Karyl Clarke v. Clark County School District, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: January 16, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-01046
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 * * * 5 Karyl Clarke, Case No. 2:24-cv-01046-GMN-DJA 6 Plaintiff, 7 Order v. and 8 Report and Recommendation Clark County School District, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Karyl Clarke’s motion to amend his complaint a 12 second time. (ECF No. 32). Plaintiff seeks to add three Defendants—the Eighth Judicial District 13 Court Marshals Service,1 and its Marshals John Doe #1 and John Doe #22—and to correct certain 14 deficiencies in his complaint. Because Plaintiff has timely moved to amend his complaint before 15 the deadline3 and because Defendants have not responded to Plaintiff’s motion,4 constituting their 16 consent to the Court granting it, the Court will recommend granting Plaintiff’s motion to amend. 17 The Court further recommends dismissing the Eighth Judicial District Court Marshals Service as 18 19 1 Plaintiff refers to this Defendant as the “Eighth Judicial District Court Marshals.” For clarity, 20 and to distinguish this Defendant from the Eighth Judicial District Court Marshals John Doe #1 21 and John Doe #2, the Court refers to this Defendant as the “Eighth Judicial District Court Marshals Service.” 22 2 Plaintiff previously named John Doe #1 as a Defendant. In his amended complaint Plaintiff 23 adds John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 and changes the previously named “John Doe #1” to “John Doe #3.” Although the use of “Doe” to identify a defendant is not favored, flexibility is allowed 24 in some cases where the identity of the parties will not be known prior to filing a complaint but can subsequently be determined through discovery. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th 25 Cir. 1980). 26 3 (ECF No. 29) (setting the deadline to amend pleadings and add parties for July 15, 2025). 27 4 Defendants initially moved for an extension to respond to Plaintiff’s motion, which motion to extend the Court granted, ultimately providing Defendants until October 10, 2025, to respond. 1 a Defendant and dismissing Plaintiff’s claim for excessive force as alleged against the Defendants 2 who have not yet appeared. 3 Plaintiff also moves to extend and stay discovery pending the outcome of his motion to 4 amend. (ECF No. 36). Defendants do not oppose that motion. (ECF No. 37). The Court grants 5 Plaintiff’s motion to extend. 6 I. Discussion. 7 A. Motion to extend discovery (ECF No. 36). 8 Turning first to Plaintiff’s motion to extend discovery, Plaintiff asks the Court to “toll” 9 any current discovery deadlines and instruct the parties to meet and confer within twenty-one 10 days of the Court’s decision on Plaintiff’s motion to amend. (ECF No. 36). Plaintiff filed his 11 motion on November 26, 2025, after nearly all of the scheduling order deadlines, except the joint 12 pretrial order deadline, had passed. Nonetheless, given Plaintiff’s arguments that he will need to 13 conduct additional discovery in the event his motion to amend is granted, and given Plaintiff’s 14 pro se status and Defendants’ non-opposition, the Court finds good cause and excusable neglect. 15 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b); see LR 26-3. The Court will therefore grant Plaintiff’s motion. The 16 parties must meet and confer and submit a proposed extended discovery plan on or before 17 February 10, 2026. 18 B. Motion to amend (ECF No. 32). 19 Generally, a party may amend its pleading once “as a matter of course” within twenty-one 20 days of serving it, or within twenty-one days after service of a responsive pleading or motion 21 under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f). Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Otherwise, “a party may amend its 22 pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 15(a)(2). “The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. “The court considers 24 five factors [under Rule 15] in assessing the propriety of leave to amend—bad faith, undue delay, 25 prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether the plaintiff has previously 26 amended the complaint.” United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011). 27 The nonmovant bears the burden of showing why amendment should not be granted. Senza-Gel 1 833 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987) (“party opposing amendment bears the burden of showing 2 prejudice”); United States for use & benefit of Source Helicopters, Div. of Rogers Helicopters, 3 Inc. v. Sayers Constr., LLC, No. 2:19-v-1602-JCM-EJY, 2020 WL 3643431, at *1 (D. Nev. July 4 6, 2020) (“The party opposing amendment holds the burden to demonstrate futility.”); Akinola v. 5 Severns, No. 3:14-CV-00222-HDM, 2015 WL 456535, at *2 (D. Nev. Feb. 2, 2015) (“party 6 opposing the amendment carries the burden of showing why leave to amend should not be 7 granted.”). 