NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2258-24
KATIA ETIENNE, on behalf of herself and those similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RESURGENT CAPITAL SERVICES LP, and CACH, LLC,
Defendants-Respondents. ________________________________
Argued May 5, 2026 – Decided July 23, 2026
Before Judges DeAlmeida and Torregrossa-O'Connor.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-5557-21.
Yongmoon Kim argued the cause for appellant (Kim Law Firm LLC, attorneys; Mark Jensen and Yongmoon Kim, on the briefs).
Jonathan M. Robbin (J. Robbin Law PLLC) of the New York bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for respondents (Jonathan M. Robbin and Jacquelyn A. DiCicco (J. Robbin Law PLLC), attorneys; Jacquelyn A. DiCicco, of counsel and on the brief).
Plaintiff Katia Etienne, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, appeals from two Law Division orders dismissing her complaints
against defendants Resurgent Capital Services LP (Resurgent) and CACH, LLC
(CACH) for failure to state a claim upon with relief can be granted: (1) the June
14, 2024 order dismissing her complaint without prejudice; and (2) the February
14, 2025 order dismissing her first amended complaint with prejudice. We
affirm.
I.
Plaintiff incurred a debt which she did not pay. The lender transmitted
that debt to CACH, a debt collector. The debt was placed with Resurgent, the
master servicing agent for CACH.
On or about July 16, 2020, Resurgent, on behalf of CACH, sent a notice
in compliance with a New York banking regulation, see 23 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1.4, to
plaintiff in response to her inquiry and dispute of the debt. The notice, which
listed the account number associated with the debt, as well as plaintiff's name
and address, which plaintiff claims was obsolete, stated, "You are receiving this
notice as a result of your recent dispute regarding the above-referenced account.
New York state regulations require us to inform you that you have the right to
A-2258-24 2 request substantiation of this debt." The notice explained the procedure for
requesting substantiation of the debt and provided the address to which the
request must be sent. The notice stated, "This communication is from a debt
collector. However, this notice is for informational purposes only, and is not an
attempt to collect a debt."
On July 15, 2021, plaintiff filed a five-count putative class action
complaint in the Law Division alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collections
Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1692 to 1692p, unconscionable
practices under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to
-229, negligence, and invasion of privacy. Plaintiff's claims were based on her
allegation the July 16, 2020 notice was generated and mailed by a third-party
vendor to whom defendants transmitted her private financial information
without her consent. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief, damages,
including treble damages under the CFA, attorney's fees, and costs, on behalf of
herself and the class.
Plaintiff's FDCPA claims were based on Section 1692c(b) of the statute.
That provision states:
Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector . . . a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of
A-2258-24 3 any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.
[15 U.S.C.A. § 1692c(b).]
The provisions of Section 1692b of the FDCPA are not applicable here.
On November 11, 2022, defendants moved pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.1
On June 14, 2024, the court issued a comprehensive written decision
granting defendants' motion. The court concluded:
The conduct at issue – the transmitting of data to a letter vendor for the purpose of preparing a letter to then be directed to the debtor herself – is simply not "communicat[ing]" proscribed by the FDCPA, nor was the communication undertaken "in connection with the collection of any debt" under any sensible interpretation of such terms as used in the statute. The letter vendor engaged by the debt collector here is no different than the telephone/telegram operator engaged as a "medium" for an otherwise permitted communication.
To hold otherwise is to ignore the reality that debt collectors employ letter vendors to prepare correspondence necessary for their lawful operations
1 Shortly after the complaint was served, defendants removed the matter to the United States District Court. On September 14, 2022, the District Court remanded the matter to the Law Division. A-2258-24 4 and, in effect, to require such debt collectors necessarily to conduct business on a fully integrated basis without need for an outside letter vendor. There is simply no basis in either the letter or the intendment of the FDCPA for any such conclusion.
