Keandre Arnold v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 20, 2015
• Docket: 49A02-1407-CR-500
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Apr 20 2015, 9:37 am Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Victoria L. Bailey Gregory F. Zoeller Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana Jesse R. Drum Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Keandre Arnold, April 20, 2015

Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1407-CR-500 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court. The Honorable Kurt M. Eisgruber, State of Indiana, Judge. Appellee-Plaintiff. Cause No. 49G01-1305-FA-35062

Barteau, Senior Judge

Statement of the Case [1] Keandre Arnold appeals the sentence he received for his convictions of

attempted murder, a Class A felony, Indiana Code sections 35-42-1-1 (2007)

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1407-CR-500 |April 20, 2015 Page 1 of 5 and 35-41-5-1 (1977), and invasion of privacy, a Class A misdemeanor, Indiana

Code section 35-46-1-15.1 (2010). We affirm.

Issue [2] Arnold presents one issue for our review, which we restate as: whether the trial

court abused its discretion in sentencing Arnold.

Facts and Procedural History [3] In May 2013, Arnold shot a gun at Aaron Coats in an attempt to kill Coats.

Based upon this incident, Arnold was charged with attempted murder and

invasion of privacy. The trial court sentenced Arnold to forty years on the

attempted murder conviction and 365 days on the invasion of privacy

conviction, to be served concurrent with the forty years. The final four years of

Arnold’s sentence were to be served in a community corrections program.

Arnold now appeals his sentence.

Discussion and Decision [4] Arnold contends the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to an

aggregate forty-year sentence. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound

discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of

discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g,

875 N.E.2d 218 (2007). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or

the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1407-CR-500 |April 20, 2015 Page 2 of 5 When imposing a sentence for a felony, a trial court must enter a sentencing

statement including reasonably detailed reasons for imposing a particular

sentence. Id. at 491. A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to issue a

sentencing statement, gives reasons for imposing a sentence that are not

supported by the record, omits reasons clearly supported by the record and

advanced for consideration, or considers reasons that are improper as a matter

of law. Id. at 490-91. Remand for resentencing may be appropriate if we

cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same

sentence had it properly considered the reasons supported by the record. Id. at

491.

[5] Arnold alleges that error occurred when a factor that is improper as a matter of

law was considered in determining his sentence. Specifically, he claims the trial

court abused its discretion by finding as an aggravating circumstance the fact

that he fired a gun into a home. At sentencing, the trial court remarked that

“shots were fired at that residence. That’s huge. It’s a huge aggravator in your

instance.” Tr. p. 177. Arnold argues this is an improper aggravating

circumstance because it constitutes a material element of the offense of

attempted murder.

[6] The nature and circumstances of an offense is a proper aggravating factor.

McCann v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Ind. 2001). Arnold is correct, though,

that a factor constituting a material element of an offense may not be used as an

aggravating circumstance. See Spears v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1161, 1167 (Ind.

2000). However, when the trial court evaluates the nature and circumstances of

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1407-CR-500 |April 20, 2015 Page 3 of 5 an offense, it may properly consider the particularized circumstances of the

factual elements as an aggravating factor. McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584,

589-90 (Ind. 2007).

[7] In order to convict Arnold of attempted murder, the State had to prove that he

intentionally took a substantial step toward killing Coats by shooting a handgun

at him. See Appellant’s App. p. 22; see also Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-1, 35-41-5-1.

The evidence at trial showed that at the time of this incident, Coats was at

home with his girlfriend and her three daughters. The interior wood door was

open but an exterior storm door closed the house to the outside. Through the

storm door, the girls saw someone approaching the house. Coats went to the

door and a man asked for one of the girls. Arnold then appeared, said

“Remember me? I’m gonna kill ya,” and began shooting. Tr. p. 62. Coats saw

the gun and told his family to run. Bullets entered the exterior of the home and

exited into the interior of the home, and one bullet pierced the couch in the

living room where the three girls had been sitting.

[8] In sentencing Arnold, the trial court relied on the danger created by firing a gun

into a room full of people as it considered the unique circumstances of this

offense. This finding is supported by the evidence and is a proper comment

upon the nature and circumstances of Arnold’s offense. See Hape v. State, 903

N.E.2d 977, 1001-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that trial court did not abuse

its discretion in recognizing danger posed to community during car chase as

aggravating circumstance in sentencing for offense of resisting law

enforcement), trans. denied. Thus, the trial court did not err in finding as an

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1407-CR-500 |April 20, 2015 Page 4 of 5 aggravating circumstance the fact that shots were fired into a room full of

people.

[9] Moreover, additional aggravating factors exist to support Arnold’s enhanced

sentence. At sentencing, the trial court stated that “[t]he aggravators clearly

overwhelm the mitigators.” Tr. p. 177. The court then discussed the

aggravating circumstances, beginning with the fact that Arnold cut off his home

detention ankle monitor just days before he attacked Coats, who was also the

victim in Arnold’s previous case. The court labeled this a “worst case scenario”

and then turned to Arnold’s juvenile record, which it stated was another “huge

aggravator” and that Arnold had “built quite a record” for being only eighteen.

Id. Thus, given the severity of the additional aggravators, we are not persuaded

that the trial court would have imposed a different sentence even in the absence

of the aggravating circumstance of firing a gun into a room full of people.

Conclusion [10] For the reasons stated, we conclude the trial court did not err in finding

Arnold’s act of firing a gun into a room full of people as an aggravating

circumstance when it determined his sentence upon his convictions of

attempted murder and invasion of privacy.

[11] Affirmed.

[12] Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1407-CR-500 |April 20, 2015 Page 5 of 5