Kathryn Roberts v. Commissioner of Social Securit

Ninth Circuit

Kathryn Roberts v. Commissioner of Social Securit

522 F. App'x 387

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJune 10, 2013

Docket12-15096, 12-15121, 12-15122

StatusUnpublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 522 F. App'x 387 (Kathryn Roberts v. Commissioner of Social Securit) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Kathryn Roberts v. Commissioner of Social Securit, 522 F. App'x 387 (9th Cir. 2013).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

In this consolidated appeal, plaintiffs, successful Social Security benefits claimants, appeal the district court’s reduction and denial of their requests for supplemental attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). We review a district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees under the EAJA for abuse of discretion. See Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.Sd 1081, 1088 (9th Cir.2002). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

In its denial or reduction of attorneys’ fees, the district court must offer a clear and concise explanation, but the explanation does not need to be elaborate. Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 584 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir.2008). A district court has “substantial discretion in fixing the amount of an EAJA award.” Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990).

Here, the magistrate judge adequately explained his reasoning for rejecting fees for the twelve hours spent preparing the supplemental reply briefing: he was rightfully concerned with a never-ending cycle of EAJA fee requests. Additionally, the magistrate judge reasonably denied all fees related to his sua sponte request for additional briefing regarding whether attorney Ralph Wilborn was entitled to fees. Plaintiffs’ counsel cannot charge the government for fees it could not charge to a private client. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (“Hours that are not properly billed to one’s client also are not properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory authority.”) (quoting Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C.Cir.1980) (en banc)).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

In this consolidated appeal, plaintiffs, successful Social Security benefits claimants, appeal the district court’s reduction and denial of their requests for supplemental attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). We review a district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees under the EAJA for abuse of discretion. See Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.Sd 1081, 1088 (9th Cir.2002). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

In its denial or reduction of attorneys’ fees, the district court must offer a clear and concise explanation, but the explanation does not need to be elaborate. Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 584 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir.2008). A district court has “substantial discretion in fixing the amount of an EAJA award.” Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990).

Here, the magistrate judge adequately explained his reasoning for rejecting fees for the twelve hours spent preparing the supplemental reply briefing: he was rightfully concerned with a never-ending cycle of EAJA fee requests. Additionally, the magistrate judge reasonably denied all fees related to his sua sponte request for additional briefing regarding whether attorney Ralph Wilborn was entitled to fees. Plaintiffs’ counsel cannot charge the government for fees it could not charge to a private client. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (“Hours that are not properly billed to one’s client also are not properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory authority.”) (quoting Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C.Cir.1980) (en banc)).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.

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522 F. App'x 387, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kathryn-roberts-v-commissioner-of-social-securit-ca9-2013.

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