[Cite as Karohl v. Ridge Tool Co., Inc., 2011-Ohio-2196.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN )
SCOTT W. KAROHL C.A. No. 10CA009834
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE RIDGE TOOL COMPANY INC., et al. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO Appellants CASE No. 09CV165333
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: May 9, 2011
DICKINSON, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
{¶1} Ridge Tool Company fired Scott Karohl based on its belief that he had lied when
he said that he was leaving work early to attend physical therapy appointments. Mr. Karohl
applied for, and was initially allowed, unemployment benefits. Later, the Ohio Department of
Job and Family Services vacated its decision because it determined that Ridge Tool had just
cause to terminate him. Mr. Karohl appealed to the Unemployment Compensation Review
Commission, which scheduled a hearing. Ridge Tool did not appear for the hearing, and the
hearing officer found that Mr. Karohl had not lied about the reasons he left work early. After the
Commission disallowed Ridge Tool’s request for review, Ridge Tool appealed to the Lorain
County Common Pleas Court, which affirmed the Commission’s decision. Ridge Tool has
appealed, arguing that the Commission’s decision was against the manifest weight of the
evidence and that the Commission incorrectly disallowed its request for review, even though it 2
had good cause for failing to attend the hearing. We affirm because the Commission’s decision
is not against the manifest weight of the evidence and Ridge Tool did not move to vacate the
hearing officer’s decision within 14 days of the hearing.
BACKGROUND
{¶2} Mr. Karohl began working for Ridge Tool as an assembler in 1997. He was
injured at work in 2006 and, from then on, was restricted to light-duty work. He testified that, on
June 18, 2009, he told his supervisor that he was going to try to schedule a physical therapy
appointment for the following day, but that he ended up not being able to get an appointment.
On June 19, he came to work, but was in a lot of pain, so he asked if he could leave early to try
to see his doctor. His supervisor allowed him to leave, but his doctor could not see him, so he
went home. The next time he came to work, his supervisor asked about his physical therapy
appointment on June 19, and Mr. Karohl answered that he had not had one. His supervisor
thought that he had lied about going to physical therapy and sent him to talk to a different
supervisor, who asked him about other days when he had left work early. According to Mr.
Karohl, because he sometimes left work early for physical therapy and other times because he
was just in a lot of pain, he was unable to remember why he had left work early on the other days
the supervisor asked him about. Ridge Tool, therefore, fired him. At his unemployment
compensation hearing, Mr. Karohl testified that he did not lie to Ridge Tool about his physical
therapy appointments and that there had been a lot of miscommunication between his
supervisors.
MANIFEST WEIGHT
{¶3} Ridge Tool’s first assignment of error is that the common pleas court incorrectly
upheld the Commission’s decision, which, it has argued, was against the manifest weight of the 3
evidence. It has argued that Mr. Karohl admitted lying to it several times about his alleged
physical therapy appointments.
{¶4} Courts review a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review
Commission under Section 4141.28.2 of the Ohio Revised Code. The common pleas court must
affirm the Commission’s decision unless it was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest
weight of the evidence. R.C. 4141.28.2(H). We apply the same standard on appeal, focusing on
the decision of the Commission instead of the common pleas court’s decision. Univ. of Akron v.
Ohio Dep’t of Job and Family Servs., 9th Dist. No. 24566, 2009-Ohio-3172, at ¶9; see Tzangas,
Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., 73 Ohio St. 3d 694, paragraph one of
the syllabus (1995). In determining whether the Commission’s decision is supported by the
manifest weight of the evidence, we apply the civil manifest weight of the evidence standard.
Lorain County Auditor v. Ohio Unemployment Review Comm’n, 185 Ohio App. 3d 822, 2010-
Ohio-37, at ¶15.
{¶5} In State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St. 3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, at ¶26, the Ohio
Supreme Court held that the test for whether a judgment is against the weight of the evidence in
civil cases is different from the test applicable in criminal cases. According to the Supreme
Court in Wilson, the standard applicable in civil cases “was explained in C.E. Morris Co. v.
Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279.” Id. at ¶24. The “explanation” in C.E. Morris was that
“[j]udgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements
of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the
evidence.” Id. (quoting C.E. Morris Co., 54 Ohio St. 2d at syllabus); but see Huntington Nat’l
Bank v. Chappell, 183 Ohio App. 3d 1, 2007-Ohio-4344, at ¶17-75 (Dickinson, J., concurring in
judgment only). 4
{¶6} Under Section 4141.29(D)(2)(a) of the Ohio Revised Code, an individual is
ineligible for unemployment benefits if he was “discharged for just cause in connection with
[his] work . . . .” “[T]raditionally, just cause, in the statutory sense, is that which, to an
ordinarily intelligent person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing a particular act.”
Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., 73 Ohio St. 3d 694, 697
(1995) (quoting Irvine v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 19 Ohio St. 3d 15, 17 (1985)).
“Just cause determinations in the unemployment compensation context, however, also must be
consistent with the legislative purpose underlying the Unemployment Compensation Act.” Id.
“The [A]ct was intended to provide financial assistance to an individual who had worked, was
able and willing to work, but was temporarily without employment through no fault or
agreement of his own.” Id. (quoting Irvine, 19 Ohio St. 3d at 17). “The Act does not exist to
protect employees from themselves, but to protect them from economic forces over which they
have no control.” Id. “When an employee is at fault, he is no longer the victim of fortune’s
whims, but is instead directly responsible for his own predicament.” Id. at 697-98. “Fault on
behalf of the employee is an essential component of a just cause termination.” Id. at paragraph
two of the syllabus.
{¶7} Ridge Tool has argued that the evidence unequivocally shows that it had just
cause for terminating Mr. Karohl because he lied about having physical therapy appointments in
order to leave work early. It has noted that Mr. Karohl admitted at the hearing that he did not
have a physical therapy appointment on June 19, 2009. Mr. Karohl testified, however, that he
did not tell his supervisor that he had a physical therapy appointment on June 19. He only said
that he was going to try to schedule an appointment for that day. According to Mr. Karohl, the 5
reason he was allowed to leave early on June 19 was because he was in a lot of pain and wanted
to try to see his doctor.
{¶8} Ridge Tool has argued that the Commission ignored a sworn statement by Mr.
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[Cite as Karohl v. Ridge Tool Co., Inc., 2011-Ohio-2196.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN )
SCOTT W. KAROHL C.A. No. 10CA009834
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE RIDGE TOOL COMPANY INC., et al. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO Appellants CASE No. 09CV165333
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: May 9, 2011
DICKINSON, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
{¶1} Ridge Tool Company fired Scott Karohl based on its belief that he had lied when
he said that he was leaving work early to attend physical therapy appointments. Mr. Karohl
applied for, and was initially allowed, unemployment benefits. Later, the Ohio Department of
Job and Family Services vacated its decision because it determined that Ridge Tool had just
cause to terminate him. Mr. Karohl appealed to the Unemployment Compensation Review
Commission, which scheduled a hearing. Ridge Tool did not appear for the hearing, and the
hearing officer found that Mr. Karohl had not lied about the reasons he left work early. After the
Commission disallowed Ridge Tool’s request for review, Ridge Tool appealed to the Lorain
County Common Pleas Court, which affirmed the Commission’s decision. Ridge Tool has
appealed, arguing that the Commission’s decision was against the manifest weight of the
evidence and that the Commission incorrectly disallowed its request for review, even though it 2
had good cause for failing to attend the hearing. We affirm because the Commission’s decision
is not against the manifest weight of the evidence and Ridge Tool did not move to vacate the
hearing officer’s decision within 14 days of the hearing.
BACKGROUND
{¶2} Mr. Karohl began working for Ridge Tool as an assembler in 1997. He was
injured at work in 2006 and, from then on, was restricted to light-duty work. He testified that, on
June 18, 2009, he told his supervisor that he was going to try to schedule a physical therapy
appointment for the following day, but that he ended up not being able to get an appointment.
On June 19, he came to work, but was in a lot of pain, so he asked if he could leave early to try
to see his doctor. His supervisor allowed him to leave, but his doctor could not see him, so he
went home. The next time he came to work, his supervisor asked about his physical therapy
appointment on June 19, and Mr. Karohl answered that he had not had one. His supervisor
thought that he had lied about going to physical therapy and sent him to talk to a different
supervisor, who asked him about other days when he had left work early. According to Mr.
