would constitute an absurd result.” Exec. Branch Ethics Com'n v. Stephens, 92
S.W.3d 69, 73 (Ky. 2002). The language of the FAAA is clear and the provisions
are easily applied to the parties and activities in this case.
The FAAA was enacted to define the duties of persons responsible for
farm animals3 to others who participate in farm animal activities. KRS
247.4013. Recognizing the importance of supporting farm animal activities in
this state, the Act bars certain claims arising from farm animal activities:
The inherent risks of farm animal activities are deemed to be beyond the reasonable control of farm animal activity sponsors,
3 The Act defines “farm animal” as “one (1) or more of the following
domesticated animals” and then lists several types of animals including “horses.”
7 farm animal professionals, or other persons. Therefore, farm animal activity sponsors, farm animal professionals, or other persons are deemed to have the duty to reasonably warn participants in farm animal activities of the inherent risks of the farm animal activities but not the duty to reduce or eliminate the inherent risks of farm animal activities. Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, no participant or representative of a participant who has been reasonably warned of the inherent risks of farm animal activities shall make any claim against, maintain an action against, or recover from a farm animal activity sponsor, a farm animal professional, or any other person for injury, loss, damage, or death of the participant resulting from any of the inherent risks of farm animal activities.
KRS 247.402(1). “Farm animal activities” are defined in KRS 247.4015(3)
which includes, in relevant part,
(d) Rides, trips, shows, clinics, demonstrations, sales, hunts, parades, games, exhibitions, or other activities of any type, however informal or impromptu, that are sponsored by a farm animal activity sponsor or other person[.]
(Emphasis added.)
Keeneland asserts that it is entitled to the protections of the FAAA as a
farm animal activity sponsor, defined by KRS 247.4015(4) as
an individual, group, club, partnership, corporation, or other legally constituted entity, whether the sponsor is operating for profit or nonprofit, which sponsors, organizes, allows, or provides the facilities for a farm animal activity . . . .
Keeneland qualifies as a farm animal activity sponsor under this subsection
because it organized and provided the facilities for the horse sale and, in turn,
“sales” are explicitly listed as a farm animal activity. KRS 247.4015(3).
Generally, farm animal activity participants are barred from bringing a
claim against a farm animal activity sponsor, a farm animal professional or a
8 person as defined in KRS 247.4015(11).4 KRS 247.4015(10) defines a farm
animal activities “participant” as “any individual, whether amateur or
professional, who engages in a farm animal activity, whether or not a fee is
paid to participate in the farm animal activity . . . .” The statute further defines
“engages in a farm animal activity” as
leading, showing . . . driving, or being a passenger upon a farm animal, whether mounted or unmounted; . . . or utilizing a farm animal facility as part of an organized event or activity; or assisting a participant or show management in farm animal activities. The term does not include being a spectator at a farm animal activity, except in cases where the spectator voluntarily places himself or herself in immediate proximity to the activity . . . .
KRS 247.4015(1).
Sallee is engaged in the business of horse transportation and KRS
247.4015(1) expressly references “leading” a farm animal. The Sallee handler
was engaging in farm animal activity by leading the horse to a van at the time
Prather was injured. KRS 247.4015(1). Also Sallee’s handling of the horse
occurred in the context of a sale, which is explicitly considered a farm animal
activity. KRS 247.4015(3). Finally, Sallee qualifies as a “person” under KRS
247.4015(11) because it is a corporation that “controls” farm animals, thus
fitting squarely within the liability limitation provision in KRS 247.402(1).
Sallee is thus afforded protection under the FAAA.
4 The Act defines “person” as “any individual, corporation, association, or other legally constituted entity that owns or controls one or more farm animals.” Sallee qualifies as a “person” under KRS 247.4015(11) because it is a corporation that “controls” farm animals, thus fitting squarely within the liability limitation provision in KRS 247.402(1).
9 The parties dispute whether Prather was a farm animal activity
participant or a spectator at the time of his injury. Keeneland and Sallee argue
that Prather was a participant in farm animal activity because he was in the
sale barn area to distribute newsletters that contained satirical information
about the sale and sale participants. Prather disagrees and asserts that he
was a spectator because his sole purpose for being on Keeneland premises was
to distribute the newsletter, not to buy, sell or lead horses. He also states that
he did not place himself within immediate proximity of the farm animal activity,
an alleged fact that is relevant only if Prather is a spectator. KRS 247.4015(1).
