Kaur v. Bondi
This text of Kaur v. Bondi (Kaur v. Bondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 8 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAJWINDER KAUR; MUSKANPREET No. 24-2200 KAUR; GURWANSHPREET SINGH, Agency Nos. A241-721-918 Petitioners, A241-721-917 A241-721-916 v.
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 4, 2025** Portland, Oregon
Before: BYBEE and FORREST, Circuit Judges, and RODRIGUEZ, District Judge.***
Petitioners Rajwinder Kaur and her two children, natives and citizens of India,
petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of their
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Xavier Rodriguez, United States District Judge for the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation. appeal from the immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of asylum, withholding of removal,
and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).1 We have jurisdiction under
8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
“Where, as here, the BIA reviewed the IJ’s factual findings for clear error, and
reviewed de novo all other issues, our review is ‘limited to the BIA’s decision,
except the extent the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.’” Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d
654, 658 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hosseini v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir.
2006)). We review factual findings for substantial evidence and legal conclusions de
novo. Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2022). Under the
substantial evidence standard, we uphold the BIA’s determination “unless the
evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025,
1028 (9th Cir. 2019).
1. Asylum and Withholding of Removal. For purposes of asylum and
withholding of removal, an applicant bears the burden of establishing, among other
things, “[past] persecution or a well-founded fear of [future] persecution . . . .” Guo
v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 2018) (alterations in original).
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Kaur did not suffer
1 Kaur’s minor children are derivative beneficiaries of their mother’s asylum application. The minor children also filed their own separate applications, but their claims are based entirely on the same facts.
2 24-2200 past persecution.2 Kaur’s claims relate to her husband’s membership in the Sikh-
driven Mann Party in Punjab. The BIA credited Kaur’s testimony that after her
husband left to the United States, she was threatened by Bharatiya Janata Party
members and was twice arrested, slapped, and pushed down by Punjab police
officers, all to get her to disclose her husband’s location. During the second arrest,
the officers threatened to have her strip naked and walk around the police station.
But Kaur never sustained physical injuries, the two arrests were almost a year apart,
the threats went unfulfilled, and the length of her detention—same day and
overnight—was minimal.
Kaur contends the BIA erred by neglecting to address “crucially probative
evidence” of two death threats she received. We disagree. The BIA need not discuss
each piece of evidence submitted when nothing in the record or the BIA’s decision
indicates a failure to consider all the evidence. Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d
915, 922 (9th Cir. 2006). When reviewing the agency’s decision, we apply “a
‘presumption that the BIA did review the record.’” Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th
757, 771 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Fernandez v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 592, 603 (9th
Cir. 2006)).
2 We need not address whether a less deferential standard applies to our review of persecution determinations because we would reach the same conclusion under any standard. See Lapdat v. Bondi, 128 F.4th 1047, 1055–56 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2025)
3 24-2200 Kaur did not testify to these death threats but included them in her written
declaration. Kaur remained in Punjab after the first death threat without incident,
and neither threat was accompanied by violence that caused Kaur to sustain physical
injuries. Kaur’s description of the death threats is also cursory and vague; she does
not specify who made the threat. Because these threats are not “highly probative nor
potentially dispositive evidence,” Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 772 (9th Cir. 2011),
“the Board need not expressly discuss [them],” Hernandez, 52 F.4th at 771.
Kaur did not demonstrate past persecution and so was not entitled to a
presumption of future persecution. See Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1029.
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Kaur did not otherwise
demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution. Kaur’s family members who
remain in India, including her similarly situated brother-in-law who is also Sikh but
not a Mann Party member, have not been harmed. Kaur was also able to pass through
screening with her passport when leaving India. Kaur’s asylum claim therefore fails,
and with it her withholding claim.
2. Judicial Notice. Kaur requests we take judicial notice of a recent event
that involves findings by the FBI “revealing the alleged involvement of the Indian
Government in a plot to harm or potentially assassinate a supporter of the Khalistani
movement” within the United States. We decline to do so. Generally, “we are limited
to reviewing the facts considered by the Board[.]” Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 963
4 24-2200 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A). Kaur has not provided
evidence of this event and Gafoor’s “dramatic foreign development” exception does
not apply. Gafoor v. INS, 231 F.3d 645, 655–57 (9th Cir. 2000), superseded by
statute on other grounds as stated in Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740–
41 (9th Cir. 2009).
3. CAT. To be eligible for CAT relief, a petitioner must show that it is
more likely than not that she would be tortured by or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official in the country of removal. Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr,
968 F.3d 1070, 1089 (9th Cir. 2020).
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