8 Here, considering the liberal standards for allowing leave to amend and the fact that 9 Defendants carry the burden of showing why amendment should not be granted, the Court grants 10 Plaintiff’s motion to amend. Despite seeking an extension, Defendants did not respond to 11 Plaintiff’s motion by the extended deadline that they proposed. Defendants’ failure to respond 12 constitutes their consent to the Court granting the motion. See LR 7-2(d). Additionally, the Court 13 does not find that Plaintiff has moved in bad faith, that Plaintiff has unduly delayed, that the 14 amendment would prejudice Defendants, that the amendment would be futile, or that Plaintiff has 15 tried and failed on multiple occasions to amend the complaint. So, the Court will recommend 16 granting Plaintiff’s motion. 17 C. Screening. 18 The Court will screen Plaintiff’s amended complaint as to the claims he brings against the 19 Eighth Judicial District Court Marshals Service, Marshal John Doe #1, Marshal John Doe #2, and 20 CCSD Police Officer John Doe #3 only. It does not screen the claims that Plaintiff brings against 21 Defendants CCSD, the CCSD Police Department, Principal Stacey, or Sergeant Evans because 22 they have already been served and are participating in the case. This is because 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1915(e)(2)5 does not obligate the Court to screen every proposed amended complaint, 24 especially “where service of process has been effectuated and Defendants are participating in the 25

26 5 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) is a codified portion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act that applies to 27 all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those filed by prisoners, and so applies to Plaintiff’s case even though he is not incarcerated. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n.7 (9th Cir. 1 case.” Collins v. NDOC, No. 2:22-cv-01795-CDS-BNW, 2024 WL 2061010, at *1 (D. Nev. Jan. 2 26, 2024); see Joshua v. Oliver, No. 2:23-cv-01087-MMD-MDC, 2024 WL 4891858, at *2 (D. 3 Nev. Nov. 25, 2024) (compiling cases). 4 As it relates to the Eighth Judicial District Court Marshals Service, Marshal John Doe #1, 5 Marshal John Doe #2, and CCSD Police Officer John Doe #3, Plaintiff alleges that on December 6 9, 2022, he visited the courthouse and was surrounded, searched, detained, handcuffed, and 7 imprisoned in a jail cell by Marshals John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 without any legal basis. (ECF 8 No. 32 at 14). The Eighth Judicial District Court Marshals (Plaintiff does not specify whom) told 9 Plaintiff that Sergeant Evans had requested that they detain Plaintiff. (Id. at 15). A few hours 10 later CCSD Police Officer John Doe #3 (formerly John Doe #1) forced Plaintiff to remove his 11 clothing and then searched, detained, arrested, and transported Plaintiff to the Clark County 12 Detention Center in a CCSD patrol vehicle, all without a warrant or a complaint against him. 13 (Id.). CCSD Police Officer John Doe #3 also confiscated Plaintiff’s driver’s license. (Id.). 14 Plaintiff was detained for “3-5 days” and was missing his driver’s license upon his release. (Id.). 15 Plaintiff alleges that he had not violated any law which would cause the Marshals or CCSD 16 Police to arrest him. (Id.). Plaintiff brings eight causes of action against these Defendants. 17 1. Plaintiff’s claims against the Eighth Judicial District Court Marshals Service. 18 19 As a preliminary matter, the Court recommends dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against the 20 Eighth Judicial District Court Marshals Service with prejudice and without leave to amend 21 because amendment would be futile. Plaintiff seeks to hold this Defendant liable for the actions 22 of Marshals John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 as their employer. However, Marshals of the Eighth 23 Judicial District Court are employed by the court. Clark County Deputy Marshals Association v. 24 Clark County, 578 P.3d 134, 141 (Nev. 2025). So, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s 25 complaint as naming the Eighth Judicial District Court. 26 Plaintiff’s claims against the Eighth Judicial District Court fail for two reasons. First the 27 Eighth Judicial District Court is an agency of the state and, under the Eleventh Amendment, 1 of Nev., 686 F.2d 749, 750 (9th Cir. 1982); See Kotab v. Eighth Judicial District Court, No. 2:24- 2 cv-00324-MMD-NJK, 2024 WL 1744705, at *2 n.3 (D. Nev. Apr. 23, 2024). Nevada has 3 explicitly refused to waive its immunity to suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Nev. Rev. 4 Stat. § 41.031(3). Second, Plaintiff’s claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would fail against 5 the Eighth Judicial District Court because it is not a “person” under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't 6 of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64–66 (1989) (“That Congress, in passing § 1983, had no intention 7 to disturb the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity and so to alter the federal-state balance 8 ....”). The Court therefore recommends dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against the Eighth Judicial 9 District Court with prejudice and without leave to amend. 