STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. AP 20-37
Harry A. Keates, et al
V. DECISION
Town of Freeport
Harry A Keates and Robin Silverman appeal a decision of the Town of Freeport's Coastal
Waters Commission ("CWC").
Petitioners own property abutting Kelsey Brook, a tidal stream. By ordinance, the CWC
has authority to approve or disapprove wharves or docks in any of the Town's tidal waters. The
Petitioners proposed a dock and float system extending out into the tidal zone. The dock would be
located at the upper limit of the tidal waters where the stream was somewhat small and narrow.
The property is in the vicinity of a nature preserve. There was testimony that although it was
buffered, there were locations in the nature preserve where the applicant's wharf would be visible.
Otherwise, the views from the preserve were "pristine."
The Petitioners obtained approval from obtained approval from the Army Corps of
Engineers and the state Department of Environmental Protection. Although the history is
convoluted, the CWC ultimately held a hearing on the application.
The Town ordinance requires that anyone building a dock or wharf on tidal waters obtain
approval from the CWC. R 266 The ordinance contains several standards that the CWC is to
apply when considering whether to approve a project. Of the eight standards, the CWC found
that the Petitioners did not meet one of the standards when rejecting the application.
1 The project shall be no larger in dimension than is consistent with the conditions, use and character of its surroundings; it will not adversely affect water use by adjacent properties; and will remain in general harmony with that of existing activities in adjacent areas within the Freeport Coastal Water Commission's jurisdiction. The property for which the project will be constructed shall have a minimum of 60 feet of water frontage. The length from the highest annual tide water mark shall not exceed 125' and must be completed within two years of final approval.
R266.
The CWC denied the permit and cited two of the clauses in that standard. The Decision
stated that the application was denied because:
1. "The dimension of the proposed Wharf was not consistent with the conditions use and character of its surroundings." 2. "The proposed wharf was not be (sic) in general harmony with that of existing activities in adjacent areas."
There was no other explanation or finding of fact. R. 249.
A. Sufficient Findings ofFact.
When the Board's findings of fact are insufficient, the court should remand for further
findings of fact to allow for meaningful judicial review. The appellate court should not "imply
findings or create an analytical constrnct that we would then attribute to a municipal decision
maker." Fissmer v. Town ofCape Elizabeth, 2017 ME 195, ,r 17; see also Appletree Cottage
LLC v. Town ofCape Elizabeth, 2017 ME 177, ,r 9; Christian Fellowship & Renewal Ctr v.
Town ofLimington., 2001 ME 16, ,r,r 12-18. A failure to make proper finding of facts, however,
does not result in an automatic remand. Christian Fellowship, ,r 19. A remand is not necessary
when the findings may be easily infen-ed from the record. Id. When there is sufficient evidence
in the record, the municipal agency's decision may be supported by implicit factfinding. Old
Town v. Expera Old Town, LLC, 2021 ME 23, ,r 22; Town ofMinot v. Starbird, 2012 ME 25,
,r11, n.4; Wells v. Portland Yacht Club, 2001 ME 20, ,r,r 10-11, all citing Forester v. City of
2 Westbrook, 604 A.2d 31, 33 (Me. 1992). 1 When the agency's findings of fact are insufficient to
apprise us of the basis of the agency's decision and whether it is supported by substantial
evidence, the court should remand to the agency for further findings of fact. Christian
Fellowship, 2001 ME 16, ,r,r 10, 14.
Here, the court finds that the paucity of any findings of fact requires that the court
remand to ewe for findings of fact sufficient to allow "meaningful judicial review." While the
court has reviewed the reasoning outlined in the Town's Brief, it is the ewe that needs to
explain why the dimensions of the wharf violate the ordinance, which are the type of findings
that can rarely be easily inferred.
3. Constitutionality
The Petitioner argues that the ordinance requirement that the proposed wharf be "in
general harmony" provision is impermissibly vague and therefore constitutes an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority to the ewe. 2 To do this analysis, the court compares the
language of the Town's ordinance with the language that the Law Court has found
unconstitutional on the same grounds in other cases.
In Kosalka, the Comt struck down an ordinance where the Town required the project to
"conserve natural beauty." Kosalka v. Town a/Georgetown, 2000 ME 106, ifl7. In Cope, the
Law eomt held a requirement that an ordinance's requirement that a project "will not adversely
affect the health, safety, or general welfare of the public" and "will not tend to devaluate or alter
1 The court declines the take up the Petitioner's invitation to suggest Christian Fellowship overruled Forester. The Law Court's continued reference to both lines of cases suggests that while the Law Court has stated a strong preference for a robust finding of fact by the municipality, a court may still rely on an assumption that the Board implicitly found facts that are supported in the record. See, Wells, ,r,r 10, 11 (citing both Christian Fellowship and Forester). 2 The Petitioners do not address, and nor does the court, whether the "dimensions" clause in unconstitutional.
