Kathleen M. Cammisano and William Cammisano, Jr. v. United States

Eighth Circuit

Kathleen M. Cammisano and William Cammisano, Jr. v. United States

829 F.2d 687, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 12745

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedSeptember 28, 1987

Docket87-1201

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 829 F.2d 687 (Kathleen M. Cammisano and William Cammisano, Jr. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Kathleen M. Cammisano and William Cammisano, Jr. v. United States, 829 F.2d 687, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 12745 (8th Cir. 1987).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Kathleen M. and William Cammisano, Jr., appeal a portion of the district court’s order holding William to be a “felon” under the federal gun control laws. We affirm.

The district court ruled William Cammisano could not legally possess hunting rifles because in 1969 he entered a guilty plea to second-degree burglary, a felony in Missouri. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) (repealed 1986). (The statute’s prohibition of a convicted felon’s possessing firearms was transferred to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and (h). See H.R.Rep. No. 495, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1327, 1349; Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub.L.No. 99-308, § 102, 100 Stat. 449, 451-53 (1986) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), (h))). On appeal Cammisano argues he should not be classified as a convicted felon because the three-year prison sentence he received in 1969 for burglary was suspended, he successfully completed his probation in 1972, and his civil rights were fully restored to him by Missouri at that time.

Federal law determines whether a person is a convicted felon under the firearms statutes. United States v. Millender, 811 F.2d 476, 477 (8th Cir.1987). Voluntary guilty pleas are treated as convictions within the meaning of these statutes. Id. (“ ‘[F]or purposes of the federal gun control laws, we equate a plea of guilty and its notation by the state court, followed by a sentence of probation, with being “convicted” ’ * * (quoting Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 114, 103 S.Ct. 986, 992, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983)). A felon’s discharge from probation does not wipe the slate clean for purposes of the federal firearms statutes. See United States v. Mostad, 485 F.2d 199, 200 (8th Cir.1973), cert, denied, 415 U.S. 947, 94 S.Ct. 1468, 39 L.Ed.2d 563 (1974). Neither does the state’s restoration of a felon’s civil rights. See United States v. Kelly, 519 F.2d 794, 796 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 926, 96 S.Ct. 272, 46 L.Ed.2d 254 (1975).

The order of the district court is affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

Kathleen M. and William Cammisano, Jr., appeal a portion of the district court’s order holding William to be a “felon” under the federal gun control laws. We affirm.

The district court ruled William Cammisano could not legally possess hunting rifles because in 1969 he entered a guilty plea to second-degree burglary, a felony in Missouri. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) (repealed 1986). (The statute’s prohibition of a convicted felon’s possessing firearms was transferred to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and (h). See H.R.Rep. No. 495, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1327, 1349; Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub.L.No. 99-308, § 102, 100 Stat. 449, 451-53 (1986) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), (h))). On appeal Cammisano argues he should not be classified as a convicted felon because the three-year prison sentence he received in 1969 for burglary was suspended, he successfully completed his probation in 1972, and his civil rights were fully restored to him by Missouri at that time.

Federal law determines whether a person is a convicted felon under the firearms statutes. United States v. Millender, 811 F.2d 476, 477 (8th Cir.1987). Voluntary guilty pleas are treated as convictions within the meaning of these statutes. Id. (“ ‘[F]or purposes of the federal gun control laws, we equate a plea of guilty and its notation by the state court, followed by a sentence of probation, with being “convicted” ’ * * (quoting Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 114, 103 S.Ct. 986, 992, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983)). A felon’s discharge from probation does not wipe the slate clean for purposes of the federal firearms statutes. See United States v. Mostad, 485 F.2d 199, 200 (8th Cir.1973), cert, denied, 415 U.S. 947, 94 S.Ct. 1468, 39 L.Ed.2d 563 (1974). Neither does the state’s restoration of a felon’s civil rights. See United States v. Kelly, 519 F.2d 794, 796 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 926, 96 S.Ct. 272, 46 L.Ed.2d 254 (1975).

The order of the district court is affirmed.

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829 F.2d 687, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 12745, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kathleen-m-cammisano-and-william-cammisano-jr-v-united-states-ca8-1987.

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