Kayheem Lilly v. the City of New York

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: August 14, 2019
• Docket: 17 2823 (L)
• Status: Published

Opinion

17Ȭ2823ȱ(L)ȱ KayheemȱLillyȱv.ȱTheȱCityȱofȱNewȱYork,ȱetȱal.ȱ

2 In the 3 United States Court of Appeals 4 For the Second Circuit 5 ________ȱ 6 ȱ 7 AUGUSTȱTERM,ȱ2018ȱ 8 ȱ 9 ARGUED:ȱOCTOBERȱ30,ȱ2018ȱȱ 10 DECIDED:ȱAUGUSTȱ14,ȱ2019ȱ 11 ȱ 12 Nos.ȱ17Ȭ2823(L)Ȭcv,ȱ17Ȭ3000(XAP)Ȭcvȱ 13 ȱ 14 KAYHEEMȱLILLY,ȱ 15 PlaintiffȬAppelleeȬCrossȬAppellant,ȱ 16 ȱ 17 v.ȱ 18 ȱ 19 THEȱCITYȱOFȱNEWȱYORK;ȱNYPDȱDETECTIVEȱMALCOLMȱFREEMAN,ȱ 20 SHIELDȱNO.ȱ7049;ȱNYPDȱPOLICEȱOFFICERȱSOULȱKIM,ȱSHIELDȱNO.ȱ10804,ȱ 21 DefendantsȬAppellantsȬCrossȬAppellees,ȱ 22 ȱ 23 JOHNȱDOEȱSERGEANT;ȱJOHNȱDOES,ȱRICHARDȱROES;ȱANDREWȱHONG;ȱ 24 DONALDȱCAMBRIDGE;ȱJORGEȱTAJEDA;ȱFRANKȱBATISTA;ȱKEVINȱ 25 WHETSTONE,ȱ 26 Defendants.*ȱ 27 ________ȱ 28 ȱ 29 AppealȱfromȱtheȱUnitedȱStatesȱDistrictȱCourtȱ 30 forȱtheȱSouthernȱDistrictȱofȱNewȱYork.ȱ 31 No.ȱ16ȱCiv.ȱ322ȱ–ȱEdgardoȱRamos,ȱJudge.ȱ 32 ________ȱ

ȱConsistentȱwithȱtheȱorderȱenteredȱbyȱthisȱCourtȱonȱOctoberȱ18,ȱ2013,ȱECFȱNo.ȱ118,ȱ *

weȱuseȱtheȱshortȬformȱcaptionȱforȱtheȱpurposeȱofȱpublishingȱthisȱopinion.ȱ 2

1 ȱ 2 Before:ȱWALKER,ȱLEVAL,ȱANDȱDRONEY,ȱCircuitȱJudges.ȱ 3 ________ȱ 4 Kayheemȱ Lillyȱ (“Lilly”)ȱ filedȱ aȱ §ȱ 1983ȱ complaintȱ againstȱ theȱ 5 Cityȱ ofȱ Newȱ Yorkȱ andȱ individualȱ policeȱ officersȱ forȱ allegedȱ 6 deprivationsȱofȱhisȱconstitutionalȱrights.ȱȱDefendantsȱpresentedȱLillyȱ 7 withȱanȱofferȱofȱjudgmentȱpursuantȱtoȱFederalȱRuleȱofȱCivilȱProcedureȱ 8 68ȱ forȱ $10,001ȱ andȱ reasonableȱ attorney’sȱ fees,ȱ expenses,ȱ andȱ costsȱ 9 incurredȱ“toȱtheȱdateȱofȱ[the]ȱoffer.”ȱȱLillyȱacceptedȱtheȱoffer,ȱbutȱtheȱ 10 partiesȱ wereȱ unableȱ toȱ agreeȱ uponȱ theȱ sumȱ ofȱ attorney’sȱ fees,ȱ 11 expenses,ȱandȱcostsȱtoȱbeȱpaid.ȱȱLillyȱfiledȱaȱmotionȱwithȱtheȱdistrictȱ 12 courtȱforȱanȱawardȱofȱreasonableȱattorney’sȱfees,ȱexpenses,ȱandȱcosts,ȱ 13 thatȱ includedȱ theȱ hoursȱ Lilly’sȱ soloȱ practitionerȱ attorneyȱ spentȱ onȱ 14 clericalȱtasksȱandȱincurredȱpreparingȱtheȱfeeȱapplication.ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱ 15 courtȱgrantedȱtheȱapplicationȱbutȱreducedȱtheȱrequestedȱhourlyȱrateȱ 16 becauseȱofȱtheȱsimple,ȱ“relativelyȱstraightforward”ȱnatureȱofȱtheȱcase,ȱ 17 andȱ imposedȱ aȱ tenȱ percentȱ acrossȬtheȬboardȱ reductionȱ toȱ theȱ feeȱ 18 awardȱ toȱ accountȱ forȱ clericalȱ tasksȱ performedȱ byȱ theȱ attorney.ȱ ȱ Weȱ 19 AFFIRMȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ decisionȱ toȱ reduceȱ Lilly’sȱ attorney’sȱ 20 reasonableȱhourlyȱrateȱinȱlightȱofȱtheȱsimpleȱnatureȱofȱthisȱcase,ȱasȱwellȱ 21 asȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱdecisionȱtoȱreduceȱtheȱhoursȱclaimedȱthroughȱanȱ 22 acrossȬtheȬboardȱreductionȱtoȱreflectȱtheȱclericalȱworkȱperformed.ȱȱWeȱ 23 REVERSEȱ andȱ VACATE,ȱ however,ȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ decisionȱ toȱ 24 awardȱ Lillyȱ attorney’sȱ feesȱ forȱ theȱ workȱ incurredȱ preparingȱ theȱ feeȱ 25 applicationȱbecauseȱtheȱexpressȱtermsȱofȱtheȱacceptedȱRuleȱ68ȱofferȱofȱ 26 judgmentȱlimitȱtheȱfeesȱrecoverableȱtoȱthoseȱincurredȱ“toȱtheȱdateȱofȱ 27 [the]ȱoffer.”ȱ

28 ________ȱ

29 JEFFREYȱ A.ȱ ROTHMAN,ȱ Lawȱ Officeȱ ofȱ Jeffreyȱ A.ȱ 30 Rothman,ȱ Newȱ York,ȱ NY,ȱ forȱ PlaintiffȬAppelleeȬ 3

1 CrossȬAppellant.ȱ

2 ELINAȱ DRUKER,ȱ Ofȱ Counselȱ (Richardȱ Dearing,ȱ onȱ 3 theȱ brief),ȱ forȱ Zacharyȱ W.ȱ Carter,ȱ Corporationȱ 4 Counsel,ȱNewȱYork,ȱNY,ȱforȱDefendantsȬAppellantsȬ 5 CrossȬAppellees.ȱ

6 ________ȱ

7 JOHNȱM.ȱWALKER,ȱJR.,ȱCircuitȱJudge:ȱ

8 Kayheemȱ Lillyȱ (“Lilly”)ȱ filedȱ aȱ §ȱ 1983ȱ complaintȱ againstȱ theȱ 9 Cityȱ ofȱ Newȱ Yorkȱ andȱ individualȱ policeȱ officersȱ forȱ allegedȱ 10 deprivationsȱofȱhisȱconstitutionalȱrights.ȱȱDefendantsȱpresentedȱLillyȱ 11 withȱanȱofferȱofȱjudgmentȱpursuantȱtoȱFederalȱRuleȱofȱCivilȱProcedureȱ 12 68ȱ forȱ $10,001ȱ andȱ reasonableȱ attorney’sȱ fees,ȱ expenses,ȱ andȱ costsȱ 13 incurredȱ“toȱtheȱdateȱofȱ[the]ȱoffer.”ȱȱLillyȱacceptedȱtheȱoffer,ȱbutȱtheȱ 14 partiesȱ wereȱ unableȱ toȱ agreeȱ uponȱ theȱ sumȱ ofȱ attorney’sȱ fees,ȱ 15 expenses,ȱandȱcostsȱtoȱbeȱpaid.ȱȱLillyȱfiledȱaȱmotionȱwithȱtheȱdistrictȱ 16 courtȱforȱanȱawardȱofȱreasonableȱattorney’sȱfees,ȱexpenses,ȱandȱcosts,ȱ 17 thatȱ includedȱ theȱ hoursȱ Lilly’sȱ soloȱ practitionerȱ attorneyȱ spentȱ onȱ 18 clericalȱtasksȱandȱincurredȱpreparingȱtheȱfeeȱapplication.ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱ 19 courtȱgrantedȱtheȱapplicationȱbutȱreducedȱtheȱrequestedȱhourlyȱrateȱ 20 becauseȱofȱtheȱsimple,ȱ“relativelyȱstraightforward”ȱnatureȱofȱtheȱcase,ȱ 21 andȱ imposedȱ aȱ tenȱ percentȱ acrossȬtheȬboardȱ reductionȱ toȱ theȱ feeȱ 22 awardȱ toȱ accountȱ forȱ clericalȱ tasksȱ performedȱ byȱ theȱ attorney.ȱ ȱ Weȱ 23 AFFIRMȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ decisionȱ toȱ reduceȱ Lilly’sȱ attorney’sȱ 24 reasonableȱhourlyȱrateȱinȱlightȱofȱtheȱsimpleȱnatureȱofȱthisȱcase,ȱasȱwellȱ 25 asȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱdecisionȱtoȱreduceȱtheȱhoursȱclaimedȱthroughȱanȱ 26 acrossȬtheȬboardȱreductionȱtoȱreflectȱtheȱclericalȱworkȱperformed.ȱȱWeȱ 27 REVERSEȱ andȱ VACATE,ȱ however,ȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ decisionȱ toȱ 28 awardȱ Lillyȱ attorney’sȱ feesȱ forȱ theȱ workȱ incurredȱ preparingȱ theȱ feeȱ 29 applicationȱbecauseȱtheȱexpressȱtermsȱofȱtheȱacceptedȱRuleȱ68ȱofferȱofȱ 4

1 judgmentȱlimitȱtheȱfeesȱrecoverableȱtoȱthoseȱincurredȱ“toȱtheȱdateȱofȱ 2 [the]ȱoffer.”ȱ

3 BACKGROUNDȱ

4 PlaintiffȬAppelleeȬCrossȬAppellantȱ Lillyȱ filedȱ aȱ complaintȱ onȱ 5 Januaryȱ14,ȱ2016,ȱallegingȱthatȱhisȱcivilȱrightsȱwereȱviolatedȱbyȱtheȱCityȱ 6 ofȱNewȱYorkȱandȱseveralȱNewȱYorkȱCityȱpoliceȱofficersȱ(collectively,ȱ 7 theȱ“City”)ȱonȱtwoȱoccasionsȱinȱOctoberȱ2014.ȱȱTheȱfirstȱclaimȱwasȱforȱ 8 useȱofȱexcessiveȱforceȱandȱtheȱsecondȱwasȱforȱimproperȱissuanceȱofȱ 9 threeȱ summonsesȱ forȱ threateningȱ behaviorȱ towardȱ anȱ officer,ȱ 10 possessionȱofȱanȱopenȱcontainer,ȱandȱlittering,ȱallȱofȱwhichȱwereȱlaterȱ 11 dismissed.ȱ

12 LillyȱwasȱrepresentedȱbyȱJeffreyȱRothmanȱ(“Rothman”),ȱaȱcivilȱ 13 rightsȱ attorneyȱ andȱ soloȱ practitioner,ȱ whoȱ filedȱ theȱ complaintȱ onȱ 14 Lilly’sȱbehalf.ȱȱOnȱOctoberȱ26,ȱ2016,ȱtheȱCityȱpresentedȱLillyȱwithȱanȱ 15 offerȱ ofȱ judgmentȱ pursuantȱtoȱ Ruleȱ68ȱ ofȱ theȱ Federalȱ Rulesȱofȱ Civilȱ 16 Procedure,ȱwhichȱLillyȱaccepted.ȱȱTheȱofferȱstated:ȱ

