Keeling v. Social Security Administration

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Arkansas
DecidedSeptember 3, 2019
Docket2:18-cv-00139
StatusUnknown

This text of Keeling v. Social Security Administration (Keeling v. Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Keeling v. Social Security Administration, (E.D. Ark. 2019).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS EASTERN DIVISION

BECKY KEELING PLAINTIFF

V. CASE NO. 2:18-CV-139-BD

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner, Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER I. Introduction:

On August 24, 2015, Becky Marie Keeling applied for Title II disability insurance benefits, alleging disability beginning December 31, 2014. (Tr. at 15) Ms. Keeling’s claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Id. After conducting a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied her application. (Tr. at 29) Ms. Keeling requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s decision, but that request was denied. (Tr. at 1-5) Therefore, the ALJ’s decision now stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. Ms. Keeling filed this case seeking judicial review of the decision denying her benefits. II. The Commissioner’s Decision: The ALJ found that Ms. Keeling had not engaged in substantial gainful activity from her alleged onset date of December 31, 2014 through December 31, 2017, when she last met the insured status requirements. (Tr. at 17) At step two of the five-step analysis, the ALJ found that Ms. Keeling had the following severe impairments: disorder of the back and anxiety. (Tr. at 18) After finding that Ms. Keeling’s impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment, the ALJ determined that Ms. Keeling had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work, with additional limitations. (Tr. at 18-21) She could only

frequently stoop or crouch. (Id.) Also, mentally, she was limited to semi-skilled work where interpersonal contact is routine but superficial, the complexity of tasks is learned by experience, involves several variables, uses judgment within limits, and the supervision required is little for routine but detailed for non-routine tasks. (Id.) The ALJ next found that Ms. Keeling could perform her past relevant work as a

general clerk and billing clerk. (Tr. at 26-27) Relying on the testimony of a Vocational Expert (“VE”), the ALJ also found, based on Ms. Keeling’s age, education, work experience and RFC, that she could perform work in the national economy as a utility teller and food sales clerk. (Tr. at 28) Based on these findings, the ALJ held that Ms. Keeling was not disabled. (Tr. at 28-29)

III. Discussion: A. Standard of Review The Court’s role is to determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. Ash v. Colvin, 812 F.3d 686, 689 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting McNamara v. Astrue, 590 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2010)). “Substantial evidence”

in this context means “enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s conclusion.” Id. (quoting McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000)). The Court must consider not only evidence that supports the Commissioner’s decision, but also evidence that supports a contrary outcome. Id. (quoting Carlson v. Astrue, 604 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2010)). The Court cannot reverse the decision, however, “merely because substantial evidence exists for the opposite decision.” Lacroix

v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 881, 885 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Chater, 87 F.3d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir.1996)). B. Ms. Keeling’s Argument on Appeal Ms. Keeling contends that the ALJ’s decision to deny benefits is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, she argues that the ALJ erred by discounting the

opinions of treating physicians Crosby and Allen and consulting physician Webber and instead relied on the opinions of state agency physicians who did not actually examine her. (#9 at 10) After reviewing the record, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not err in denying benefits. 1. Relevant Facts

Ms. Keeling was 46 years old at the time of the hearing, and she lived alone. (Tr. at 37) She was a high school graduate and had taken some college courses. (Tr. at 37) She had past work as a secretary for her husband’s farm business, but that employment ended when she and her husband divorced. (Tr. at 40-41) She reported that she was able to care for her granddaughter occasionally and care for her pets. She reported no problem

with personal care. She went outside daily, performed simple chores, and was able to drive. (Tr. at 224-32, 255-62) Glenn Allen Cosby, M.D., diagnosed Ms. Keeling with lumbar spondylosis at L5- S1; and in November 2008, Ms. Keeling had a “[l]eft-sided L5-S1 decompressive hemilaminectomy, total fasciectomy, and total discectomy with foraminotomy.” (Tr. at

287) In appointments following her back surgery in January, March, June, and September of 2009 and in February 2010, Ms. Keeling reported to Dr. Cosby that her pain had improved. (Tr. at 292-299) Additionally, on examinations throughout this period, Dr. Cosby reported essentially normal examinations and x-rays. (Id.) At a follow-up appointment with Dr. Cosby in June 2010, Ms. Keeling reported

radicular pain; but on examination, Dr. Cosby noted that Ms. Keeling had no straight-leg pain and good fusion at L5-S1, as shown on her x-rays. (Tr. at 290) Dr. Cosby referred Ms. Keeling for a second opinion to assess whether she needed nerve root decompression surgery. (Tr. at 290) Julius Fernandez, M.D., performed a second back surgery on Ms. Keeling in 2012. Following the left L5-S1 removal of rod and decompression, Ms.

Keeling reported that she felt much better and that her left L5 pain had improved. (Tr. at 329-32, 485) Joseph E. Allen, M.D., Ms. Keeling’s primary care physician, examined her in February 2015. At that time, Ms. Keeling complained of low-back pain. On examination, Dr. Allen found Ms. Keeling to be in the same condition she was in 2013.1 Dr. Allen

diagnosed chronic left-lumbar radiculopathy and chronic anxiety. He refilled her Clonazepam and told her to lose some weight with diet and exercise. (Tr. at 376)

1 Ms. Keeling’s treatment records from 2013 are not in the transcript. Manuel F. Carro, M.D., examined Ms. Keeling in June 2015 for complaints of neuropathic pain in both lower extremities. She reported that Tramadol relieved her pain but that a transforaminal block did not help. (Tr. at 361) On examination, Dr. Carro found

that Ms. Keeling had no ankle jerks; her toes were down-going; she had no muscle spasms; and her mood and affect were stable. (Tr. at 362) Dr. Carro diagnosed left S1 radiculopathy and chronic lumbar post-laminectomy syndrome. He told Ms. Keeling to continue taking Tramadol; and he referred her to a pain clinic. (Tr. at 363) In January 2016, David Lee Webber, D.O., performed a consultative physical

examination of Ms. Keeling. (Tr. at 387) On examination, Dr. Webber noted that Ms. Keeling had normal range of motion with no swelling or tenderness in her extremities; and, spine and her straight-leg raising was negative. (Tr. 385-86) He also noted that Ms. Keeling could pick up a coin, stand or walk without an assistive device, walk on heels and toes, and squat/rise from a squatting position. He diagnosed Ms. Keeling with low

back pain due to multiple surgeries, irritable bowel syndrome, depression, and fibromyalgia. He opined that she was severely limited in her ability to walk, stand, sit, lift, and carry. (Tr. at 387) Kenneth B.

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Keeling v. Social Security Administration, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/keeling-v-social-security-administration-ared-2019.