Keene v. Anaconda Company

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: October 13, 1982
• Docket: 81-270
• Status: Published

Opinion

No. 81-270 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1982

JACKIE KEENE, Claimant and Respondent, VS . THE ANACONDA COMPANY, Employer, Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: Workers' Compensation Court Honorable William Hunt, Judge presiding Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Utick & Grosfield, Helena, Montana Andrew J. Utick argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Bernard Everett argued, Anaconda, Montana

- Submitted: September 14, 1982 Decided: October 13, 1982 Filed: 0K 13 1982 T M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the Court.

Claimant-respondent petitioned the Workers ' Compensation C o u r t f o r p e r m a n e n t t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s , a t t o r n e y f e e s and

a 20 p e r c e n t p e n a l t y f o r u n r e a s o n a b l e d e l a y and r e f u s a l to p a y b e n e f i t s , i n J u l y , 1980. The Workers Compensation Court e n t e r e d judgment for the c l a i m a n t on a l l i s s u e s . Defendant-appellant,

Anaconda Company appeals the judgment of the Workers

Compensation C o u r t . C l a i m a n t was employed w i t h t h e Anaconda Company a s a b o i l e r - m a k e r a t t h e B e r k l e y P i t i n B u t t e , Montana. On A u g u s t 2 3 , 1 9 7 8 ,

claimant was riding in a two and one-half ton truck in the B e r k l e y P i t when t h e t r u c k c a u g h t f i r e . C l a i m a n t jumped o u t of

t h e t r u c k w i t h a f i r e e x t i n g u i s h e r i n h i s hand and l a n d e d o n h i s

l e f t leg. C l a i m a n t i m m e d i a t e l y f e l t p a i n i n h i s lower b a c k and l e f t leg. On A u g u s t 2 4 , 1 9 7 8 , c l a i m a n t went t o see D r . J a m e s P . Murphy,

an orthopedic surgeon i n Butte, Montana, f o r treatment of his

lower b a c k and l e g p a i n . Dr. Murphy recommended c l a i m a n t u n d e r g o a myelogram b u t c l a i m a n t r e f u s e d t o c o n s e n t to a myelogram and asked f o r a second o p i n i o n . Dr. Murphy r e f e r r e d c l a i m a n t t o D r . Johnson, a neurosurgeon , who examined c l a i m a n t on S e p t e m b e r 1 3 , 1978. Dr. J o h n s o n found c l a i m a n t had s u f f e r e d a " l o w b a c k and

lower leg muscular ligamentous" injury but found no "neural

component" to c l a i m a n t s p a i n . Dr. Murphy t h e n r e l e a s e d c l a i m a n t and claimant was treated by Dr. Phillip A. Blom, D.C., a

chiropractor in Butte, Montana. Dr. Blom t r e a t e d c l a i m a n t from S e p t e m b e r 2 9 , 1 9 7 8 , u n t i l November 3 , 1 9 7 8 , f o r a " l u m b a r s a c r a l strain with accompanying myofacitis and grade I1 radiculitis left." On November 3 , 1 9 7 8 , D r . B l o m r e l e a s e d c l a i m a n t to r e t u r n t o work.

When claimant continued to complain of pain, Dr. Blom

r e f e r r e d him t o D r . David P . J a c o b s o n , a n o r t h o p e d i c s u r g e o n i n M i s s o u l a , Montana. Dr. J a c o b s o n examined c l a i m a n t on November 7 , 1 9 7 8 , and recommended c l a i m a n t r e t u r n t o f u l l y a c t i v e employment. Claimant returned t o work as a boilermaker with the Anaconda

Company o n November 9 , 1 9 7 8 . C l a i m a n t t e s t i f i e d he had t o q u i t a f t e r w o r k i n g o n l y f o u r h o u r s b e c a u s e of p a i n . On November 1 0 , 1 9 7 8 , c l a i m a n t saw D r . Ladd D . R u t h e r f o r d , a n orthopedic surgeon, in Bozeman, Montana. Claimant saw Dr.