17 Pursuantȱ toȱ Ruleȱ 68ȱ ofȱ theȱ Federalȱ Rulesȱ ofȱ Civilȱ 18 Procedure,ȱ defendantsȱ herebyȱ offerȱ toȱ allowȱ plaintiffȱ 19 [Kayheem]ȱ Lillyȱ toȱ takeȱaȱ judgmentȱ againstȱ theȱCityȱ ofȱ 20 Newȱ Yorkȱ inȱ thisȱ actionȱ forȱ theȱ totalȱ sumȱ ofȱ Tenȱ 21 ThousandȱandȱOneȱ($10,001.00)ȱDollars,ȱplusȱreasonableȱ 22 attorneys’ȱ fees,ȱ expenses,ȱ andȱ costsȱ toȱ theȱ dateȱ ofȱ thisȱ 23 offerȱforȱplaintiff’sȱfederalȱclaims.1ȱ 24 ȱ TheȱCityȱandȱLillyȱ(throughȱRothman)ȱattemptedȱtoȱnegotiateȱaȱ 25 settlementȱ regardingȱ attorney’sȱ fees,ȱ expenses,ȱ andȱ costsȱ butȱ wereȱ 26 unsuccessful.ȱ ȱ Rothmanȱ filedȱ aȱ formalȱ motionȱ forȱ anȱ awardȱ ofȱ 27 attorney’sȱfees,ȱexpenses,ȱandȱcostsȱwithȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt,ȱpursuantȱ 28 toȱ42ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ1988,ȱforȱaȱtotalȱsumȱofȱ$34,527.ȱȱThatȱfigureȱrepresentsȱ 29 50.3ȱ hoursȱ ofȱ workȱ upȱ toȱ theȱ dateȱ ofȱ theȱ offerȱ ofȱ judgmentȱ andȱ 6.5ȱ

1 ȱJointȱApp’xȱatȱ45.ȱ 5

1 hoursȱofȱworkȱpreparingȱtheȱattorney’sȱfeeȱapplicationȱatȱanȱhourlyȱ 2 rateȱofȱ$600,ȱasȱwellȱasȱ11.5ȱhoursȱforȱworkȱafterȱtheȱfeeȱapplicationȱ 3 andȱthroughȱtheȱfilingȱofȱLilly’sȱreplyȱbriefȱatȱanȱhourlyȱrateȱofȱ$625.2ȱȱ 4 Theȱ Cityȱ objectedȱ toȱ theȱ feeȱ requestȱ onȱ theȱ groundsȱ that:ȱ (1)ȱ hisȱ 5 requestedȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ wasȱ excessive,ȱ (2)ȱ theȱ numberȱ ofȱ hoursȱ 6 expendedȱwasȱunreasonable,ȱandȱ(3)ȱfeesȱincurredȱafterȱacceptanceȱofȱ 7 theȱRuleȱ68ȱofferȱareȱnotȱrecoverableȱunderȱtheȱtermsȱofȱtheȱoffer.ȱ

8 TheȱdistrictȱcourtȱgrantedȱRothmanȱreducedȱfees,ȱexpenses,ȱandȱ 9 costsȱ inȱ theȱ amountȱ ofȱ $28,128.99.ȱ ȱ Theȱ districtȱ courtȱ agreedȱ thatȱ 10 Rothmanȱhadȱcomparableȱexperienceȱandȱqualificationsȱtoȱotherȱcivilȱ 11 rightsȱattorneysȱwhoȱhaveȱreceivedȱattorney’sȱfeeȱawardsȱinȱtheȱlowȱ 12 $600ȱ perȱ hourȱ range,ȱ butȱ believedȱ thatȱ theȱ “simplicityȱ ofȱ thisȱ caseȱ 13 warrant[ed]ȱ aȱ reductionȱ ofȱ hisȱ claimedȱ hourlyȱ rates.”3ȱ ȱ Dueȱ toȱ theȱ 14 “relativelyȱ straightforward”ȱ natureȱ ofȱ theȱ case,ȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ 15 foundȱanȱhourlyȱrateȱofȱ$450ȱtoȱbeȱreasonable.4ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱcourtȱalsoȱ 16 imposedȱ aȱ tenȱ percentȱ acrossȬtheȬboardȱ cutȱ toȱ theȱ awardȱ becauseȱ 17 someȱofȱtheȱhoursȱclaimedȱwereȱforȱclericalȱtasksȱthatȱheȱhadȱbilledȱatȱ 18 anȱ attorney’sȱ hourlyȱ rate.ȱ ȱ Lastly,ȱ notwithstandingȱ theȱ factȱ thatȱ theȱ 19 Ruleȱ68ȱofferȱofȱjudgmentȱlimitedȱrecoverableȱfeesȱtoȱthoseȱincurredȱ 20 priorȱtoȱtheȱoffer,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱgrantedȱLillyȱattorney’sȱfeesȱforȱtheȱ 21 timeȱRothmanȱspentȱpreparingȱtheȱfeeȱapplication.ȱȱThisȱappealȱandȱ 22 crossȬappealȱfollowed.ȱȱȱ

23 DISCUSSIONȱ

24 Theȱ Cityȱ appealsȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ orderȱ grantingȱ “feesȱ onȱ 25 fees”ȱ (i.e.,ȱ theȱ attorney’sȱ feesȱ Rothmanȱ incurredȱ inȱ litigatingȱ theȱ 26 applicationȱforȱanȱawardȱofȱattorney’sȱfees)ȱbecauseȱtheȱRuleȱ68ȱofferȱ

2ȱTheȱincreaseȱreflectsȱaȱ$25ȱincreaseȱinȱRothman’sȱhourlyȱrateȱthatȱbecameȱeffectiveȱ onȱJanuaryȱ1,ȱ2016.ȱȱ 3ȱJointȱApp’xȱ277–79.ȱ

4ȱId.ȱ 6

1 ofȱ judgmentȱ limitedȱ theȱ recoverableȱ attorney’sȱ feesȱ toȱ onlyȱ thoseȱ 2 incurredȱ priorȱ toȱ theȱ offer.ȱ ȱ Lillyȱ crossȬappealsȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ 3 orderȱ reducingȱ Rothman’sȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ toȱ $450ȱ andȱ prohibitingȱ 4 Rothmanȱfromȱreceivingȱhisȱfullȱhourlyȱrateȱforȱclericalȱtasks.ȱ

5 Weȱreviewȱaȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱawardȱforȱattorney’sȱfees,ȱexpenses,ȱ 6 andȱ costsȱ forȱ abuseȱ ofȱ discretion.5ȱ ȱ “Aȱ districtȱ courtȱ abusesȱ itsȱ 7 discretionȱ ifȱ itȱ (1)ȱ basesȱ itsȱ decisionȱ onȱ anȱ errorȱ ofȱ lawȱ orȱ usesȱ theȱ 8 wrongȱ legalȱ standard;ȱ (2)ȱ basesȱ itsȱ decisionȱ onȱ aȱ clearlyȱ erroneousȱ 9 factualȱ finding;ȱ orȱ (3)ȱ reachesȱ aȱ conclusionȱ that,ȱ thoughȱ notȱ 10 necessarilyȱtheȱproductȱofȱaȱlegalȱerrorȱorȱaȱclearlyȱerroneousȱfactualȱ 11 finding,ȱcannotȱbeȱlocatedȱwithinȱtheȱrangeȱofȱpermissibleȱdecisions.”6ȱȱ 12 “Givenȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ inherentȱ institutionalȱ advantagesȱ inȱ thisȱ 13 area,ȱourȱreviewȱofȱaȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱfeeȱawardȱisȱhighlyȱdeferential.”7ȱȱ 14 Thisȱhighȱdegreeȱofȱdeferenceȱisȱappropriateȱbecauseȱ“[w]eȱcanȱhardlyȱ 15 thinkȱ ofȱ aȱ sphereȱ ofȱ judicialȱ decisionmakingȱ inȱ whichȱ appellateȱ 16 micromanagementȱhasȱlessȱtoȱrecommendȱit.”8ȱȱWeȱreviewȱquestionsȱ 17 ofȱlawȱregardingȱtheȱlegalȱstandardȱforȱgrantingȱorȱdenyingȱattorney’sȱ 18 feesȱdeȱnovo.9ȱȱWeȱalsoȱreviewȱaȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱinterpretationȱofȱaȱRuleȱ 19 68ȱofferȱdeȱnovo.10ȱ

20 I. CalculationȱofȱtheȱReasonableȱHourlyȱRateȱ

21 LillyȱarguesȱthatȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱerredȱinȱreducingȱRothman’sȱ 22 rateȱ fromȱ $600ȱ andȱ $625ȱ perȱ hourȱ toȱ $450ȱ perȱ hourȱ becauseȱ ofȱ theȱ 23 “durationȱandȱsimplicity”ȱofȱtheȱcase.ȱȱSpecifically,ȱheȱarguesȱthatȱafterȱ

5ȱSeeȱMilleaȱv.ȱMetroȬNorthȱR.ȱCo.,ȱ658ȱF.3dȱ154,ȱ166ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2011).ȱ 6ȱId.ȱ(internalȱquotationȱmarksȱomitted).ȱ 7ȱMcDonaldȱexȱrel.ȱPrendergastȱv.ȱPensionȱPlanȱofȱtheȱNYSAȬILAȱPensionȱTrustȱFund,ȱ

450ȱF.3dȱ91,ȱ96ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2006)ȱ(perȱcuriam).ȱ 8ȱFoxȱv.ȱVice,ȱ563ȱU.S.ȱ826,ȱ838ȱ(2011).ȱ

9ȱSeeȱScarangellaȱv.ȱGroupȱHealth,ȱInc.,ȱ731ȱF.3dȱ146,ȱ151ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2013).ȱ

10ȱSteinerȱv.ȱLewmar,ȱInc.,ȱ816ȱF.3dȱ26,ȱ31ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2016).ȱ 7

1 theȱ Supremeȱ Court’sȱ decisionȱ inȱ Perdueȱ v.ȱ Kennyȱ A.ȱ exȱ rel.ȱ Winn,11ȱ 2 districtȱcourtsȱcanȱnoȱlongerȱconsiderȱtheȱ“relativelyȱstraightforward”ȱ 3 natureȱ ofȱ anȱ actionȱ inȱ calculatingȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ toȱ beȱ 4 awarded.ȱȱToȱtheȱextentȱourȱdecisionȱinȱArborȱHillȱConcernedȱCitizensȱ 5 NeighborhoodȱAssociationȱv.ȱCountyȱofȱAlbany12ȱpermitsȱconsiderationȱofȱ 6 theȱsimplicityȱofȱlitigationȱinȱdeterminingȱtheȱappropriateȱhourlyȱrate,ȱ 7 LillyȱcontendsȱthatȱPerdueȱoverruledȱArborȱHill.ȱȱLilly’sȱargumentsȱareȱ 8 withoutȱmerit.ȱ

9 A. EarlyȱHistoryȱofȱFeeȬShiftingȱJurisprudenceȱ

10 BeforeȱaddressingȱArborȱHillȱandȱPerdue,ȱweȱthinkȱitȱhelpfulȱtoȱ 11 brieflyȱreviewȱtheȱrelevantȱhistoryȱofȱattorney’sȱfeesȱjurisprudence.ȱ

12 Inȱ 1976,ȱ Congressȱ enactedȱ theȱ Civilȱ Rightsȱ Attorney’sȱ Feesȱ 13 AwardȱAct,ȱ42ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ1988ȱ(“FeesȱAct”),ȱwhichȱauthorizedȱdistrictȱ 14 courtsȱ toȱ awardȱ theȱ prevailingȱ partyȱ inȱ civilȱ rightsȱ actionsȱ “aȱ 15 reasonableȱattorney’sȱfee.”13ȱȱTheȱActȱdidȱnotȱspecifyȱtheȱappropriateȱ 16 methodȱforȱcalculatingȱaȱreasonableȱattorney’sȱfee,ȱbutȱtheȱHouseȱandȱ 17 Senateȱ Reportsȱ referredȱ toȱ twoȱ methodsȱ thatȱ hadȱ developedȱ inȱ theȱ 18 circuitȱcourts.14ȱȱ

19 Theȱfirst,ȱknownȱasȱtheȱlodestarȱmethod,ȱwasȱadoptedȱbyȱtheȱ 20 Thirdȱ Circuitȱ inȱ Lindyȱ Bros.ȱ Builders,ȱ Inc.ȱ ofȱ Philadelphiaȱ v.ȱ Americanȱ 21 Radiatorȱ &ȱ Standardȱ Sanitaryȱ Corp.15ȱ ȱ Thisȱ approachȱ calculatesȱ 22 attorney’sȱfeesȱbyȱmultiplyingȱtheȱattorney’sȱusualȱhourlyȱrateȱbyȱtheȱ 23 numberȱofȱhoursȱbilled,ȱtoȱproduceȱaȱfigureȱknownȱasȱtheȱlodestar.16ȱȱ 24 Afterȱdeterminingȱtheȱlodestar,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱthenȱhasȱdiscretionȱ

11ȱ559ȱU.S.ȱ542ȱ(2010).ȱ 12ȱ522ȱF.3dȱ182ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2008).ȱ 13ȱSeeȱHensleyȱv.ȱEckerhart,ȱ461ȱU.S.ȱ424,ȱ429ȱ(1983).ȱ

