Katie Lynn Maynard v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: October 28, 2025
• Docket: 06-25-00063-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-25-00063-CR

KATIE LYNN MAYNARD, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 8th District Court Hopkins County, Texas Trial Court No. 1424008

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef MEMORANDUM OPINION

Katie Lynn Maynard pled guilty to recklessly causing serious injury to a child, a second-

degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04 (Supp.). Pursuant to a plea agreement with

the State, Maynard was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, but the sentence was suspended in

favor of placing her on community supervision for ten years. The State alleged that Maynard

violated the terms and conditions of her community supervision by committing the Nevada

offense of child abuse and neglect and moved to revoke her community supervision. Maynard

pled true to the State’s allegation, and as a result, the trial court revoked her community

supervision and imposed the originally assessed, ten-year sentence. Maynard appeals.

Maynard’s attorney filed a brief stating that she reviewed the record and found no

genuinely arguable issues that could be raised on appeal. The brief sets out the procedural

history of the case and summarizes the evidence elicited during the trial court proceedings.

Since counsel provided a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no

arguable grounds to be advanced, that evaluation meets the requirements of Anders v. California.

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743–44 (1967); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 509–10 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1991); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 812–13 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978).

Counsel also filed a motion with this Court seeking to withdraw as counsel in this appeal.

On August 20, 2025, counsel mailed to Maynard copies of the brief, the motion to

withdraw, and the appellate record. Maynard was informed of her rights to review the record

and file a pro se response. We received Maynard’s pro se response on September 22, 2025.

2 We have reviewed the entire appellate record and Maynard’s pro se response and have

independently determined that no reversible error exists. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824,

826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). However, we find non-reversible error in the trial court’s

judgment, which mistakenly lists the statute of offense as Section 22.04(f) of the Texas Penal

Code, but Subsection (f) only applies if “the victim is a disabled individual residing in a center”

and “the actor is an employee of the center or facility whose employment involved providing

direct care for the victim.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(f). Here, the record shows that

Maynard was not employed and that the injury was to a child, not a disabled individual residing

in a center. In this case, the correct statute of offense is Section 22.04(e) of the Texas Penal

Code, which states that recklessly causing serious bodily injury to a child is a second-degree

offense. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(e) with § 22.04(f).

Accordingly, we modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect that the proper statute of

offense is Section 22.04(e), not 22.04(f). As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.1

Charles van Cleef Justice

Date Submitted: October 14, 2025 Date Decided: October 28, 2025 Do Not Publish 1 Since we agree that this case presents no reversible error, we also, in accordance with Anders, grant counsel’s request to withdraw from further representation of appellant in this case. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant desire to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, appellant must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review (1) must be filed within thirty days from either the date of this opinion or the date on which the last timely motion for rehearing was overruled by this Court, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2, (2) must be filed with the clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.3, and (3) should comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4. 3