Rel: October 17, 2025
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________
CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105 _________________________
K.C.M.
v.
Madison County Department of Human Resources
Appeals from Madison Juvenile Court (JU-22-46.02, JU-22-47.02, JU-22-48.02, JU-22-49.02, and JU-23-448.02)
FRIDY, Judge.
K.C.M. ("the mother"), appeals from five substantively identical
judgments of the Madison Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court")
terminating her parental rights to D.M.B., Jr., who was born in
November 2014; J.T.M., who was born in May 2017; C.K.B. and T.K.B., CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
twins who were born in May 2018; and S.M.M., who was born in May
2019.1 For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse the juvenile court's
judgments.
Background
On June 5, 2024, the Madison County Department of Human
Resources ("DHR") filed separate petitions seeking to terminate the
parental rights of the mother to D.M.B., Jr., J.T.M., C.K.B., T.K.B., and
S.M.M. ("the children"). The juvenile court scheduled a bench trial in
each case for August 20, 2024. On August 8, 2024, DHR filed in each case
a motion to continue the bench trial in which it asserted that it needed
time to complete a psychological assessment and a parenting assessment
of the mother. It indicated that it had scheduled those assessments with
Dr. Barry Wood for September 14, 2024. The juvenile court granted
1The judgments also terminated the parental rights of D.M.B., Sr.
("the father"), the legal father of D.M.B., Jr., C.K.B., T.K.B., and S.M.M. At the time of trial, the father was incarcerated following his conviction for attempted sodomy of a child and was serving a sentence with a mandatory minimum release date of July 2032. The father did not appeal the judgments terminating his parental rights, so our recitation of the evidence is limited to the evidence pertaining solely to the mother. The father of J.T.M. is unknown; his name does not appear on J.T.M.'s birth certificate, and the mother did not provide the name of any alleged father of J.T.M. 2 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
DHR's motions to continue and set the bench trial in the cases for
December 3, 2024.
The mother did not appear for her psychological assessment with
Dr. Wood on September 14, 2024. The assessment was rescheduled and
conducted on November 13, 2024. Dr. Wood completed his report of the
assessment on December 2, 2024, the day before the scheduled bench
trial.
On December 2, 2024, the mother filed in each case a motion to
continue the trial in which she asserted, among other things, that,
although she had completed the psychological assessment, the results of
that assessment had not yet been made available. She argued that her
counsel needed additional time to confer with her and to review the
assessment results in preparation for the trial. However, she effectively
withdrew those motions at the beginning of the trial the next day when
her attorney received a copy of the report of the assessment and indicated
that she had reviewed that report with the mother and was prepared to
proceed with the trial.
Lisa Sutter, a DHR caseworker assigned to the matter on March
17, 2022, testified at the trial that DHR first became involved with the
3 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
mother and D.M.B., Jr., J.T.M., C.K.B., and T.K.B. in November 2021
when the mother was operating a vehicle in which the four children were
occupants and crashed the vehicle into a trash can. The mother tested
positive for alcohol and marijuana at the scene of the accident, was
arrested, and was transported, along with the four children, to the
hospital for treatment. Sutter explained that the four children were
subsequently placed with their maternal grandmother and their
maternal grandfather pursuant to a safety plan. According to Sutter,
S.M.M. was not placed with the maternal grandparents under that safety
plan because, she said, DHR was not aware of the existence of S.M.M.
and did not become aware of her existence until April 2023, when, she
said, she learned that the mother had executed a written agreement
pursuant to which she had agreed for D.M., a maternal aunt of the
children, to care for S.M.M.
Sutter testified that the safety plan with the maternal
grandparents failed when the maternal grandparents twice tested
positive for marijuana. In February 2022, a second safety plan was
implemented, pursuant to which the four oldest children were placed
with Z.M., a maternal aunt of the children, B.M., a maternal uncle of the
4 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
children, and D.M. At some point, that placement failed after Z.M. tested
positive for marijuana and D.M. failed to submit to a drug screen within
a required period DHR had set. The four children were then placed in
foster care in Huntsville, where they remained at the time of the
termination-of-parental-rights trial.
