Keating v. Mason
This text of 2013 Ark. App. 477 (Keating v. Mason) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Cite as 2013 Ark. App. 477
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION III No. CV-13-93
Opinion Delivered SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 MARY KEATING and KEATING FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP APPEAL FROM THE UNION APPELLANTS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. CV-08-5-6] V. HONORABLE DAVID F. GUTHRIE, FANNY E. MASON ET AL. JUDGE APPELLEES DISMISSED
BILL H. WALMSLEY, Judge
Appellant Mary Keating, as general partner of the Keating Family Limited Partnership,
filed suit to establish an easement across timberland owned by appellees, heirs of W.E. Mason.
Following a bench trial, the trial court denied the easement sought by the Keatings along the
eastern side of the Masons’ property. However, the trial court granted an easement along the
western side of the Masons’ property. The Keatings now argue that they proved the existence
of an easement on the eastern side of the property that had not been extinguished or
abandoned and that the easement granted crossed a third party’s property. We must dismiss
the appeal, however, for lack of a final order.
In dismissing this appeal, we rely on Petrus v. Nature Conservancy, 330 Ark. 722, 957
S.W.2d 688 (1997), and its progeny. In Petrus, the supreme court held that the trial court’s
order was not final because it did not describe the property awarded with sufficient specificity
that it could be identified solely by reference to that order. The order contemplated a future Cite as 2013 Ark. App. 477
survey. We have followed Petrus in dismissing appeals where property is not adequately
described and the record does not contain sufficient evidence to permit the trial court to set
forth the specific description of the property without further proceedings. See, e.g., Strange
v. Mary K. Reed Trust, 2012 Ark. App. 592; Dohle v. Duffield, 2011 Ark. App. 135; Greenway
Land Co. v. Hinchey, 2010 Ark. App. 330; Penland v. Johnston, 97 Ark. App. 11, 242 S.W.3d
635 (2006).
In other cases with deficient property descriptions, dismissal is not necessary. When
nothing remains to be done, we have decided the merits and remanded for the inclusion of
a more specific legal description in the order. See, e.g., Rice v. Whiting, 248 Ark. 592, 452
S.W.2d 842 (1970); Boyster v. Shoemake, 101 Ark. App. 148, 272 S.W.3d 139 (2008); Adams
v. Atkins, 97 Ark. App. 328, 249 S.W.3d 166 (2007); Jennings v. Burford, 60 Ark. App. 27, 958
S.W.2d 12 (1997). The orders in these cases all referenced existing surveys.
Here, the trial court granted the Keatings a “right of easement across the land of Mason
in the NE1/4 of Section 22, Township 18 South, Range 17 West in Union County,
Arkansas.” There is no survey or other evidence in the record that would establish the exact
location of the easement without further proceedings. Thus, this case is governed by the
Petrus line of cases. Accordingly, we hold that the order is not final and dismiss the appeal
without prejudice.
Dismissed.
GLADWIN, C.J., and HARRISON, J., agree. Thomas & Hickey, L.L.P., by: Floyd M. Thomas, Jr., for appellants. Burbank, Dodson & Barker, PLLC, by: Gary R. Burbank, for appellees.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
2013 Ark. App. 477, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/keating-v-mason-arkctapp-2013.