While acknowledging a literal application of Section 1692c(b) could
encompass defendants' transmission of plaintiff's information to a letter vendor,
the motion court examined the legislative declaration of purpose set forth in the
FDCPA. The court noted when enacting the FDCPA, Congress found: "There
is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive and unfair debt collection
practices by many debt collectors. Abusive debt collection practices contribute
to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs,
and to invasions of individual privacy." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692(a). In addition, the
motion court observed Congress declared: "It is the purpose of this subchapter
to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that
those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices
are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to
protect consumers against debt collection abuses." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692(e). The
court noted the complaint contained no allegations the letter vendor or its
employees used the information transmitted by defendants to inflict reputational
or other harm on plaintiff or misused the information in any other way.
A-2258-24 5 In addition, the motion court found defendants' transmission of
information to the letter vendor was not "in connection with the collection of
any debt" within the meaning of Section 1692c(b). The court explained:
The purpose of providing the information to the vendor was not collection. The communication made no demand for payment, nor was it intended to inform the recipient of the debtor's indebtedness for purposes of facilitating a collection. Indeed, the letter vendor had no ability, directly or indirectly, to persuade, coerce or shame the debtor into payment merely by receipt of the data concerning the debt. Instead, the debt collector transmitted the data to enable preparation of a letter to the debtor, which letter, when issued by or for the debt collector, was a communication in connection with collection.
....
What is more, there are no facts alleged establishing that Resurgent intended a communication with a "person" when it transmitted the information via electronic means to the letter vendor. Indeed, as Resurgent points out, it is unlikely that any individual at the letter vendor ever saw, let alone examined, the information concerning the debt.
Those individuals working for the letter vendor(s) in issue in this case are far more akin to clerical employees of the debt collector or personnel with postal/telephone/telegram operators that happen to receive and process information conveyed by a debt collector than to an employer, neighbor, friend or family member of a debtor. In truth, given advances in technology, letter vendors are even less likely than any such functionaries actually to see the debtor's data.
A-2258-24 6 Such personnel are instead more realistically viewed as part and parcel of the "medium" by which a communication is ultimately undertaken, and not the intended recipients of that communication.
Thus, the court concluded plaintiff had not alleged a viable cause of action under
the FDCPA.
The court also found plaintiff failed to allege a valid claim under the CFA.
The court reasoned: "[E]ven presuming the [CFA] regulates the conduct of debt
collectors (a highly dubious proposition), the transmission of information to a
letter vendor is simply not an unconscionable commercial practice" under the
CFA. The court found "[t]here is nothing deceptive, fraudulent, or
unconscionable about either engaging a letter vendor for a legitimate purpose or
transmitting to such vendor the information the latter needs to perform its
function." The court noted plaintiff had not identified an ascertainable loss
causally linked to defendants' transmission of her personal information, a
necessary element of a CFA claim.
The motion court found "the theory of recovery sounding in common law
negligence to be untenable as well." The court explained, "There is no duty of
care owed by a debt collector to a debtor that provides the foundational basis for
a claim sounding in negligence." To the extent plaintiff argued the FDCPA
established a standard of care for debt collectors, the court concluded she did
A-2258-24 7 not allege a valid claim defendants violated the statute for the reasons it
previously stated.
Finally, the motion court concluded plaintiff did not plead a viable cause
of action for invasion of privacy. The court found plaintiff did not allege
defendants published her private information "by communicating it to the public
at large or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially
certain to become one of public knowledge," as required to establish invasion of
privacy. See Bisbee v. John C. Conover Agency, Inc., 186 N.J. Super. 335, 340
(App. Div. 1982). Accepting plaintiffs' allegations as true, the motion court
found, at worst, defendants communicated her private information to a small
group of employees at the letter vendor. The court noted, however, plaintiff did
not allege any employee of the letter vendor read her information during
production of the mailing, much less publicized the information to any other
person.
The court dismissed the complaint without prejudice to afford plaintiff an
opportunity to replead her claims against defendants. The court noted plaintiff
could "address the legal deficiencies identified" in the court's decision "by
alleging facts concerning some impropriety in the handling of data by the letter
vendor that caused her data to be provided to other third parties or even to be
A-2258-24 8 publicly disseminated." A June 14, 2024 order memorialized the court's
decision.