While Prather was not involved in the actual sale or handling of any horses, he
deliberately placed himself at the backside of the track where the horses were
being stalled, shown to prospective purchasers, and loaded and unloaded into
horse vans as they arrived and departed the Keeneland premises. He was
present on the backside of the track to disseminate information related to the
sale, distinguishing him from a mere sale spectator.
The Keeneland sales pavilion, where the auction activity occurred,
houses a designated spectator area with enclosed stadium seating,
concessions, conference rooms and a business center. The premises include a
free spectator parking lot and due to the layout of the property spectators
wanting to view the sale can access the pavilion without ever coming into
contact with a horse. The spectator area and the sales area are separated.
As noted, at the time of his injury Prather was paid to distribute
newsletters. Prather testified that he deliberately distributed the newsletters
10 on the backside of the track and in the sale barns. He was not in the areas
designated for spectators. The trial court’s finding that Prather was not a mere
spectator but rather a participant is supported by substantial evidence. In
sum, Prather qualifies as a participant under the FAAA because he was an
individual engaged in a farm animal activity. KRS 247.4015(10).
Having established that the FAAA is applicable to the parties, we turn to
whether either Keeneland or Sallee is entitled to the protections of the FAAA
based on the facts of this case. While the FAAA generally precludes Prather,
who was reasonably warned of the inherent risks of the farm animal activity at
Keeneland, from bringing a claim against Keeneland or Sallee, there are
exceptions.
In his complaint Prather alleged that Keeneland and Sallee “negligently,
recklessly and willfully and wantonly failed to secure . . . the race horse which
caused [his] fall.” Prather also alleged that Sallee breached its duty to him by
losing control of the race horse in a crowded environment. Through his
allegations in the complaint and responses to the motions for summary
judgment, Prather asserts claims under each of the five exceptions:
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall prevent or limit the liability of a farm animal activity sponsor, a farm animal professional, or any other person if the farm animal activity sponsor, farm animal professional, or person:
(a) Provided the equipment or tack, and knew or should have known that the equipment or tack was faulty, and the equipment or tack was faulty to the extent that it contributed to the injury;
(b) Provided the farm animal and failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant 11 to engage safely in the farm animal activity and to safely manage the particular farm animal based on the participant’s representations of the participant's ability;
(c) Owns, leases, has authorized use of, rents, or otherwise is in lawful possession and control of the land or facilities upon which the participant sustained injuries because of a dangerous latent condition which was known or should have been known to the farm animal activity sponsor, farm animal professional, or person and for which warning signs have not been conspicuously posted;
(d) Commits an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant, and that act or omission caused the injury; or
(e) Negligently or wrongfully injures the participant.
KRS 247.402(2).
Although the FAAA limits the liability of farm animal activity sponsors,
farm animal professionals, and “persons,” KRS 247.4025(1) specifically
provides that FAAA protection “shall not apply” when farm animal activity
sponsors, professionals, persons or participants are “engaged in horse racing
activities.” “Horse racing activities” are defined as “the conduct of horse racing
activities within the confines of any horse racing facility licensed and regulated
by KRS 230.070 to 230.990, but shall not include harness racing at county
fairs[.]” KRS 247.4015(8). Notably, this reference to a licensed and regulated
facility is the only reference to KRS Chapter 230 in the entire FAAA.
For Prather to proceed on his claims against Keeneland and Sallee he
must show either that the defendants were engaged in horse racing activities,
rendering the FAAA inapplicable, KRS 247.4025(1), or show that one of the
exceptions in KRS 247.402(2) applies. If Prather’s injury is the result of the
12 “inherent risks of farm animal activities” then the FAAA bars his claim. KRS
247.402(1).