10 2. Unlawful arrest. 11 Plaintiff titles his first claim “Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Unconstitutional Seizure.” 12 The Court liberally construes this as a claim for unlawful arrest. “A claim for unlawful arrest is 13 ‘cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, provided the arrest was 14 without probable cause or other justification.’” Perez-Morciglio v. Las Vegas Metro. Police 15 Dep’t, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (D. Nev. 2011) (citing Dubner v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 266 16 F.3d 959, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2001)). Probable cause exists if, at the time of the arrest, “under the 17 totality of the circumstances known to the arresting officers (or within the knowledge of the other 18 officers at the scene), a prudent person would believe the suspect had committed a crime.” Perez- 19 Morciglio, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1121 (citing Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 471–72 20 (9th Cir. 2007)). Plaintiff alleges that Marshals John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 and CCSD Police 21 Officer John Doe #3 arrested him without probable cause and simply at the behest of Sergeant 22 Evans despite Plaintiff committing no crime. Plaintiff therefore alleges a colorable claim for 23 unlawful arrest against these Defendants. 24 3. False imprisonment. 25 Plaintiff titles his second cause of action, “Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 False Arrest and 26 Imprisonment.” Given Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court liberally construes this cause of action as 27 a claim for false imprisonment arising under Nevada law rather than federal law. To assert a false 1 confine plaintiff within boundaries fixed by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s act directly 2 resulted in such a confinement of the plaintiff; and (3) the plaintiff is conscious of the 3 confinement or was harmed by it. Hernandez v. City of Reno, 634 P.2d 668, 671 (Nev. 1981). 4 Here, Plaintiff alleges that Marshal John Doe #1, Marshal John Doe #2, and CCSD Police Officer 5 John Doe #3 intended and did confine him in a jail cell and a patrol vehicle and that he was 6 conscious of the confinement and suffered harm. Plaintiff has alleged a colorable claim for false 7 imprisonment against Marshals John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 and CCSD Police Officer John 8 Doe #3. 9 4. Excessive force. 10 Plaintiff titles his third cause of action “Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Excessive Use of 11 Force.” Allegations of excessive force are examined under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition 12 on unreasonable seizures. Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 823 (9th Cir. 201). In analyzing 13 an excessive force allegation, courts ask “whether the officers’ actions are objectively reasonable 14 in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 15 (1989) (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff alleges that Marshals John Doe #1, John Doe #2, 16 and CCSD Police Officer John Doe #3 used excessive force when arresting and detaining him. 17 But Plaintiff does not describe this force other than stating that the Defendants touched him, 18 handcuffed him, and “forcefully moved” him against his will. Without more facts, this is not 19 enough to allege a colorable claim for excessive force. 20 5. Unreasonable search and seizure. 21 Plaintiff titles his fourth cause of action “Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Unreasonable 22 Search.” However, Plaintiff brings this claim under the United States Constitution and the 23 Nevada Constitution. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits 24 unreasonable searches and seizures by the Government. United States v. Valde-Vega, 685 F.3d 25 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 2012). Article I, Section 18 of the Nevada Constitution, similar to the 26 Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, protects an individual’s right to be free 27 from unreasonable searches and seizures. See Mack v. Williams, 522 P.3d 434, 451 (Nev. 2022). 1 under each are the same, as other courts in the District of Nevada have done. See, e.g., Braxton v. 2 Clark County School District, No. 2:23-cv-00144-JAD-BNW, 2023 WL 11284282, at *2 (D. 3 Nev. Nov. 8, 2023); Bates v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, No. 2:22-cv-00957-CDS-EJY, ECF 4 No. 19 at *7-8 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 2023) (citing Edwards v. Estill, Case No. 2:19-cv-01268-GMN- 5 VCF, 2020 WL 6286233, at *4 (D. Nev. Oct. 26, 2020)); Meisler v. Chrzanowski, Case No. 3:12- 6 cv-00487-MMD-WGC, 2015 WL 6123225, at *1 n.2 (D. Nev. Oct. 16, 2015); Cortes v. State, 7 260 P.3d 184, 191 n.6 (Nev. 2011). 