Evidence in the record indicates that, in February 2022, D.M.B.,
Jr., was placed with one foster parent, and J.T.M., C.K.B., and T.K.B.
were placed with another foster parent, R.N. In July 2022, the four
children were all placed with R.N. In March 2023, D.M.B., Jr., and J.T.M.
("the sons") were placed with their paternal great-aunt and great-uncle
in McCalla, with the stated goal being placement of C.K.B. and T.K.B. in
that home if the transition with the sons proved successful. On April 19,
2023, however, the paternal great-aunt and great-uncle contacted DHR
and requested that the sons be removed from their care; the sons were
returned to Huntsville. Although the record is unclear whether they
reentered R.N.'s care or were placed in another foster home, testimony
from the children's guardian ad litem indicates that C.K.B. and T.K.B.
were removed from R.N.'s home and placed with their current foster
5 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
parent, B.H., with whom they have remained for approximately three
years.
According to Sutter, when DHR learned of the existence of S.M.M.
on April 25, 2023, DHR considered placing her with D.M. and Z.M. under
a safety plan; however, she said, D.M. tested positive for marijuana and
Z.M. failed to submit to a drug screen. Despite repeated efforts to work
with D.M. as a relative-placement option, D.M. tested positive for
marijuana on two additional occasions. The guardian ad litem testified
that S.M.M. was then placed with B.H., and she remained in that
placement at the time of the trial.
Sutter testified that DHR initially attempted to place the children
together, but, she said, DHR was unable to locate a foster home that could
accommodate all five. At the time of the termination-of-parental-rights
trial, the sons were placed with L.G., and C.K.B., T.K.B., and S.M.M.
("the daughters") were placed with B.H. Both Sutter and the guardian ad
litem confirmed that the daughters share a bond with B.H. The guardian
ad litem further testified that B.H. was willing to adopt the daughters.
Sutter confirmed that the sons recently had been placed with L.G.
and that they had known him since March or April 2024. Sutter and L.G.
6 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
testified that L.G. provided respite care for D.M.B., Jr., when he had had
his tonsils removed, during which time the sons stayed at L.G.'s house
for most of the day and then returned to their foster parent's house at
night because the foster parent was unable to care for the sons during
the day. L.G. further testified that the sons are familiar with his siblings
and his parents, that he intends to adopt the sons, and that they share a
bond with him.
Sutter testified that DHR conducted a total of 18 individualized-
service-plan ("ISP") meetings with the mother between January 10, 2022,
and December 2, 2024. At the initial ISP meeting, the mother was
required to complete a drug assessment with Aletheia House, to
participate in color-code drug testing, to complete parenting classes, and
to attend weekly supervised visitation with the children. At the February
8, 2022, ISP meeting, DHR agreed to provide the mother "Medicaid
Rehab Services." By February 18, 2022, the ISP notes reflect that the
mother was participating in intensive outpatient drug-rehabilitation
classes with Aletheia House and in parenting classes; DHR agreed to
provide bus passes, "transportation and sitter service," and assistance
7 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
with a "housing program and letter." Sutter testified that the mother
completed the required parenting class in February 2022.
Sutter further testified that DHR identified stable housing and
employment as additional concerns affecting the mother's ability to
parent. At the March 17, 2022, ISP meeting, the mother's ISP was
amended to include obtaining stable housing and employment.
Additional services were added as ISP meetings progressed. At the June
2022 ISP meeting, the mother agreed to participate in counseling and in-
home services, and DHR agreed to assign Donnie Thompson, a DHR
service provider, to provide those services; DHR also agreed to provide
gas vouchers to assist the mother with attending her appointments at
Aletheia House and her color-code drug testing. Sutter confirmed that
DHR provided gas vouchers and bus passes and that the mother
completed a substance-abuse assessment for Aletheia House on July 19,
2022.
By the May 2023 ISP meeting, the mother's ISP indicated that the
mother would consider calling Thrive Alabama "for her medical needs."