Rutherford on two o c c a s i o n s a f t e r which D r . Rutherford advised c l a i m a n t t h a t h e would n o t d o a n y damage t o h i m s e l f by r e t u r n i n g to work but that he may have periodic back pain. Claimant

r e t u r n e d t o work w i t h t h e Anaconda Company as a b o i l e r m a k e r on or a b o u t December 1, 1 9 7 8 . C l a i m a n t c o n t i n u e d w o r k i n g u n t i l March

1 9 7 9 , when c l a i m a n t q u i t b e c a u s e of p a i n . On April 19, 1979, claimant went to work f o r Union Tank Works, Inc., i n Missoula, Montana, as a b o i l e r m a k e r . Claimant

quit work a t Union Tank Works, Inc., on S e p t e m b e r 11, 1 9 7 9 . S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , c l a i m a n t worked a t Weiss C o n s t r u c t i o n Company f o r a p e r i o d o f e i g h t d a y s and q u i t when t h e j o b w a s f i n i s h e d .

On O c t o b e r 7, 1979, c l a i m a n t began working for Refractory Construction, Inc. as a boilermaker. Claimant q u i t work on O c t o b e r 1 7 , 1 9 7 9 , b e c a u s e of l o w b a c k p a i n . On O c t o b e r 3 0 , 1 9 7 9 ,

claimant returned to Dr. Blom for treatment. Dr. Blom treated c l a i m a n t on f o u r o c c a s i o n s . On April 22, 1980, claimant went to work for Combustion

Engineering Company. Claimant was fired on April 29, 1980, because of a p e r s o n a l i t y c o n f i c t with h i s employer. On December

1 3 , 1979, c l a i m a n t w a s examined b y D r . Arnold G . Peterson, an o r t h o p e d i c s u r g e o n i n Missoula , Montana. Dr. Peterson s t a t e d , " [ h ] is h i s t o r y , [claimant's] , p h y s i c a l f i n d i n g s and x - r a y s [sic] a r e a l l f a i r l y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a musculoskeletal etiology for his back pain and I s t r o n g l y doubt that it has a neurogenic

origin." Dr. P e t e r s o n s u g g e s t e d c l a i m a n t s h o u l d s e e k work t h a t

i s less l a b o r i n t e n s i v e .

When c l a i m a n t s u b m i t t e d D r . P e t e r s o n ' s r e p o r t to t h e Anaconda Company's a d j u s t e r , it was r e q u e s t e d t h a t he be examined b y D r . John H. Avery, an orthopedic surgeon i n Great F a l l s , Montana.

Dr. A v e r y s t a t e d c l a i m a n t had s u s t a i n e d a " s o f t t i s s u e i n j u r y to

the lumbosacral spine as a r e s u l t of his a c c i d e n t of August, 1978." Dr. Avery a d v i s e d c l a i m a n t f i n d work i n an occupation w h i c h would n o t i n v o l v e e x c e s s i v e bending of h i s b a c k or h e a v y

lifting. However, the Anaconda Company still refused to pay workers c o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s t o c l a i m a n t or c l a i m a n t ' s m e d i c a l expenses. Claimant t e s t i f i e d due to Anaconda's refusal t o pay

benefits or medical expenses, claimant exhausted all of his s a v i n g s w h i c h amounted to o v e r $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 and l o s t h i s home and t w o trucks.

