Rel: May 15, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________
CL-2025-0536 _________________________
Kayla Dykes
v.
Joshua Dykes
Appeal from Dallas Circuit Court (DR-24-900056)
BOWDEN, Judge.
Kayla Dykes ("the wife") appeals from the February 25, 2025,
judgment of the Dallas Circuit Court ("the circuit court") divorcing her
from Joshua Dykes ("the husband") and, among other things, awarding
the husband sole physical custody of their minor child, K.E.D. ("the CL-2025-0536
child"). The wife raises several issues on appeal, including that the circuit
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody
determination regarding the child under Alabama's version of the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("the
UCCJEA"), Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-101 et seq.
We do not reach the merits of the wife's arguments, however,
because she failed to timely invoke this court's appellate jurisdiction by
filing a notice of appeal within 42 days of the entry of the February 25,
2025, divorce judgment. The wife did send an e-mail to an employee in
the circuit court clerk's office after the entry of the February 25, 2025,
divorce judgment, and the circuit court construed that e-mail as a
postjudgment motion. But, under the existing rules and orders of the
Supreme Court of Alabama, a document cannot be "filed" by e-mailing it
to a trial-court clerk's office. Thus, the wife's e-mail did not suspend the
time to file a notice of appeal, and the wife had until April 8, 2025, to file
a notice of appeal from the February 25, 2025, divorce judgment. The wife
filed her notice of appeal on July 9, 2025. Therefore, we dismiss the wife's
appeal as untimely.
2 CL-2025-0536
Procedural History
The husband, acting pro se, filed a complaint for a divorce on April
8, 2024. The husband simultaneously filed, among other things, a
handwritten settlement agreement providing, in part, that the wife
would have "sole primary custody" of the child and that the husband
would have visitation "when able to do so based on work schedule."
After the husband had commenced the underlying divorce action,
the wife filed a child-custody action concerning the child in North
Carolina. The respective testimony of the parties indicates that the North
Carolina court dismissed the wife's child-custody action in deference to
the underlying divorce action.
On July 30, 2024, the husband, represented by an attorney, filed a
"notice of recission of handwritten agreement." That same day, the
husband filed a "motion for pendente lite relief," requesting, among other
things, sole physical custody of the child.
On October 2, 2024, the husband filed an amended complaint,
requesting, among other things, sole physical custody of the child. Later
that same day, the circuit court held a hearing and entered a pendente
lite order awarding the parties joint legal and joint physical custody of
3 CL-2025-0536
the child, with physical custody of the child alternating between the
parties from month to month.
The circuit court held a hearing on February 12, 2025. The parties
were instructed at the conclusion of that hearing to file proposed orders.
The husband filed a proposed order, and the wife filed what appear to be
screenshot images of a rental agreement for a house located in Virginia.
The circuit court subsequently entered the divorce judgment on
February 25, 2025, essentially adopting the husband's proposed order in
its entirety. Among other things, the circuit court awarded the husband
sole physical custody of the child.
Later that same day, February 25, 2025, the wife sent an e-mail to
Betty Lewis, an employee in the circuit-court clerk's office. The wife's e-
mail to Lewis was "written in response to the [husband's] proposed
order." The wife objected to the husband's proposed order on several
grounds and asked the circuit court to "please consider all findings of this
case be reviewed accuracy [sic] before making a ruling," even though the
circuit court had already entered the February 25, 2025, divorce
judgment.
4 CL-2025-0536
Lewis forwarded a copy of the wife's e-mail to the circuit-court
judge, noting that the wife's e-mail concerned the husband's proposed
order and that the divorce judgment had already been entered. The
circuit-court judge instructed Lewis to "have the case set for Motion to
Set Aside Decree/[New] Trial." The case-action summary indicates that
Lewis entered a "Motion to Reconsider" into the record on February 28,
2025. A copy of the wife's e-mail to Lewis was included in the record on
appeal; however, the copy of the wife's e-mail lacks an electronic-filing
stamp that would indicate that it was electronically filed using the
AlaFile electronic-filing system or a physical stamp that would indicate
that it was filed in person at the circuit-court clerk's office.