Based on the record, it is unclear what "medical needs" were identified at
that time. Sutter testified that, around that time, the mother completed
8 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
another substance-abuse assessment for Aletheia House and that
Aletheia House did not recommend treatment at that time; the mother
was, however, asked to continue color-code drug testing. Thompson
testified that she assisted the mother with supervised visitation,
transportation, in-home counseling, parenting, housing, and employment
services.
Sutter testified that the mother initially lived with the maternal
grandparents because she had been evicted from her federally subsidized
housing for owing $1,378.60. Sutter said that the mother could not secure
new federally subsidized housing until she repaid that amount, which,
Sutter said, "[the mother] worked hard to do it herself." Sutter confirmed
that the mother ultimately secured federally subsidized housing and that
DHR assisted her with that process. DHR's efforts included having the
mother provide a budget to allocate her future expenses, agreeing to work
with the mother on a down payment for an apartment, and
recommending the housing authority "as the primary option for housing."
Sutter testified that the mother provided a budget but that she had
included only expenses and no income.
9 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
Sutter testified that stable income was one of the mother's "biggest
issues" and that the mother was unable to maintain employment. She
explained that, although the mother claimed that she had been employed
with ALDI, a grocery-store chain, since October 2024, her investigation
revealed that ALDI had no record of having employed the mother, and
the mother was unable to provide the name of a supervisor when asked.
Thompson testified that the mother had a history of employment
instability and terminations.
Thompson testified that she began providing the mother with
weekly counseling services on June 29, 2022, which, Thompson said,
included counseling regarding the mother's ability to maintain sobriety.
She said that the mother completed 14 counseling sessions in 2022, 31
sessions in 2023, and 8 sessions in 2024, the last of which, Thompson
said, occurred on November 26, 2024. Thompson and the guardian ad
litem expressed concern that the mother had issues with consistency.
Sutter testified that the mother was required to submit to drug
screens twice each month, with concerns focused on alcohol and
marijuana. The mother tested negative on December 18, 2023; tested
positive for alcohol on January 12 and February 1, 2024; failed to appear
10 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
for tests from February 15 through July 5, 2024; and tested negative on
July 9, 2024. The mother did not submit to any drug screens after July 9,
2024. When she was asked if she had requested that the mother submit
to drug screens at the ISP meetings held on August 12 and October 31,
2024, Sutter replied in the affirmative. She stated, however, that the
mother failed to comply with those requests. Sutter said that the mother
was scheduled to complete a drug assessment with New Horizons on
November 26, 2024, because, according to Sutter, the mother was having
difficulty contacting someone at Aletheia House. Sutter further testified
that New Horizons had no record of the mother's appointment. Sutter
found it concerning that the mother had not demonstrated sobriety since
July 2024 and testified that the results of screenings help "prove
stability."
Thompson said that she started monitoring the mother's visits with
the children on April 15, 2022. She testified that the mother sometimes
went months without visiting the children and that, in December 2022,
she visited the four oldest children only once. Sutter testified that
Thompson accommodated the mother's schedule and allowed her to select
visitation locations. Thompson explained that she frequently had to
11 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
encourage the mother to attend visits so that she could maintain a
relationship with the children. According to Thompson, she normally had
to encourage the mother to attend visitation with the children, and, she
said, the mother attended most visits only because of her encouragement.
Sutter testified that, in 2024, the mother was offered twice-monthly
visitation, for a total of 22 possible visits, but she attended only 11. The
mother last visited the children in October 2024. Although she was given
the opportunity to increase visitation by providing four consecutive
negative drug screens, she failed to meet that requirement.
Sutter testified that she observed the mother's interaction with the
children during visitations, and, she said, "they love her. They love her a
lot. Um, especially the [sons]." She added that the children "really care
about [the mother]." Sutter also testified that the children love and talk
about their maternal grandparents, aunts, and uncle.
Sutter testified that she was not certain when the mother was
asked to complete a mental-health assessment at WellStone, but, she
said, she believed that DHR had discussed sending the mother there.