I n J u l y 1980, claimant petitioned t h e Workers1 Compensation C o u r t f o r p e r m a n e n t t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s , a t t o r n e y f e e s and a 20 p e r c e n t p e n a l t y f o r u n r e a s o n a b l e d e l a y and r e f u s a l to pay

benefits. The Workers C o m p e n s a t i o n C o u r t found c l a i m a n t is p e r - manently totally disabled, ordered the Anaconda Company pay

claimant's r e a s o n a b l e c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s and h e l d c l a i m a n t

was e n t i t l e d t o a 20 p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e i n award f o r u n r e a s o n a b l e

delay and refusal to pay claimant permanent total disability benefits. D e f e n d a n t , Anaconda Company, a p p e a l s t h e r u l i n g o f t h e lower c o u r t . The i s s u e s r a i s e d o n a p p e a l are a s f o l l o w s : 1. Whether the lower court erred in finding that the

claimant is p e r m a n e n t l y t o t a l l y disabled because he could not r e t u r n t o h i s f o r m e r o c c u p a t i o n as a b o i l e r m a k e r . 2. Whether there is substantial evidence to support the lower c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t could not engage i n h i s former occupation as a boilermaker since August 23, 1978. 3. W h e t h e r t h e l o w e r c o u r t e r r e d i n a w a r d i n g c l a i m a n t t h e 20 p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e f o r u n r e a s o n a b l e d e l a y and r e f u s a l to p a y bene- f i t s u n d e r s e c t i o n 39-71-2907 , MCA.

The Anaconda Company contends the lower court erred in

f i n d i n g c l a i m a n t t o be p e r m a n e n t l y t o t a l l y d i s a b l e d b e c a u s e t h e

court did not apply the s t a t u t e properly. The s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g permanent total d i s a b i l i t y is s e c t i o n 3 9 - 7 1 - 1 1 6 ( 1 3 ) , MCA, which

states:

" 'Permanent total disability means a con- d i t i o n r e s u l t i n g from i n j u r y as d e f i n e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r t h a t r e s u l t s i n t h e loss o f a c t u a l earnings o r earning capacity t h a t e x i s t s a f t e r t h e i n j u r e d w o r k e r i s as f a r r e s t o r e d a s t h e p e r m a n e n t c h a r a c t e r of t h e i n j u r i e s w i l l p e r m i t and w h i c h r e s u l t s - -e in th w o r k e r -h a v i n g - -s o n a b l e p r o s p e c t o f f i n - - no r e a d i n g r e g u l a r employment o f a n y k i n d - t h e -- h n o r m a l l a b o r - a r k e t . ~ i s a F i 1 - s m b<-s-up- m- ported by a preponderance - - of medical evidence. "- ( ~ m ~ h a s supplied. ) is The Anaconda Company a r g u e s h e r e t h e l o w e r c o u r t made no f i n d i n g that claimant had no reasonable prospect of finding regular

employment o f a n y k i n d i n t h e n o r m a l l a b o r m a r k e t and t h u s was i n

error. Instead, t h e lower c o u r t found c l a i m a n t " i s p e r m a n e n t l y

totally disabled from engaging in his normal occupation as a boilermaker. "

A l t h o u g h c l a i m a n t may n o t be able to engage i n h i s normal

occupation a s a boilermaker, t h a t d o e s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y mean t h a t c l a i m a n t h a s a permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y . The s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s

t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t h a v e no r e a s o n a b l e p r o s p e c t of f i n d i n g r e g u l a r employment of any kind in the normal l a b o r market before the c o u r t can f i n d permanent total d i s a b i l i t y . I n Dunphy v . Anaconda

Co. (1968) 1 5 1 Mont. 7 6 , 438 P.2d 660, t h i s Court h e l d , " [ t l h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e L e g i s l a t u r e m u s t f i r s t be d e t e r m i n e d from t h e

p l a i n meaning of t h e words used, and if i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the

s t a t u t e may be so d e t e r m i n e d , t h e c o u r t s may n o t go f u r t h e r and a p p l y a n y o t h e r means o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ." Claimant cites Brurud v. Judge Moving and Storage Co. &