II. The FAAA’S Horse Racing Exception Does Not Apply.
The Court of Appeals determined that because the legislature referenced
KRS Chapter 230 in the FAAA, i.e., the Act does not apply to horse racing
activities at facilities “licensed and regulated by KRS 230.070 to 230.990,” it
recognized that the sale of race horses is “innately intertwined” with horse
racing. With that curious leap of logic the Court of Appeals concluded the
horse racing exception to the FAAA applied. The exception, KRS 247.4025(1),
focuses however not only on the person or entity involved but also the farm
animal activity at issue. In this case, even though the sale occurred at
Keeneland, a licensed horse racing facility regulated by KRS Chapter 230, no
horse racing activities were occurring at the time of the sale. The FAAA
exception does not apply simply because Keeneland is a licensed horse racing
facility under KRS Chapter 230.5 The Court of Appeals’ interpretation
5 Further, KRS 230.280(1) states that “[n]o person shall hold or conduct any horse race meeting for any stake, purse or reward within the Commonwealth of Kentucky without securing the required license from the racing commission.” KRS 230.260(1), which outlines the authority of the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission, states that “[t]he racing commission is vested with jurisdiction and supervision over all horse race meetings in this Commonwealth and over all associations and all persons on association grounds . . . .” An “association” is defined by KRS Chapter 230 as “any person licensed by the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission under KRS 230.300 and engaged in the conduct of a recognized horse race meeting.” KRS 230.210. The Court of Appeals emphasized that Keeneland is licensed and regulated by KRS Chapter 230. However, sales and racing at Keeneland never occur simultaneously. When Keeneland is operating as a sales facility it is not engaged in any racing activity governed by KRS Chapter 230 so there is no rational basis for treating it differently than a facility conducting the exact same sales activity at an unlicensed location.
13 completely ignores the nature of the activity occurring at Keeneland at the time
Prather was injured.
Nothing in the record supports a conclusion that Keeneland, Sallee or
Prather were engaged in the “conduct of horse racing activities” under any
reasonable meaning of the phrase. The only activities occurring on the
Keeneland premises were the transport of horses, by hand, to and from the
backside, sales arena, and transport vans where the horses were loaded and
taken off the premises after being purchased. No live racing was occurring,
Keeneland’s racing meets being confined to April and October of each year.
Horse sales and horse racing are entirely different activities and the FAAA
treats them as such. While the Court of Appeals’ classification of Keeneland as
a horse racing facility is proper, Keeneland was not operating as a horse racing
facility during the September Yearling Sale. Therefore, the blanket exemption
of horse racing activity from the FAAA in KRS 247.4025(1) is inapplicable.
The legislative history of the FAAA also supports our conclusion that the
General Assembly intended to treat horse racing and horse sales differently,
requiring not only a licensed horse racing facility but also horse racing activity
in order for the FAAA exemption to apply. In 2015 the General Assembly
amended KRS 247.4015 and the definition of farm animal activity to explicitly
include sales. KRS 247.4015(3)(d). This addition to the statute makes the
General Assembly’s intent abundantly clear. It is fundamental that in
determining the meaning of a statute, we must defer to the language of the
statute and we are not at liberty to add or subtract from the legislative
14 enactment or interpret it at variance from the language used. Caesars
Riverboat Casino, LLC v. Beach, 336 S.W.3d 51, 56 (Ky. 2011) (citing Johnson v.
Branch Banking and Trust Co., 313 S.W.3d 557, 559 (Ky. 2010)). Interpreting
the horse racing activities exemption in accordance with its plain meaning
creates a result that is consistent with the legislative intent of the FAAA.
The purpose of KRS Chapter 230, which governs horse racing and
showing, is to “vest in the racing commission forceful control of horse racing in
the Commonwealth with plenary power to promulgate administrative
regulations prescribing conditions under which all legitimate horse racing and
wagering thereon is conducted in the Commonwealth . . . .” KRS 230.215(2).
KRS 230.357, enacted in 2006, requires that all transfers of horses, stallion
seasons, or economic interests in horses be evidenced by a bill of sale and that
any person acting as an agent for both a purchaser and a seller receive the
informed consent of both parties. This provision focusing on the sales
transaction is the only manner in which KRS Chapter 230 addresses “sales.”
Importantly, KRS 230.357 was enacted ten years after the FAAA and almost
ten years before the General Assembly specifically amended the definition of
farm animal activities in KRS 247.4015(3)(d) to include “sales.” Thus, when
the FAAA was enacted (1996), KRS Chapter 230 did not reference horse sales
in any way. We presume that the legislature is “aware of existing laws when
enacting a new statute,” Pearce v. University of Louisville, 448 S.W.3d 746, 760
(Ky. 2014), and we find no reasonable basis for concluding that the General
Assembly intended KRS 230.357 to limit the scope and protections of the
15 FAAA, particularly since “sales” were added to the farm animals activity
definition in 2015.