When asked whether the mother was seeing a therapist, Sutter testified
that, when she visited WellStone in November 2024 inquiring about the
12 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
mother, WellStone employees had informed her that WellStone did not
have any records for the mother. The ISP notes from January 2022 until
August 2024 do not indicate that the mother had been required to
complete a mental-health assessment.
The notes from an ISP meeting held on August 12, 2024, reflect that
DHR recommended that the mother create a plan for after-school care for
the children and provide a list of five individuals who would be a part of
her "support system"; Sutter added that the mother provided some
names. Sutter testified that, on August 12, 2024, the mother was referred
for a psychological assessment with Dr. Wood, which was scheduled for
"the first part of September." The record reflects that this was the first
psychological service provided to the mother. The August 12, 2024, ISP
notes reflect that the meeting with Dr. Wood was scheduled for
September 4, 2024, at noon.2 Sutter testified that the mother failed to
attend the initial appointment with Dr. Wood and that she was unable to
contact the mother because the mother had changed her telephone
2We recognize that the September 4, 2024, date referenced in the
ISP differs from the September 14, 2024, date referenced in DHR's August 8, 2024, motion to continue the August 20, 2024, termination-of- parental-rights trial setting. 13 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
number. Later that month, Sutter was able to contact the mother; she
provided the mother with Dr. Wood's contact information so that she
could reschedule the evaluation.
Dr. Wood, a clinical psychologist specializing in assessment
psychology, said that he assessed the mother on November 13, 2024. His
assessment included completing a "Comprehensive Family Assessment,"
a clinical interview regarding the mother's personal and professional
history, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory-3 ("MMPI-3"), and the Parenting
Stress Index-Fourth Edition. Dr. Wood said that the mother "responded
honestly to the test" and did not exaggerate or minimize her problems.
Dr. Wood's written report from the assessment noted that the
mother "likely provided an accurate portrayal of her psychological
functioning." The report further stated:
"Review of the Substantive Scales revealed recurrent indications [that the mother] experiences thought symptoms. Test results also revealed recurrent indications she experiences episodes of excitability, elevated mood, and impulsivity consistent with mania or hypomania. In addition, test results revealed some compulsive behaviors, worry, fears, self-dissatisfaction, and a history of significant misconduct as a juvenile. Among what were labelled 'critical items' by the MMPI-3 developers, [the mother] endorsed seven such items.
14 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
All seven of the items she endorsed related to aberrant thinking."
Dr. Wood explained that "mania" involves impulsive and sporadic
thought processes lasting at least a week, while "hypomania" is similar
in nature but generally lasts two or three days. He further explained that
"critical items" are "individual test items which are so powerful that they
are of particular note," and he testified that the mother had "the worst
like seven of them" and that "the worst were odd thinking."
Dr. Wood noted the mother's family history of depression and
schizophrenia. He testified that, given the objective indications from an
honest MMPI-3 with no exaggeration -- namely, the presence of mania or
hypomania, coupled with aberrant thought processes -- he was concerned
that the mother had not received "aggressive treatment for a disorder of
this severity." He explained that it is common for individuals with
schizophrenia to use marijuana or alcohol in an effort to manage their
symptoms, which he described as a secondary issue. He also explained
that individuals with significant mood and thought symptoms often
attempt to "self-medicate" with alcohol or marijuana.
He further testified that, although it was possible the mother
suffered from bipolar disorder with psychotic features, the results of her 15 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
testing suggested that she likely had exhibited thought symptoms during
the assessment even in the absence of active mania or hypomania. For
that reason, he said, he believed that the mother likely suffers from a
variant of schizoaffective disorder.
Dr. Wood testified that he had an "ethical obligation[] to come here
today and tell [the juvenile court] this information" and that the mother
should be given additional time to receive increased, targeted treatment
for her foundational psychiatric symptoms in addition to treatment for
alcohol abuse. He said that addressing those foundational psychiatric
symptoms "puts a whole new flavor on the alcohol [abuse issue], even
though there is a strong family history of that as well." He testified that
there was "evidence that there [is] something a lot deeper going on …
than just the alcohol," which, he said, made the case more complicated.