14ȱSeeȱArborȱHill,ȱ522ȱF.3dȱatȱ186;ȱseeȱalsoȱHensley,ȱ461ȱU.S.ȱatȱ429–30.ȱ

15ȱ487ȱF.2dȱ161ȱ(3dȱCir.ȱ1973).ȱ

16ȱId.ȱatȱ167–68.ȱ 8

1 toȱadjustȱtheȱfinalȱamountȱtoȱensureȱthatȱtheȱfeeȱisȱreasonable.17ȱ

2 Theȱ secondȱ method,ȱ knownȱ asȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ approach,ȱ wasȱ 3 developedȱbyȱtheȱFifthȱCircuitȱinȱJohnsonȱv.ȱGeorgiaȱHighwayȱExpress,ȱ 4 Inc.18ȱ ȱ Insteadȱ ofȱ startingȱ withȱ theȱ attorney’sȱ usualȱ hourlyȱ rate,ȱ 5 multiplyingȱitȱbyȱtheȱnumberȱofȱhoursȱworked,ȱandȱthenȱdeterminingȱ 6 whetherȱ thatȱ figureȱ (theȱ lodestar)ȱ shouldȱ beȱ adjusted,ȱ theȱ districtȱ 7 courtȱ determinesȱ aȱ reasonableȱ attorney’sȱ feeȱ inȱ oneȱ stepȱ byȱ 8 consideringȱtwelveȱfactors.19ȱȱTheseȱtwelveȱfactorsȱare:ȱ

9 (1)ȱ theȱ timeȱ andȱ laborȱ required;ȱ (2)ȱ theȱ noveltyȱ andȱ 10 difficultyȱofȱtheȱquestions;ȱ(3)ȱtheȱlevelȱofȱskillȱrequiredȱ 11 toȱperformȱtheȱlegalȱserviceȱproperly;ȱ(4)ȱtheȱpreclusionȱ 12 ofȱemploymentȱbyȱtheȱattorneyȱdueȱtoȱacceptanceȱofȱtheȱ 13 case;ȱ (5)ȱ theȱ attorney’sȱ customaryȱ hourlyȱ rate;ȱ (6)ȱ 14 whetherȱ theȱ feeȱ isȱ fixedȱ orȱ contingent;ȱ (7)ȱ theȱ timeȱ 15 limitationsȱ imposedȱ byȱ theȱ clientȱ orȱ theȱ circumstances;ȱ 16 (8)ȱ theȱ amountȱ involvedȱ inȱ theȱ caseȱ andȱ theȱ resultsȱ 17 obtained;ȱ(9)ȱtheȱexperience,ȱreputation,ȱandȱabilityȱofȱtheȱ 18 attorneys;ȱ (10)ȱ theȱ “undesirability”ȱ ofȱ theȱ case;ȱ (11)ȱ theȱ 19 natureȱ andȱ lengthȱ ofȱ theȱ professionalȱ relationshipȱ withȱ 20 theȱclient;ȱandȱ(12)ȱawardsȱinȱsimilarȱcases.20ȱ 21 TheȱSupremeȱCourtȱfirstȱconsideredȱtheȱappropriateȱmethodȱtoȱ 22 calculateȱ aȱ reasonableȱ attorney’sȱ feeȱ inȱ Hensleyȱ v.ȱ Eckerhart.21ȱ ȱ Theȱ 23 Courtȱ“adoptedȱtheȱlodestarȱmethodȱinȱprinciple,ȱwithout,ȱhowever,ȱ 24 fullyȱ abandoningȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ method.”22ȱ ȱ Insteadȱ ofȱ usingȱ theȱ 25 attorney’sȱ usualȱ hourlyȱ rate,ȱ theȱ Courtȱ instructedȱ districtȱ courtsȱ toȱ

17ȱId.ȱatȱ168–69.ȱ 18ȱ488ȱF.2dȱ714ȱ(5thȱCir.ȱ1974),ȱabrogatedȱonȱotherȱgroundsȱbyȱBlanchardȱv.ȱBergeron,ȱ 489ȱU.S.ȱ87ȱ(1989).ȱ 19ȱSeeȱid.ȱatȱ717–19.ȱ

20ȱArborȱHill,ȱ522ȱF.3dȱatȱ186ȱn.3ȱ(citingȱJohnson,ȱ488ȱF.2dȱatȱ717–19).ȱȱ

21ȱ461ȱU.S.ȱ424ȱ(1983).ȱ

22ȱArborȱHill,ȱ522ȱF.3dȱatȱ188ȱ(internalȱcitationȱomitted).ȱ 9

1 determineȱaȱ“reasonableȱhourlyȱrate,”ȱandȱspecificallyȱreferredȱtoȱtheȱ 2 Johnsonȱ factorsȱ asȱ usefulȱ toolsȱ forȱ determiningȱ whatȱ isȱ reasonable.23ȱȱ 3 TheȱCourtȱdescribedȱthisȱprocessȱofȱdeterminingȱaȱreasonableȱhourlyȱ 4 rateȱ andȱ thenȱ multiplyingȱ itȱ byȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hoursȱ billedȱ asȱ “anȱ 5 objectiveȱbasisȱonȱwhichȱtoȱmakeȱanȱinitialȱestimateȱofȱtheȱvalueȱofȱaȱ 6 lawyer’sȱservices,”ȱ(i.e.,ȱtheȱlodestar).24ȱȱTheȱCourtȱwentȱonȱtoȱholdȱthatȱ 7 afterȱ calculatingȱ theȱ lodestarȱ inȱ thisȱ manner,ȱ aȱ districtȱ courtȱ hasȱ 8 discretionȱtoȱincreaseȱorȱdecreaseȱtheȱfinalȱfeeȱinȱ“casesȱofȱexceptionalȱ 9 success”ȱorȱ“onlyȱpartialȱorȱlimitedȱsuccess,”ȱrespectively.25ȱȱ

10 Aȱyearȱlater,ȱinȱBlumȱv.ȱStenson,ȱtheȱCourtȱreiteratedȱitsȱholdingȱ 11 inȱ Hensley,ȱ thatȱ theȱ initialȱ feeȱ awardȱ shouldȱ beȱ determinedȱ byȱ 12 multiplyingȱ aȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ byȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hoursȱ 13 expended,ȱandȱthatȱtheȱfinalȱawardȱcanȱbeȱincreasedȱorȱdecreasedȱinȱ 14 exceptionalȱcasesȱtoȱachieveȱaȱreasonableȱfee.26ȱȱTheȱCourtȱexplainedȱ 15 thatȱtheȱFeesȱAct:ȱ

16 requiresȱ aȱ “reasonableȱ fee,”ȱ andȱ thereȱ mayȱ beȱ 17 circumstancesȱinȱwhichȱtheȱbasicȱstandardȱofȱreasonableȱ 18 ratesȱmultipliedȱbyȱreasonablyȱexpendedȱhoursȱresultsȱinȱ 19 aȱ feeȱ thatȱ isȱ eitherȱ unreasonablyȱ lowȱ orȱ unreasonablyȱ 20 high.ȱȱWhen,ȱhowever,ȱtheȱapplicantȱforȱaȱfeeȱhasȱcarriedȱ 21 hisȱburdenȱofȱshowingȱthatȱtheȱclaimedȱrateȱandȱnumberȱ 22 ofȱ hoursȱ areȱ reasonable,ȱ theȱ resultingȱ productȱ isȱ 23 presumedȱ toȱ beȱ theȱ reasonableȱ feeȱ contemplatedȱ byȱ 24 §ȱ1988.27ȱ 25 ThisȱhybridȱapproachȱwasȱagainȱapprovedȱbyȱtheȱCourtȱinȱtheȱ 26 1986ȱcaseȱofȱPennsylvaniaȱv.ȱDelawareȱValleyȱCitizen’sȱCouncilȱforȱCleanȱ

23ȱId.ȱ(citingȱHensley,ȱ461ȱU.S.ȱatȱ434ȱn.9).ȱ 24ȱHensley,ȱ461ȱU.S.ȱatȱ433.ȱ 25ȱId.ȱatȱ435–37.ȱ

26ȱ465ȱU.S.ȱ886,ȱ896–97ȱ(1984).ȱ

27ȱId.ȱatȱ897.ȱ 10

1 Air.28ȱȱInȱbothȱBlumȱandȱDelawareȱValley,ȱhowever,ȱtheȱCourtȱclarifiedȱ 2 thatȱ manyȱ ofȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ factorsȱ “areȱ subsumedȱ withinȱ theȱ initialȱ 3 calculation”ȱofȱtheȱlodestarȱ(reasonableȱhoursȱexpendedȱmultipliedȱbyȱ 4 theȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rate),ȱ andȱ thereforeȱ “cannotȱ serveȱ asȱ 5 independentȱbasesȱforȱincreasingȱ[orȱdecreasing]ȱtheȱbasicȱfeeȱaward,”ȱ 6 (i.e.,ȱtheȱlodestar).29ȱȱSpecifically,ȱtheȱCourtȱstatedȱthatȱtheȱnoveltyȱandȱ 7 complexityȱofȱtheȱissues,ȱtheȱspecialȱskillȱandȱexperienceȱofȱcounsel,ȱ 8 theȱ qualityȱ ofȱ representation,ȱ andȱ theȱ resultsȱ obtainedȱ fromȱ theȱ 9 litigationȱ shouldȱ beȱ “fullyȱ reflectedȱ inȱ theȱ numberȱ ofȱ billableȱ hoursȱ 10 recordedȱbyȱcounsel”ȱorȱ“theȱreasonablenessȱofȱtheȱhourlyȱrates.”30ȱȱAsȱ 11 aȱresult,ȱitȱisȱinappropriateȱforȱaȱdistrictȱcourtȱtoȱincreaseȱorȱdecreaseȱ 12 theȱlodestarȱfigureȱonȱaccountȱofȱanyȱofȱtheseȱfactors,ȱbecauseȱtheyȱareȱ 13 alreadyȱ accountedȱ forȱ inȱ calculatingȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ orȱ 14 reasonableȱhoursȱbilledȱtoȱdetermineȱtheȱlodestar.31ȱ

15 B. ArborȱHillȱ

16 Theȱ Supremeȱ Court’sȱ adoptionȱ ofȱ aȱ hybridȱ approachȱ causedȱ 17 confusionȱamongstȱtheȱlowerȱcourtsȱasȱtoȱhowȱtoȱbalanceȱtheȱbrightȬ 18 lineȱstandardsȱofȱtheȱlodestarȱmodelȱwithȱtheȱnumerousȱevaluationsȱ 19 requiredȱ byȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ factorsȱ andȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ abilityȱ toȱ 20 exerciseȱ itsȱ discretionȱ toȱ enhanceȱ orȱ cutȱ theȱ finalȱ feeȱ awardȱ inȱ 21 exceptionalȱcircumstances.32ȱ

22 InȱArborȱHill,ȱweȱattemptedȱtoȱresolveȱsomeȱofȱthisȱtensionȱandȱ

28ȱ478ȱU.S.ȱ546,ȱ563–64ȱ(1986).ȱȱ 29ȱId.ȱatȱ564–65ȱ(internalȱquotationȱmarksȱomitted)ȱ(citingȱBlum,ȱ465ȱU.S.ȱatȱ898– 900).ȱ 30ȱBlum,ȱ465ȱU.S.ȱatȱ898;ȱseeȱalsoȱDelawareȱValley,ȱ478ȱU.S.ȱatȱ564–65.ȱ

31ȱSeeȱBlum,ȱ465ȱU.S.ȱatȱ898–99,ȱ900;ȱseeȱalsoȱDelawareȱValley,ȱ478ȱU.S.ȱatȱ564–65,ȱ566–

67.ȱ 32ȱSeeȱArborȱHill,ȱ522ȱF.3dȱatȱ188ȱ(“AfterȱHensleyȱandȱBlum,ȱcircuitȱcourtsȱstruggledȱ

withȱ theȱ nettlesomeȱ interplayȱ betweenȱ theȱ lodestarȱ methodȱ andȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ method.”).ȱ 11

1 clarifyȱourȱcircuit’sȱfeeȬsettingȱjurisprudence.ȱȱWeȱinstructedȱdistrictȱ 2 courtsȱtoȱcalculateȱaȱ“presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfee”33ȱbyȱdeterminingȱ 3 theȱ appropriateȱ billableȱ hoursȱ expendedȱ andȱ “settingȱ aȱ reasonableȱ 4 hourlyȱ rate,ȱ takingȱ accountȱ ofȱ allȱ caseȬspecificȱ variables.”34ȱ ȱ Weȱ 5 explainedȱwithȱrespectȱtoȱtheȱlatter:ȱ