The circuit court entered an order on March 5, 2025, stating that
the wife's "motion to reconsider … is hereby pending" and set a hearing
for May 14, 2025. (Capitalization in original removed.) The wife
subsequently sent another e-mail to Lewis on March 12, 2025, suggesting
that the circuit court had set aside the divorce judgment when it entered
the March 5, 2025, order. The wife requested that the circuit court
"consider entering this motion until [the May 14, 2025, hearing]" so that
the parties could continue the month-to-month joint-custody
5 CL-2025-0536
arrangement under the pendente lite order. The circuit court entered an
order on March 18, 2025, noting that it had treated the wife's March 12,
2025, e-mail to Lewis as a request to stay the enforcement of the divorce
judgment, and it stayed the enforcement of the divorce judgment pending
the May 14, 2025, hearing. That same day, for the first time in the
matter, an attorney filed a notice of appearance on behalf of the wife.
During the May 14, 2025, hearing, the circuit-court judge noted
that he had treated the wife's February 25, 2025, e-mail to Lewis as a
"motion to reconsider." The wife's attorney argued during that hearing
that, when the divorce action was commenced, Alabama was not the
child's "home state" and that the circuit court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination regarding the
child under Alabama's version of the UCCJEA. The circuit court
disagreed, stating that it had subject-matter jurisdiction to award
custody of the child.1
1Although we do not reach the merits of the wife's arguments about
the UCCJEA on appeal, we note that Alabama's version of the UCCJEA applies to a "child custody proceeding," which includes, but is not limited to, a child-custody action. See Ala.
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Rel: May 15, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________
CL-2025-0536 _________________________
Kayla Dykes
v.
Joshua Dykes
Appeal from Dallas Circuit Court (DR-24-900056)
BOWDEN, Judge.
Kayla Dykes ("the wife") appeals from the February 25, 2025,
judgment of the Dallas Circuit Court ("the circuit court") divorcing her
from Joshua Dykes ("the husband") and, among other things, awarding
the husband sole physical custody of their minor child, K.E.D. ("the CL-2025-0536
child"). The wife raises several issues on appeal, including that the circuit
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody
determination regarding the child under Alabama's version of the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("the
UCCJEA"), Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-101 et seq.
We do not reach the merits of the wife's arguments, however,
because she failed to timely invoke this court's appellate jurisdiction by
filing a notice of appeal within 42 days of the entry of the February 25,
2025, divorce judgment. The wife did send an e-mail to an employee in
the circuit court clerk's office after the entry of the February 25, 2025,
divorce judgment, and the circuit court construed that e-mail as a
postjudgment motion. But, under the existing rules and orders of the
Supreme Court of Alabama, a document cannot be "filed" by e-mailing it
to a trial-court clerk's office. Thus, the wife's e-mail did not suspend the
time to file a notice of appeal, and the wife had until April 8, 2025, to file
a notice of appeal from the February 25, 2025, divorce judgment. The wife
filed her notice of appeal on July 9, 2025. Therefore, we dismiss the wife's
appeal as untimely.
2 CL-2025-0536
Procedural History
The husband, acting pro se, filed a complaint for a divorce on April
8, 2024. The husband simultaneously filed, among other things, a
handwritten settlement agreement providing, in part, that the wife
would have "sole primary custody" of the child and that the husband
would have visitation "when able to do so based on work schedule."
After the husband had commenced the underlying divorce action,
the wife filed a child-custody action concerning the child in North
Carolina. The respective testimony of the parties indicates that the North
Carolina court dismissed the wife's child-custody action in deference to
the underlying divorce action.
On July 30, 2024, the husband, represented by an attorney, filed a
"notice of recission of handwritten agreement." That same day, the
husband filed a "motion for pendente lite relief," requesting, among other
things, sole physical custody of the child.
On October 2, 2024, the husband filed an amended complaint,
requesting, among other things, sole physical custody of the child. Later
that same day, the circuit court held a hearing and entered a pendente
lite order awarding the parties joint legal and joint physical custody of
3 CL-2025-0536
the child, with physical custody of the child alternating between the
parties from month to month.
The circuit court held a hearing on February 12, 2025. The parties
were instructed at the conclusion of that hearing to file proposed orders.
The husband filed a proposed order, and the wife filed what appear to be
screenshot images of a rental agreement for a house located in Virginia.
The circuit court subsequently entered the divorce judgment on
February 25, 2025, essentially adopting the husband's proposed order in
its entirety. Among other things, the circuit court awarded the husband
sole physical custody of the child.