He reiterated that the mother should be given additional time so that
professionals could "find out what [is] really going on at the deepest
level."
Dr. Wood recommended that the mother undergo a psychotropic-
medication evaluation by a psychiatrist, whom he described as a "major
player" in addressing her condition. He also recommended that she
16 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
participate in individual counseling for the foreseeable future and that
she understand that continued alcohol use would likely necessitate more
intensive substance-abuse treatment. He clarified that he was not
suggesting that the mother was unable to work, but he explained that he
was willing to provide a summary of her assessment for her use in
applying for Social Security disability compensation because "the folks at
disability need to know about this diagnosis." He testified that the
mother has a "longitudinal thought disorder" and that, although there
are no "quick fix[es]," her condition could "potentially" be managed to
some degree. He added that he was aware of "high-placed individuals in
the DHR system" who had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder "and are
on serious medications and are absolutely doing a … spectacular job."
The juvenile-court judge then posed a series of questions concerning
Dr. Wood's recommendation. Regarding the duration of psychiatric
treatment, the following exchange occurred:
"THE COURT: Okay. When you think somebody needs to be seeing a psychiatrist, what is the -- and I know it's individual based, but what is the prognosis on how long that treatment would go on?
"[Dr. Wood]: I think that's a hard call. But I mean I would think you'd be looking six months to a year at least maybe to figure out what's going on. 17 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
"THE COURT: Well, and therein lies the problem I've got and worry is the head that wears the crown I guess. If we were talking three or six months, I'd say, 'Okay. We can kick this down the road for three to six months.' But if we're talking about years, I've got children who need some permanency."
Dr. Wood added that it was possible that "significant things happen
early" if a psychiatrist prescribed Abilify, Lamictal, or another
antipsychotic medication to help stabilize the mother's mood.
The juvenile-court judge also inquired about the efficacy of
psychotropic medications given the mother's family history of substance
abuse:
"THE COURT: What effect would a history of a family who continuously even to date is abusing drugs -- I'm not even going to throw in alcohol. I'm talking about using drugs and you don't force yourself in that situation and you stay there, I don't know that any professional help with psychotropic drugs is going to change that if you're not out of that situation.
"[Dr. Wood]: I see your point. This is, this is like seeing through a glass darkly, okay? There's stuff going on. My findings say there's stuff going on. There's odd, twisted thinking. There are odd perceptions. There are things that we did not know about we now know about. So things are not firing on all eight, okay? Something is not working optimally. So when you're talking about subtle judgments, who should I hạng around, who should I not hạng around, she's depending on alcohol, if she is, to control her thought symptoms. Maybe she relies on other people, too. Maybe she's got some dependent personality features as well. 18 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
"THE COURT: Depending on the family, who may or may not have some of the same issues she has, but they've, they've shown no propensity to want to stop using drugs and she can't divorce herself from that crew. I guess the issue I'm having is what is kicking it down the road three, six months, nine months, a year for professional help if she's not going to purge herself of that situation?
"[Dr. Wood]: Well, I'm just saying, Your Honor, I, I cannot tell you that if she got aggressive treatment full bore that she would not make different decisions. That would certainly be the hope is that her judgment would improve commensurate with her, with her clarity of thought. And I just cannot tell you that. You know, I can't tell you. Maybe she'd have a, maybe she'd have a 45-degree turn. Maybe she wouldn't. I just don't know. But I'm saying that it's just -- it just feels wrong to me to take this untreated condition and kind of, and kind of ignore it -- And I'm not saying you're doing that, but I'm just saying for us to do that collectively, and just say, 'Well, it's really the alcohol.' 'Cause I'm not -- I'm just not sure it is just the alcohol. Or the dependency on other people. I'm not sure that that wouldn't clear up if she had aggressive treatment with all resources available, I'm not sure that she wouldn't draw some different conclusions.
"THE COURT: I could ask more questions, but they're all speculative in nature.