This Court has previously considered the applicability of the FAAA to
horse sales in Daugherty v. Tabor, 554 S.W.3d 319 (Ky. 2018). Tabor, a
prospective horse buyer, contacted Daugherty Stables about buying several
horses and visited the stables to test ride horses. Id. at 320. While test riding
a horse, Tabor lost control and was thrown from the horse, suffering several
injuries. Id. Tabor alleged that Daugherty breached various duties under the
FAAA but Daugherty argued that as a farm animal activities professional they
satisfied the FAAA’s mandate to warn participants about the inherent dangers
of horseback riding. Id. at 321. The crux of the case turned on whether
Daugherty satisfied the duty to ensure that Tabor had the requisite skill to ride
the horse, KRS 247.402(2)(b), and whether the actions of Daugherty and his
employees were reasonable under the FAAA. Notably, this Court held that
liability for the horse’s unpredictable reaction to Tabor was abrogated by the
FAAA.
While Daugherty involved the sale of only a few horses, compared to a
large sales event like the Yearling Sale at Keeneland, it nonetheless constitutes
an instance where this Court has found that a horse sale was within the
protections of the FAAA. Indeed, given the plain legislative intent we could not
hold otherwise. Because the sale of horses constitutes a farm animal activity
and Keeneland constituted a farm animal activity sponsor at the time of
Prather’s injury, it is entitled to the protections of the FAAA. Further, because
16 Sallee was a “person” engaged in farm animal activities by handling the horse
to transport it off the premises, it is also afforded the protections of the FAAA.
The Court of Appeals’ strained construction of the horse racing exemption is
simply not justified.
III. Prather’s Injury Stemmed from an Inherent Risk of Engaging in Farm Animal Activity.
The FAAA explicitly recognizes that there are inherent risks in working
with and around farm animals, risks that are “essentially impossible . . . to
eliminate.” KRS 247.401. In enacting the FAAA the legislature recognized the
widespread occurrence of farm animal activities in Kentucky and the economic
benefits such activities bring to the state. The FAAA is “necessary to instruct
persons voluntarily engaging in farm animal activities of the potential risks
inherent in the activities.” KRS 247.401. A stated purpose of the FAAA is to
“preserve and promote the long Kentucky tradition of activities involving farm
animals” while also protecting “the health and safety” of Kentucky citizens. Id.
“[P]ersons do not have a duty to eliminate risks inherent in farm animal
activities which are beyond their immediate control if those risks are or should
be reasonably obvious, expected, or necessary to participants engaged in farm
animal activities.” KRS 247.4013.
The FAAA also imposes a duty on farm animal activity participants,
(Prather in this case), to “act in a safe and responsible manner at all times to
avoid injury to the participant and others and to be aware of risks inherent in
farm animal activities to the best of the participant’s ability.” KRS 247.4019.
“Inherent risks of farm animal activities” are defined as 17 dangers or conditions which are an integral part of farm animal activities, including, but not limited to;
(a) The propensity of a farm animal to behave in ways that may result in injury, harm, or death to persons around them;
(b) The unpredictability of the reaction of a farm animal to sounds, sudden movement, and unfamiliar objects, persons, or other animals;
(c) Certain hazards such as surface and subsurface conditions;
(d) Collisions with other farm animals or objects; and
(e) The potential of a participant to act in a negligent manner that may contribute to injury to the participant or others, such as failing to maintain control over a farm animal or not acting within his or her ability[.]
KRS 247.4015(9).
KRS 247.4027 requires farm animal activity sponsors and professionals
to post and maintain signs that warn participants of inherent risks. All parties
agree that Keeneland had clearly visible signs posted in accordance with KRS
247.4027(3):
WARNING
Under Kentucky law, a farm animal activity sponsor, farm animal professional, or other person does not have the duty to eliminate all risks of injury of participation in farm animal activities. There are inherent risks of injury that you voluntarily accept if you participate in farm animal activities.
The foundation of the FAAA is that a participant who has been
reasonably informed of the inherent risks of farm animal activities cannot
make a claim against a sponsor, professional or any other person for their
injury, unless an exception applies. KRS 247.402(1). This limitation on claims 18 arising from farm animal activities serves to accomplish the purpose of the act
itself, which is to promote farm animal activities for the benefit of Kentucky as
a whole. Additionally, the Act specifically recognizes that inherent risks of farm
animals are “essentially impossible . . . to eliminate.” KRS 247.401.
While it is unclear what precisely caused the horse to break loose from
its handler on that day in September 2016, the FAAA recognizes the
unpredictability of a farm animal as an inherent risk. KRS 247.4015(9)(b). A
horse becoming “spooked” or getting loose from its handler is something farm
animal activity sponsors and participants should recognize as an obvious risk.
