Karpark Corp. v. Town of Graham

99 F. Supp. 124, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4053
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. North Carolina
DecidedJuly 30, 1951
DocketCiv. No. 502
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 99 F. Supp. 124 (Karpark Corp. v. Town of Graham) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Karpark Corp. v. Town of Graham, 99 F. Supp. 124, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4053 (M.D.N.C. 1951).

Opinion

WARLICK, District Judge.

The plaintiff in this action seeks Specific Performance of a written contract, alleged by it to have been entered into between the parties to this action, for delivery and installation of certain parking meters, payment for which was expressly and solely provided for out of the receipts, funds and revenue subsequently to be obtained from the operation thereof, — and- invokes the jurisdiction of this court for decree of Declaratory Judgment under the provisions of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201-2202 and Rule 57, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.

Findings of Fact:

Plaintiff is a Delaware Corporation and has its principal place of business in Cincinnati, Ohio, and is wholly engaged in the manufacture, sale and installation of parking meters. The defendant, Town of Graham, is a municipal corporation, a political sub-division of the State of North Carolina, located in Alamance County in said state, and is the county seat of such county.

John H. Crawford is the duly elected Mayor of said town and Dean Andrews, Herman Morris, T. R. Harden, Jr., Harvey Linens and W. F. Okey are Commissioners and constitute as such the Board of the Town of Graham. All the individual defendants were duly elected by the voters of said town and subsequently qualified for such offices and are acting in such capacity.

On September 19, 1947, plaintiff entered into a written contract with the Town of Graham, acting by and through its then Mayor and Board of Town Commissioners, in which the defendant, Town of Graham, agreed to purchase and the plaintiff agreed to sell and deliver to it 173 one-hour automatic parking meters for the price of $71.-50, each, and subsequently, on March 3, 1948, plaintiff again contracted with the defendant to furnish the defendant 43 [126]*126two-hour automatic parking meters at the same price per meter, which effected a total contract price to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff of $15,444.00. The meters purchased under the contract were delivered to the Town of Graham during the months of January and April, 1948, and were subsequently installed on those streets of said town as designated by an ordinance of said town duly adopted.

(Copy of contract entered into is attached hereto and constitutes one among the findings of fact.)

Obedient to the contract entered into between the plaintiff and the Town of Graham, and with respect to this particular provision “Ordinance and Resolution Enforcement, The City will agree to enact and will enforce in good faith all ordinances and resolutions relating to the installation and operation of said parking meters and those providing for the collection of a fee for parking opposite said meters installed in said City until all parking meters installed under this contract shall have been fully paid for * * * ”, the Board of Commissioners in regular session of said Board on January 5, 1948, by virtue of the General Statutes of North Carolina, § 160-200, as amended, unanimously adopted an ordinance providing for a parking meter area and for the regulation of parking on the streets of-said town.

(Copy of this ordinance and its adoption is attached hereto and is made a part of these findings of fact.)

During the period of time intervening between the date of the execution of the contract and the delivery and installation of said meters, and July 1, 1949, the defendant, Town of Graham, through its duly qualified officials, remitted to the plaintiff $5,046.29 as payment under the terms of the contract for the parking meters theretofore purchased, and subsequently installed on the streets of said town, and correspondingly retained in the treasury of the town a similar amount, — for the purposes intended, and there is now due the plaintiff and unpaid, under the terms of said contract, the sum of $10,279.21.

The present Mayor and members of the Board of Town Commissioners, defendants herein, upon their induction into office, have refused to operate the parking meters and have since that time failed and. refused to enforce in good faith the ordinance adopted by their predecessors in office, and have consistently failed and refused to collect any fees for the operation of said meters and through such action have neglected or purposely refrained from paying the plaintiff any sum or sums whatsoever due to it under the contract entered into. Moreover on demand made the defendants have notified plaintiff that they will not enforce said ordinance and will refuse consistently to abide the terms of said contract and have thereupon repudiated it.

Following the institution of this action the defendants constituting the present Board adopted a resolution repealing the ordinance attached to and made a 'part of these findings of fact relating to the operation and maintenance of the parking meters, and have subsequently notified the plaintiff that they had repealed said ordinance as enacted by their predecessors in office.

The 43 meters additionally purchased under the contract were ordered in due course from the plaintiff by the defendant, Town of Graham, and its then Board of Town Commissioners on March 3, 1948, and at a time following the operation and use of the 173 previously purchased under the terms of the contract. This was done under a resolution of the Board of Commissioners in a meeting duly held and became as such a part of the original order, since it was enacted under the same circumstances as was the original purchase. Two certain payments were made by the defendants to the plaintiff on June 29, 1949, in the sum of $202.25, and subsequently in October 1949, $118.50 was remitted to the plaintiff by the defendants.

On the facts above found, I make the following conclusions of law:

The defendants in their answer allege in substance the following as a complete defense:

a. That plaintiff fails to state a claim in its complaint which can be entertained and determined, under the relief sought.

[127]*127b. That this court has no jurisdiction of the cause of action in that the amount sought to be recovered is nqt within the amount as prescribed by statute.

c. That the controversy is not a proper one in which the jurisdiction of this court can be invoked for that the matters alleged in the complaint “involve purely local state statutory law.”

d. For that the said purported contract is invalid and void in that there is no statute in North Carolina which purports to authorize the Town of Graham to enter into or make such contract, and that such contract is unenforceable.

e. For that the Town of Graham, if such authority did exist to enter into such contract, did not execute the same in accordance with the provisions of the General Statutes of North Carolina, § 143-129 in that such statute provides for the publication of notice in the event the amount embraced in the purported contract is in excess of $1,000.

f. For that the Town of Graham had no legal authority to pledge its credit for the purchase of said meters in that the same was not a necessary expense and was not voted upon by the duly qualified electors of said municipality. G.S. §§ 160-59, and 160-62.

g. For that G.S. § 160-200 is unconstitutional and void.

h. For a summary dismissal on the pleadings filed.

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Bluebook (online)
99 F. Supp. 124, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4053, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/karpark-corp-v-town-of-graham-ncmd-1951.