K.B. Equities, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse

764 F. Supp. 1005, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5923, 1991 WL 81114
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedMay 3, 1991
DocketCiv. A. 86-4295
StatusPublished

This text of 764 F. Supp. 1005 (K.B. Equities, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
K.B. Equities, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, 764 F. Supp. 1005, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5923, 1991 WL 81114 (E.D. Pa. 1991).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

DITTER, District Judge.

This case is one in a series of claims concerning AIA Industries, Inc. See In re AIA Industries, Inc. Securities Litigation, Master File No. 84-2276 (E.D.Pa.). Here, plaintiff claims defendant, an accounting firm, produced fraudulent audits and financial statements for AIA and that plaintiff relied on these reports when purchasing AIA securities. Plaintiff alleges violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), Rule 10b-5, and common law. Defendant asserts plaintiff’s action is barred by the statute of limitations and has moved for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Having considered the parties’ briefs and oral argument, I will grant defendant’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, KB Equities, is a Nevada Corporation. Its owners are Bernard Katz (65 percent) and George Bell (35 percent). As Mr. Bell has previously explained, these men formed the venture to “invest in high risk companies.”

Both men are highly educated and experienced investors. Mr. Bell has spent over 35 years in the securities and investment field. During the relevant period, he was co-chairman of Janney Montgomery Scott (“JMS”), a Philadelphia stock broker. Mr. Katz, a professional investor, was the sole owner of the corporation that preceded KB and had been the chairman of the board and controlling shareholder of another company.

In March of 1983, and on June 18 and July 9, 1984, plaintiff bought securities in AIA, an airline company that began by providing charters to Atlantic City casinos and later initiated scheduled service to other cities. Defendant was AIA’s accountant and in that capacity prepared the firm’s financial statements during this period.

Plaintiff claims it directly relied on these reports when making its investments in AIA. KB further alleges the reports were “tainted by errors, inaccuracies, and downright fraud.” As a result, plaintiff seeks damages under the 1934 Securities Act, Rule 10b-5, and the common law. I conclude, however, that the statute of limitations is a bar.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

A two year statute of limitations governs both plaintiff’s federal and common law claims. The parties have never disputed this period for the common law claims, but there has been some controversy over the federal claims. In both Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 697 F.Supp. 859 (E.D.Pa.1988) aff'd 911 F.2d 960 (3d Cir.1990), and ITG., Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, 697 F.Supp. 867 (E.D.Pa.1988), two related cases, I held that the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.1988), was not to be applied retroactively. For the reasons set forth in Gruber and ITG, the plaintiff’s federal securities claims are restricted by the common law, two-year statute of limitations.

The relevant inquiry is also the same for all of the claims: since the clock started when plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury and its cause, the question is when KB was on notice that PW’s financial statements were inadequate.

Once again, I addressed this subject fully in Gruber and ITG. In both opinions, I discussed constructive notice in the securities fraud context:

*1007 [A plaintiff] must have sufficient information of possible wrongdoing to place [him or her] on inquiry notice or to excite storm warnings of culpable activity.... Once on inquiry notice, [a plaintiff has] a duty to exercise reasonable diligence to, uncover the basis for [any] claims and [is] held to have constructive notice of all facts that could have been learned through diligent investigation during the limitations period. Gruber, 697 F.Supp. at 864; ITG, 697 F.Supp. at 870 (internal citations omitted).

The duty of diligent analysis is both subjective and objective, and several factors guide it. Previous courts have considered particular circumstances like the existence of a fiduciary relationship, concealment of fraud, opportunity to detect fraud, position in the industry, sophistication and expertise in the financial community, and knowledge of related proceedings. See Tobacco and Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F.Supp. 323, 329 (D.Del.1956) aff'd, 244 F.2d 902 (3d Cir.1957); Maggio v. Gerard Freezer & Ice Co., 824 F.2d 123, 128 (1st Cir.1987).

Plaintiff brought this suit on July 18, 1986. As a result, my job here is to analyze the record for evidence of storm warnings at AIA, storm warnings that would have made plaintiff aware that PW’s reports had not been reliable. Having done so, I conclude a reasonable jury would necessarily find that plaintiff saw black clouds and lightning, heard howling winds and thunder, and felt the drive of hail and rain well before July 18, 1984. Plaintiff was surrounded by more than warnings — the storm had begun.

B. The Falling Barometer Cannot Be Ignored

Prospective investors try to predict a company’s future, and they frequently rely on an independent accounting firm’s report. Where the data is flawed or incomplete, the accountant may be liable in damages for the harm it has caused. A different result follows, of course, if the investor has better access to information and knows more than the accountant for then reliance would not be justified. It is easy to see why.

To permit an investor to sit idly by would permit the securities acts to be used as safe havens for speculation and a buffer against any investment loss. When faced with knowledge of a company’s serious financial difficulty, an investor cannot be allowed to wait for market increases knowing that if growth does not take place the securities acts will provide insurance against loss.- Instead, the exercise of reasonable diligence requires an investor to be reasonably cognizant of financial developments relating to his investment, and mandates that early steps be taken to appraise those facts which come to the investor's attention. ITG at 874 (emphasis in original) (quoting Cook v. Avien, 573 F.2d 685, 695 (1st Cir.1978)).

Given this standard, PW’s forecast will not indemnify KB against its own bad judgment. Mr. Bell, an experienced investor and sophisticated business man, was the consummate insider.

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764 F. Supp. 1005, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5923, 1991 WL 81114, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kb-equities-inc-v-price-waterhouse-paed-1991.