Trans. I n s . Co. ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 2 Mont. 2 4 9 , 5 6 3 P.2d 5 5 8 , w h e r e t h i s Court held: "The s t a t u t e d o e s r e q u i r e t h a t h e h a v e no reasonable prospect of finding regular employment i n t h e n o r m a l l a b o r m a r k e t ; b u t it d o e s n o t s e t o u t t h a t h e m u s t h a v e made a r e a s o n a b l e e f f o r t to s e c u r e s u c h employment. I n some c a s e s , t h i s C o u r t c a n f o r e s e e t h e f u t i l i t y of such an e f f o r t . " 1 7 2 Mont. a t 2 5 3 , 563 P.2d a t 560. A s t h i s Court s t a t e d i n Brurud, s u p r a , i n some cases it would be futile for a claimant t o e v e n a t t e m p t to f i n d employment. In Brurud, supra, c l a i m a n t was a g e f i f t y - e i g h t a t t h e t i m e of the i n j u r y and had r e a c h e d s i x t y - t w o by t h e t i m e of t h e h e a r i n g . He

had been involved i n h e a v y l a b o r a l l of his life. The m e d i c a l

reports stated claimant was too old f o r h i s back i n j u r y t o be fused or greatly improved. However, in the present case,

c l a i m a n t was a g e t h i r t y - t w o when t h e a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d and had been trained as a mechanic and welder prior t o working as a boilermaker. Here, t h e lower c o u r t made a f i n d i n g t h a t c l a i m a n t

c o u l d n o t r e t u r n t o h i s n o r m a l o c c u p a t i o n as a b o i l e r m a k e r . The lower c o u r t d i d n o t make a f i n d i n g t h a t c l a i m a n t had no r e a s o - n a b l e p r o s p e c t of f i n d i n g r e g u l a r employment of a n y k i n d i n t h e

normal l a b o r market. T h u s , w e h o l d t h e lower c o u r t d i d n o t p r o -

perly apply section 39-71-116(13), MCA, and we remand to the l o w e r c o u r t to make a f i n d i n g o f w h e t h e r c l a i m a n t h a s no r e a s o n -

a b l e p r o s p e c t of f i n d i n g r e g u l a r employment o f any k i n d i n the

normal l a b o r market. The Anaconda Company n e x t a r g u e s t h e r e was n o t substantial

credible evidence to support the lower court's finding that c l a i m a n t c o u l d n o t e n g a g e i n h i s f o r m e r o c c u p a t i o n as a b o i l e r - maker. I n S t e f f e s v. 9 3 L e a s i n g C o . , Inc. ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 7 Mont. 8 3 ,

580 P.2d 450, t h i s Court stated: " [w] e c a n n o t s u b s t i t u t e o u r j u d g m e n t f o r t h a t o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t as t o t h e w e i g h t of t h e e v i - d e n c e on q u e s t i o n s of f a c t . Where t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e W o r k e r s 1 C o m p e n s a t i o n C o u r t , t h i s

Court cannot overturn the decision." Here, t h e g e n e r a l c o n s e n s u s

of the d o c t o r s who examined c l a i m a n t was that he should find l i g h t e r work i f he c o u l d n o t be c o m f o r t a b l e w h i l e w o r k i n g a s a boilermaker. This Court will not reverse the lower court's f i n d i n g t h a t c l a i m a n t c o u l d n o t r e t u r n t o work as a b o i l e r m a k e r ,

but again we note, t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n a l o n e does not s u p p o r t a

f i n d i n g of permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y . The n e x t i s s u e i s w h e t h e r t h e lower c o u r t e r r e d i n a w a r d i n g

c l a i m a n t t h e 20 p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e f o r u n r e a s o n a b l e d e l a y and r e f u - s a l t o p a y b e n e f i t s u n d e r s e c t i o n 39-71-2907, MCA. This section states:

