Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc.

51 F.R.D. 18, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13518
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedDecember 18, 1969
DocketCiv. No. 1348-68
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 51 F.R.D. 18 (Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 51 F.R.D. 18, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13518 (D.N.J. 1969).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

COHEN, District Judge:

This is a motion by certain of numerous defendants, supported and resisted by briefs and arguments, upon rehearing, General Rule 12-1, U.S.D.C.N.J., [20]*20urging a reconsideration of this Court’s Order filed October 1, 1969 which denied their four motions to dismiss the complaint as to them; alternatively, defendants petition for certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

The complaint is stated in three counts. In Count I, brought under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., plaintiff seeks the following relief: (a) treble damages for himself, (b) for each member of a class which he purports to represent, (c) for each of the defendant externally managed mutual funds, (d) for each member of the class mentioned in (c), (e) a final injunction restraining the defendants from paying or receiving grossly excessive management fees, and (f) costs and counsel fees; in Count II, brought under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l et seq., he seeks the same treble damages and equitable relief for himself and others as in Count I; and in Count III, brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq., the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S. C. §§ 80b-l et seq. and under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-20, 80a-33, he demands such damages as are determined to have been sustained by him and the classes which he purports to represent. In essence, the plaintiff maintains that the defendant management and investment advisors, be they corporate or individual, as well as the alleged “self-dealing” directors of the externally managed mutual funds, conspired to fix grossly excessive fees, thereby illegally monopolizing the mutual funds investment market, all to his damage, and to that of the classes, both mutual and shareholder, which he purports to represent.

The four motions1 which were re-argued and reconsidered were those challenging the legal standing and capacity of the plaintiff to maintain his complaint which is based upon alleged violations of the Antitrust and Securities Laws of the United States and upon conspiracies to violate the same. In support of their motions, the defendants urged the following: (1) that inasmuch as the plaintiff is a shareholder in only four of the defendant mutual funds,2 he does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of all other funds or their shareholders as required by Rules 23 and 23.1, F.R.Civ.P.; (2) he cannot individually or representatively assert claims on behalf of individual shareholders of mutual funds, as such claims are necessarily derivative in nature and thus for the benefit of the corporations alone, Rule 12(b) (6), F.R.Civ.P.; (3) he cannot maintain this action to the extent that it seeks relief in Counts I, II and III of the complaint, (a) on behalf of mutual funds of which he is not a shareholder, (b) on behalf of shareholders of said funds of which he is not a shareholder because one may not maintain a legal action on behalf of a corporation or its shareholders, unless he is a shareholder of such corporation, Rules 12(b) (6), 23 and 23.1, F.R.Civ.P., and (4) Counts II and III of the complaint fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted in that the conspiracy alleged, even if true, would not violate either the Antitrust, Security Exchange or Investment Company Acts.

In the alternative, the moving defendants petition for a permissive certification, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), on the ground that the Order denying their motions to dismiss “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for differ[21]*21ence of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation * * *” as to them and as well as to. some 129 other defendants with whom plaintiff has no mutual shareholder relationship and which, if granted, will reduce the case to a derivative antitrust action shorn of the attempted representative class counts. Moreover, the defendants argue that a determination that this action is to proceed under the antitrust or securities laws (including the investment and ad-visors statutes) as a derivative one will substantially reduce the problems of jurisdiction, venue and process lurking in the other pending motions.3

Full and careful reconsideration has been given to the arguments advanced by able counsel upon rehearing. Nevertheless, this Court is of the conviction that nothing has been adduced which might lead to a conclusion and ruling different from its Order of October 1, 1969.4 When that Order was entered denying the four motions, the Court was of the opinion, as it is now, that: (a) plaintiff does fairly and adequately represent claims on behalf of individual shareholders of the defendant mutual funds, not being limited to those of which he is himself a shareholder, nor confined to the assertion of only derivative, as distinguished from nonderivative or representative claims; that (b) this action may be maintained at least as a “hybrid class” action, a class yet to be ascertained, in order to reach and dispose of other motions involving jurisdiction, process and venue; and that (c) the conspiracy charge of the complaint directed against all investment advisors, be they corporate or individual, and against the alleged “self-dealing" directors can be maintained by the plaintiff subject, of course, to an immediate resolution of other pending motions and ultimately to a determination of whether the conduct of defendants, or any of them, violates the Antitrust or Securities Acts or both. Manifestly, in the role in which plaintiff places himself, he is in effect an “ancillary force” supplementing governmental enforcement of the Antitrust and Securities Laws. Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Corp. Ass’n, 395 F.2d 420, 423 (3 Cir.1968). Moreover, inasmuch as the directors of the externally managed mutual funds have been charged by the plaintiff as “self-dealing,” it should be inferred that in all probability they would not institute this action nor, because a charge of conspiracy has been levelled, is it likely that the shareholders could persuade their respective directors to do so on their behalf or that of their own mutuals. Several cases have upheld class actions of spurious or hybrid-class character and of national extent, where the plaintiff could not claim an interest in each member of the class. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2 Cir.1968); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1969, 301 F.Supp. 484 (N.D. Ill.1969); Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda Amer. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa.1968); City of Philadel[22]

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Bluebook (online)
51 F.R.D. 18, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13518, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kauffman-v-dreyfus-fund-inc-njd-1969.