3 the essential characteristics of the sunounding property." Cope v. Inhabitants ofBrunswick, 464
A.2d 223,227 (Me. 1983).
In Wake/in v. Town ofYarmouth, 523 A.2d 575,576 (Me.1987), the court struck down a
zoning ordinance that gave zoning board of appeals the discretion to deny special exception
applications because the proposed use was not "compatible with existing uses in the
neighborhood, with respect to physical size, visual impact, intensity of use, proximity to other
structures and density of development." Id.
While "intensity of use," like "dimension" can be measured, the Law Court rejected the
ordinance because it failed "to articulate the quantitative standards necessary to transform the
unmeasured qualities 'intensity of use' and 'density of development' into specific criteria
objectively useable by both the Board and the applicant." 523 A.2d at 577. "Without such
specific objective criteria, the ZBA was 'free to express a legislative-type opinion about what is
appropriate for the community." Kosalka, 114, quoting Wake/in, 523 A.2d at 577.
Comparing the Town's ordinance to the language found in Kosalka, Cope, and Wake/in,
the "general harmony" clause does not provide either the applicant or the agency with sufficient
guidance as to what is acceptable. The court agrees that the "general harmony" clause is
impermissibly vague and is unconstitutional.
The Town cites the Law Court's approval of language allowing the Board of
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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. AP 20-37
Harry A. Keates, et al
V. DECISION
Town of Freeport
Harry A Keates and Robin Silverman appeal a decision of the Town of Freeport's Coastal
Waters Commission ("CWC").
Petitioners own property abutting Kelsey Brook, a tidal stream. By ordinance, the CWC
has authority to approve or disapprove wharves or docks in any of the Town's tidal waters. The
Petitioners proposed a dock and float system extending out into the tidal zone. The dock would be
located at the upper limit of the tidal waters where the stream was somewhat small and narrow.
The property is in the vicinity of a nature preserve. There was testimony that although it was
buffered, there were locations in the nature preserve where the applicant's wharf would be visible.
Otherwise, the views from the preserve were "pristine."
The Petitioners obtained approval from obtained approval from the Army Corps of
Engineers and the state Department of Environmental Protection. Although the history is
convoluted, the CWC ultimately held a hearing on the application.
The Town ordinance requires that anyone building a dock or wharf on tidal waters obtain
approval from the CWC. R 266 The ordinance contains several standards that the CWC is to
apply when considering whether to approve a project. Of the eight standards, the CWC found
that the Petitioners did not meet one of the standards when rejecting the application.
1 The project shall be no larger in dimension than is consistent with the conditions, use and character of its surroundings; it will not adversely affect water use by adjacent properties; and will remain in general harmony with that of existing activities in adjacent areas within the Freeport Coastal Water Commission's jurisdiction. The property for which the project will be constructed shall have a minimum of 60 feet of water frontage. The length from the highest annual tide water mark shall not exceed 125' and must be completed within two years of final approval.
R266.
The CWC denied the permit and cited two of the clauses in that standard. The Decision
stated that the application was denied because:
1. "The dimension of the proposed Wharf was not consistent with the conditions use and character of its surroundings." 2. "The proposed wharf was not be (sic) in general harmony with that of existing activities in adjacent areas."
There was no other explanation or finding of fact. R. 249.
A. Sufficient Findings ofFact.
When the Board's findings of fact are insufficient, the court should remand for further
findings of fact to allow for meaningful judicial review. The appellate court should not "imply
findings or create an analytical constrnct that we would then attribute to a municipal decision
maker." Fissmer v. Town ofCape Elizabeth, 2017 ME 195, ,r 17; see also Appletree Cottage
LLC v. Town ofCape Elizabeth, 2017 ME 177, ,r 9; Christian Fellowship & Renewal Ctr v.
