Kautzmann-Vernet Lumber Co. v. Fink

24 So. 2d 112, 156 Fla. 628, 1945 Fla. LEXIS 951
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedDecember 4, 1945
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 24 So. 2d 112 (Kautzmann-Vernet Lumber Co. v. Fink) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kautzmann-Vernet Lumber Co. v. Fink, 24 So. 2d 112, 156 Fla. 628, 1945 Fla. LEXIS 951 (Fla. 1945).

Opinion

THOMAS, J.:

A most deplorable mishap occurred when a little three-year-old boy was struck by a tractor and trailer and seriously injured. We shall spend no time, in our analysis of the facts, discussing the nature of the injuries or the justness of the amount found by the jury, for we think the outcome of this appeal depends entirely on the sufficiency of the evidence to establish-negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle.

There were introduced in support of the declaration eight witnesses: the mother and father, who told of going to the scene and discovering their child badly injured and of the subsequent efforts on the part of themselves and the physicians to nurse him to recovery; a policeman, who described the scene as he found it when he arrived immediately after the accident; a surveyor, who prepared a sketch of the locality; the driver of the vehicle, who testified only as to its *629 dimensions; the physician, who described the injuries; the little sister of the victim; and a man who operated a garage. It is the testimony of the last two that we must examine to determine whether the responsibility for the unfortunate happening can be placed on the driver of the vehicle because he was negligent in its operation.

First, let us describe this vehicle. The chassis of the truck was 13 V2 feet in length, equipped with dual rear wheels, and weighed 4,445 pounds. The trailer drawn by it was a metal frame mounted on two wheels, surmounted by a platform equipped with stanchions on the sides, but not in front and back, and with what appear to be rollers across the bed and the forward end. This trailer weighed 3,000 pounds. The combination was known as a trailmobile, and the total weight was 7,445 pounds.

Confining our examination now to the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiff, we learn from the patrolman that when he appeared at the locale of the accident shortly after the collision he measured the marks supposed to have been made on the pavement by the wheels of the tractor when the brakes were applied and noted that these wheels had dragged for a distance of fifty-six feet in a northwesterly direction and on a curve away from the right side of the street. The marks indicated that the back wheels of the truck slid twenty-four feet before striking the little boy and thirty-two feet afterwards. Lumber was scattered in front and to the right of the place where it came to rest. From the photographs and the sketch introduced in evidence by the plaintiff it is obvious that the truck was being driven along the right-hand side of the pavement, which was thirty feet wide, and that it started sliding to the rear of a car which was parked on the right-hand side of the street facing in the same direction; that the truck stopped in a position across the left-hand lane with the front wheels just over the edge of the pavement and the rear wheels slightly to the east of the center of the street. According to the testimony of the police officer, the victim was struck by the rear wheels of the tractor, and the driver, when interviewed by him immediately after the accident, stated that at the time he was going twenty-five miles an *630 hour. The officer said the lawful speed at that place was thirty miles an hour.

We now examine the evidence of the only eyewitness introduced by the plaintiff, the little sister of the victim, wlm at the timé she testified was twelve years old and who was telling of an event which happened three years before, when she was about nine. She was riding her bicycle south on the left side of the street when she saw the truck and trailer about a hundred feet away, approaching from the opposite direction and on the same side of the street. She noticed a little boy between her and the truck, but at such distance that she did not then recognize him as her brother. The lad was midway between the margin of the street and the center line “just trotting along.” She saw the vehicle hit the little boy and swerve to her right, or toward the other side of the street. Upon being asked whether he looked to see whether anyone was coming, she replied, “No, he didn’t look.” This, in substance, is all the testimony of the only eyewitness offered by the plaintiff shedding any light on the conduct of the driver and of the victim at the time of the collision. Even if it is granted that a twelve-year-old child can accurately recall the details of an occurrence witnessed by her when she was but nine years old, still her version failed utterly to show any negligence on the part of the driver.

Bearing in mind the statement of the policeman about the distance that the truck slid after the brakes were applied— in a curve from a point near the parked car to the place where it stopped at the other side of the street — we turn to the only testimony offered in support of the averment of negligence. This was supplied by a man who described himself as the operator of a garage, a business in which he said he had been engaged for about twenty-five years. He claimed to have had experience in adjusting and testing the brakes of automobiles and trucks and to have had some special training in that field. Upon closer examination, after telling that he had served three years with the Buick factory in Detroit, he related that he had not specialized there upon brakes only, but upon the automobile as a whole. He said he was familiar with the brakes installed in 1941 Chevrolet tractor units of *631 the hydraulic type and that he had “had occasion to becomé familiar with the distance in which a tractor unit of that sort can be stopped by the application of the brakes on a dry pavement.”' After this preliminary examination there was propounded the hypothetical question:

“Assume, if you will, Mr. Harrison, that the tractor and trailer unit, which I have shown you a picture of, Plaintiff’s Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3, had a combined weight of 7,445 pounds; that is to say, the two units weighed that much; that the tractor weighed 4,445 pounds and the trailer weighed 3,000 pounds, making a total of 7,445 pounds. Assuming, if you will, please, sir, that on the 22nd day of December, 1941, that unit, with some lumber on it, —here are pictures indicating the amount of lumber, — assume that that unit was being driven at a rate of twenty-five miles an hour, on a dry pavement, the pavement being asphalt, — within what distance in your opinion could that tractor and trailer unit be stopped by an application of the brakes, assuming the brakes to be in good working order?” . (Italics Supplied.)

To this he replied that he thought the vehicle could be stopped within thirty or thirty-five feet. He was then asked to assume that the skid marks were fifty-six feet long and to state what, in his opinion, was the speed of the truck which made these marks, to which he answered that he judged it would be “around forty to forty-five miles an hour.” On cross-examination he said the more a vehicle weighed the longer would be the distance required to stop it. He admitted that it had been about two years since he had tested a truck and trailer similar to the one we have described. To illustrate the quality of his testimony we give the last five questions propounded to this witness on cross-examination and his answers to them.

“Q. You have already testified that your stopping distance increases in direct ratio to the increase in speed.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
24 So. 2d 112, 156 Fla. 628, 1945 Fla. LEXIS 951, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kautzmann-vernet-lumber-co-v-fink-fla-1945.