"--- r e a s e - award -- u n r e a s o n a b l e d e l a y o r I n-c in -p for - r e f u s a l - -- . to pay When payment of c o m p e n s a t i o n h a s b e e n u n r e a s o n a b l y d e l a y e d o r r e f u s e d by a n i n s u r e r , e i t h e r p r i o r or s u b s e q u e n t t o t h e i s s u a n c e o f a n o r d e r by t h e w o r k e r s ' compen- s a t i o n judge g r a n t i n g a c l a i m a n t compensation b e n e f i t s , t h e f u l l amount o f t h e c o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s d u e a c l a i m a n t , b e t w e e n t h e t i m e com- p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s were d e l a y e d or r e f u s e d and t h e d a t e o f t h e o r d e r g r a n t i n g a c l a i m a n t com- p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s , may be i n c r e a s e d by t h e ." w o r k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t i o n j u d g e by 2 0 % From and after the receipt by Anaconda of Dr. Peterson's

report, buttressed b y t h e r e p o r t of Dr. Avery, Anaconda should have e n t e r t a i n e d no doubt t h a t c l a i m a n t w a s d i s a b l e d , even though it questioned t h e t o t a l e x t e n t of h i s d i s a b i l i t y . C l a i m a n t was entitled to compensation payments when the d o c t o r fs report

showed a d i s a b i l i t y . S e c t i o n 39-71-709, MCA. R e f u s a l to make compensation payments to claimant by Anaconda in the circum- s t a n c e s h e r e was u n r e a s o n a b l e , and t h e p e n a l t y p r o v i d e d i n sec-

t i o n 39-71-2907, MCA, may be a p p l i e d by t h e c o m p e n s a t i o n j u d g e to w h a t e v e r amount o f d i s a b i l i t y is e v e n t u a l l y awarded t o c l a i m a n t . Claimant is likewise entitled to costs and attorney fees

u n d e r s e c t i o n 39-71-611 , MCA.

R e v e r s e d and remanded f o r f i n d i n g s and judgment i n a c c o r d a n c e

herewith. (- - - --' I

- s t i c= - Ju e %- We concur:

Justices - 7 - Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber specially concurring: I agree with the holding of the majority opinion remanding

the cause to the Workers' Compensation Court to make a finding on the absence of a reasonable prospect of finding

regular employment of any kind in the normal labor market; and also agree with the majority conclusion that we will not reverse the lower court's finding that claimant could

not return to work as a boilermaker. I do not agree with the holding of the majority that

the twenty percent penalty allowed in section 39-71-2907, MCA, necessarily should be applied. This conclusion appears to me to be premature. We are sending the case back for determination by the court as to the extent of the disability,

and do not know whether it will turn out to be permanent or

temporary, partial or full. Under those circumstances, I do not believe it is appropriate to suggest that the reports of Drs. Peterson and Avery are sufficient to warrant applica- tion of the maximum penalty at this time. That appears particularly true in the present case where we find a large number of qualified medical experts who concluded that claimant in fact did not have a disability and was free to

go back to work as a boilermaker. Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority opinion that a finding by the Workers' Compensation Court that claimant was disabled from

performing work as a boilermaker is not sufficient to support a finding of permanent total disability. However, there is

substantial credible evidence in the record to uphold the finding of the Workers' Compensation Court that this claimant did suffer from a total disability. The majority correctly quotes section 39-71-116(13), MCA, which sets forth the definition of permanent total disability for workers' compensation purposes. That statute requires that claimant show he has no reasonable prospect of regular employment in the normal labor market.

Evidence was provided by claimant at the hearing in this matter, that claimant was unable to hold any kind of regular job due to the pain experienced by claimant. Claimant's

testimony is corroborated by testimony from a highly reputable board certified orthopedic surgeon, Arnold Peterson, showing that claimant suffered from a thirty-five percent disability.

This evidence, when combined with evidence of claimant's lack of education and inability to qualify for employment other than that of a boilermaker, provides substantial credible evidence for a finding by the Workers' Compensation Court that this claimant was permanently totally disabled.

It certainly would have been better for the Workers' Compensation Court to make a specific factual finding supporting the reason for its determination of permanent total disability. However, we can imply such a finding. In light of the fact that the Workers' Compensation Act is to be liberally construed in favor of the worker, I would imply such a finding in this situation because there is certainly evidence in the record

to uphold the determination herein made.

I concur h Justice Morrison's dissent. I