Karpinski v. Commissioner

1983 T.C. Memo. 50, 45 T.C.M. 589, 1983 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 740
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedJanuary 26, 1983
DocketDocket No. 3156-81.
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1983 T.C. Memo. 50 (Karpinski v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Karpinski v. Commissioner, 1983 T.C. Memo. 50, 45 T.C.M. 589, 1983 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 740 (tax 1983).

Opinion

RICHARD C. and KAREN E. KARPINSKI, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Karpinski v. Commissioner
Docket No. 3156-81.
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 1983-50; 1983 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 740; 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 589; T.C.M. (RIA) 83050;
January 26, 1983.
Richard C. Karpinski, pro se.
Marikay Lee-Martinez, for the respondent.

FAY

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FAY, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency of $430 in petitioners' 1978 Federal income tax. The only issue is whether petitioners are entitled to a sales tax deduction with respect to the purchase of their new home.

All the facts*741 are stipulated and found accordingly.

Petitioners, Richard C. and Karen E. Karpinski, resided in Tempe, Ariz., when they filed their petition herein.

Ellis Suggs Construction Company (Ellis) is a general contractor in the business of building and selling completed single family homes to the general public. In 1978 petitioners purchased a new tract home in a subdivision owned and improved by Ellis for a stated purchase price of $73,191. Ellis purchased the materials that went into the construction of the home.

Both the State of Arizona and the City of Tempe impose a tax on the privilege of doing business within their respective jurisdictions. These so called "transaction privilege" taxes are based on the volume of business transacted which is measured by values, gross proceeds of sales, or gross income as the case may be. With respect to businesses engaged in contracting, the State of Arizona imposed a transaction privilege tax of 4 percent on the gross proceeds of sales less land and labor costs. 1The City of Tempe levied its own contractor's transaction privilege tax on 1 percent of gross proceeds from sales less a 35 percent deduction for labor. 2

*742 As a prime contractor, Ellis paid State of Arizona and City of Tempe transaction privilege taxes on all homes sold in those jurisdictions, which necessarily included the home sold to petitioners. On their 1978 Federal income tax return, petitioners claimed a $1,354 sales tax deduction on the purchase of their new home. 3 In his notice of deficiency, respondent disallowed this deduction.

Section 164(a)(4) 4 allows a deduction for state and local general sales taxes paid or accrued within the taxable year. A "general sales tax" is a tax imposed at one rate in respect of the sale at retail of a broad range of classes of items. Sec. 164(b)(2)(A). Respondent claims that the transaction*743 privilege taxes in issue were imposed with respect to the sale of real property and, therefore, do not quality as "general sales taxes" within the meaning of section 164(a)(4). 5 We agree with respondent.

With certain exceptions not relevant herein, a sales tax is imposed on the sellers or consumers of tangible personal property. Sec. *744 1.164-3(e), Income Tax Regs.; Black v. Commissioner,60 T.C. 108, 113 (1973). Moreover, a "general sales tax" is a sales tax imposed in respect of a sale at retail. Sec. 164(b)(2)(A); sec. 1.164-3(f)(1), Income Tax Regs.

To qualify as a retail sale under both the State of Arizona and the City of Tempe taxing provisions, the sale must be a "sale for any purpose other than for resale in the form of tangible personal property". Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., section 42-1301 (1980); Tempe City Code, Chapter 33, Art. II, Div. 2, section 33-11.18, as amended by Ordinance No. 569-4, December 1, 1977. The Supreme Court of Arizona has made it clear that a contractor's completed work is not tangible personal property.

When a contractor fabricates his materials for the contractee, and the completed structure is erected on the owner's land, it is as much real property as the land itself. The constituent elements of tangible personal property have been destroyed by their incorporation into the completed structure. And such a contractor, therefore, is not making a sale of tangible personalty to his contractee. [Duhame v. State Tax Commission,179 P.2d 252, 259;*745 65 Ariz. 268 (1947).]

Moreover, the sale of a contractor's product does not constitute a retail sale.

By the definitions in this Act a contractor when fabricating personalty into realty neither sells, resells, sells at retail, nor can he be considered a retailer. [Duhame v. State Tax Commission,179 P.2d 252, 259;

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State Tax Commission v. Ranchers Exploration & Development Corp.
528 P.2d 866 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 1974)
Duhame v. State Tax Commission
179 P.2d 252 (Arizona Supreme Court, 1947)
Armentrout v. Commissioner
43 T.C. 16 (U.S. Tax Court, 1964)
Black v. Commissioner
60 T.C. No. 13 (U.S. Tax Court, 1973)
Petty v. Commissioner
77 T.C. 482 (U.S. Tax Court, 1981)
Wise v. Commissioner
78 T.C. No. 19 (U.S. Tax Court, 1982)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1983 T.C. Memo. 50, 45 T.C.M. 589, 1983 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 740, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/karpinski-v-commissioner-tax-1983.