Karr v. Arizona, State of

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: July 20, 2021
• Docket: 2:20-cv-01048
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Shawn Karr, No. CV-20-01048-PHX-DWL (ESW)

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 State of Arizona, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 INTRODUCTION 16 This is a prisoner civil rights action in which Plaintiff Shawn Karr (“Plaintiff”), who 17 is represented by counsel, alleges that Defendant Maria Pena (“ Maria Pena”), a corrections 18 officer employed by the Arizona Department of Corrections (“ADC”), allowed two 19 inmates to enter a corridor where Plaintiff was working and “relentlessly assault[]” him. 20 (Doc. 8 ¶¶ 11-12, 20-21.) Since the outset of this case, Maria Pena has maintained that she 21 is the victim of mistaken identity because she was not even working on the night of the 22 assault. Eventually, Maria Pena moved for summary judgment on this basis. Although 23 Plaintiff initially opposed Maria Pena’s motion, he now concedes that the guard on duty 24 on the night of the assault was Soledad Pena, not Maria Pena. Accordingly, Plaintiff agrees 25 that Maria Pena’s summary judgment motion may be granted but requests leave to amend 26 his complaint to add Soledad Pena as a defendant. (Doc. 46.) As discussed below, this 27 amendment request is denied because Plaintiff did not act with diligence in pursuing it, as 28 required by Rule 16(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 RELEVANT BACKGROUND 2 On April 7, 2020, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint in Maricopa 3 County Superior Court. (Doc. 1 ¶ 1.) 4 On May 28, 2020, the action was removed to federal court. (Doc. 1.) 5 On August 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed the first amended complaint (“FAC”), which is 6 his operative pleading. (Doc. 8.) It alleges that the underlying assault took place “[o]n or 7 about April 8, 2019” (id. ¶ 19), although Plaintiff has since clarified that the assault actually 8 “took place sometime around 8:00 p.m. on April 9, 2019” (Doc. 38 at 2). Plaintiff’s sole 9 claim against Maria Pena is a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for exhibiting deliberate 10 indifference to his safety and welfare. (Doc. 8 ¶¶ 35-44.)1 11 On September 29, 2020, the Rule 16 scheduling order issued. (Doc. 18.) As 12 relevant here, it provided that “[t]he deadline for joining parties, amending pleadings, and 13 filing supplemental pleadings is sixty (60) days from the date of this Order.” (Id. at 2.) In 14 other words, the scheduling order set a deadline of late November 2020 for amending the 15 pleadings. 16 At some point during the discovery process, likely on October 14, 2020, Plaintiff 17 received ADC’s “Daily Post Sheet”—another word for the attendance log—for the date of 18 the assault, April 9, 2019. (Doc. 46-2.)2 This document reflects that Soledad Pena (but not 19 Maria Pena) was working that day. (Id.) During the discovery process, Plaintiff also 20 received Maria Pena’s “Positive Attendance Report,” which reflects that Maria Pena did 21 not work on April 8 or 9, 2019. (Doc. 33-2.) 22 On January 29, 2021, Maria Pena filed an early summary judgment motion that was 23 premised, in part, on the argument that “she was not working . . . on the day of the alleged 24 1 The FAC also asserts a state-law claim for gross negligence (Doc. 8 ¶¶ 45-58), but 25 Plaintiff subsequently dismissed that claim as to Maria Pena (Doc. 21). 26 2 Although Plaintiff identifies the receipt date as “October 14, 2021” (Doc. 46 at 2), this is obviously an error—October 14, 2021 is a future date that has not yet occurred. In 27 all likelihood, the year was a typographical error and the receipt date was October 14, 2020—it strikes the Court as less likely that the month was written in error. At any rate, 28 Plaintiff explains that he took action in March 2021 in reliance on the document (which necessarily means the disclosure took place before then). 1 assault.” (Doc. 32 at 3.) This motion emphasized that “Plaintiff’s attorney has been 2 informed repeatedly that [Maria] Pena was not working on the day of the assault,” yet 3 “Plaintiff inexplicably refuses to dismiss his claim against [Maria] Pena.” (Id. at 1.) In 4 support of her mistaken-identity argument, Maria Pena submitted a variety of evidence, 5 including her own declaration (Doc. 33-2 at 39-40 ¶ 9 [“I was not at Rast Unit or in the 6 control room for any reason on April 8 or April 9, 2019.”]) and one of the previously 7 mentioned attendance logs (Doc. 33-2). 