6 [T]heȱ districtȱ court,ȱ inȱ exercisingȱ itsȱ considerableȱ 7 discretion,ȱ[should]ȱbearȱinȱmindȱallȱofȱtheȱcaseȬspecificȱ 8 variablesȱ thatȱ weȱ andȱ otherȱ courtsȱ haveȱ identifiedȱ asȱ 9 relevantȱtoȱtheȱreasonablenessȱofȱattorney’sȱfeesȱinȱsettingȱ 10 aȱreasonableȱhourlyȱrate.ȱȱTheȱreasonableȱhourlyȱrateȱisȱ 11 theȱ rateȱ aȱ payingȱ clientȱ wouldȱ beȱ willingȱ toȱ pay.ȱ ȱ Inȱ 12 determiningȱwhatȱrateȱaȱpayingȱclientȱwouldȱbeȱwillingȱ 13 toȱpay,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱshouldȱconsider,ȱamongȱothers,ȱ 14 theȱ Johnsonȱ factors;ȱ itȱ shouldȱ alsoȱ bearȱ inȱ mindȱ thatȱ aȱ 15 reasonable,ȱpayingȱclientȱwishesȱtoȱspendȱtheȱminimumȱ 16 necessaryȱ toȱ litigateȱ theȱ caseȱ effectively.ȱ ȱ Theȱ districtȱ 17 courtȱshouldȱalsoȱconsiderȱthatȱsuchȱanȱindividualȱmightȱ 18 beȱableȱtoȱnegotiateȱwithȱhisȱorȱherȱattorneys,ȱusingȱtheirȱ 19 desireȱ toȱ obtainȱ theȱ reputationalȱ benefitsȱ thatȱ mightȱ 20 accrueȱfromȱbeingȱassociatedȱwithȱtheȱcase.ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱ 21 courtȱ shouldȱ thenȱ useȱ thatȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ toȱ 22 calculateȱ whatȱ canȱ properlyȱ beȱ termedȱ theȱ 23 “presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfee.”35ȱȱ 24 ȱ Inȱ theȱ wakeȱ ofȱ Arborȱ Hill,ȱ weȱ haveȱ consistentlyȱ appliedȱ thisȱ 25 methodȱ ofȱ determiningȱ aȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ byȱ consideringȱ allȱ 26 pertinentȱfactors,ȱincludingȱtheȱJohnsonȱfactors,ȱandȱthenȱmultiplyingȱ

33ȱWeȱusedȱtheȱtermȱ“presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfee”ȱinsteadȱofȱtheȱtraditionalȱtermȱ “lodestar”ȱbecauseȱtheȱmeaningȱofȱtheȱlatterȱtermȱ“hasȱshiftedȱoverȱtime,ȱandȱitsȱ valueȱasȱaȱmetaphorȱhasȱdeterioratedȱtoȱtheȱpointȱofȱunhelpfulness.”ȱȱId.ȱatȱ190.ȱȱ TheȱSupremeȱCourt,ȱhowever,ȱcontinuesȱtoȱuseȱtheȱtermȱaccordingȱtoȱtheȱdefinitionȱ providedȱ byȱ theȱ Courtȱ inȱ Hensley.ȱ ȱ Forȱ allȱ intentsȱ andȱ purposes,ȱ theȱ twoȱ termsȱ meanȱtheȱsameȱthing.ȱ 34ȱId.ȱatȱ189–90.ȱ

35ȱId.ȱatȱ190.ȱ 12

1 thatȱrateȱbyȱtheȱnumberȱofȱhoursȱreasonablyȱexpendedȱtoȱdetermineȱ 2 theȱ presumptivelyȱ reasonableȱ fee.36ȱ ȱ Itȱ isȱ onlyȱ afterȱ thisȱ initialȱ 3 calculationȱ ofȱ theȱ presumptivelyȱ reasonableȱ feeȱ isȱ performedȱ thatȱ aȱ 4 districtȱ courtȱ may,ȱ inȱ extraordinaryȱ circumstances,ȱ adjustȱ theȱ 5 presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfeeȱwhenȱitȱ“doesȱnotȱadequatelyȱtakeȱintoȱ 6 accountȱ aȱ factorȱ thatȱ mayȱ properlyȱ beȱ consideredȱ inȱ determiningȱ aȱ 7 reasonableȱfee.”37ȱ

8 C. Perdueȱ

9 Afterȱ announcingȱ theȱ hybridȱ approachȱ forȱ calculatingȱ 10 attorney’sȱfeesȱinȱHensley,ȱandȱclarifyingȱwhenȱitȱisȱpermissibleȱforȱaȱ 11 districtȱcourtȱtoȱincreaseȱorȱdecreaseȱtheȱlodestarȱvalueȱinȱexceptionalȱ 12 casesȱinȱBlumȱandȱDelawareȱValley,ȱtheȱSupremeȱCourt’sȱrevisitedȱitsȱ 13 feeȬshiftingȱjurisprudenceȱinȱ2010ȱinȱPerdueȱv.ȱKennyȱA.ȱexȱrel.ȱWinn.ȱȱ

36ȱSee,ȱe.g.,ȱGortatȱv.ȱCapalaȱBros.,ȱInc.,ȱ621ȱF.ȱApp’xȱ19,ȱ22ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2015)ȱ(summaryȱ order)ȱ (“Inȱ calculatingȱ theȱ ‘presumptivelyȱ reasonableȱ fee,’ȱ whichȱ isȱ generallyȱ arrivedȱ atȱ byȱ multiplyingȱ theȱ numberȱ ofȱ hoursȱ reasonablyȱ expendedȱ onȱ theȱ litigationȱ .ȱ .ȱ .ȱ byȱ aȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rate,ȱ thisȱ Courtȱ hasȱ recommendedȱ thatȱ aȱ districtȱ courtȱ takeȱ intoȱ accountȱ whatȱ aȱ payingȱ clientȱ wouldȱ beȱ willingȱ toȱ pay.”ȱ (internalȱ citationȱ andȱ quotationȱ marksȱ omitted));ȱ Torresȱ v.ȱ Gristede’sȱ Operatingȱ Corp.,ȱ 519ȱ F.ȱ App’xȱ 1,ȱ 3–4ȱ (2dȱ Cir.ȱ 2013)ȱ (summaryȱ order)ȱ (“[W]eȱ haveȱ directedȱ considerationȱ ofȱ theȱ caseȬspecificȱ variablesȱ thatȱ weȱ andȱ otherȱ courtsȱ haveȱ identifiedȱ asȱ relevantȱ toȱ theȱ reasonablenessȱ ofȱ attorney’sȱ fees—includingȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ factors—inȱ settingȱ aȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rate.”ȱ (internalȱ quotationȱ marksȱ omitted));ȱBergersonȱv.ȱN.Y.ȱStateȱOfficeȱofȱMentalȱHealth,ȱCent.ȱN.Y.ȱPsychiatricȱCtr.,ȱ 652ȱF.3dȱ277,ȱ289ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2011)ȱ(“Attorneys’ȱfeesȱareȱawardedȱbyȱdeterminingȱaȱ presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfee,ȱreachedȱbyȱmultiplyingȱaȱreasonableȱhourlyȱrateȱbyȱ theȱnumberȱofȱreasonablyȱexpendedȱhours.”);ȱMillea,ȱ658ȱF.3dȱatȱ166ȱ(“Bothȱthisȱ Courtȱ andȱ theȱ Supremeȱ Courtȱ haveȱ heldȱ thatȱ theȱ lodestar—theȱ productȱ ofȱ aȱ reasonableȱhourlyȱrateȱandȱtheȱreasonableȱnumberȱofȱhoursȱrequiredȱbyȱtheȱcase— createsȱaȱ‘presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfee.’”);ȱKonitsȱv.ȱValleyȱStreamȱCent.ȱHighȱSch.ȱ Dist.,ȱ 350ȱ F.ȱ App’xȱ 501,ȱ 503ȱ (2dȱ Cir.ȱ 2009)ȱ (summaryȱ order)ȱ (“Inȱ determiningȱ reasonableȱattorneys’ȱfees,ȱaȱdistrictȱcourtȱmust:ȱ(1)ȱsetȱaȱreasonableȱhourlyȱrate,ȱ bearingȱinȱmindȱallȱofȱtheȱcaseȱspecificȱvariables,ȱandȱ(2)ȱuseȱtheȱreasonableȱhourlyȱ rateȱtoȱcalculateȱaȱ‘presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfee.’”).ȱ 37ȱMillea,ȱ658ȱF.3dȱatȱ167ȱ(quotingȱPerdue,ȱ559ȱU.S.ȱatȱ554).ȱ 13

1 InȱPerdue,ȱ theȱCourtȱwasȱ“askedȱtoȱdecideȱwhetherȱeitherȱtheȱ 2 qualityȱ ofȱ anȱ attorney’sȱ performanceȱ orȱ theȱ resultsȱ obtainedȱ areȱ 3 factorsȱthatȱmayȱproperlyȱprovideȱaȱbasisȱforȱanȱenhancement”ȱofȱtheȱ 4 lodestarȱvalue.38ȱȱTheȱCourtȱfirstȱaffirmedȱitsȱlongȬstandingȱpositionȱ 5 thatȱ “theȱ lodestarȱ methodȱ yieldsȱ aȱ feeȱ thatȱ isȱ presumptivelyȱ 6 sufficient,”ȱ butȱ “thatȱ presumptionȱ mayȱ beȱ overcomeȱ inȱ thoseȱ rareȱ 7 circumstancesȱ inȱ whichȱ theȱ lodestarȱ doesȱ notȱ adequatelyȱ takeȱ intoȱ 8 accountȱ aȱ factorȱ thatȱ mayȱ properlyȱ beȱ consideredȱ inȱ determiningȱ aȱ 9 reasonableȱfee.”39ȱȱFactorsȱthatȱareȱalreadyȱsubsumedȱinȱtheȱlodestarȱ 10 calculationȱcannotȱbeȱusedȱtoȱenhanceȱorȱcutȱtheȱlodestarȱamount.40ȱȱ 11 Theȱ Courtȱ reiteratedȱ thatȱ “theȱ noveltyȱ andȱ complexityȱ ofȱ aȱ caseȱ 12 generallyȱmayȱnotȱbeȱusedȱasȱaȱgroundȱforȱenhancementȱbecauseȱtheseȱ 13 factorsȱ‘presumablyȱareȱfullyȱreflectedȱinȱtheȱnumberȱofȱbillableȱhoursȱ 14 recordedȱbyȱcounsel,’”ȱasȱwellȱasȱtheȱreasonableȱhourlyȱrate.41ȱȱThus,ȱ 15 Perdueȱ confirmedȱ theȱ longȬstandingȱ approachȱ toȱ calculatingȱ 16 attorney’sȱ feesȱ endorsedȱ byȱ theȱ Supremeȱ Courtȱ inȱ Hensley,ȱ Blum,ȱ 17 DelawareȱValley,ȱasȱwellȱasȱourȱcircuitȱinȱArborȱHill.ȱ

18 D. Theȱ Districtȱ Court’sȱ Reasonableȱ Hourlyȱ Rateȱ 19 Determinationȱ

20 Inȱhisȱfeeȱapplication,ȱLillyȱrequestedȱanȱhourlyȱrateȱfirstȱatȱ$600ȱ 21 andȱ laterȱ atȱ $625ȱ perȱ hourȱ forȱ Rothman’sȱ workȱ onȱ theȱ matter.ȱ ȱ Theȱ 22 Cityȱarguedȱthatȱthisȱrateȱwasȱunreasonableȱbecauseȱtheȱcaseȱwasȱaȱ 23 simple,ȱ“gardenȱvariety”ȱcivilȱrightsȱcase.42ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱcourtȱagreedȱ 24 withȱtheȱCityȱthatȱtheȱcaseȱwasȱ“relative[ly]ȱsimpl[e]”43ȱand,ȱrelyingȱ

38ȱ559ȱU.S.ȱatȱ554.ȱ 39ȱId.ȱatȱ552,ȱ553–54.ȱ 40ȱId.ȱatȱ553ȱ(citingȱDelawareȱValley,ȱ478ȱU.S.ȱatȱ566).ȱ

41ȱId.ȱ(quotingȱBlum,ȱ465ȱU.S.ȱatȱ898ȱ(bracketsȱomitted)).ȱȱ

42ȱLillyȱv.ȱCityȱofȱNewȱYork,ȱNo.ȱ16ȱCiv.ȱ322ȱ(ER),ȱ2017ȱWLȱ3493249,ȱatȱ*2ȱ(S.D.N.Y.ȱ