On July 15, 2024, plaintiff filed the first amended complaint. She
reiterated her claims and added allegations that letter vendors in general compile
consumer data relating to debt collection practices and payments to model and
market consulting services to debt buyers and debt collectors. Plaintiff alleged
letter vendors and related companies, including the parent company of the letter
vendor used to generate the notice plaintiff received from defendants, profit
from their analysis of the customer data sent to them by debt collectors. In
addition, plaintiff alleged defendants' transmission of her information to the
letter vendor increased the risk the information would be improperly released to
other parties.
On August 19, 2024, defendants moved pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) to
dismiss the first amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. Plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved for leave to file
a second amended complaint. Defendants opposed the cross-motion.
On February 14, 2025, a different judge issued an oral decision granting
defendant's motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. The second motion
judge incorporated the written decision of the first motion judge and found the
A-2258-24 9 additional allegations in the first amended complaint did not cure the
deficiencies that led to dismissal of the complaint. The judge found the
additional allegations, if true, did not constitute violations of the FDCPA or the
CFA, or constitute common law causes of action.
The second motion judge also found dismissal of the first amended
complaint with prejudice was warranted and declined to grant plaintiff leave to
file a second amended complaint. A February 14, 2025 order memorialized the
decision to dismiss the first amended complaint with prejudice. A second
February 14, 2025 order denied plaintiff's cross-motion to file a second amended
complaint.
This appeal followed. Plaintiff argues the court erred when it dismissed
her complaint and first amended complaint because it: (1) failed to apply the
unequivocal prohibition in the FDCPA on a debt collector communicating a
debtor's protected information to a third party, except in limited circumstances
not applicable here; (2) predicated violation of the FDCPA on the third party's
use of protected information it received from a debt collector, a condition not
included in the plain text of the statute; and (3) did not follow federal precedents
A-2258-24 10 holding a debt collector's transmission of protected information to a third-party
letter vendor violates the FDCPA. 2
II.
We apply a de novo standard of review to a trial court's order dismissing
a complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e). See Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC v.
Cnty. of Bergen, 450 N.J. Super. 286, 290 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Teamsters
Loc. 97 v. State, 434 N.J. Super. 393, 413 (App. Div. 2014)). Under the rule,
we owe no deference to the motion judge's conclusions. Rezem Fam. Assocs.,
LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div. 2011). Our
"inquiry is limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the
2 Plaintiff's March 31, 2025 notice of appeal and case information statement listed only the February 14, 2025 order dismissing her first amended complaint as the subject of her appeal. On August 22, 2025, plaintiff filed, without leave of court, an amended notice of appeal that added the June 14, 2024 order to the list of appealed orders. On September 19, 2025, plaintiff moved for leave to file a second amended notice of appeal that added the February 14, 2025 order denying her motion to file a second amended complaint to the list of appealed orders. Defendants opposed the motion and cross-moved to dismiss the first amended notice of appeal as untimely to the extent it purported to appeal the June 14, 2024 order. We denied both plaintiff's motion and defendant's cross- motion. Etienne v. Resurgent Capital Servs., No. A-2258-24 (App. Div. Oct. 27, 2025). Our decision on the motions left in place plaintiff's amended notice of appeal listing both the February 14, 2025 and June 14, 2024 orders. Although defendants' merits brief includes a point addressing the timeliness of plaintiff's appeal of the June 14, 2024 order, that issue was resolved by the denial of defendants' cross-motion to dismiss the amended notice of appeal. A-2258-24 11 face of the complaint." Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116
N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (citing Rieder v. Dep't of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552
(App. Div. 1987)). "A pleading should be dismissed if it states no basis for
relief and discovery would not provide one." Rezem Fam. Assocs., LP, 423 N.J.
Super. at 113 (citing Camden Cnty. Energy Recovery Assoc., LP v. N.J. Dep't
of Env'l Prot., 320 N.J. Super. 59, 64 (App. Div. 1999), aff'd, 170 N.J. 246
(2001)).
To establish an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the
plaintiff is a consumer; (2) the defendant is a debt collector; (3) the challenged
practice involves an attempt to collect a "debt" as defined by the FDCPA; and
(4) the defendant violated the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt. Midland
Funding LLC v. Thiel, 446 N.J. Super. 537, 549 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting
Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 2014)).