8 Around the time she filed her summary judgment motion, Maria Pena also 9 propounded requests for admission (“RFAs”) to Plaintiff. (Doc. 42-1 at 5.) Among other 10 things, the RFAs asked Plaintiff to “[a]dmit that Maria Pena was not working at the Rast 11 Unit on April 9, 2019.” (Id.) 12 On March 11, 2011, Plaintiff filed his response to Maria Pena’s summary judgment 13 motion. (Doc. 38.) In this filing, Plaintiff doubled-down on his claim that Maria Pena was 14 the corrections officer on duty on the night of the assault. (Doc. 38 at 6 [“Plaintiff is 15 adamant that COII Pena was the correctional officer who facilitated the attack on Plaintiff 16 by opening the doors with knowledge the other inmates were there to attack Plaintiff. Thus, 17 a jury could reasonably conclude that Defendant Pena began her shift on April 9, 2019 and 18 ended her shift in the morning on April 10, 2019.”].) In support of this claim, Plaintiff 19 submitted his own declaration, in which he avowed that “COII Pena” was the guard on 20 duty on the night of the assault. (Doc. 39-2 at 3 ¶¶ 6-9.) However, Plaintiff also argued, 21 in the alternative, that he should be granted leave under Rule 56(d) to conduct additional 22 discovery into the mistaken-identity issue. (Id. at 4-6.) Finally, and seemingly as yet 23 another alternative, Plaintiff argued in passing that “[i]f it is a different correctional officer 24 Pena, Plaintiff requests leave to amend the Complaint to name the correct officer.” (Id. at 25 6-7.) Plaintiff did not, however, submit a redlined version of a proposed amended 26 complaint, as required by LRCiv 15.1(a). 27 On June 28, 2021, Maria Pena filed a supplement to her summary judgment motion. 28 (Doc. 42.) The supplement establishes that Plaintiff never responded to the January 2021 1 RFA discussed above, despite multiple follow-up inquiries, and argues that Plaintiff’s 2 failure to respond should, under Rule 36, be deemed a conclusive admission that she wasn’t 3 working on the night in question. (Id.) 4 On July 8, 2021, the Court issued an order addressing the merits of the Rule 36 5 issue. (Doc. 43.) The order explained that, “even though the evidence previously 6 submitted by Plaintiff regarding [Maria] Pena’s presence on April 9, 2019 . . . might 7 otherwise be sufficient to create a triable issue of fact, it appears to the Court that, on this 8 record, [Maria] Pena is entitled to summary judgment.” (Id. at 3.) However, the order also 9 explained that, “[b]efore issuing an order to that effect, . . . the Court will give Plaintiff an 10 opportunity to be heard.” (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff was ordered to “show cause why [Maria] 11 Pena’s motion for summary judgment should not be granted in light of his deemed 12 admission to the RFA concerning Defendant Pena’s presence on April 9, 2019.” (Id. at 4.) 13 On July 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed his response. (Doc. 46.) In this filing, Plaintiff 14 concedes that Maria Pena’s summary judgment motion may be granted based on the 15 mistaken-identity issue. (Id.at 1-2 [“Plaintiff does not object to the dismissal of Defendant 16 Maria Pena in this matter. . . [because] Plaintiff has now learned that Soledad Pena was 17 operating the A/B Controls for the particular unit on April 9, 2019, when the subject 18 incident occurred.”].) Additionally, Plaintiff reveals some information that he did not 19 disclose in previous filings. Specifically, Plaintiff discloses that he received documents in 20 October 20203 that “first provided Plaintiff with the identity of Soledad Pena” and further 21 discloses that, on March 10, 2021, he “served a Notice of Claim on Soledad Pena.” (Id. at 22 2.) Plaintiff proceeds to identity various reasons why his potential claims against Soledad 23 Pena should be deemed timely under state and federal law (id. at 2-3) and formally moves, 24 pursuant to “Ariz. R. Civ. P. 15,” for leave to amend his complaint to add Soledad Pena as 25 a defendant (id. at 3). Plaintiff also provides, as an attachment to his response, a redlined 26 version of the proposed new complaint. (Doc. 46-1.) 27 … 28 3 See supra n.2. 1 DISCUSSION 2 As an initial matter, Maria Pena’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 32) is 3 granted. Plaintiff concedes that the motion may be granted (Doc. 46) and Maria Pena is, 4 at any rate, entitled to relief based on Plaintiff’s deemed admissions (Doc. 43). 