8 Warrantless searches by law enforcement officers are per se unreasonable under the 9 Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. 10 United States v. Cervantes, 678 F.3d 798, 802 (9th Cir 2012). Among the exceptions to the 11 warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Arizona v. Grant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 12 (2009). Plaintiff alleges that Marshal John Doe #1 and Marshal John Doe #2 searched Plaintiff 13 upon arresting him without any legal cause. Plaintiff alleges that CCSD Police Officer John Doe 14 #3 forced Plaintiff to remove his clothing, searched him, and seized his driver’s license upon 15 arresting him without any legal cause. So, Plaintiff has alleged a colorable claim of unreasonable 16 search and seizure against Marshal John Doe #1, Marshal John Doe #2, and CCSD Police Officer 17 John Doe #3 under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under the 18 Nevada Constitution. 19 6. Assault. 20 Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action is for assault. Plaintiff’s assault claim arises under Nevada 21 law. To establish a claim for assault, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) intended to 22 cause harmful or offensive physical contact, and (2) the victim was put in apprehension of such 23 contact. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 21 (1965); Burns v. Mayer, 175 F.Supp.2d 1259, 1269 24 (D. Nev. 2001). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Marshals John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 and CCSD 25 Police Officer John Doe #3 intended to cause an offensive physical contact with Plaintiff when 26 they approached him to arrest him and that Plaintiff apprehended such contact. So, Plaintiff has 27 alleged a colorable claim of assault against Marshals John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 and CCSD 1 7. Battery. 2 Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action is for battery. Plaintiff’s battery claim arises under 3 Nevada law. To establish a battery claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) intended to 4 cause harmful or offensive contact, and (2) such contact did occur. Restatement (Second) of 5 Torts, §§ 13, 18 (1965); Burns v. Mayer, 175 F.Supp.2d 1259, 1269 (D. Nev. 2001). Plaintiff 6 alleges that Marshals John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 and CCSD Police Officer John Doe #3 7 intentionally touched him when they arrested him and that Plaintiff did not do anything to warrant 8 their arrest. So, Plaintiff has alleged a colorable claim of battery against Marshals John Doe #1 9 and John Doe #2 and CCSD Police Officer John Doe #3. 10 8. Intentional infliction of emotional distress. 11 Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action is for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 12 Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim arises under Nevada law. To state a 13 claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Nevada law, a plaintiff must allege 14 “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct with either the intention of, or reckless disregard for, 15 causing emotional distress, (2) the plaintiff’s having suffered severe or extreme emotional 16 distress, and (3) actual or proximate causation.” Welder v. Univ. of S. Nevada, 833 F.Supp.2d 17 1240, 1245 (D. Nev. 2011) (quoting Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Beckwith, 115 Nev. 372, 989 18 P.2d 882, 886 (1999)). “[E]xtreme and outrageous conduct is that which is outside all possible 19 bounds of decency and is regarded as utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Maduike v. 20 Agency Rent–A–Car, 953 P.2d 24, 26 (Nev. 1998) (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff alleges 21 that Marshals John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 and CCSD Police Officer John Doe #3 acted 22 outrageously when they arrested him without probable cause, which arrest caused Plaintiff to 23 suffer emotional distress. So, Plaintiff has alleged a colorable claim of intentional infliction of 24 emotional distress against Marshals John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 and CCSD Police Officer John 25 Doe #3. 26 9. Negligent infliction of emotional distress. 