Kean v. United States

20 C.C.P.A. 388, 1933 CCPA LEXIS 7
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJanuary 23, 1933
DocketNo. 3575
StatusPublished

This text of 20 C.C.P.A. 388 (Kean v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kean v. United States, 20 C.C.P.A. 388, 1933 CCPA LEXIS 7 (ccpa 1933).

Opinion

Bland, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

In this appeal the importer, appellant, challenges the correctness of the decision and judgment of the United States Customs Court, First Division, in overruling appellant’s protests against the action of the collector in levying certain duties on rugs imported from Canada. The rugs were imported in 1921 and 1922 after the antidumping provision (being a part of the Emergency Tariff Act of 1921) became effective. The entries were made under the Tariff Act of 1913. The merchandise covered by the entries came within the terms of T. D. 39032, which was a finding by the Secretary of the Treasury, under said antidumping act, section 291 (a), of rug dumping from Canada into the United States.

This appeal involves five protests, under each of which were a number of entries, and which are particularly set out under schedule “A” in appellant’s petition for review. In this court, appellant abandoned the protests as to entry 92 in protest 365845-G and entry 394 in protest 365887-G.

The appraisements in the several entries involved were made in the early part of the year 1924, and from some of such appraisements, appeals were taken by the importer, which appeals were dismissed for want of samples.

This court in United States v. Tower & Sons, 14 Ct. Cust. Appls. 421, T. D. 42058, in March, 1927, held appraisements and liquidations of customs officials, upon entries of rugs from Canada, which appraise-ments and liquidations were made in pursuance of T. D. 39032, supra, to be void, since the finding of dumping by the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury delegated to the special agent in charge at New York certain duties which the Secretary should have performed himself.

In 1929 the collector liquidated the entries at bar. He levied certain duties provided for in the rug provision of the tariff act of 1913 and certain additional duties but levied no antidumping duties.

It is claimed by the importer (and the case was argued on that theory here) that the collector liquidated upon a value found in accordance with the requirements of the antidumping act.

[390]*390The following is the substance of the importer's protests in all the entries:

Protest is hereby made against your liquidation of the following entries:
# % # * # *
We claim that duty should have been assessed either on the entered value or on the appraised value, without additional duty, as the appeals to reappraisement were taken under the provisions of the Emergency Act of 1921, in view of the statement made in notices of appraisement “being subject to a dumping duty section 202, E. T.” — under T. D. 39032. The finding of the Secretary of the Treasury in T. D. 39032 having been held to be void, the dumping appraisement and reappraisement are likewise void.

The court below questioned whether the protest raised the question of the validity of the appraisement but discussed at length the question of whether the appraisements were invalidated on account of the lack of designation of samples. It held the appraisements and the liquidations thereon valid and overruled the protests, one judge dissenting.

We think the protests are sufficient to raise the question as to the effect upon the validity of the liquidations, which the action of the appraiser in appraising in pursuance of the antidumping act would have thereon. In view of our conclusions herein we do not need to determine whether they are sufficient to raise the question as to the effect of the failure by the collector to designate sufficient samples.

The court below held that there was no appraisement made under the antidumping statute and that—

The addition to the entries indicates conclusively that the merchandise was appraised under paragraph M of section 3 of that act.

The Government in its supplementary brief here merely states that—

It is further to be noted that there is no proof in the record that the value found by the appraiser was not the proper market value as required by paragraph E, and there is no evidence that said value was not the market value regardless of its method of determination.

As pertinent to our discussion we here copy certain provisions of the antidumping act:

Sec. 202. (a) That in the case of all imported merchandise, whether dutiable or free of duty, of a class or kind as to which the Secretary has made public a finding as provided in section 201, and as to which the appraiser or person acting as appraiser has made no appraisement report to the collector before such finding has been so made public, if the purchase price or the exporter’s sales price is less than the foreign market value (or, in the absence of such value, than the cost of production) there shall be levied, collected, and paid, in addition to the duties imposed thereon by law, a special dumping duty in an amount equal to such difference. (Italics ours.)
Sec. 205. That for the purposes of this title the foreign market value of imported merchandise shall be the price, at the time of exportation of such merchandise to the United States, at which such or similar merchandise is sold [391]*391or freely offered for sale to all purchasers in the principal markets of the country from which exported, in the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of trade for home consumption (or, if not so sold or offered for sale for home consumption, then for exportation to countries other than the United States), plus, when not included in such price, the cost of all containers and coverings, and all other costs, charges, and expenses incident to placing the merchandise in condition packed ready for shipment to the United States, except that in the ease of merchandise purchased or agreed to be purchased by the person by whom or for whose account the merchandise is imported, prior to the time of exportation, the foreign market value shall be ascertained as of the date of such purchase or agreement to purchase. In the ascertainment of foreign market value for the purposes of this title no pretended sale or offer for sale, and no sale or offer for sale intended to establish a fictitious market, shall be taken into account.
Sec. 206. That for the purposes of this title the cost of production of imported merchandise shall be the sum of—
(1) The cost of materials of, and of fabrication, manipulation, or other process employed in manufacturing or producing, identical or substantially identical merchandise, at a time preceding the date of shipment of the particular merchandise under consideration which would ordinarily permit the manufacture or production of the particular merchandise under consideration in the usual course of business;
(2) The usual general expenses (not less than 10 per centum of such cost) in the case of identical or substantially identical merchandise;
(3) The cost of all containers and coverings, and all other costs, charges, and expenses incident to placing the particular merchandise under consideration in condition, packed ready for shipment to the United States; and

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Related

United States v. Tower & Sons
14 Ct. Cust. 421 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1927)
United States v. Murphy
16 Ct. Cust. 461 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1929)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
20 C.C.P.A. 388, 1933 CCPA LEXIS 7, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kean-v-united-states-ccpa-1933.