Aug.ȱ15,ȱ2017).ȱ 43ȱId.ȱatȱ*3–5.ȱ 14

1 onȱ Arborȱ Hill,ȱ thatȱ theȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ shouldȱ reflectȱ thisȱ lackȱ ofȱ 2 complexity.44ȱȱThus,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱlookedȱtoȱtheȱreasonableȱhourlyȱ 3 ratesȱ forȱ civilȱ rightsȱ attorneysȱ workingȱ onȱ aȱ simple,ȱ gardenȱ varietyȱ 4 civilȱrightsȱcaseȱinȱtheȱSouthernȱDistrictȱofȱNewȱYork.45ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱ 5 courtȱ foundȱ thatȱ similar,ȱ straightforwardȱ civilȱ rightsȱ casesȱ inȱ theȱ 6 Southernȱ Districtȱ involvingȱ attorneysȱ withȱ similarȱ experienceȱ andȱ 7 qualificationsȱasȱRothmanȱresultedȱinȱhourlyȱratesȱbetweenȱ$350ȱandȱ 8 $450.46ȱȱTherefore,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱawardedȱRothmanȱanȱhourlyȱrateȱ 9 ofȱ$450,ȱatȱtheȱtopȱofȱtheȱrange.ȱ

10 Weȱ findȱ noȱ errorȱ inȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ reasoning.ȱ ȱ Asȱ weȱ 11 emphasizedȱinȱArborȱHill,ȱ“[t]heȱreasonableȱhourlyȱrateȱisȱtheȱrateȱaȱ 12 payingȱ clientȱ wouldȱ beȱ willingȱ toȱ payȱ .ȱ .ȱ .ȱ bear[ing]ȱ inȱ mindȱ thatȱ aȱ 13 reasonable,ȱpayingȱclientȱwishesȱtoȱspendȱtheȱminimumȱnecessaryȱtoȱ 14 litigateȱ theȱ caseȱ effectively.”47ȱ ȱ Itȱ wasȱ entirelyȱ appropriateȱ forȱ theȱ 15 districtȱ courtȱ toȱ considerȱ theȱ complexityȱ ofȱ aȱ matterȱ becauseȱ aȱ 16 reasonableȱpayingȱclientȱwouldȱconsiderȱtheȱcomplexityȱofȱhisȱorȱherȱ 17 caseȱ whenȱ decidingȱ whetherȱ anȱ attorney’sȱ proposedȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ isȱ 18 fair,ȱ reasonable,ȱ andȱ commensurateȱ withȱ theȱ proposedȱ action.ȱ ȱ Theȱ 19 districtȱcourt’sȱdecisionȱtoȱconsiderȱbothȱRothman’sȱexperienceȱandȱ 20 theȱgardenȬvarietyȱnatureȱofȱtheȱlitigation,ȱwhichȱ“lastedȱlessȱthanȱ10ȱ 21 months,ȱ requiredȱ noȱ depositions,ȱ andȱ involvedȱ noȱ substantialȱ 22 motionsȱorȱbriefings”ȱorȱappearancesȱbeforeȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt,48ȱwasȱ 23 consistentȱwithȱourȱdirectionȱforȱdistrictȱcourts,ȱ“inȱexercisingȱ[their]ȱ 24 considerableȱ discretion,ȱ toȱ bearȱ inȱ mindȱ allȱ ofȱ theȱ caseȬspecificȱ 25 variablesȱthatȱweȱandȱotherȱcourtsȱhaveȱidentifiedȱasȱrelevantȱtoȱtheȱ

44ȱId.ȱatȱ*4.ȱ 45ȱId.ȱatȱ*4–5.ȱ 46ȱId.ȱatȱ*5.ȱ

47ȱArborȱHill,ȱ522ȱF.3dȱatȱ190.ȱ

48ȱLilly,ȱ2017ȱWLȱ3493249,ȱatȱ*5.ȱ 15

1 reasonablenessȱ ofȱ attorney’sȱ feesȱ inȱ settingȱ aȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ 2 rate.”49ȱ

3 Lilly’sȱ argumentȱ thatȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ considerationȱ ofȱ theȱ 4 simpleȱ natureȱ ofȱ thisȱ caseȱ andȱ ourȱ opinionȱ inȱ Arborȱ Hillȱ permittingȱ 5 suchȱ considerationȱ areȱ inȱ conflictȱ withȱ Perdueȱ isȱ misplaced.ȱ ȱ Perdueȱ 6 addressedȱ whetherȱ aȱ districtȱ court,ȱ afterȱ calculatingȱ aȱ reasonableȱ 7 hourlyȱ rateȱ andȱ multiplyingȱ itȱ byȱ theȱ reasonableȱ numberȱ ofȱ hoursȱ 8 workedȱtoȱproduceȱtheȱlodestar,ȱcouldȱgrantȱaȱfeeȱenhancementȱorȱcutȱ 9 toȱ theȱ lodestarȱ amountȱ inȱ recognitionȱ ofȱ theȱ qualityȱ ofȱ anȱ attorney’sȱ 10 performanceȱ orȱ theȱ resultsȱ obtained.50ȱ ȱ Perdueȱ didȱ notȱ involveȱ aȱ 11 challengeȱtoȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱcomputationȱofȱtheȱreasonableȱhourlyȱ 12 rateȱatȱall—itȱonlyȱconcernedȱtheȱproprietyȱofȱtheȱfeeȱenhancement.ȱȱItȱ 13 wasȱinȱthisȱcontextȱthatȱtheȱCourtȱreiteratedȱitsȱpriorȱstatementsȱfromȱ 14 BlumȱandȱDelawareȱValley,ȱthatȱtheȱnoveltyȱandȱcomplexityȱofȱaȱcaseȱ 15 generallyȱ mayȱ notȱ beȱ usedȱ asȱ aȱ groundȱ forȱ anȱ enhancementȱ orȱ 16 reductionȱbecauseȱthoseȱfactorsȱareȱalreadyȱreflectedȱinȱtheȱreasonableȱ 17 hourlyȱrateȱandȱreasonableȱhoursȱbilledȱ(i.e.,ȱtheȱlodestar).51ȱȱȱ

18 Perdue,ȱ therefore,ȱ didȱ notȱ overruleȱ Arborȱ Hillȱ orȱ otherwiseȱ 19 prohibitȱdistrictȱcourtsȱfromȱconsideringȱtheȱnoveltyȱorȱcomplexityȱofȱ 20 aȱ caseȱ inȱ determiningȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ orȱ hoursȱ billed.ȱȱ 21 PerdueȱisȱconsistentȱwithȱpriorȱSupremeȱCourtȱopinionsȱthatȱindicateȱ 22 thatȱcaseȬspecificȱfactorsȱlikeȱtheȱnoveltyȱorȱcomplexityȱofȱtheȱmatterȱ 23 areȱ appropriatelyȱ consideredȱ inȱ determiningȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ 24 rateȱorȱhoursȱbilled.ȱȱImportantly,ȱtheȱPerdueȱCourtȱstatedȱthatȱ“theȱ

49ȱArborȱHill,ȱ522ȱF.3dȱatȱ190.ȱȱ 50ȱPerdue,ȱ559ȱU.S.ȱatȱ548ȱ(describingȱhowȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱdeterminedȱaȱreasonableȱ hourlyȱrateȱandȱreasonableȱhoursȱbilled,ȱmultipliedȱthemȱtoȱcalculateȱaȱlodestarȱofȱ approximatelyȱ$6ȱmillion,ȱandȱ“thenȱenhancedȱthisȱawardȱbyȱ75%,ȱconcludingȱthatȱ theȱlodestarȱcalculationȱdidȱnotȱtakeȱintoȱaccount”ȱvariousȱfactorsȱwarrantingȱanȱ increase).ȱ 51ȱId.ȱatȱ553.ȱ 16

1 lodestarȱmethodȱproducesȱanȱawardȱthatȱroughlyȱapproximatesȱtheȱ 2 feeȱthatȱtheȱprevailingȱattorneyȱwouldȱhaveȱreceivedȱifȱheȱorȱsheȱhadȱ 3 beenȱ representingȱ aȱ payingȱ clientȱ whoȱ wasȱ billedȱ byȱ theȱ hourȱ inȱ aȱ 4 comparableȱ case.”52ȱ ȱ Andȱ asȱ inȱ Delawareȱ Valleyȱ andȱ Blum,ȱ theȱ Perdueȱ 5 Courtȱspecificallyȱstatedȱthatȱtheȱnoveltyȱandȱcomplexityȱofȱaȱcaseȱareȱ 6 presumablyȱreflectedȱinȱtheȱlodestarȱamount.53ȱ

7 Finally,ȱ Lillyȱ pointsȱ toȱ aȱ quoteȱ fromȱ theȱ Perdueȱ opinion,ȱ inȱ 8 whichȱtheȱCourtȱcriticizesȱtheȱoldȱJohnsonȱmethodȱcreatedȱbyȱtheȱFifthȱ 9 Circuitȱbecauseȱitȱ“gaveȱveryȱlittleȱactualȱguidanceȱtoȱdistrictȱcourts”ȱ 10 andȱ “placedȱ unlimitedȱ discretionȱ inȱ trialȱ judgesȱ andȱ producedȱ 11 disparateȱ results.”54ȱ ȱ This,ȱ Lillyȱ says,ȱ isȱ evidenceȱ thatȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ 12 factors,ȱincludingȱtheȱnoveltyȱandȱcomplexityȱofȱtheȱcase,ȱcannotȱbeȱ 13 usedȱ byȱ districtȱ courtsȱ toȱ determineȱ aȱ reasonableȱ fee.ȱ ȱ Butȱ Lillyȱ 14 confusesȱ theȱ Court’sȱ criticismȱ ofȱ theȱ “Johnsonȱ approach”55ȱ withȱ theȱ 15 permissiveȱ useȱ ofȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ factorsȱ inȱ determiningȱ theȱ reasonableȱ 16 hourlyȱ rateȱ andȱ reasonableȱ hoursȱ billedȱ toȱ determineȱ theȱ 17 presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfeeȱorȱlodestar.56ȱȱHensleyȱandȱitsȱprogenyȱ 18 makeȱ clearȱ thatȱ whileȱ aȱ strictȱ applicationȱ ofȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ methodȱ ofȱ 19 calculatingȱattorney’sȱfeesȱusedȱbyȱtheȱFifthȱCircuitȱisȱtooȱimpreciseȱ 20 andȱ variableȱ toȱ beȱ reliable,ȱ theȱ twelveȱ Johnsonȱ factorsȱ remainȱ 21 importantȱtoolsȱforȱhelpingȱdistrictȱcourtsȱcalculateȱtheȱlodestarȱand,ȱ 22 inȱexceptionalȱcases,ȱdeterminingȱwhetherȱanȱenhancementȱorȱcutȱtoȱ

52ȱId.ȱatȱ551ȱ(emphasisȱomitted)ȱ(emphasisȱadded).ȱ 53ȱId.ȱatȱ553;ȱDelawareȱValley,ȱ478ȱU.S.ȱatȱ565;ȱBlum,ȱ465ȱU.S.ȱatȱ898.ȱ 54ȱPerdue,ȱ559ȱU.S.ȱatȱ550–51ȱ(internalȱquotationȱmarksȱomitted).ȱ

55ȱId.ȱatȱ551–52.ȱ

56ȱSeeȱJinȱv.ȱPacificȱBuffetȱHouse,ȱInc.,ȱNo.ȱ06ȬCVȬ579ȱ(VVP),ȱ2010ȱWLȱ2653334,ȱatȱ*2ȱ

n.2ȱ (E.D.N.Y.ȱ Juneȱ 25,ȱ 2010)ȱ (Perdueȱ “cautionsȱ againstȱ usingȱ aȱ strictȱ Johnsonȱ approachȱ asȱ theȱ primaryȱ basisȱ forȱ determiningȱ reasonableȱ attorneys’ȱ fees,ȱ butȱ nowhereȱcallsȱintoȱquestionȱtheȱideaȱofȱusingȱrelevantȱJohnsonȱfactorsȱinȱhelpingȱtoȱ comeȱtoȱaȱreasonableȱfee”).ȱ 17

1 theȱlodestarȱisȱwarranted.57ȱȱȱ

2 Findingȱ thatȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ correctlyȱ appliedȱ theȱ law,ȱ 3 reachedȱaȱconclusionȱwithinȱtheȱrangeȱofȱpermissibleȱdecisions,ȱandȱ 4 didȱnotȱabuseȱitsȱdiscretionȱonȱaȱclearlyȱerroneousȱfactualȱfinding,ȱweȱ 5 haveȱnoȱbasisȱtoȱvacateȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱdecisionȱtoȱawardȱRothmanȱ 6 anȱhourlyȱrateȱofȱ$450.ȱȱWeȱthereforeȱaffirmȱthisȱportionȱofȱtheȱdistrictȱ 7 court’sȱorder.ȱ