For purposes of the motion to dismiss, we, like the motion court, accept
as true plaintiff's allegations she is a consumer and defendants are debt
collectors under the FDCPA. The viability of plaintiffs' claims under the
FDCPA is dependent on whether, by transmitting information about plaintiff's
debt to a third-party letter vendor, defendants "communicate[d], in connection
A-2258-24 12 with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer" within
the meaning of 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692c(b).
"In construing the meaning of a statute . . . our review is de novo."
Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 (2013). To interpret a statute, we
"determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent." In re H.D., 241 N.J. 412,
418 (2020) (quoting N.J. Dep't of Child. & Fams., Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs.
v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 20 (2013)). "[W]e begin by looking at the statute's plain
language," Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 592 (2012), and
give the language "its ordinary meaning and . . . construe[ it] in a common-sense
manner," State in re K.O., 217 N.J. 83, 91 (2014).
"We will 'neither rewrite a plainly[] written enactment of the Legislature
nor presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed
by way of the plain language.'" Sanchez v. Fitness Factory Edgewater, LLC,
242 N.J. 252, 261 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting O'Connell v. State, 171
N.J. 484, 488 (2002)). However, "[a]n enactment that is part of a larger statutory
framework should not be read in isolation, but in relation to other constituent
parts so that a sensible meaning may be given to the whole of the legislative
scheme." Vitale v. Schering-Plough Corp., 447 N.J. Super. 98, 115 (App. Div.
A-2258-24 13 2016) (quoting Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558, 572
(2012)).
On de novo review, we discern no error in the motion court's conclusion
defendants' transmission of information about plaintiff's debt to a third-party
letter vendor was not the type of conduct Congress intended to regulate when it
enacted the FDCPA. "In adopting the [FDCPA], . . . Congress left no doubt that
its purpose was to protect debtors from abuse and that Congress perceived a
need for national uniformity to fulfill that goal." Rutgers-The State Univ. v.
Fogel, 403 N.J. Super. 389, 394 (App. Div. 2008). Defendants' transmission of
information to the letter vendor was merely to facilitate the regulatory obligation
to inform plaintiff of her right to seek substantiation of the debt defendants
claimed was outstanding. Plaintiff made no allegation the communication was
anything other than a routine business practice.
Plaintiff did not allege defendants caused public release of information
about her debt. Indeed, she did not allege any employee of the letter vendor saw
the information transmitted by defendants or that generation and mailing of the
July 16, 2020 notice by the third-party vendor required human review of her
information. Plaintiff also failed to identify any concrete harm she suffered
A-2258-24 14 because of defendants' use of a third-party letter vendor, given she does not
allege public disclosure of her protected information.
Thus, accepting the allegations in the first amended complaint as true,
plaintiff cannot establish defendants' communication with a third-party letter
vendor was an abusive practice proscribed by the FDCPA. Plaintiff's wooden
interpretation of the statute to apply to what is essentially an internal
communication to facilitate defendants' communication with plaintiff about her
right to seek substantiation of the underlying debt is inconsistent with
congressional intent.
We are not persuaded by the federal and out-of-state decisions on which
plaintiff relies to support her interpretation of the FDCPA. We note "decisions
of the federal courts of appeals are not binding on this court." Daniels v.
Hollister Co., 440 N.J. Super. 359, 367 n.7 (App. Div. 2015). See also Pressler
& Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3.5 on R. 1:36-3 (2026) ("On
questions of federal constitutional law and statutory law, only decisions of the
United States Supreme Court are binding on the courts of this state."). We are
confident the interpretation of the FDCPA adopted by the motion court comports
with congressional intent and the text of the statute.
A-2258-24 15 To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of plaintiff's
remaining arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).3
Affirmed.
3 Plaintiff's merits brief does not address the dismissal of her claims not based on the FDCPA. We therefore deem any arguments with respect to those claims waived. "[A]n issue not briefed is deemed waived." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5 on R. 2:6-2 (2026); Telebright Corp. v. Dir., N.J. Div. of Tax'n, 424 N.J. Super. 384, 393 (App. Div. 2012) (deeming a contention waived when the party failed to include any arguments supporting the contention in its brief). A-2258-24 16