Katina Maria Guidry v. Glazer's Distributors of Louisiana, Inc.

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: November 3, 2010
• Docket: CA-0010-0218
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

10-218

KATINA MARIA GUIDRY

VERSUS

GLAZER’S DISTRIBUTORS OF LOUISIANA, INC.

********** APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-20084966 HONORABLE MARILYN CARR CASTLE, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

OSWALD A. DECUIR JUDGE

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Oswald A. Decuir, and James T. Genovese, Judges.

Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, dissents and assigns written reasons.

AFFIRMED.

Leonard Knapp, Jr. Attorney at Law P. O. Box 1665 Lake Charles, LA 70602 (337) 439-1700 Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant: Katina Maria Guidry

Michael S. Mitchell Fisher & Philips LLP 201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 3710 New Orleans, LA 70170 (504) 522-3303 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: Glazer’s Distributors of Louisiana, Inc. DECUIR, Judge.

Katina Maria Guidry appeals the trial court’s award of summary judgment in

favor of Glazer’s Distributors of Louisiana, Inc. (Glazer’s), dismissing her action for

employment discrimination in violation of La.R.S. 23:332. Guidry, whom Glazer’s

terminated after she failed to report for work as scheduled, alleges that Glazer’s

terminated her because of her gender. Glazer’s argues that it terminated Guidry after

she violated company policy. The trial court granted Glazer’s motion for summary

judgment, concluding that Glazer’s set forth a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason

for Guidry’s termination and that Guidry failed to offer evidence that Glazer’s treated

her disparately. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS

At the time of her termination, Guidry was one of two women employed in the

warehouse at Glazer’s. Guidry normally worked the night shift at Glazer’s, beginning

at 5:00 p.m. and ending at approximately 3:30 a.m. the next day. The incident leading

to Guidry’s termination arose when Guidry learned that a close family friend had

died. The day before the friend’s funeral, Guidry asked her supervisor, Kevin

Courville, if she could attend the funeral. Courville indicated that they were

shorthanded and never gave Guidry express permission to take the night off.

On the morning of the funeral, Guidry called into work and left a message

stating that she would not work her evening shift as scheduled. She then attended the

funeral. Despite the fact that two of her fellow employees attended the funeral and

returned to work, Guidry did not come in to complete her shift after the funeral. She

returned to work the following business day. When she returned, Courville consulted

with the Human Resource Director, Rusty Harmount, and the Branch Manager, John

O’Reilly, before taking action. Glazer’s terminated her. Approximately one year prior to Guidry’s termination, Terry Matte overheard Courville commenting that he

was not going to hire any more women to work in the warehouse. Steven Breaux and

Nanette Leger also reported hearing a similar comment approximately one year after

Guidry was terminated.

Guidry filed a charge of discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission and later brought this action. The trial court granted

Glazer’s motion for summary judgment, and Guidry appeals.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Guidry contends that the trial court erred in granting Glazer’s motion for

summary judgment. We disagree.

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, an appellate court “applies the

de novo standard of review, ‘using the same criteria that govern the trial court’s

consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate, i.e., whether there is a

genuine issue of material fact and whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.’” Gray v. Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co., 07-1670, p. 6 (La. 2/26/08), 977

So.2d 839, 844 (quoting Supreme Serv. & Specialty Co., Inc. v. Sonny Greer, 06-

1827, p. 4 (La. 5/22/07), 958 So.2d 634, 638). “The judgment sought shall be

rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B).

A fact is material if it potentially insures or precludes recovery, affects a

litigant’s ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the legal dispute. Smith v.

Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730. A genuine

2 issue is one in which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could

reach only one conclusion, there is no need for trial on that issue, and summary

judgment is appropriate. Id. Whether a fact is material is determined in light of the

relevant substantive law. Weingartner v. La. IceGators, 02-1181 (La.App. 3 Cir.

4/17/03), 854 So.2d 898, writ denied, 03-1388 (La. 9/13/03), 853 So.2d 645.

Guidry alleges that Glazer’s violated La.R.S. 23:332, which states in relevant

part:

A. It shall be unlawful discrimination in employment for an employer to engage in any of the following practices:

(1) Intentionally . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to intentionally discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, or his terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of the individual’s . . . sex . . . .

(2) Intentionally limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of the individual’s . . . sex. . . .

To recover, Guidry must prove that her gender played a part in the termination

of her employment. She may establish gender discrimination through either direct or

circumstantial evidence. See Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir.

2004).1 The nature of the evidence determines the framework to be used in analyzing

Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:332 is substantially similar to Title VII of the Civil Rights 1

Act of 1964. Thus, the outcome will be the same under the federal and state statutes. LA Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Trahan v. Rally’s Hamburgers, Inc., 96- 1837 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/20/97), 696 So.2d 637).

3 Guidry’s claim. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 105 S.Ct.

613 (1985).

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973)

establishes the procedural framework for analyzing motions for summary judgment

in cases which rely on circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination. Under

the McDonnell Douglas framework, Guidry must first establish a prima facie case of

discrimination. Willis v. Coca Cola Enterprises, Inc., 445 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2006).

To establish a prima facie case, Guidry must show that: (1) she is a member of a

protected class; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an adverse

employment action; and (4) others outside the protected class who were similarly

situated were more favorably treated. Ross v. Univ. of Tex. at San Antonio, 139 F.3d

521 (5th Cir. 1998). If Guidry establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, a

presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden shifts to Glazer’s to produce a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged actions. If the employer

produces a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination, the burden then

returns to Guidry to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the non-discriminatory

reason offered by Glazer’s is merely pretextual. Willis, 445 F.3d at 413.

