Kay v. Board of Education

83 A. 954, 83 N.J.L. 551, 54 Vroom 551, 1912 N.J. LEXIS 176
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
DecidedJune 20, 1912
StatusPublished

This text of 83 A. 954 (Kay v. Board of Education) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kay v. Board of Education, 83 A. 954, 83 N.J.L. 551, 54 Vroom 551, 1912 N.J. LEXIS 176 (N.J. 1912).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Yooritees, J.

This writ of error brings to a test the propriety of a judgment of the Supreme Court, dismissing a writ of certiorari. By the latter writ, a resolution pa,ssed by [552]*552the board of education of the town of Kearny, on October 2d, 1911, was reviewed, awarding a contract to the defendant, the American Concrete Steel Company, for the sum of $94,750 for a re-inforced concrete school, and providing that the contract be signed, subject to the approval of the board of school estimate, on the evening of October 18th, 1911. It was further resolved that a copy of the estimate be sent to each member of the board of school estimate.

On the same evening, the following entries appear in the minutes: “American Concrete Steel Company proposes to deduct $3,500 from their proposal if the general basement is made ten feet and the gymnasium fifteen .feet under slab.” Also a further resolution of the estimate of money required for the erection of the school building in which appears the item “General contract $91,250.” “Note — Where the American Concrete Steel Company allowed $3,500 for the difference in the height of the basement, E. W. Waldron & Co. would only allow $1,908 in brick.”

In September, 1911, the board of education accepted the plans and specifications of an architect for a new school house, directing that bids be separately received for brick and concrete construction, that is partly brick and partly concrete, and they also 'in the alternate, provided for a construction entirely of concrete. The specifications provided with great particularity for the brick and concrete construction, but as to the concrete construction, the provision was as follows:

“Alternate bids for the construction of the building throughout of re-inforced concrete will be considered. Full and complete plans and specifications showing the method of construction must be submitted to and approved of by the architect seventy-two hours before the opening of bids. Only such systems as have been previously approved of by the architect as above will be considered.”

There were nine proposals submitted, two of them only for the concrete construction, the defendant, the American Concrete Steel Company, being the lower of the two bids, the contract was awarded to it by the resolution above recited.

[553]*553It appeared by the proofs fhat the receipt of the bids was the first business transacted by the board on the evening of October 2d; that immediately after their reception, they were referred to the committee on buildings and grounds, and a recess was declared by the president. The hoard then retired to another room, and went into a committee of the whole 'and looked over the bids; ihat there was some difficulty in listing them, but after it had been done as well as they could, it was found that concrete was perhaps cheaper, and they decided to adopt it; at that time, Mr. Conklin, the architect, stated that the Concrete Steel Company would be able to reduce their bid $3,500 if the basement height was lessened.

The president of the steel company had pieviously mentioned to the architect that such alteration would save about $3,500. The steel company’s president was sent for and came into the private room where the hoard was in session as a committee of the whole. The board announced to him that they had decided to award the contract to his company, and asked whether he would make a cut of $3,500 suggested by the architect; he assented and wrote the memorandum, agreeing to it above referred to.

The board then came hack into the public room and voted to award the contract to the steel company on its original hid, and then voted for the reduction of $3,500 which the company had offered to make if the alterations were made.

The steel company, with their hid, submitted their own working plans and specifications which indicated their system and which had been approved by the architect seventy-two hours before the opening of bids.

The School law, by article 6, which includes sections 38 to 76 (Comp. Stat., p. 4735, 4747), provides for the regulation of boards of education in cities. Sections 72 and 73 enact that there shall be a board of school estimate in every city school district, and then define its duties. Section 52 prohibits the execution of any contract for building of a new school, except after advertisement, and section 53 forbids the acceptance of any bid for building school houses “which does not conform to the specifications furnished, and all contracts [554]*554shall be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder.” Comp. Stat., p. 4741. Section 243 (Comp. Stat., p. 4805) provides. that by .a referendum vote a town may accept the provisions of article 6 and be governed in all respects by it. By the act of 1909 (Pamph. L., p. 277; Conip. Stat., p. 4762, § 105c) it is enacted that "Every school district heretofore organized * * * in any town * * * and now acting under the provisions of article 6 * * * shall be deemed and held to be organized and existing under and in all respects governed by the provisions of said article.”

There was, therefore, two ways in which the district of the town of Kearny might have legally been governed by the city scheme as set out in that article, one by the vote of its inhabitants, and the other by haying acted under it before the passage of the act of 1909.

There was no direct proof that the city plan had been adopted by vote, but the fact that the resolution was passed, subject to the approval of the board of estimate, and that copies of the resolution were ordered to be sent to each member thereof, is persuasive, that such board existed in Kearny, and hence article 6 governed the administration of school affairs in that town.

Therefore, before a bid for the construction of this school house could be accepted and a contract awarded, it was requisite that it be -the lowest bid received in answer' to advertisement, and conform to the specifications furnished.

The board decided to adopt the alternate of concrete construction throughout. For this work, the board of education did not furnish the specifications in their entirety, but to the bidder was committed the making of "full and complete plans and specifications, showing the method'of construction.” This probably involved a double test in ascertaining the lowest bid, viz., least money and most satisfactory' plan. But the latter was not submitted to the competing bidders, it remained with its author, unseen except for exhibition to the architect, seventy-two hours before the bids were received, for his rejection or approval. The latter feature, it may be remarked, might work to smother competition, if disapproval of such' [555]*555specifications were made at the very beginning of the prescribed interval of seventy-two hours by preventing the submission of other plans. All bidders were not made acquainted with the specifications in their entirety by this method.

The bids were thus not competitive within the principle approved in Van Reipen v. Jersey City, 29 Vroom 262, because the opportunity to compete, afforded by definite specifications open to all bidders and to which all could conform, was not given.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
83 A. 954, 83 N.J.L. 551, 54 Vroom 551, 1912 N.J. LEXIS 176, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kay-v-board-of-education-nj-1912.