Later that same day, February 25, 2025, the wife sent an e-mail to
Betty Lewis, an employee in the circuit-court clerk's office. The wife's e-
mail to Lewis was "written in response to the [husband's] proposed
order." The wife objected to the husband's proposed order on several
grounds and asked the circuit court to "please consider all findings of this
case be reviewed accuracy [sic] before making a ruling," even though the
circuit court had already entered the February 25, 2025, divorce
judgment.
4 CL-2025-0536
Lewis forwarded a copy of the wife's e-mail to the circuit-court
judge, noting that the wife's e-mail concerned the husband's proposed
order and that the divorce judgment had already been entered. The
circuit-court judge instructed Lewis to "have the case set for Motion to
Set Aside Decree/[New] Trial." The case-action summary indicates that
Lewis entered a "Motion to Reconsider" into the record on February 28,
2025. A copy of the wife's e-mail to Lewis was included in the record on
appeal; however, the copy of the wife's e-mail lacks an electronic-filing
stamp that would indicate that it was electronically filed using the
AlaFile electronic-filing system or a physical stamp that would indicate
that it was filed in person at the circuit-court clerk's office.
The circuit court entered an order on March 5, 2025, stating that
the wife's "motion to reconsider … is hereby pending" and set a hearing
for May 14, 2025. (Capitalization in original removed.) The wife
subsequently sent another e-mail to Lewis on March 12, 2025, suggesting
that the circuit court had set aside the divorce judgment when it entered
the March 5, 2025, order. The wife requested that the circuit court
"consider entering this motion until [the May 14, 2025, hearing]" so that
the parties could continue the month-to-month joint-custody
5 CL-2025-0536
arrangement under the pendente lite order. The circuit court entered an
order on March 18, 2025, noting that it had treated the wife's March 12,
2025, e-mail to Lewis as a request to stay the enforcement of the divorce
judgment, and it stayed the enforcement of the divorce judgment pending
the May 14, 2025, hearing. That same day, for the first time in the
matter, an attorney filed a notice of appearance on behalf of the wife.
During the May 14, 2025, hearing, the circuit-court judge noted
that he had treated the wife's February 25, 2025, e-mail to Lewis as a
"motion to reconsider." The wife's attorney argued during that hearing
that, when the divorce action was commenced, Alabama was not the
child's "home state" and that the circuit court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination regarding the
child under Alabama's version of the UCCJEA. The circuit court
disagreed, stating that it had subject-matter jurisdiction to award
custody of the child.1
1Although we do not reach the merits of the wife's arguments about
the UCCJEA on appeal, we note that Alabama's version of the UCCJEA applies to a "child custody proceeding," which includes, but is not limited to, a child-custody action. See Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-102(4) (defining a "child custody proceeding" as: "A proceeding in a court in which legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue. The term includes a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, 6 CL-2025-0536
The circuit court subsequently entered an order "reset[ting]" the
case for a hearing on August 18, 2025, and instructing the wife "to
properly plead and file her claim."2
dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear." (emphasis added)). Thus, an Alabama trial court must have jurisdiction under Alabama's version of the UCCJEA to make a child-custody determination in a divorce action involving interstate issues, such as the underlying divorce action. See, e.g., Ex parte Cate, 303 So. 3d 142, 149 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020) (granting, in part, the mother's petition for a writ of mandamus so that the trial court could determine the issue of its jurisdiction to make a child-custody determination in a divorce action under Alabama's version of the UCCJEA ("The trial court's comments … indicate that it did not consider the various grounds under § 30-3B-201[, Ala. Code 1975,] in determining that it had jurisdiction over custody issues [in a divorce action]. Rather, those comments and the arguments of the parties indicate that the trial court relied solely on the father's apparent residence in Alabama for the six months preceding his commencement [of the divorce action when it concluded that it had jurisdiction over custody issues under § 30-2-5, Ala. Code 1975].")).
