K.C. v. P.O.
This text of K.C. v. P.O. (K.C. v. P.O.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-730
K.C.
vs.
P.O.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant appeals from a harassment prevention order
issued following a two-party hearing after notice, pursuant to
G. L. c. 258E, § 3. Concluding that the order was not supported
by evidence of three separate acts of willful and malicious
conduct, we remand for entry of orders vacating and setting
aside the order.
Background. On April 29, 2025, a District Court judge
conducted a two-party hearing after notice to the plaintiff and
defendant. The plaintiff testified and offered in evidence
three photographs of a post from the defendant's Facebook page.
The defendant did not testify. According to the plaintiff, the
defendant was the plaintiff's ex-husband's ex-girlfriend.
Discussion. We review an order pursuant to G. L. c. 258E
to determine "whether the judge could find, by a preponderance of the evidence, together with all permissible inferences, that
the defendant committed '[three] or more acts of willful and
malicious conduct aimed at a specific person committed with the
intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property
and that [did] in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage
to property.'" A.T. v. C.R., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 532, 535 (2015),
quoting G. L. c. 258E, § 1. Accord J.C. v. J.H., 92 Mass. App.
Ct. 224, 227 (2017). In this context, willful and malicious
conduct is defined as acts "characterized by cruelty, hostility
or revenge." O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 420 (2012),
quoting G. L. c. 258E, § 1.
In her affidavit in support of the application, the
plaintiff alleged three incidents of harassment: (1) on April
17, 2025, the defendant circled the area of the plaintiff's
workplace trying to intimidate her; (2) on April 21, 2025, the
defendant drove by the plaintiff's workplace and yelled, "I'll
see you in Byfield tomorrow" (Byfield was the location of the
plaintiff's daughter's softball game); and (3) on April 23,
2025, the defendant was parked down the street from the
plaintiff's house. During the hearing, the plaintiff reaffirmed
these assertions. However, these claims lacked any context or
specific information about the defendant's behavior that would
permit an inference as to intent, and therefore cannot
reasonably be construed as "intimidation, intending to cause
2 fear of physical harm or damage to property." Gassman v.
Reason, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 9 (2016).1
The plaintiff also testified at the hearing that the
defendant posted on Facebook a photograph of the plaintiff's
mother's grave with the message, "twenty-five years is a long
time . . . join her. Try some pills with that Tito's - You left
a handle in that garage."2 Even if we were to consider this
Facebook post as qualifying conduct, it would constitute only
one of the three acts of harassment required to issue an
harassment prevention order under the statute. See G. L.
c. 258E, §§ 1, 3.
In sum, we conclude that the harassment prevention order
against the defendant should not have issued because it was not
supported by evidence of three separate acts of willful and
malicious conduct. Therefore, we remand the case to the
District Court for entry of an order vacating and setting aside
1 Under different circumstances, repeatedly appearing at a person's place of work or home might well be qualifying conduct under c. 258E. See, e.g., V.J. v. N.J., 91 Mass. App. Ct. 22, 27 (2017) (defendant's confrontation on bus where plaintiff worked as driver along with stated goal of engaging in daily confrontations was act of harassment).
2 The plaintiff testified at there were other concerning Facebook posts, but they "could have been towards anyone because there was no evidence that [they] had a connection to me." See F.K. v. S.C., 481 Mass. 325, 332 (2019) ("As a threshold matter, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant engaged in [three] or more acts, each aimed at a specific person" [quotations and citation omitted]). 3 the April 29, 2025 harassment prevention order and ordering
destruction of "all record" of the order as required by G. L. c.
258E, § 9. See C.E.R. v. P.C., 91 Mass. App. Ct. 124, 132 n.17
(2017).
So ordered.
By the Court (Meade, Massing & Brennan, JJ.3),
Clerk
Entered: February 18, 2026.
3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority. 4
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
K.C. v. P.O., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kc-v-po-massappct-2026.