Kaufman v. Puritan Insurance

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Kaufman v. Puritan Insurance

126 A.D.2d 702, 511 N.Y.S.2d 307, 1987 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 41847

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 26, 1987

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 126 A.D.2d 702 (Kaufman v. Puritan Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Kaufman v. Puritan Insurance, 126 A.D.2d 702, 511 N.Y.S.2d 307, 1987 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 41847 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1987).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for the alleged breach of an insurance contract, the defendant Puritan Insurance Company appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Weiner, J.), entered May 9, 1985, as denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it is asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, with costs, the cross motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as it is asserted against the appellant, and the action is severed against the remaining defendants.

In support of its cross motion for summary judgment, the appellant produced its insurance policy which indicated that the only named insured was 3816 Ninth Avenue Roller Rink, Inc., the plaintiffs former tenant, and a notice of cancellation which was duly served upon the former tenant indicating that the policy was canceled prior to the loss in question. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the plaintiff to come forward with evidentiary proof, in admissible form, challenging the appellant’s showing that the plaintiff was not an insured, which the plaintiff failed to do. Specifically, the "certificate of insurance”, relied upon by the plaintiff, was merely a confirmation that the plaintiffs former tenant had acquired insurance on the premises and its contents. This document stated on its face that it was "issued as a matter of information only” and "confer[red] no rights upon the certificate holder” and further clearly set forth the name of the insured as "3816 Ninth Ave. Roller Rink, Inc.”.Therefore, the certificate of insurance does [703]*703not support the plaintiffs position that he was a coinsured under the insurance policy, or that he had any contractual relationship with the appellant. Moreover, the lease between the plaintiff and his former tenant regarding the purchasing of insurance did not in any way bind the appellant. Finally, we note that the other contentions raised by the plaintiff do not preclude the granting of summary judgment to the appellant (cf. Schillinger v North Hills Realty Corp., 15 AD2d 539, 540, affd 11 NY2d 1044; Di Sabato v Soffes, 9 AD2d 297). Mangano, J. P., Niehoff, Lawrence and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for the alleged breach of an insurance contract, the defendant Puritan Insurance Company appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Weiner, J.), entered May 9, 1985, as denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it is asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, with costs, the cross motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as it is asserted against the appellant, and the action is severed against the remaining defendants.

In support of its cross motion for summary judgment, the appellant produced its insurance policy which indicated that the only named insured was 3816 Ninth Avenue Roller Rink, Inc., the plaintiffs former tenant, and a notice of cancellation which was duly served upon the former tenant indicating that the policy was canceled prior to the loss in question. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the plaintiff to come forward with evidentiary proof, in admissible form, challenging the appellant’s showing that the plaintiff was not an insured, which the plaintiff failed to do. Specifically, the "certificate of insurance”, relied upon by the plaintiff, was merely a confirmation that the plaintiffs former tenant had acquired insurance on the premises and its contents. This document stated on its face that it was "issued as a matter of information only” and "confer[red] no rights upon the certificate holder” and further clearly set forth the name of the insured as "3816 Ninth Ave. Roller Rink, Inc.”.Therefore, the certificate of insurance does [703]*703not support the plaintiffs position that he was a coinsured under the insurance policy, or that he had any contractual relationship with the appellant. Moreover, the lease between the plaintiff and his former tenant regarding the purchasing of insurance did not in any way bind the appellant. Finally, we note that the other contentions raised by the plaintiff do not preclude the granting of summary judgment to the appellant (cf. Schillinger v North Hills Realty Corp., 15 AD2d 539, 540, affd 11 NY2d 1044; Di Sabato v Soffes, 9 AD2d 297). Mangano, J. P., Niehoff, Lawrence and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

126 A.D.2d 702, 511 N.Y.S.2d 307, 1987 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 41847, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kaufman-v-puritan-insurance-nyappdiv-1987.

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