8 II. ReductionȱofȱtheȱFeeȱforȱClericalȱTasksȱ

9 Lillyȱ alsoȱ assertsȱ thatȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ erredȱ byȱ prohibitingȱ 10 Rothmanȱfromȱreceivingȱhisȱfullȱhourlyȱrateȱofȱ$450ȱforȱclericalȱtasks,ȱ 11 suchȱ asȱ sendingȱ faxes,ȱ printingȱ documents,ȱ etc.ȱ ȱ Lillyȱ arguesȱ thatȱ aȱ 12 districtȱ courtȱ shouldȱ notȱ “reduceȱ theȱ hourlyȱ billingȱ rateȱ ofȱ aȱ soloȱ 13 practitionerȱ attorneyȱ whoȱ doesȱ notȱ operateȱ withȱ theȱ assistanceȱ ofȱ 14 associates,ȱparalegals,ȱorȱotherȱsupportȱstaffȱconcerningȱtimeȱheȱorȱsheȱ 15 reasonablyȱspendsȱonȱclericalȱtasksȱinȱadvancingȱtheȱlitigation.”58ȱȱȱ

16 Weȱhaveȱnotȱaddressedȱwhetherȱaȱdistrictȱcourtȱmayȱdiscountȱ 17 theȱ reasonableȱ hoursȱ expendedȱ orȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ anȱ 18 attorneyȱspendsȱonȱtasksȱthatȱareȱclericalȱorȱadministrativeȱinȱnature.ȱȱ 19 Butȱ theȱ Supremeȱ Courtȱ providedȱ guidanceȱ onȱ thisȱ questionȱ inȱ 20 Missouriȱv.ȱJenkinsȱbyȱAgyei.59ȱȱInȱthatȱcase,ȱtheȱCourtȱheldȱthatȱplaintiffsȱ 21 couldȱrecoverȱattorney’sȱfeesȱunderȱtheȱFeesȱActȱforȱworkȱperformedȱ 22 byȱparalegalsȱandȱlawȱclerksȱunderȱtheȱsupervisionȱofȱanȱattorneyȱatȱ

57ȱSeeȱHensley,ȱ461ȱU.S.ȱatȱ434ȱn.9ȱ(“Theȱdistrictȱcourtȱalsoȱmayȱconsiderȱ[the]ȱfactorsȱ identifiedȱinȱJohnsonȱ.ȱ.ȱ.ȱ,ȱthoughȱitȱshouldȱnoteȱthatȱmanyȱofȱtheseȱfactorsȱusuallyȱ areȱ subsumedȱ withinȱ theȱ initialȱ calculationȱ ofȱ hoursȱ reasonablyȱ expendedȱ atȱ aȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rate.”);ȱ Delawareȱ Valley,ȱ 478ȱ U.S.ȱ atȱ 563–64ȱ (“[Inȱ Hensley,ȱ we]ȱ adoptedȱaȱhybridȱapproachȱthatȱsharedȱelementsȱofȱbothȱJohnsonȱandȱtheȱlodestarȱ methodȱofȱcalculation.”).ȱ 58ȱAppelleeȬCrossȬAppellant’sȱBr.ȱatȱ7.ȱ

59ȱ491ȱU.S.ȱ274ȱ(1989).ȱ 18

1 theȱmarketȱrateȱforȱtheirȱservices,ȱratherȱthanȱatȱcostȱtoȱtheȱattorney.60ȱȱ 2 However,ȱtheȱCourtȱcautionedȱthatȱ“purelyȱclericalȱorȱsecretarialȱtasksȱ 3 shouldȱnotȱbeȱbilledȱatȱaȱparalegalȱrate”ȱbyȱeitherȱaȱparalegalȱorȱanȱ 4 attorneyȱperformingȱsuchȱtasks.61ȱȱTheȱCourtȱexplained:ȱ

5 Itȱisȱappropriateȱtoȱdistinguishȱbetweenȱlegalȱwork,ȱinȱtheȱ 6 strictȱsense,ȱandȱinvestigation,ȱclericalȱwork,ȱcompilationȱ 7 ofȱfactsȱandȱstatisticsȱandȱotherȱworkȱwhichȱcanȱoftenȱbeȱ 8 accomplishedȱ byȱ nonȬlawyersȱ butȱ whichȱ aȱ lawyerȱ [orȱ 9 paralegal]ȱmayȱdoȱbecauseȱheȱhasȱnoȱotherȱhelpȱavailable.ȱȱ 10 Suchȱ nonȬlegalȱ workȱ mayȱ commandȱ aȱ lesserȱ rate.ȱ ȱ Itsȱ 11 dollarȱ valueȱ isȱ notȱ enhancedȱ justȱ becauseȱ aȱ lawyerȱ [orȱ 12 paralegal]ȱdoesȱit.62ȱ 13 Weȱ thereforeȱ concludeȱ thatȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ didȱ notȱ commitȱ 14 legalȱerrorȱinȱreducingȱLilly’sȱfeeȱawardȱtoȱaccountȱforȱclericalȱtasksȱ 15 performedȱ byȱ Rothman.ȱ ȱ Asȱ weȱ haveȱ stated,ȱ theȱ keyȱ inquiryȱ inȱ 16 determiningȱ theȱ reasonablenessȱ ofȱ anȱ attorney’sȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ andȱ 17 hoursȱbilledȱisȱwhetherȱaȱpayingȱclientȱwouldȱbeȱwillingȱtoȱpayȱtheȱ 18 fee.63ȱȱTheȱanswerȱtoȱthisȱquestion,ȱofȱcourse,ȱwillȱvaryȱdependingȱonȱ 19 theȱ circumstancesȱ ofȱ theȱ case,ȱ theȱ attorney,ȱ andȱ theȱ customsȱ inȱ theȱ 20 relevantȱlegalȱmarket.ȱȱTherefore,ȱwhileȱdistrictȱcourtsȱhaveȱtheȱlegalȱ 21 authorityȱandȱdiscretionȱtoȱeitherȱreduceȱanȱattorney’sȱhourlyȱrateȱforȱ 22 timeȱspentȱonȱclericalȱtasksȱorȱapplyȱanȱacrossȬtheȬboardȱreductionȱtoȱ 23 theȱhoursȱbilledȱorȱtotalȱfeeȱawardȱtoȱaccountȱforȱtimeȱspentȱonȱclericalȱ 24 tasksȱ(orȱblockȬbilledȱtimeȱentriesȱreflectingȱaȱmixȱofȱclericalȱandȱlegalȱ 25 work),ȱaȱdistrictȱcourtȱisȱnotȱrequiredȱtoȱmakeȱsuchȱreductions.ȱȱAsȱ

60ȱId.ȱ286–87.ȱ 61ȱId.ȱatȱ288ȱn.10.ȱ 62ȱId.ȱ(internalȱquotationȱmarksȱomitted).ȱ

63ȱArborȱHill,ȱ522ȱF.3dȱatȱ190;ȱseeȱalsoȱPerdue,ȱ559ȱU.S.ȱatȱ551ȱ(“[T]heȱlodestarȱmethodȱ

producesȱanȱawardȱthatȱroughlyȱapproximatesȱtheȱfeeȱthatȱtheȱprevailingȱattorneyȱ wouldȱhaveȱreceivedȱifȱheȱorȱsheȱhadȱbeenȱrepresentingȱaȱpayingȱclientȱwhoȱwasȱ billedȱbyȱtheȱhourȱinȱaȱcomparableȱcase.ȱ.ȱ.ȱ.”ȱ(emphasisȱinȱoriginal)).ȱ 19

1 withȱ allȱ aspectsȱ ofȱ ourȱ feeȬshiftingȱ jurisprudence,ȱ weȱ affordȱ districtȱ 2 courtsȱbroadȱdiscretionȱinȱawardingȱattorneys’ȱfeesȱbecauseȱtheyȱareȱ 3 muchȱ closerȱ toȱ theȱ detailsȱ ofȱ eachȱ individualȱ caseȱ andȱ canȱ betterȱ 4 determineȱwhatȱisȱreasonableȱandȱappropriateȱinȱtheȱfeeȱcalculusȱforȱ 5 theȱparticularȱcase.64ȱ

6 Here,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱreviewedȱtheȱtimeȱsheetsȱsubmittedȱbyȱ 7 Rothmanȱandȱfoundȱaȱvarietyȱofȱobviouslyȱclericalȱtasks,ȱasȱwellȱasȱ 8 entriesȱthatȱ“blendȱclericalȱtasksȱwithȱlegalȱtasks.”65ȱȱAȱreviewȱofȱtheȱ 9 timeȱsheetsȱconfirmsȱthatȱmanyȱentriesȱdescribeȱclericalȱtasksȱthatȱareȱ 10 notȱappropriatelyȱbilledȱatȱRothman’sȱreasonableȱhourlyȱrateȱofȱ$450,ȱ 11 suchȱasȱsendingȱandȱreceivingȱfaxes,ȱrequestingȱandȱreceivingȱmedicalȱ 12 records,ȱ servingȱ papers,ȱ andȱ handȬdeliveringȱ courtesyȱ copiesȱ ofȱ 13 filingsȱtoȱtheȱcourthouse.66ȱȱTheȱfactȱthatȱRothmanȱisȱaȱsoloȱpractitionerȱ 14 doesȱnotȱentitleȱhimȱtoȱhisȱfullȱhourlyȱrateȱasȱanȱattorneyȱforȱpurelyȱ 15 clericalȱwork.ȱȱIndeed,ȱitȱisȱhighlyȱunlikelyȱthatȱaȱpayingȱclientȱwouldȱ 16 agreeȱtoȱ payȱanyȱ personȱ $450ȱforȱ anȱ hourȱ ofȱ sendingȱ andȱ receivingȱ 17 faxes,ȱ callingȱ medicalȱ offices,ȱ andȱ deliveringȱ papers.ȱ ȱ Weȱ findȱ theȱ 18 districtȱcourt’sȱimpositionȱofȱaȱtenȱpercentȱreductionȱtoȱtheȱfeeȱawardȱ 19 onȱaccountȱofȱclericalȱworkȱappropriate,ȱandȱcertainlyȱnotȱanȱabuseȱofȱ 20 discretion,ȱbecauseȱtheȱtimeȱentriesȱreflectingȱ50.3ȱhoursȱofȱworkȱshowȱ 21 atȱ leastȱ 5ȱ hoursȱ ofȱ purelyȱ clericalȱ work.67ȱ ȱ Inȱ reducingȱ Rothman’sȱ 22 hoursȱ byȱ tenȱ percentȱ toȱ accountȱ forȱ clericalȱ tasks,ȱ weȱ areȱ confidentȱ 23 thatȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ achievedȱ “roughȱ justice,”ȱ ifȱ notȱ “auditingȱ 24 perfection,”ȱ inȱ itsȱ calculationȱ ofȱ theȱ appropriateȱ feeȱ award.68ȱ ȱ Weȱ

64ȱSeeȱFox,ȱ563ȱU.S.ȱatȱ838.ȱ 65ȱLilly,ȱ2017ȱWLȱ3493249,ȱatȱ*6.ȱ 66ȱSeeȱJointȱApp’xȱatȱ78,ȱ89–92,ȱ247.ȱ

67ȱSeeȱMcDonald,ȱ450ȱF.3dȱatȱ96ȱ(“Aȱdistrictȱcourtȱmayȱexerciseȱitsȱdiscretionȱandȱ

useȱ aȱ percentageȱ deductionȱ asȱ aȱ practicalȱ meansȱ ofȱ trimmingȱ fatȱ fromȱ aȱ feeȱ application.”ȱ(internalȱquotationȱmarksȱomitted)).ȱ 68ȱSeeȱFox,ȱ563ȱU.S.ȱatȱ838.ȱ 20

1 thereforeȱupholdȱthisȱportionȱofȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱorder.ȱ

2 III. AwardȱofȱFeesȱonȱFeesȱ

3 Finally,ȱtheȱCityȱchallengesȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱdecisionȱtoȱgrantȱ 4 attorney’sȱfeesȱforȱtimeȱRothmanȱspentȱworkingȱonȱtheȱfeeȱapplicationȱ 5 andȱreplyȱbriefȱinȱsupportȱofȱthatȱapplication.ȱȱTheȱCityȱassertsȱthatȱ 6 theȱ districtȱ courtȱ didȱ notȱ haveȱ theȱ authorityȱ toȱ awardȱ thoseȱ feesȱ 7 becauseȱtheyȱwereȱincurredȱafterȱtheȱCityȱmade,ȱandȱLillyȱaccepted,ȱ 8 theȱ Ruleȱ 68ȱ offerȱ ofȱ judgment,ȱ whichȱ explicitlyȱ contemplatedȱ theȱ 9 paymentȱofȱattorney’sȱfeesȱonlyȱ“upȱuntilȱtheȱdateȱofȱtheȱoffer.”69ȱȱȱ

