Keach v. Chadwick

14 R.I. 571, 1884 R.I. LEXIS 59

• Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
• Decided: December 2, 1884
• Status: Published

Opinion

Pee Curiam.

The receiver of an in sob vent debtor under Pub. Stat. R. I. cap. 237, § 13, is required to “ take possession of all the property, evidences of property, books, papers, debts, choses in action, and estate of every kind of the debtor,” &c., . . . “ excepting so much of said estate and property, other than bills of exchange and negotiable promissory notes, as is or shall be exempted from attachment by law.” We think the receiver is entitled by this language to a patent right belonging to the debtor. We do not think a patent right is within the exception; for though not liable to attachment, on account of its intangible or incorporeal character, it is not “ exempted from attachment by law,” within the meaning of the statute. The exemption meant is exemption by statute. The phrase “except what is exempted (or exempt) from attachment by law ” is used, and has long been used, in the assignment, oath, and certificate prescribed in the provisions for the relief of poor debtors, and it has always, so far as we know, been construed as covering only statutory exemptions.

The court is authorized by § 13 to order the debtor “ to do whatever may be necessary and proper to carry this chapter into effect, and all proceedings therein or thereunder shall be in accordance with the course of equity.” The court is therefore empowered to order the debtor to convey the patent right to the receiver, if such conveyance is necessary and proper to give the receiver full dominion over it. In Ashcroft v. Walworth, 1 Holmes, 152, it was decided in the Circuit Court, Shepley, J., delivering judgment, that the legal title in a patent right belonging to an insolvent debtor did not pass to his assignee in insolvency by the assignment made by a judge of probate and insolvency under the insolvency law in Massachusetts, though the assignee was entitled to the patent right under the'law and could compel an assignment by the debtor. The ground of the decision is that the act of Congress requires that the assignment shall be by an instrument in writing, to be recorded in the Patent Office. The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Ager v. Murray, 15 Otto, 126, seems to import that the instrument in writing may be made by some person appointed for that purpose by the court. Even if that be so, we do not think it will prevent our requiring the assignment from the debtor. Let a decree be entered directing a conveyance or assignment as prayed.

Bollin Mathewson, for petitioner. Stephen A. Cooke, Jun., S? Louis L. Angelí, contra.