27 Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action is titled “Violation of 42 Negligent Infliction of 1 that a direct victim of a negligent act may “be able to assert a negligence claim that includes 2 emotional distress as part of the damage suffered.” Shoen v. Amerco, Inc., 896 P.2d 469, 477 3 (Nev. 1995). So, “negligent infliction of emotional distress can be an element of the damage 4 sustained by the negligent acts committed directly against the victim-plaintiff.” Id. In negligent 5 infliction of emotional distress claims, “if emotional distress damages are not secondary to 6 physical injuries, but rather, precipitate physical symptoms, either a physical impact must have 7 occurred or, in the absence of physical impact, proof of ‘serious emotional distress’ causing 8 physical injury or illness must be presented.” Ferm v. McCarty, No. 2:12-cv-00782-RFB-PAL, 9 2014 WL 6983234, at *7 (D. Nev. Dec. 9, 2014); (quoting Bermettler v. Reno Air, Inc., 956 P.2d 10 1382, 1387 (Nev. 1998)). As outlined below, Plaintiff has brought a negligence claim against 11 Marshals John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 and CCSD Police Officer John Doe #3 that the Court 12 allows to proceed. Plaintiff alleges that, because of these Defendants’ negligent conduct, he “has 13 suffered and continues to suffer physical symptoms, pain, anguish, severe emotional trauma, and 14 humiliation…” Although Plaintiff does not describe his physical symptoms, because this case is 15 at the screening stage, and because negligent infliction of emotional distress is an element of 16 damages for negligence, the Court will allow this cause of action to proceed against Marshals 17 John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 and CCSD Police Officer John Doe #3. 18 10. Negligence. 19 Plaintiff ninth cause of action is for negligence. Plaintiff’s negligence claim arises under 20 Nevada law. To state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant owed 21 the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the breach was the legal 22 cause of the plaintiff’s injuries; and (4) the plaintiff suffered damages. Sadler v. PacifiCare of 23 Nev., 340 P.3d 1264, 1267 (Nev. 2014). Whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty of care is 24 question of law. Scialabba v. Brandise Constr. Co. Inc., 921 P.2d 928, 930 (Nev. 1996). “Police 25 officers unquestionably owe a duty of care to the general public.” Vasquez-Brenes v. Las Vegas 26 Metro. Police Dep’t, 51 F.Supp.3d 999, 1014 (D. Nev. 2014) reversed on other grounds by 27 Vasquez-Brenes v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 670 Fed. App’x 617 (9th Cir. 2016). Liberally 1 CCSD Police Officer John Doe #3 violated their duty of care to Plaintiff when they arrested, 2 searched, and detained him without cause, which caused his injuries. So, Plaintiff has alleged a 3 colorable claim of negligence against Marshals John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 and CCSD Police 4 Officer John Doe #3. 5 6 ORDER 7 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to extend discovery (ECF No. 8 36) is granted. The parties shall have until February 10, 2026, to meet and confer and submit a 9 stipulated proposed amended discovery plan. 10 11 RECOMMENDATION 12 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion to amend (ECF No. 32) 13 be granted and that the Clerk of Court be directed to detach Plaintiff’s second amended 14 complaint (ECF No. 32 at 9-34) and file it on the docket. 15 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claims against the Eighth Judicial 16 District Court be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. 17 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claim for excessive force against 18 Marshal John Doe #1, Marshal John Doe #2, and CCSD Police Officer John Doe #3 be dismissed 19 without prejudice and with leave to amend. 20 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claims arising under 42 U.S.C. 21 § 1983 for unlawful arrest and unreasonable search and seizure be permitted to proceed against 22 Marshal John Doe #1, Marshal John Doe #2, and CCSD Police Officer John Doe #3 once 23 Plaintiff learns their identities. 24 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claims arising under Nevada law 25 for false imprisonment, unreasonable search and seizure, assault, battery, intentional infliction of 26 emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress as an element of damages related to 27 Plaintiff’s negligence claim, and negligence be permitted to proceed against Marshal John Doe 1 #1, Marshal John Doe #2, and CCSD Police Officer John Doe #3 once Plaintiff learns their 2 identities. 3 4 NOTICE 5 Pursuant to Local Rule IB 3-2 any objection to this Report and Recommendation must be 6 in writing and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen (14) days after service of this 7 Notice. The Supreme Court has held that the courts of appeal may determine that an appeal has 8 been waived due to the failure to file objections within the specified time. Thomas v. Arn, 474 9 U.S. 140, 142 (1985) reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986). The Ninth Circuit has also held that 10 (1) failure to file objections within the specified time and (2) failure to properly address and brief 11 the objectionable issues could waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order and/or appeal 12 factual issues from the order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 13 1991); see Britt v. Simi Valley United Sch. Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983); see Miranda 14 v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 2012). 15 16 DATED: January 20, 2026 17 18 DANIEL J. ALBREGTS 19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27