Guidry may meet the burden of demonstrating pretext and thus avoid summary

judgment “if the evidence taken as a whole (1) creates a fact issue as to whether each

of [Glazer’s] stated reasons was what actually motivated [Glazer’s] and (2) creates

a reasonable inference that [gender] was a determinative factor in the actions of which

[Guidry] complains.” Vadie v. Miss. State Univ., 218 F.3d 365, 374 n.23 (5th Cir.

2000).

4 Guidry contends that she was wrongfully terminated because of her gender.

Specifically, she asserts that though she was terminated when she failed to report to

work after calling in, other similarly situated male employees received a less harsh

method of discipline when they engaged in the same conduct.

Because Guidry has not offered direct evidence of discrimination, her claim is

properly analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework. As noted above, to

establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Guidry must show that: (1) she is a

member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3) she suffered

an adverse employment decision; and (4) similarly situated male employees were

treated more favorably.

Glazer’s does not dispute that Guidry satisfies the first three prongs of the

prima facie standard. They question, however, whether Guidry offered appropriate

“similarly situated” comparators who Glazer’s treated more favorably than she. For

this court to compare Guidry to other employees, she must show that she “was

similarly situated to those other employees in terms of performance, qualifications,

and conduct” and that no other unique facts differentiated their situations. Lester v.

Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 514 F. Supp.2d 866, 874 (W.D. La. 2007).

We find that Guidry has not identified similarly situated comparators. Guidry

cites two full-time warehouse workers, Earl LeBlanc and Casey Howard, whom

Leger identified as individuals who missed work without notice and were not

terminated. Rather, Glazer’s gave them “occurrences.” These individuals held the

same position as Guidry, however, they were not engaged in the same conduct.

Guidry did not just miss work without notice. Guidry sought permission to miss work

and when that permission was not granted, she missed work anyway. Moreover

5 unlike some of her other coworkers, she missed her entire shift when she could have

come in after the funeral services. Her actions are clearly distinguishable from the

comparators she offers. Accordingly, we conclude that Guidry failed to establish a

prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Even if this were not the case, establishing a prima facie case merely shifts the

burden to Glazer’s to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Guidry’s

termination. Glazer’s submits that Guidry was insubordinate and violated company

policy by not reporting to work as scheduled. When an employer claims that an

employment decision was based on a legitimate reason, two questions must be posed.

First, objectively, is the reason given “legitimate” under Title VII? St. Mary’s Honor

Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (1993). If the reason is

illegitimate on its face, the employer is liable. Id. Second, subjectively, is the

employer’s reason merely a pretext for discrimination? Id. If so, then the employer

is again liable. Id.

Here, we find that Glazer’s reason for Guidry’s termination is legitimate on its

face. Guidry failed to show up for her shift after having failed to obtain permission

to do so. This was clearly insubordinate behavior and a violation of company policy.

Guidry’s allegations regarding statements by Courville in no way justify her

insubordination nor call into question the legitimacy of Glazer’s actions in

terminating her.

Summary judgment procedure is favored in Louisiana and is designed to

secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of actions. La.Code Civ.P. art.

966(A)(2). Cheramie Services, Inc. v. Shell Deepwater Prod., Inc., 09-1633 (La.

6 4/23/10), 35 So.3d 1053. Glazer’s motion for summary judgment was properly

granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. All costs

of these proceedings are taxed to appellant, Katina Maria Guidry.

7 STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge, dissenting.

Ms. Guidry clearly offered evidence upon which a trier of fact could

conclude that Glazer’s proffered reason for termination was discriminatorily

pretextual. Mr. Courville’s statement that he “[was] not going to hire any more

women to work in the warehouse because they [were] too much trouble” evinces an

intent to discriminate.

The comment Mr. Courville made clearly relates to women, and it was

made only two weeks following Ms. Guidry’s termination. Moreover, Mr. Courville

had authority over Ms. Guidry’s employment. Finally, the comment’s temporal

proximity to Ms. Guidry’s termination lends credence to the assertion that it related

to that event.

Earl LeBlanc and Casey Howard, contrary to the majority’s assertion,

were engaged in the exact conduct as Ms. Guidry. The majority’s language implies

that Ms. Guidry was unequivocally denied permission when, in fact, she received no

response to her request to attend her friend’s funeral. Unlike the majority’s misplaced

characterization, her action was not tantamount to insubordination. At least, Ms.

Guidry attempted to give notice and obtain authorization. LeBlanc and Howard did

not bother to even attempt notice. Even assuming Ms. Guidry’s action was insubordinate, LeBlanc’s and Howard’s actions are even more egregious examples

of insubordination. Yet, they were rewarded with continued employment, while Ms.

Guidry suffered the ultimate disciplinary action—termination.

Ms. Guidry also offers evidence that since assuming his position as

operations manager, Mr. Courville has not terminated any other employee for not

reporting to work. Finally, Ms. Guidry submits that of the approximately ten persons

hired by Mr. Courville to work in the warehouse since Ms. Guidry’s termination

through the date of his deposition, none of the new hires was a woman.

In construing the facts in a light most favorable to Ms. Guidry, I

conclude that she has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to the motive and

intent of Glazer’s agent, Kevin Courville. “Summary judgment is seldom appropriate

for determinations based on subjective facts, such as motive, intent, good faith,

knowledge and malice.” Smith, 639 So.2d at 751 (citing Penalber v. Blount, 550

So.2d 577 (La.1989)). See also, Indep. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 99-2181, 99-

2257 (La. 2/29/00), 755 So.2d 226. Mr. Courville’s motive and intent are factors that

should be explored by a trier of fact.

Thus, I conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment

in favor of Glazer’s. I would reverse the trial court’s granting of summary judgment

and remand this case for further proceedings.

For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.