10 Ordinarily,ȱ aȱ districtȱ courtȱ hasȱ authorityȱ andȱ discretionȱ toȱ 11 awardȱattorney’sȱfeesȱforȱhoursȱexpendedȱonȱaȱfeeȱapplicationȱmadeȱ 12 underȱ theȱ Feesȱ Act,ȱ soȬcalledȱ feesȱ onȱ fees.70ȱ ȱ Theȱ questionȱ hereȱ isȱ 13 whetherȱtheȱparties’ȱagreementȱtoȱsettleȱtheȱcaseȱandȱcutȱoffȱattorney’sȱ 14 feesȱ asȱ ofȱ theȱ timeȱ ofȱ theȱ offerȱ circumscribesȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ 15 authorityȱ toȱ awardȱ feesȱ accruedȱ afterȱ theȱ offerȱ date.ȱ ȱ Weȱ believeȱ itȱ 16 does.ȱ

17 FederalȱRuleȱofȱCivilȱProcedureȱ68ȱpermitsȱaȱpartyȱdefendingȱaȱ 18 claimȱtoȱserveȱanȱopposingȱpartyȱwithȱ“anȱofferȱtoȱallowȱjudgmentȱonȱ 19 specifiedȱterms.”71ȱȱIfȱtheȱopposingȱpartyȱacceptsȱtheȱoffer,ȱthenȱeitherȱ 20 partyȱmayȱfileȱtheȱofferȱandȱnoticeȱofȱacceptanceȱwithȱtheȱcourt,ȱandȱ 21 theȱ “clerkȱ mustȱ thenȱ enterȱ [the]ȱ judgment”ȱ specifiedȱ inȱ theȱ 22 agreement.72ȱ ȱ Ifȱ theȱ opposingȱ partyȱ rejectsȱ theȱ offerȱ andȱ thatȱ partyȱ 23 eventuallyȱ obtainsȱ aȱ judgmentȱ thatȱ isȱ notȱ asȱ favorableȱ asȱ theȱ

69ȱSeeȱJointȱApp’xȱatȱ45.ȱ 70ȱSeeȱGagneȱv.ȱMaher,ȱ594ȱF.2dȱ336,ȱ343–44ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ1979),ȱaff’d,ȱ448ȱU.S.ȱ122ȱ(1980);ȱ seeȱalsoȱHinesȱv.ȱCityȱofȱAlbany,ȱ862ȱF.3dȱ215,ȱ223ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2017)ȱ(“Prevailingȱpartiesȱ underȱSectionȱ1988ȱareȱthereforeȱentitledȱtoȱrecoverȱaȱreasonableȱfeeȱforȱpreparingȱ andȱdefendingȱaȱfeeȱapplication.”).ȱ 71ȱFed.ȱR.ȱCiv.ȱP.ȱ68(a).ȱ

72ȱId.ȱ 21

1 unacceptedȱoffer,ȱtheȱopposingȱpartyȱmustȱpayȱtheȱcostsȱincurredȱbyȱ 2 theȱdefendantȱafterȱtheȱofferȱwasȱmade,73ȱwhichȱincludesȱattorney’sȱ 3 fees.74ȱ ȱ Theȱ purposeȱ ofȱ thisȱ mechanismȱ isȱ toȱ “encourageȱ settlementȱ 4 andȱ avoidȱ litigation”ȱ byȱ “prompt[ing]ȱ bothȱ partiesȱ toȱ aȱ suitȱ toȱ 5 evaluateȱtheȱrisksȱandȱcostsȱofȱlitigation,ȱandȱtoȱbalanceȱthemȱagainstȱ 6 theȱlikelihoodȱofȱsuccessȱuponȱtrialȱonȱtheȱmerits.”75ȱ

7 Likeȱaȱtypicalȱsettlementȱagreement,ȱanȱacceptedȱRuleȱ68ȱofferȱ 8 ofȱ judgmentȱ isȱ aȱ contract,ȱ andȱ itȱ mustȱ beȱ interpretedȱ accordingȱ toȱ 9 ordinaryȱcontractȱprinciples.76ȱȱCritically,ȱ“[i]fȱtheȱtermsȱofȱaȱcontractȱ 10 areȱclear,ȱcourtsȱmustȱtakeȱcareȱnotȱtoȱalterȱorȱgoȱbeyondȱtheȱexpressȱ 11 termsȱofȱtheȱagreement,ȱorȱtoȱimposeȱobligationsȱonȱtheȱpartiesȱthatȱ 12 areȱ notȱ mandatedȱ byȱ theȱ unambiguousȱ termsȱ ofȱ theȱ agreementȱ 13 itself.”77ȱȱ

14 Theȱ acceptedȱ Ruleȱ 68ȱ offerȱ atȱ issueȱ hereȱ (i.e.,ȱ theȱ contract)ȱ 15 unambiguouslyȱstatesȱthatȱtheȱrecoverableȱattorney’sȱfees,ȱexpenses,ȱ 16 andȱcostsȱareȱlimitedȱtoȱthoseȱincurredȱbyȱtheȱdateȱofȱtheȱoffer,ȱwhichȱ 17 wasȱOctoberȱ26,ȱ2016.78ȱȱTheȱfeesȱRothmanȱchargedȱforȱworkȱonȱtheȱ 18 feeȱ applicationȱ andȱ replyȱ briefȱ inȱ supportȱ ofȱ thatȱ applicationȱ wereȱ 19 incurredȱbetweenȱNovemberȱ30,ȱ2016,ȱandȱJanuaryȱ20,ȱ2017,ȱafterȱtheȱ 20 cutȬoffȱ dateȱ forȱ feesȱ inȱ theȱ agreement.79ȱ ȱ Therefore,ȱ theyȱ cannotȱ beȱ 21 recoveredȱbyȱLilly,ȱandȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱhadȱnoȱauthorityȱtoȱawardȱ 22 them.ȱ

23 Nonetheless,ȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ determinedȱ thatȱ becauseȱ theȱ

73ȱFed.ȱR.ȱCiv.ȱP.ȱ68(d).ȱ 74ȱMarekȱv.ȱChesny,ȱ473ȱU.S.ȱ1,ȱ9ȱ(1985).ȱ 75ȱId.ȱatȱ5.ȱ

76ȱSteiner,ȱ816ȱF.3dȱatȱ31.ȱ

77ȱId.ȱatȱ32ȱ(internalȱquotationȱmarksȱomitted).ȱ

78ȱSeeȱJointȱApp’xȱatȱ45–47.ȱ

79ȱSeeȱid.ȱatȱ247.ȱ 22

1 partiesȱactedȱinȱgoodȱfaithȱinȱnegotiatingȱtheȱattorney’sȱfeesȱtoȱbeȱpaidȱ 2 toȱ Lilly,ȱ butȱ wereȱ simplyȱ unableȱ toȱ agreeȱ onȱ aȱ reasonableȱ amount,ȱ 3 equityȱcounseledȱinȱfavorȱofȱgrantingȱLillyȱattorney’sȱfeesȱforȱtheȱtimeȱ 4 spentȱworkingȱonȱtheȱfeeȱapplicationȱandȱreplyȱbrief.80ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱ 5 courtȱisȱnotȱaloneȱinȱgrantingȱtheseȱfeesȱonȱfeesȱasȱaȱmatterȱofȱequityȱ 6 despiteȱ theȱ clearȱ termsȱ ofȱ theȱ parties’ȱ agreementsȱ barringȱ suchȱ 7 awards.81ȱ ȱ Asȱ nobleȱ asȱ thisȱ practiceȱ mayȱ be,ȱ itȱ violatesȱ theȱ firstȱ 8 principleȱ ofȱ contractȱ interpretation:ȱ “whereȱ theȱ languageȱ ofȱ theȱ 9 contractȱisȱclearȱandȱunambiguous,ȱtheȱcontractȱisȱtoȱbeȱgivenȱeffectȱ 10 accordingȱ toȱ itsȱ terms.”82ȱ ȱ Byȱ awardingȱ Lillyȱ feesȱ beyondȱ whatȱ theȱ 11 partiesȱ agreedȱ to,ȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ effectivelyȱ rewroteȱ theȱ contract.ȱȱ 12 Thisȱitȱcannotȱdo.ȱ

13 Lillyȱmakesȱthreeȱargumentsȱforȱwhyȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱdidȱnotȱ 14 err,ȱ noneȱ ofȱ whichȱ isȱ persuasive.ȱ ȱ First,ȱ heȱ assertsȱ thatȱ theȱ offerȱ ofȱ 15 judgment’sȱinclusionȱofȱreasonableȱattorney’sȱfeesȱupȱtoȱtheȱdateȱofȱ 16 theȱofferȱ“necessarilyȱincludesȱfeesȱforȱtheȱtimeȱthatȱanȱattorneyȱmustȱ 17 spendȱtoȱmoveȱtoȱobtainȱthoseȱunderlyingȱfeesȱifȱDefendantsȱwillȱnotȱ 18 enterȱintoȱaȱreasonableȱsettlementȱconcerningȱtheȱunderlyingȱfees.”83ȱȱ 19 Thisȱinterpretationȱofȱtheȱcontractȱisȱnotȱsupportedȱbyȱitsȱclearȱterms,ȱ

80ȱLilly,ȱ2017ȱWLȱ3493249,ȱatȱ*8.ȱ 81ȱSee,ȱe.g.,ȱRosadoȱv.ȱCityȱofȱNewȱYork,ȱNo.ȱ11ȱCiv.ȱ4285ȱ(SAS),ȱ2012ȱWLȱ955510,ȱatȱ*6ȱ (S.D.N.Y.ȱMar.ȱ15,ȱ2012)ȱ(“Plaintiffȱalsoȱseeksȱfeesȱincurredȱbyȱcounselȱinȱpreparingȱ theȱ instantȱ feeȱ application.ȱ ȱ However,ȱ bothȱ theȱ Ruleȱ 68ȱ Offerȱ ofȱ Judgmentȱ andȱ plaintiff’sȱ Noticeȱ ofȱ Acceptanceȱ specificallyȱ limitedȱ reasonableȱ attorney’sȱ fees,ȱ expensesȱandȱcostsȱtoȱtheȱdateȱofȱthisȱoffer.ȱ.ȱ.ȱ.ȱNonetheless,ȱasȱaȱmatterȱofȱequity,ȱ plaintiffȱ shouldȱ beȱ awardedȱ someȱ amountȱ forȱ theȱ timeȱ hisȱ counselȱ spentȱ inȱ preparingȱtheȱinstantȱfeeȱapplication.”ȱ(internalȱquotationȱmarksȱomitted)).ȱȱButȱseeȱ Schoolcraftȱv.ȱCityȱofȱNewȱYork,ȱNo.ȱ10ȱCiv.ȱ6005ȱ(RWS),ȱ2016ȱWLȱ4626568,ȱatȱ*13ȱ (S.D.N.Y.ȱSept.ȱ6,ȱ2016)ȱ(“TheȱRuleȱ68ȱJudgmentȱprovidesȱ‘plaintiffȱshallȱbeȱentitledȱ toȱreasonableȱattorney’sȱfees,ȱexpenses,ȱandȱcostsȱtoȱtheȱdateȱofȱthisȱoffer.’ȱȱOnȱtheȱ termsȱofȱtheȱagreementȱalone,ȱfeesȬonȬfeesȱareȱdenied.”ȱ(internalȱcitationȱomitted)).ȱ 82ȱ Steiner,ȱ 816ȱ F.3dȱ atȱ 31ȱ (modificationsȱ omitted)ȱ (internalȱ quotationȱ marksȱ

omitted).ȱ 83ȱAppelleeȬCrossȬAppellant’sȱBr.ȱatȱ28.ȱ 23

1 norȱisȱitȱaȱnecessaryȱassumption.ȱȱThereȱisȱnothingȱinȱtheȱagreement’sȱ 2 termsȱ toȱ indicateȱ that,ȱ inȱ theȱ eventȱ aȱ feeȱ applicationȱ toȱ theȱ courtȱ isȱ 3 neededȱ toȱ determineȱ whatȱ constitutesȱ “reasonableȱ attorney’sȱ fees,”ȱ 4 theȱpartiesȱintendedȱforȱanyȱattorney’sȱfeesȱincurredȱbyȱLillyȱinȱthatȱ 5 processȱ toȱ beȱ includedȱ inȱ theȱ amountȱ theȱ Cityȱ agreedȱ toȱ payȱ asȱ 6 reasonableȱattorney’sȱfees.ȱȱToȱtheȱcontrary,ȱtheȱexpressȱtermsȱofȱtheȱ 7 contractȱstateȱthatȱtheȱCityȱwillȱonlyȱbeȱliableȱforȱreasonableȱattorney’sȱ 8 feesȱincurredȱonȱorȱbeforeȱtheȱdateȱofȱtheȱoffer,ȱandȱnotȱsubsequentȱ 9 thereto.ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱcourtȱacknowledgedȱthatȱtheȱofferȱofȱjudgmentȱ 10 containsȱ“languageȱexpresslyȱlimitingȱrecoverableȱfeesȱandȱexpensesȱ 11 toȱ thoseȱ incurredȱ priorȱ toȱ theȱ Ruleȱ 68ȱ Offer”ȱ beforeȱ itȱ thenȱ grantedȱ 12 feesȱonȱfeesȱasȱaȱmatterȱofȱequity.84ȱ