"[Dr. Wood]: Well, I appreciate you honoring me with those questions."
This colloquy led into a discussion concerning the mother's drug-screen
results:
19 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
"THE COURT: I just -- You know, she's dependent on this family, like I say, that will not stop their drug usage, nobody no how no way.
"And then she didn't show up for five months for drug screens she knew she had to take. And the reasonable, rational conclusion of that is, 'Well, maybe I can't test 'cause I'm using illegal drugs.'
"[Dr. Wood]: Well, just to, just to counter that, that direction, what if her need to -- her self-perceived need to use alcohol and/or other drugs is dramatically greater than ours might be because we're not facing a cavalcade of thought symptoms and mood symptoms and stuff? That's the problem if you've got that underlying disorder.
"And I -- This is -- This concept is overused. I get it. I've been around it. But what I'm saying is I do not believe that she is on the same -- based on information I have today, I do not believe she is on the same playing field with us in terms of 'I'll just not do that.' So, yeah, I absolutely believe that she would evade, she'd know she was using. But what I'm saying her temptation to use, her drive to use is arguably a lot higher than would be ours that do not have psychiatric disorders. That's all I'm trying to say."
At the conclusion of the trial, the juvenile-court judge remarked: "In my
six and half years, this is probably, based on the testimony of Dr. Wood,
the most difficult termination I ever had to consider. Dr. Wood's concerns
are my concerns."
On January 6, 2025, DHR filed substantively identical proposed
judgments in each case, except J.T.M.'s case, in which it included a
20 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
paragraph concerning Dr. Wood's testimony. On January 9, 2025, the
juvenile court adopted DHR's proposed judgments verbatim, terminating
the mother's parental rights to the children.
In its judgments, the juvenile court found that the mother had been
provided services by DHR, including family counseling, a mental-health
assessment, a psychological assessment, individual counseling,
parenting classes, supervised visitation, random drug screens, and
assistance with securing stable housing. It further found that the mother
had failed to adjust her circumstances to meet the children's needs and
had been inconsistent in her participation during the pendency of the
cases. In the judgment relating to J.T.M., the juvenile court
acknowledged Dr. Wood's testimony that the mother needed
"psychotropic assistance" and could possibly improve her situation to be
able to parent, but it also noted his inability to provide a time frame
necessary for the mother's improvement or to determine whether the
mother "could improve her current situation and be able and willing to
parent [J.T.M.] in the foreseeable future."
The juvenile court also noted that it had considered the mother's
interactions with the children, her efforts to change her circumstances,
21 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
the absence of relative resources, the time allowed for change, DHR's
reasonable efforts toward reunification, and the credibility of the
witnesses in reaching its decision.
The mother filed a postjudgment motion in each case, which the
juvenile court denied. The mother then filed a timely notice of appeal in
each case, and this court consolidated the appeals.
Standard of Review
"A judgment terminating parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, which is ' " '[e]vidence that, when weighed against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion.' " ' C.O. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 206 So. 3d 621, 627 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (quoting L.M. v. D.D.F., 840 So. 2d 171, 179 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), quoting in turn Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11- 20(b)(4)).
" ' "[T]he evidence necessary for appellate affirmance of a judgment based on a factual finding in the context of a case in which the ultimate standard for a factual decision by the trial court is clear and convincing evidence is evidence that a fact-finder reasonably could find to clearly and convincingly ... establish the fact sought to be proved."
" 'KGS Steel[, Inc. v. McInish,] 47 So. 3d [749] at 761 [(Ala. Civ. App. 2006)]. 22 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
" '... [F]or trial courts ruling ... in civil cases to which a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof applies, "the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden[,]" [Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254[, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202] (1986); thus, the appellate court must also look through a prism to determine whether there was substantial evidence before the trial court to support a factual finding, based upon the trial court's weighing of the evidence, that would "produce in the mind [of the trial court] a firm conviction as to each element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion." '
"Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d 767, 778 (Ala. 2008). This court does not reweigh the evidence but, rather, determines whether the findings of fact made by the juvenile court are supported by evidence that the juvenile court could have found to be clear and convincing. See Ex parte T.V., 971 So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007). When those findings rest on ore tenus evidence, this court presumes their correctness. Id. We review the legal conclusions to be drawn from the evidence without a presumption of correctness. J.W. v. C.B., 68 So. 3d 878, 879 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)."