Town ofLimington., 2001 ME 16, ,r,r 12-18. A failure to make proper finding of facts, however,
does not result in an automatic remand. Christian Fellowship, ,r 19. A remand is not necessary
when the findings may be easily infen-ed from the record. Id. When there is sufficient evidence
in the record, the municipal agency's decision may be supported by implicit factfinding. Old
Town v. Expera Old Town, LLC, 2021 ME 23, ,r 22; Town ofMinot v. Starbird, 2012 ME 25,
,r11, n.4; Wells v. Portland Yacht Club, 2001 ME 20, ,r,r 10-11, all citing Forester v. City of
2 Westbrook, 604 A.2d 31, 33 (Me. 1992). 1 When the agency's findings of fact are insufficient to
apprise us of the basis of the agency's decision and whether it is supported by substantial
evidence, the court should remand to the agency for further findings of fact. Christian
Fellowship, 2001 ME 16, ,r,r 10, 14.
Here, the court finds that the paucity of any findings of fact requires that the court
remand to ewe for findings of fact sufficient to allow "meaningful judicial review." While the
court has reviewed the reasoning outlined in the Town's Brief, it is the ewe that needs to
explain why the dimensions of the wharf violate the ordinance, which are the type of findings
that can rarely be easily inferred.
3. Constitutionality
The Petitioner argues that the ordinance requirement that the proposed wharf be "in
general harmony" provision is impermissibly vague and therefore constitutes an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority to the ewe. 2 To do this analysis, the court compares the
language of the Town's ordinance with the language that the Law Court has found
unconstitutional on the same grounds in other cases.
In Kosalka, the Comt struck down an ordinance where the Town required the project to
"conserve natural beauty." Kosalka v. Town a/Georgetown, 2000 ME 106, ifl7. In Cope, the
Law eomt held a requirement that an ordinance's requirement that a project "will not adversely
affect the health, safety, or general welfare of the public" and "will not tend to devaluate or alter
1 The court declines the take up the Petitioner's invitation to suggest Christian Fellowship overruled Forester. The Law Court's continued reference to both lines of cases suggests that while the Law Court has stated a strong preference for a robust finding of fact by the municipality, a court may still rely on an assumption that the Board implicitly found facts that are supported in the record. See, Wells, ,r,r 10, 11 (citing both Christian Fellowship and Forester). 2 The Petitioners do not address, and nor does the court, whether the "dimensions" clause in unconstitutional.
3 the essential characteristics of the sunounding property." Cope v. Inhabitants ofBrunswick, 464
A.2d 223,227 (Me. 1983).
In Wake/in v. Town ofYarmouth, 523 A.2d 575,576 (Me.1987), the court struck down a
zoning ordinance that gave zoning board of appeals the discretion to deny special exception
applications because the proposed use was not "compatible with existing uses in the
neighborhood, with respect to physical size, visual impact, intensity of use, proximity to other
structures and density of development." Id.
While "intensity of use," like "dimension" can be measured, the Law Court rejected the
ordinance because it failed "to articulate the quantitative standards necessary to transform the
unmeasured qualities 'intensity of use' and 'density of development' into specific criteria
objectively useable by both the Board and the applicant." 523 A.2d at 577. "Without such
specific objective criteria, the ZBA was 'free to express a legislative-type opinion about what is
appropriate for the community." Kosalka, 114, quoting Wake/in, 523 A.2d at 577.
Comparing the Town's ordinance to the language found in Kosalka, Cope, and Wake/in,
the "general harmony" clause does not provide either the applicant or the agency with sufficient
guidance as to what is acceptable. The court agrees that the "general harmony" clause is
impermissibly vague and is unconstitutional.
The Town cites the Law Court's approval of language allowing the Board of
Environmental to consider the impact of a project on nearby scenic and aesthetic uses in Uliano
v. Board ofEnvironmental Protection, 2009 ME 89, 129. In Uliano, however, the Law Court
specifically distinguished Kosalka and Wake/in on the grounds that Uliano interpreted a state
statute as opposed to municipal ordinances. Id. 1126-28. Therefore, Uliano provides the Town
with no assistance.
4 The Town argues that the court should not reach the constitutionality issue because it
could find that the CWC found facts necessary to support its decision in reliance on the
"dimensions" clause without relying on the "general harmony" clause. The CWC' s decision
cited both provisions. The court cannot, however, without any findings of fact or conclusions of
law, determine whether the CWC's decision was, or can be, based on the "dimensions" clause
alone.
On remand, the CWC would need to make findings of fact to determine whether the
CWC's findings show that the project violated the "dimensions" clause.
It is ordered: The decision of the CWC is REMANDED for further findings as described
herein.
This Order is incorporated on the docket by reference pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 79(a).
Thomas R. McKeon Justice, Maine Superior Court