Indeed, the FAAA recognizes that farm animals may react to sounds, sudden
movement, or unfamiliar objects, persons or other animals. Prather, a
participant familiar with horses generally and Keeneland particularly, testified
that Keeneland was especially crowded on the day of the sale. Specifically, he
testified that the area where the horse was crossing was very crowded with
people. Any number of things could have startled the horse and caused it to
break loose from the handler.
Although not dispositive in our analysis, we note that Prather had more
experience in the horse industry than many Kentuckians, having had two
previous employment experiences involving horses. He acknowledged that he
was familiar with the Keeneland grounds and Keeneland sales. He also
acknowledged that when he worked for another company during a sale a horse
got loose so he knew that was a type of risk associated with horses. He
understood that horses present a risk of injury and thus while distributing
19 newsletters he tried to keep his distance from the horses because he did not
want to “spook a horse.” Additionally, Prather acknowledged seeing the
warning signs, as required by KRS 247.4027(3), posted at Keeneland and
knowing that there were inherent risks of being around horses. On cross-
examination at his deposition, he stated he understood that he subjected
himself to certain risks by being at Keeneland to distribute the newsletters.
While several questions regarding the incident remain unanswered, it is
clear that Prather’s injury was caused by a horse getting loose from its handler.
Although Prather is unable to describe the mechanism of his injury—whether
the horse kicked him, another pedestrian pushed or bumped into him when
panic ensued, etc.—the injury unquestionably stemmed from the horse’s
behavior in escaping the handler. Prather did not see the horse break free from
its handler, so he was unable to speculate as to how or why the horse broke
loose. Additionally, the area of Keeneland in which Prather was injured was a
designated crossing area for horses, a space where people and horses came
into close proximity.
In sum, by voluntarily attending the Yearling Sale at Keeneland and
acting as a farm animal activity participant, Prather subjected himself to the
inherent risks associated with horses. The injury he suffered is precisely the
type of injury that is foreseeable when a horse unpredictably breaks loose from
its handler. Holding Keeneland or Sallee liable for his injury would contradict
the purpose of the FAAA and the protections afforded to farm animal activity
20 sponsors, professionals and persons for farm animal behavior, behavior which
to a large extent cannot be predicted or controlled.
On appeal, we review a summary judgment de novo. Shelton v. Ky.
Easter Seals Soc’y, Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901, 905 (Ky. 2013). We consider whether
the trial court “correctly determined that there were no genuine issues of
material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fluke Corp. v. LeMaster, 306 S.W.3d 55, 59 (Ky. 2010). The Prathers
failed to present evidence demonstrating genuine issues of material fact.6
“Designed to be narrow and exacting so as to preserve one's right to trial
by jury, summary judgment is nevertheless appropriate in cases where the
nonmoving party relies on little more than ‘speculation and supposition’ to
support his claims.” Blackstone Mining Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 351 S.W.3d
193, 201 (Ky. 2010) (citing O’Bryan v. Cave, 202 S.W.3d 585, 588 (Ky. 2006).
Here, Prather could not identify the cause of his fall and did not present
statements or testimony from any eyewitnesses that would support a
conclusion that his fall was not the result of the inherent risks associated with
farm animals, in this case a “loose horse.” The primary source of evidence is
his own testimony. “The party opposing summary judgment cannot rely on
6 In Prather’s responses to interrogatories he stated that his counsel possessed two recorded statements from two of the crossing guards who were present at the scene. The contents of the statements are unknown, and it is unclear why eyewitness statements were not made part of the record, especially given the uncertainties surrounding the events that transpired. The Prathers’ case was pending for one year in the trial court before summary judgment was granted, allowing sufficient time for discovery and development of their claim and submission of proof for the trial court’s consideration.
21 their own claims or arguments without significant evidence in order to prevent
a summary judgment.” Wymer v. JH Properties, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 195, 199 (Ky.
2001). Simply put, the Prathers have not presented any affirmative evidence to
support their assertion that the FAAA does not bar their claims against
Keeneland and Sallee. The trial court properly granted summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate
the order of the Fayette Circuit Court granting summary judgment to
Keeneland and Sallee.
Minton, C.J.; Conley, Keller, Lambert, and Nickell, JJ., concur.
VanMeter, J., not sitting.
22 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, KEENELAND ASSOCIATION, INC:
Woodson Chapman Hopkins Steven B. Loy Stoll Keenon Ogden PLLC
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, SALLEE HORSE VANS, INC:
Gregg Edward Thornton Jillian Dove House Ward Hocker & Thornton PLLC
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES:
Nicholas D. Summe Martin Sebastian Summe Summe & Summe PSC