Z.P. v. Mobile Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 414 So. 3d 151, 154 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2024).
Analysis
The mother advances two arguments on appeal. First, she contends
that clear and convincing evidence did not support the termination of her
23 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
parental rights. Second, she contends that the juvenile court erred in
finding that DHR had made reasonable efforts to reunify her with her
children. Because we find her latter contention dispositive of these
appeals, we pretermit consideration of the former.
As part of her argument that DHR did not use reasonable efforts to
reunify her with her children, the mother criticizes DHR's failure to order
a psychological assessment of her until after it had filed its petitions to
terminate her parental rights, and she points out that the results of that
assessment were not made available until the day before the trial. She
argues that, because DHR waited until the very end of the process to have
her complete the psychological assessment, it never put in place the
proper services to reunify her with her children. We agree.
"Once DHR places a child in foster care, it has an immediate duty
to use reasonable efforts to reunite the family, absent aggravating
circumstances. See Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-312." H.B. v. Mobile Cnty.
Dep't of Hum. Res., 236 So. 3d 875, 882 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017). "That duty
requires DHR to identify the circumstances that led to removal of the
child, to develop a plan to ameliorate those circumstances, and to use
reasonable efforts to achieve that plan." Id. Put another way, "in the
24 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
absence of aggravating circumstances, DHR must make ' "a fair and
serious attempt to reunify a parent with a child prior to seeking to
terminate parental rights." ' " P.R.P. v. Marshall Cnty. Dep't of Hum.
Res., [Ms. CL-2023-0899, Dec. 13, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App.
2024) (quoting H.H. v. Baldwin Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 989 So. 2d 1094,
1104 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (plurality opinion), quoting in turn State ex
rel. A.C., 97 P.3d 706, 712 (Utah Ct. App. 2006)).
"As part of the reasonable-efforts mandate, before a juvenile court
can terminate parental rights on the ground that the parent has not
successfully rehabilitated, the juvenile court must first give the parent a
fair opportunity to rectify the barrier to family reunification." P.R.P., ___
So. 3d at ___. "A juvenile court can find that reasonable efforts at
rehabilitation have failed only if DHR has proven by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent has not made substantial progress toward
becoming able to adequately care for the child after reasonable efforts
have been expended to rehabilitate the parent." B.L. v. Elmore Cnty.
Dep't of Hum. Res., 324 So. 3d 829, 837 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020) (citing H.B.
v. Mobile Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 236 So. 3d 875, 883 (Ala. Civ. App.
2017)).
25 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
In these cases, for reasons not explained in the record, DHR waited
until the August 12, 2024, ISP meeting to identify undergoing a
psychological assessment as a task the mother was to complete. This was
more than two years after DHR began working with the mother and more
than two months after it had filed the petitions seeking to terminate her
parental rights to the children. The report of that assessment, which was
not completed until the day before the trial and which the mother's
counsel did not receive until the morning of the trial, revealed that the
mother suffers from significant psychological issues.
Among other things, the testing showed that the mother
experienced "thought symptoms" as well as "episodes of excitability,
elevated mood, and impulsivity consistent with mania or hypomania."
According to the report of the assessment, "[a]mong what were labelled
'critical items' " by the developers of one of the tests Dr. Woods
administered to the mother, the mother "endorsed seven such items," all
of which "related to aberrant thinking." In the report, Dr. Wood opined
that the mother, despite being of average intelligence, "faces far more
daunting challenges than are readily apparent." He noted that, while it
was "possible she suffers from Bipolar Disorder With Psychotic
26 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
Features," he believed that the mother "most probably suffers from a
variant of Schizoaffective Disorder," and he diagnosed her with
"Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar Type." He recommended in his report
that, because the findings from his testing represented new information,
the mother "should be provided additional time to receive increased,
targeted treatment of her foundational psychiatric symptoms in addition
to treatment for alcohol abuse …." He further recommended that the
mother receive medication for her condition as well as participate in
individual counseling. As noted above, Dr. Woods's testimony was
consistent with his report of the mother's psychological assessment.