13 Second,ȱLillyȱinvokesȱtheȱdoctrineȱofȱcontraȱproferentemȱtoȱassertȱ 14 thatȱ theȱ ambiguousȱ languageȱ inȱ theȱ agreementȱ “mustȱ beȱ construedȱ 15 againstȱDefendantsȱsinceȱtheyȱdraftedȱitȱunilaterallyȱinȱtheȱcontextȱofȱ 16 makingȱaȱRuleȱ68ȱoffer.”85ȱȱLilly’sȱstatementȱofȱtheȱruleȱisȱcorrect:ȱthatȱ 17 ambiguitiesȱinȱtheȱlanguageȱofȱaȱRuleȱ68ȱofferȱofȱjudgmentȱareȱtoȱbeȱ 18 “construedȱagainstȱtheȱpartyȱmakingȱtheȱoffer.”86ȱȱBut,ȱasȱdiscussed,ȱ 19 theȱofferȱisȱnotȱambiguous.ȱȱLillyȱcannotȱreadȱambiguityȱintoȱtheȱclearȱ 20 termsȱ ofȱ theȱ contractȱ inȱ orderȱ toȱ invokeȱ theȱ doctrineȱ ofȱ contraȱ 21 proferentem.ȱ

22 Finally,ȱLillyȱurgesȱthatȱevenȱifȱtheȱofferȱofȱjudgment’sȱtermsȱdoȱ 23 inȱ factȱ precludeȱ feesȱ onȱ fees,ȱ thenȱ theyȱ shouldȱ beȱ heldȱ “voidȱ asȱ aȱ 24 matterȱofȱpublicȱpolicy.”87ȱȱWeȱareȱsympatheticȱtoȱtheȱfactȱthatȱbecauseȱ 25 theȱ partiesȱ wereȱ unableȱ toȱ agreeȱ onȱ reasonableȱ attorney’sȱ fees,ȱ 26 Rothmanȱwasȱforcedȱtoȱprepare,ȱfile,ȱandȱargueȱaȱfeeȱapplicationȱtoȱ

84ȱLilly,ȱ2017ȱWLȱ3493249,ȱatȱ*7.ȱ 85ȱAppelleeȬCrossȬAppellant’sȱBr.ȱatȱ31–32.ȱ 86ȱSteiner,ȱ816ȱF.3dȱatȱ31.ȱ

87ȱAppelleeȬCrossȬAppellant’sȱBr.ȱatȱ36.ȱ 24

1 seekȱhisȱfee,ȱandȱthatȱdueȱtoȱtheȱtermsȱofȱtheȱparties’ȱagreement,ȱheȱisȱ 2 notȱ ableȱ toȱ beȱ compensatedȱ forȱ thatȱ extraȱ work.ȱ ȱ Nonetheless,ȱ theȱ 3 argumentȱthatȱanȱofferȱofȱjudgmentȱorȱsettlementȱagreementȱthatȱcutsȱ 4 offȱfeesȱonȱfeesȱisȱvoidȱasȱaȱmatterȱofȱpublicȱpolicyȱisȱcontradictedȱbyȱ 5 controllingȱSupremeȱCourtȱprecedent.ȱȱȱ

6 Inȱ Evansȱ v.ȱ Jeffȱ D.,ȱ theȱ Courtȱ heldȱ thatȱ becauseȱ theȱ Feesȱ Actȱ 7 bestowedȱtheȱrightȱtoȱanȱawardȱofȱattorney’sȱfeesȱinȱcivilȱrightsȱactionsȱ 8 toȱtheȱprevailingȱparty,ȱandȱnotȱtheȱattorney,ȱpartiesȱwereȱfreeȱtoȱwaiveȱ 9 theirȱrightȱtoȱattorney’sȱfeesȱasȱpartȱofȱaȱsettlementȱagreementȱonȱtheȱ 10 merits.88ȱ ȱ Specificallyȱ theȱ Courtȱ statedȱ thatȱ Congressȱ neitherȱ 11 “bestowedȱ feeȱ awardsȱ uponȱ attorneysȱ norȱ renderedȱ themȱ 12 nonwaivableȱorȱnonnegotiable;ȱinstead,ȱitȱaddedȱthemȱtoȱtheȱarsenalȱ 13 ofȱremediesȱavailableȱtoȱcombatȱviolationsȱofȱcivilȱrights,ȱaȱgoalȱnotȱ 14 invariablyȱinconsistentȱwithȱconditioningȱsettlementȱonȱtheȱmeritsȱonȱ 15 aȱ waiverȱ ofȱ statutoryȱ attorney’sȱ fees.”89ȱ ȱ Theȱ Courtȱ reasonedȱ thatȱ itȱ 16 wouldȱ beȱ poorȱ policyȱ toȱ prohibitȱ litigantsȱ fromȱ waivingȱ theirȱ 17 statutoryȱrightȱtoȱattorney’sȱfeesȱasȱpartȱofȱaȱcompromiseȱonȱtheȱmeritsȱ 18 becauseȱitȱwouldȱ“impedeȱvindicationȱofȱcivilȱrights,ȱatȱleastȱinȱsomeȱ 19 cases,ȱbyȱreducingȱtheȱattractivenessȱofȱsettlement.”90ȱȱIndeed,ȱbecauseȱ 20 theȱattorney’sȱfeeȱawardȱisȱoftenȱsimilarȱtoȱorȱgreaterȱthanȱtheȱamountȱ 21 ofȱ damagesȱ receivedȱ onȱ theȱ merits,91ȱ itȱ isȱ “notȱ implausibleȱ toȱ 22 anticipateȱthatȱpartiesȱtoȱaȱsignificantȱnumberȱofȱcivilȱrightsȱcasesȱwillȱ 23 refuseȱ toȱ settleȱ ifȱ liabilityȱ forȱ attorney’sȱ feesȱ remainsȱ open,ȱ therebyȱ 24 forcingȱ moreȱ casesȱ toȱ trial,ȱ unnecessarilyȱ burdeningȱ theȱ judicialȱ

88ȱ475ȱU.S.ȱ717,ȱ730–32ȱ(1986);ȱseeȱalsoȱVenegasȱv.ȱMitchell,ȱ495ȱU.S.ȱ82,ȱ87–88ȱ(1990)ȱ (holdingȱ thatȱ itȱ isȱ theȱ party’sȱ rightȱ toȱ waive,ȱ settle,ȱ orȱ negotiateȱ theȱ party’sȱ entitlementȱtoȱreceiveȱattorney’sȱfees).ȱȱ 89ȱEvans,ȱ475ȱU.S.ȱatȱ731–32.ȱ

90ȱId.ȱatȱ732.ȱ

91ȱId.ȱatȱ734–35ȱ&ȱn.24ȱ(collectingȱexamplesȱofȱattorney’sȱfeeȱawardsȱgreaterȱthanȱ

theȱmeritsȱaward).ȱȱInȱfact,ȱthisȱcaseȱisȱoneȱsuchȱexample.ȱ 25

1 system,ȱ andȱ disservingȱ civilȱ rightsȱ litigants.”92ȱ ȱ Theseȱ 2 pronouncementsȱfromȱtheȱSupremeȱCourtȱillustrateȱthat,ȱcontraryȱtoȱ 3 Lilly’sȱarguments,ȱitȱisȱnotȱagainstȱpublicȱpolicyȱforȱlitigantsȱtoȱwaiveȱ 4 theirȱstatutoryȱrightȱtoȱattorney’sȱfees—letȱaloneȱfeesȱonȱfees.ȱ

5 Thus,ȱweȱconcludeȱthatȱwhenȱaȱsettlementȱcutsȱoffȱaȱplaintiff’sȱ 6 entitlementȱtoȱattorney’sȱfeesȱonȱaȱspecificȱdate,ȱaȱdistrictȱcourtȱmayȱ 7 notȱawardȱaȱpartyȱattorney’sȱfeesȱforȱworkȱincurredȱafterȱthatȱcutȬoffȱ 8 date.ȱ ȱ Thisȱ includesȱ feesȱ forȱ workȱ performedȱ preparingȱ aȱ feeȱ 9 applicationȱsubmittedȱtoȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱinȱtheȱeventȱtheȱpartiesȱareȱ 10 unableȱtoȱagreeȱonȱtheȱattorney’sȱfeesȱtoȱbeȱawardedȱdespiteȱaȱgoodȱ 11 faithȱeffortȱtoȱnegotiate.93ȱȱIfȱaȱplaintiffȱdesiresȱfeesȱonȱfeesȱinȱtheȱeventȱ 12 aȱfeeȱapplicationȱtoȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱisȱrequired,ȱtheȱplaintiffȱshouldȱ 13 ensureȱthatȱ theȱ settlementȱtermsȱdoȱ notȱ forecloseȱ theȱ availabilityȱ ofȱ 14 suchȱfees.ȱȱAccordingly,ȱtheȱportionȱofȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱdecisionȱandȱ 15 orderȱ grantingȱ Lillyȱ attorney’sȱ feesȱ forȱ allȱ workȱ performedȱ afterȱ 16 Octoberȱ26,ȱ2016,ȱcannotȱstand.ȱ

17 CONCLUSIONȱ

18 Weȱhaveȱconsideredȱtheȱparties’ȱotherȱargumentsȱandȱfindȱthemȱ 19 toȱbeȱwithoutȱmerit.ȱȱWeȱthereforeȱAFFIRM,ȱinȱpart,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱ 20 orderȱsettingȱ Rothman’sȱ hourlyȱ rateȱatȱ$450ȱ perȱ hourȱ andȱ reducingȱ 21 Lilly’sȱfeeȱawardȱbyȱtenȱpercentȱtoȱaccountȱforȱclericalȱtasksȱbilledȱbyȱ

92ȱId.ȱatȱ736–37.ȱ 93ȱBecauseȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱfoundȱthatȱtheȱpartiesȱinȱthisȱcaseȱnegotiatedȱinȱgoodȱ faith,ȱseeȱLilly,ȱ2017ȱWLȱ3493249,ȱatȱ*8,ȱweȱdeclineȱtoȱconsiderȱwhetherȱaȱdistrictȱ courtȱmay,ȱasȱaȱmatterȱofȱequityȱorȱotherwise,ȱawardȱfeesȱonȱfeesȱwhenȱaȱpartyȱ negotiatesȱinȱbadȱfaith,ȱdespiteȱtheȱpresenceȱofȱaȱcutȬoffȱclauseȱinȱtheȱRuleȱ68ȱofferȱ orȱsettlementȱagreement.ȱȱSee,ȱe.g.,ȱLongȱv.ȱCityȱofȱNewȱYork,ȱNo.ȱ09ȱCiv.ȱ6099ȱ(AKH),ȱ 2010ȱU.S.ȱDist.ȱLEXISȱ81020,ȱatȱ*5–6ȱ(S.D.N.Y.ȱAug.ȱ6,ȱ2010)ȱ(“TheȱRuleȱ68ȱjudgmentȱ limitedȱ recoverableȱ feesȱ andȱ expensesȱ toȱ thoseȱ incurredȱ priorȱ toȱ theȱ dateȱ ofȱ theȱ offer.ȱ ȱ Ifȱ theȱ City’sȱ disputeȱ overȱ recoverableȱ feesȱ wereȱ inȱ badȱ faith,ȱ th[e]nȱ compensationȱ forȱ theȱ workȱ necessaryȱ forȱ plaintiff[’]sȱ feeȱ applicationȱ mayȱ beȱ justified.”).ȱ 26

1 Rothman,ȱ andȱ REVERSEȱ andȱ VACATE,ȱ inȱ part,ȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ 2 decisionȱandȱorderȱawardingȱLillyȱ$7,290.00ȱforȱRothman’sȱworkȱonȱ 3 theȱfeeȱapplicationȱandȱreplyȱbriefȱinȱsupportȱofȱthatȱapplication.ȱ