2The record indicates that the circuit court "reset" the case to allow
the wife to file either a petition to modify the child's custody based on the custody-modification standard set forth in Ex parte McLendon, 455 So. 2d 863 (Ala. 1984), or a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., regarding newly discovered evidence. Although the case was "reset" for another hearing, neither the filing of a petition to modify child custody nor a Rule 60(b) motion would affect the finality of the underlying judgment. Cf. T.J.H. v. S.N.F., 960 So. 2d 669, 673 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006) (holding that the trial court's order denying the father's petition to modify custody was a final judgment even though the trial court purported to grant the parties the right to move for a modification in the future without having to pay a civil docket fee); see Rule 60(b) ("A motion under 7 CL-2025-0536
The wife filed a notice of appeal from the divorce judgment on July
9, 2025.
Analysis
Although neither party has raised the issue, we can take notice of
whether the wife's notice of appeal was timely filed because it implicates
this court's appellate jurisdiction. Rule 2(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P. ("An
appeal shall be dismissed if the notice of appeal was not timely filed to
invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court."). See Gunnison-Mack v.
Alabama State Pers. Bd., 923 So. 2d 319, 320 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005)
(" ' "[J]urisdictional matters are of such magnitude that we take notice of
them at any time and do so even ex mero motu ." ' " (citations omitted)).
this subdivision does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.").
The divorce judgment included the following provision indicating that it is a final judgment from which an appeal may be taken: "To the extent other relief has been requested by either party and not addressed or disposed of herein, such relief is denied. It is the intent of [the circuit court] that this Decree constitutes a full and final disposition of this litigation." Thus, the divorce judgment is a final judgment that would support an appeal because it adjudicated all disputed issues between the parties. See Quintana v. Quiroz, 313 So. 3d 1134, 1137 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020) (" ' " '[A] final judgment is a "terminal decision which demonstrates there has been a complete adjudication of all matters in controversy between the litigants." ' " ' " (citations omitted)). 8 CL-2025-0536
Generally, the first step in determining whether a notice of appeal
was timely filed is to determine whether either party filed a
postjudgment motion that suspended the running of the time to file a
notice of appeal. Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P. Under the unique facts and
circumstances of this case, however, we must first address whether the
wife's e-mail to Lewis satisfied the procedural requirements for the filing
of a postjudgment motion and suspended the running of the time to file
a notice of appeal. See SMM Gulf Coast, LLC v. Dade Cap. Corp., 311 So.
3d 736, 741 (Ala. 2020) ("[Q]uestions about the trial court's jurisdiction
or the proper interpretation of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure are
also questions of law subject to de novo review ….").
I. Whether the wife "filed" a postjudgment motion by sending an e- mail to Lewis
Except as otherwise provided in the Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure, every written motion, including a postjudgment motion, must
be served upon each of the parties and must be filed with the trial court.
Ala. R. Civ. P. 5(a) and (d). Parties may "file" papers with the trial court
by using one of several methods authorized by Rule 5:
"The filing of papers with the court as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the court, except that the judge may permit the papers to be filed with the
9 CL-2025-0536
judge, in which event, the judge shall note thereon the filing date and forthwith transmit them to the office of the clerk. A pleading, motion, order, or other document filed by electronic means in accordance with an order or rules of the Supreme Court of Alabama constitutes filing with the court for the purpose of applying these rules."
(Emphasis added.)
Naturally, a document sent to a trial-court clerk's office by e-mail
is sent "by electronic means," but the current orders and rules of our
supreme court that govern the electronic filing of documents in our trial-
court system are clear: the only authorized method for electronically
filing a document is to upload that document using the AlaFile electronic-
filing system.
Electronically "filing" a document by e-mail is specifically
prohibited by the "Administrative Policies and Procedures for Electronic
Filing in the Civil Divisions of the Alabama Unified Judicial System"
(Feb. 27, 2026) ("the electronic-filing policy manual"),
https://efile.alacourt.gov/media/1118/administrative-policies-and-
procedures-02-27-2026.pdf (https://perma.cc/CUS8-9YVF) (last visited
May 14, 2026), see Ala. R. Jud. Admin. 44, which is considered an order
of our supreme court. Premier Choice Realty & Invs., Inc. v. Lumpkin,
[Ms. CL-2025-0749, Feb. 27, 2026] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App.
