Katz v. . Daughtrey

151 S.E. 879, 198 N.C. 393, 1930 N.C. LEXIS 355

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: February 26, 1930
• Status: Published

Opinion

Stacy, C. J\,

after stating tbe case: The case turns on the question as to whether the defendant’s deed, which is prior in date of execution and registration to that of the plaintiff’s, is valid, either to pass title, or as color thereof.

That the deed is void for vagueness and uncertainty of description would seem to admit of no doubt. It fails to describe with certainty the property sought to be conveyed, and it contains no reference to anything extrinsic, which by recourse thereto is capable of making the description certain under the principle of id cerium est quod cerium reddi potest. Cathey v. Lumber Co., 151 N. C., 592, 66 S. E., 580; Harris v. Woodard, 130 N. C., 580, 41 S. E., 790; Hemphill v. Annis, 119 N. C., 514, 26 S. E., 152; Harrell v. Butler, 92 N. C., 20; Greer v. Rhyne, 69 N. C., 350; Murdock v. Anderson, 57 N. C., 77; Allen v. Chambers, 39 N. C., 125; Robeson v. Lewis, 64 N. C., 734; Edmundson v. Hooks, 33 N. C., 372. See, also, Gilbert v. Wright, 195 N. C., 165, 141 S. E., 577; Perry v. Scott, 109 N. C., 374, 14 S. E., 294, and Farmer v. Batts, 83 N. C., 387.

The defendant’s deed presumably attempts to convey twenty-five acres of a fifty-acre tract (though this may be doubted) without fixing the beginning point or any of the boundaries of the twenty-five acres. This is too vague and indefinite to admit of parol evidence to fit the description to the thing intended to be conveyed. Harrison v. Hahn, 95 N. C., 28. Section 992 of the Consolidated Statutes, which deals with indefinite descriptions, applies only to descriptions which are capable of being aided by parol, and not to those incapable of such assistance. Bissette v. Strickland, 191 N. C., 260, 131 S. E., 655; Harris v. Woodard, supra.

If the land intended to be conveyed cannot be identified from the description contained in the deed, it follows as a necessary corollary, that as the deed is, for this reason, inoperative, it is equally inoperative as color of title. If the land cannot be identified for one purpose, how can it be for another? Campbell v. Miller, 165 N. C., 51, 80 S. E., 974; Barker v. R. R., 125 N. C., 596, 34 S. E., 701; Dickens v. Barnes, 79 N. C., 490; Hinchey v. Nichols, 72 N. C., 66; Capps v. Holt, 58 N. C., 153.

A deed which conveys no title, because the land intended to be conveyed thereby is incapable of identification from the description contained therein, would necessarily be inoperative as color of title. Fincannon v. Sudderth, 144 N. C., 587, 57 S. E., 337.

There was error in directing a verdict for the defendant.

New trial.