During Dr. Woods's testimony, the juvenile-court judge expressed
concern that treating the mother for the psychological problems
identified by Dr. Woods would delay permanency for the children.
However, that potential delay in permanency for the children was the
direct result of DHR's failure to seek a psychological assessment of the
mother for more than two years, waiting until after it had filed its
petitions to terminate the mother's parental rights before doing so. As
noted above, the law required DHR to identify, at the outset, the
circumstances that caused the removal of the children from the mother's
27 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
custody, H.B., 236 So. 3d at 882, and, by delaying more than two years to
seek a psychological assessment of the mother, DHR only belatedly
identified, at a time when effective treatment would necessarily delay
permanency for the children, what could be the most significant cause of
that removal -- that the mother suffers from a type of schizoaffective
disorder. 3
In T.B. v. Jefferson County Department of Human Resources, 369
So. 3d 158 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022), evidence indicated that the Jefferson
County Department of Human Resources ("the Jefferson County DHR")
had failed to use reasonable efforts because it did not tailor services to a
mother's identified barriers to reunification and that the record was
"notable for what it d[id] not contain." 369 So. 3d at 163. No ISPs were
discussed or admitted; there was no evidence indicating that the
Jefferson County DHR had tracked the mother's progress; although
3DHR complains about the mother's failure to appear for the first
scheduled psychological assessment with Dr. Wood, which was scheduled for September 2024. The fact that the mother's failure to appear for that assessment resulted in a two-month delay (she participated in the assessment with Dr. Wood in November 2024) in no way exonerates DHR's more than two-year delay in ordering the psychological assessment as part of its obligation to identify those conditions necessitating removal of the children from the mother's custody. 28 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
substance abuse had been identified as a barrier, there was no evidence
indicating that the Jefferson County DHR had arranged for or referred
the mother to counseling recommended by an assessment; and there was
no evidence indicating that the Jefferson County DHR had assisted the
mother with finding appropriate housing, another identified barrier. Id.
at 163-64. This court reversed the judgment in that case, holding that the
Jefferson County DHR had not provided services reasonably directed at
the obstacles to reunification. Id. at 164.
Here, the record reflects no documented requirement that the
mother complete a psychological assessment in any ISP notes from
January 2022 until August 2024, and DHR did not refer her for a
psychological assessment until the August 12, 2024, ISP meeting, which
was more than two months after it had filed its petitions to terminate the
mother's parental rights, and the results of the assessment were not
available until the day before the December 3, 2024, trial. Dr. Wood's
assessment report identified untreated psychiatric needs, and he
expressed concern that he had not seen the mother receive "aggressive
treatment for a disorder of this severity."
29 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
Based on the undisputed evidence in the record, we find that the
delay in identifying and addressing what could be a significant barrier to
the mother's reunification with her children -- untreated mental illness
-- parallels the deficiency in T.B. Put simply, by its delay in identifying
the mother's mental illness, DHR made no efforts reasonably tailored to
eliminating that barrier to the mother's reunification with her children.
Having failed to do so, we are constrained to conclude that DHR did not
expend reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the mother, B.L., 324 So. 3d at
837, and that the mother was not afforded "a fair opportunity to rectify
the barrier to family reunification," P.R.P., ___ So. 3d at ___. We must,
therefore, reverse the juvenile court's judgments.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the juvenile court's judgments
terminating the mother's parental rights to the children, and we remand
the cases to the juvenile court for the entry of judgments consistent with
this opinion.
CL-2025-0101 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
CL-2025-0102 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
CL-2025-0103 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
30 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105
CL-2025-0104 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
CL-2025-0105 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Bowden, JJ., concur.