Kayton v. . Barnett

New York Court of Appeals

Kayton v. . Barnett

23 N.E. 24, 116 N.Y. 625, 27 N.Y. St. Rep. 678, 71 Sickels 625, 1889 N.Y. LEXIS 1376

CourtNew York Court of Appeals

DecidedDecember 3, 1889

StatusPublished

Cited by16 cases

This text of 23 N.E. 24 (Kayton v. . Barnett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Kayton v. . Barnett, 23 N.E. 24, 116 N.Y. 625, 27 N.Y. St. Rep. 678, 71 Sickels 625, 1889 N.Y. LEXIS 1376 (N.Y. 1889).

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Opinion

Follett, Ch. J.

When goods are sold on credit to a person whom the vendor believes to be the purchaser, and he after-wards discovers that the person credited bought as agent for another, the vendor has a cause of action against the principal for the purchase-price. The defendants concede the existence of this general rule, but assert that it is not applicable to this case, because, while Bishop and the plaintiffs were negotiating, they stated they would not sell the property to the defendants, and Bishop assured them he was buying for himself and not for them. It appears by evidence, which is wholly uncontradicted, that the defendants directed every step taken by Bishop in his negotiations with plaintiffs; that the property was purchased for and delivered to the defendants, who have ever since retained it; that they paid the $3,000 towards the pur *628 chase-price, and agreed with Bishop, after the notes had been delivered, to hold him harmless from them. Notwithstanding the assertion of the plaintiffs that they would not sell to the defendants, they, through the circumvention of Bishop and the defendants, did sell the property to the defendants, who have had the benefit of it, and have never paid the remainder of the purchase-price pursuant to their agreement. Bishop was the defendants’ agent. Bishop’s mind was, in this transaction, the defendants’ mind, and so the minds of the parties met, and the defendants having, through their own and their agent’s deception, acquired the plaintiffs’ property by purchase, cannot successfully assert that they are not liable for the remainder of the purchase-price because they, through their agent, succeeded in inducing the defendants to do that which they did not intend to do, and, perhaps, would not have done had the defendants not dealt disingenuously.

The judgment should he reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.

All concur, except Haight, J., not sitting.

Judgment reversed.

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Follett, Ch. J.

When goods are sold on credit to a person whom the vendor believes to be the purchaser, and he after-wards discovers that the person credited bought as agent for another, the vendor has a cause of action against the principal for the purchase-price. The defendants concede the existence of this general rule, but assert that it is not applicable to this case, because, while Bishop and the plaintiffs were negotiating, they stated they would not sell the property to the defendants, and Bishop assured them he was buying for himself and not for them. It appears by evidence, which is wholly uncontradicted, that the defendants directed every step taken by Bishop in his negotiations with plaintiffs; that the property was purchased for and delivered to the defendants, who have ever since retained it; that they paid the $3,000 towards the pur *628 chase-price, and agreed with Bishop, after the notes had been delivered, to hold him harmless from them. Notwithstanding the assertion of the plaintiffs that they would not sell to the defendants, they, through the circumvention of Bishop and the defendants, did sell the property to the defendants, who have had the benefit of it, and have never paid the remainder of the purchase-price pursuant to their agreement. Bishop was the defendants’ agent. Bishop’s mind was, in this transaction, the defendants’ mind, and so the minds of the parties met, and the defendants having, through their own and their agent’s deception, acquired the plaintiffs’ property by purchase, cannot successfully assert that they are not liable for the remainder of the purchase-price because they, through their agent, succeeded in inducing the defendants to do that which they did not intend to do, and, perhaps, would not have done had the defendants not dealt disingenuously.

The judgment should he reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.

All concur, except Haight, J., not sitting.

Judgment reversed.

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Bluebook (online)

23 N.E. 24, 116 N.Y. 625, 27 N.Y. St. Rep. 678, 71 Sickels 625, 1889 N.Y. LEXIS 1376, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kayton-v-barnett-ny-1889.

Opinion

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