10 CL-2025-0536
2026); Seibert v. Fields, 386 So. 3d 776, 780 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023);
Alabama Dep't of Revenue v. Frederick, 166 So. 3d 123, 124 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2014). The electronic-filing policy manual defines the term
"electronic filing" to mean "uploading a document directly from the
registered user's computer, using the court's internet-based system[,
commonly referred to as AlaFile,] … to file that document in the court's
case file. Sending a document to the court via e-mail does not constitute
'electronic filing .' " (Emphasis added.) Although not binding, the
Committee Comments to Amendments to Rule 5, Ala. R. Civ. P., Effective
October 24, 2008, also specifically proscribe "filing" documents by e-mail:
"Electronic filing must be accomplished within the electronic-filing
system established by order and rules of the Supreme Court of Alabama,
[i.e., AlaFile,] not merely by e-mail communication." (Emphasis added.)
This court has also noted that "in Alabama's court system … sending e-
mail transmissions does not constitute filing." Matthews v. City of
Mobile, 182 So. 3d 547, 550 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014)(comparing the method
for electronically filing documents in the trial-court system to the lack of
an electronic-filing system for disputes before the Mobile County
Personnel Board).
11 CL-2025-0536
Although we recognize that the wife was acting pro se when she
sent the February 25, 2025, e-mail to Lewis, "it is well settled that '[r]ules
governing the operation of the courts of this state are no more forgiving
to a pro se litigant than to one represented by counsel.' Lockett v. A.L.
Sandlin Lumber Co., 588 So. 2d 889, 890 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991)." L.M. v.
Shelby Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 999 So. 2d 505, 507-08 (Ala. Civ. App.
2008) (dismissing appeal for failing to timely invoke this court's
jurisdiction because the document purporting to be a notice of appeal
from the juvenile court's judgment terminating the mother's parental
rights was not "filed" when the mother, acting pro se, sent it to the
juvenile-court clerk by facsimile transmission).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the existing rules and
orders of our supreme court do not specifically authorize the electronic
filing of a document by sending it to a trial-court clerk via e-mail. Cf. Ex
parte Tuck, 622 So. 2d 929, 930 (Ala. 1993)(holding that documents sent
to a trial-court clerk by facsimile transmission are not "filed" because
"[t]he Alabama rules of court do not presently specifically authorize any
'filings,' either of notices of appeal or any other documents, by facsimile
transmissions"). Thus, the wife did not effectively "file" a Rule 59(e), Ala.
12 CL-2025-0536
R. Civ. P., postjudgment motion by sending an e-mail to the circuit-court
clerk's office on February 25, 2025.
II. Whether the wife's notice of appeal was timely filed
Except in circumstances that are inapplicable here, "the notice of
appeal … shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 42 days (6
weeks) of the date of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from,"
Ala. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), but the filing of a Rule 59(e) postjudgment motion
suspends the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal. Ala. R. App.
P. 4(a)(3).
Because we have concluded in Section I, supra, that the wife did not
electronically "file" a Rule 59(e) postjudgment motion by sending an e-
mail to the circuit-court clerk's office on February 25, 2025, that e-mail
did not suspend the time to file a notice of appeal from the divorce
judgment.3 Thus, the wife had 42 days from the date of the divorce
judgment, or until April 8, 2025, to file a notice of appeal. The wife did
3The wife's March 12, 2025, e-mail to the circuit-court clerk's office,
construed by the circuit court as a motion to stay the enforcement of the divorce judgment, also did not affect the timeliness of the wife's notice of appeal. See Ala. R. App. P. 4(a)(3) (providing that certain postjudgment motions suspend the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal but not including among such motions a motion to stay the enforcement of a judgment pursuant to Rule 62(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.). 13 CL-2025-0536
not file the notice of appeal until July 9, 2025, or 134 days from the date
of the divorce judgment. Therefore, the wife failed to timely invoke this
court's appellate jurisdiction, and her appeal is due to be dismissed. See
Ala. R. App. P. 2(a)(1) ("An appeal shall be dismissed if the notice of
appeal was not timely filed to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate
court.").
Conclusion
Under the existing rules and orders of the Supreme Court of
Alabama, a document cannot be "filed" by e-mailing it to a trial-court
clerk's office. Thus, the mother's February 25, 2025, e-mail to the circuit-
court clerk's office did not constitute the filing of a postjudgment motion
and did not suspend the running of the time to file a notice of appeal from
the divorce judgment. Therefore, the mother's notice of appeal was
untimely and failed to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this court.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.
Moore, P.J., concurs in the result, without opinion.