Kathleen M. Bonczyk v. Richard C. Wolfe

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: January 14, 2026
• Docket: 3D2025-2173
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed January 14, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D25-2173 Lower Tribunal No. 22-663-CA-01 ________________

Kathleen M. Bonczyk, Petitioner,

vs.

Richard C. Wolfe, Respondent.

A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Writ of Prohibition.

Kathleen M. Bonczyk, in proper person.

Wolfe Law Miami, P.A., and Richard C. Wolfe, for respondent.

Before FERNANDEZ, MILLER, and GOODEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent her fourth assigned trial

judge from further presiding over her civil dispute. Because at least one of

her myriad of previous disqualification efforts proved successful, the lower

tribunal correctly applied the successive motion provision contained within

Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.330(i). See

Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330(i) (“If a judge has been previously

disqualified on motion for alleged prejudice or partiality under subdivision (e),

a successor judge cannot be disqualified based on a successive motion by

the same party unless the successor judge rules that he or she is in fact not

fair or impartial in the case. Such a successor judge may rule on the truth of

the facts alleged in support of the motion.”). Given this provision, our review

is more deferential than that employed in evaluating the denial of an initial

disqualification motion. We are limited to determining “‘whether the record

clearly refutes the successor judge’s decision to deny the motion.’” Ardis v.

Ardis, 130 So. 3d 791, 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (quoting Kokal v. State, 901

So. 2d 766, 774 (Fla. 2005)). And here, the record discloses no basis for

disturbing the ruling below. See Universal X Rays, Corp. v. Infinity Auto Ins.

Co., 399 So. 3d 1145, 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (“[T]he fact that a judge has

ruled adversely to the party in the past does not constitute a legally sufficient

2 ground for a motion to disqualify.” (quoting Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d

650, 659 (Fla. 2000))). Accordingly, we deny the petition.

Petition denied.