5 As for Plaintiff’s amendment request, Plaintiff argues the request is governed by 6 Rule 15’s liberal amendment standards and focuses solely on whether his proposed new 7 claims against Soledad Pena would be barred by the statute of limitations—analysis that 8 appears intended to address the issue of futility, which is a relevant consideration under 9 Rule 15. The difficulty with this approach is that, because Plaintiff’s amendment request 10 comes long after the November 2020 amendment deadline set forth in the scheduling order, 11 it is governed by Rule 16(b)(4)’s “good cause” standard. Johnson v. Mammoth 12 Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-608 (9th Cir. 1992). “Unlike Rule 15(a)’s liberal 13 amendment policy . . . , Rule 16(b)’s good cause standard primarily considers the diligence 14 of the party seeking the amendment.” Id. at 609. Under the Rule 16(b) standard, “the focus 15 of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification. If that party 16 was not diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id. 17 Here, Plaintiff was not diligent in pursuing his amendment request. His most recent 18 filing reveals that he likely received information in October 2020—or if not then, at some 19 point before March 2021—suggesting that Soledad Pena was the Pena-surnamed guard on 20 duty at the time of his assault, yet he did not make a meaningful and effective effort to 21 amend his complaint to add Soledad Pena as a defendant until July 2021.4 “Ideally, a party 22 will move to amend within weeks of learning new information.” Story v. Midland Funding 23 LLC, 2016 WL 5868077, *2-3 (D. Or. 2016). A delay of four-plus months does not present 24 a close call on the issue of diligence. See, e.g., Zivkovic v. S. California Edison Co., 302

25 4 As noted, Plaintiff tucked an undeveloped and cursory amendment request into his summary judgment response brief, which was filed in March 2021. (Doc. 38 at 5-6.) This 26 was not an effective way to seek leave to file an amended complaint. First, Plaintiff’s approach violated LRCiv 15.1(a), because Plaintiff did not provide a redlined version of 27 the proposed new complaint. Second, and more important, a plaintiff seeking leave to file an amended complaint is “[t]ypically . . . required to make an explicit motion (arguments 28 and requests buried in briefs opposing the motion to dismiss usually will not do).” Gensler, 1 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rules and Commentary, Rule 12, at 340 (2021). 1 F.3d 1080, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2002) (district court properly denied amendment request 2 because “Zivkovic’s counsel did not seek to modify that order until four months after the 3 court issued the order”); Johnson, 975 F.2d at 610 (same); Gonzalez v. US Human Rights 4 Network, 2021 WL 2226191, *4 (D. Ariz. 2021) (“Even accepting Plaintiff's timeline, 5 Plaintiff had sufficient information to assert her racial discrimination claim by February 6 2021 at the latest. Nevertheless, Plaintiff waited until May 7, 2021, more than two months 7 after that discovery, before filing the pending motion for leave to amend. That length of 8 time is not consistent with reasonable diligence.”) (citations omitted); MiCamp Sols. LLC 9 v. Nat’l Processing LLC, 2021 WL 289661, *3 (D. Ariz. 2021) (“That Plaintiff filed the 10 motion nearly one month after [discovering relevant facts] does not indicate diligence.”); 11 Sako v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 2015 WL 5022326, *2 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (“Courts 12 have held that waiting two months after discovering new facts to bring a motion to amend 13 does not constitute diligence under Rule 16.”). 14 Plaintiff’s lack of diligence in pursuing the amendment request is underscored by 15 the revelation that Plaintiff filed a notice of claim—a state-law precursor to liability— 16 against Soledad Pena on March 10, 2021. This shows that, by March 10, 2021, Plaintiff 17 had sufficient notice that Soledad Pena was the guard on duty during his assault. 18 Nevertheless, the very next day after he filed this notice of claim, Plaintiff submitted an 19 opposition to Maria Pena’s summary judgment motion in which he expressed his 20 “adamant” disagreement with the notion that she was a victim of mistaken identity. (Doc. 21 38 at 6.) This, too, was inconsistent with a diligent attempt to amend the complaint to add 22 Soledad Pena as a defendant. 23 … 24 … 25 … 26 … 27 … 28 … 1 Accordingly, 2 IT IS ORDERED that: 3 (1) Maria Pena’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 32) is granted. 4 (2) Plaintiffs response to the order to show cause (Doc. 46), which the Court 5 || construes as a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, is denied. 6 Dated this 20th day of July, 2021. 7 8 Lm ee” 9 f t _o—— Dominic W. Lanza 10 United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

-7-