Karohl, because he sometimes left work early for physical therapy and other times because he
was just in a lot of pain, he was unable to remember why he had left work early on the other days
the supervisor asked him about. Ridge Tool, therefore, fired him. At his unemployment
compensation hearing, Mr. Karohl testified that he did not lie to Ridge Tool about his physical
therapy appointments and that there had been a lot of miscommunication between his
supervisors.
MANIFEST WEIGHT
{¶3} Ridge Tool’s first assignment of error is that the common pleas court incorrectly
upheld the Commission’s decision, which, it has argued, was against the manifest weight of the 3
evidence. It has argued that Mr. Karohl admitted lying to it several times about his alleged
physical therapy appointments.
{¶4} Courts review a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review
Commission under Section 4141.28.2 of the Ohio Revised Code. The common pleas court must
affirm the Commission’s decision unless it was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest
weight of the evidence. R.C. 4141.28.2(H). We apply the same standard on appeal, focusing on
the decision of the Commission instead of the common pleas court’s decision. Univ. of Akron v.
Ohio Dep’t of Job and Family Servs., 9th Dist. No. 24566, 2009-Ohio-3172, at ¶9; see Tzangas,
Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., 73 Ohio St. 3d 694, paragraph one of
the syllabus (1995). In determining whether the Commission’s decision is supported by the
manifest weight of the evidence, we apply the civil manifest weight of the evidence standard.
Lorain County Auditor v. Ohio Unemployment Review Comm’n, 185 Ohio App. 3d 822, 2010-
Ohio-37, at ¶15.
{¶5} In State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St. 3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, at ¶26, the Ohio
Supreme Court held that the test for whether a judgment is against the weight of the evidence in
civil cases is different from the test applicable in criminal cases. According to the Supreme
Court in Wilson, the standard applicable in civil cases “was explained in C.E. Morris Co. v.
Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279.” Id. at ¶24. The “explanation” in C.E. Morris was that
“[j]udgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements
of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the
evidence.” Id. (quoting C.E. Morris Co., 54 Ohio St. 2d at syllabus); but see Huntington Nat’l
Bank v. Chappell, 183 Ohio App. 3d 1, 2007-Ohio-4344, at ¶17-75 (Dickinson, J., concurring in
judgment only). 4
{¶6} Under Section 4141.29(D)(2)(a) of the Ohio Revised Code, an individual is
ineligible for unemployment benefits if he was “discharged for just cause in connection with
[his] work . . . .” “[T]raditionally, just cause, in the statutory sense, is that which, to an
ordinarily intelligent person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing a particular act.”
Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., 73 Ohio St. 3d 694, 697
(1995) (quoting Irvine v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 19 Ohio St. 3d 15, 17 (1985)).
“Just cause determinations in the unemployment compensation context, however, also must be
consistent with the legislative purpose underlying the Unemployment Compensation Act.” Id.
“The [A]ct was intended to provide financial assistance to an individual who had worked, was
able and willing to work, but was temporarily without employment through no fault or
agreement of his own.” Id. (quoting Irvine, 19 Ohio St. 3d at 17). “The Act does not exist to
protect employees from themselves, but to protect them from economic forces over which they
have no control.” Id. “When an employee is at fault, he is no longer the victim of fortune’s
whims, but is instead directly responsible for his own predicament.” Id. at 697-98. “Fault on
behalf of the employee is an essential component of a just cause termination.” Id. at paragraph
two of the syllabus.
{¶7} Ridge Tool has argued that the evidence unequivocally shows that it had just
cause for terminating Mr. Karohl because he lied about having physical therapy appointments in
order to leave work early. It has noted that Mr. Karohl admitted at the hearing that he did not
have a physical therapy appointment on June 19, 2009. Mr. Karohl testified, however, that he
did not tell his supervisor that he had a physical therapy appointment on June 19. He only said
that he was going to try to schedule an appointment for that day. According to Mr. Karohl, the 5
reason he was allowed to leave early on June 19 was because he was in a lot of pain and wanted
to try to see his doctor.
{¶8} Ridge Tool has argued that the Commission ignored a sworn statement by Mr.
Karohl, in which he admitted that he had lied to his supervisors about physical therapy
appointments. Ridge Tool did not submit the alleged sworn statement at Mr. Karohl’s hearing,
but attached a copy of it to its request for review of the hearing officer’s decision.
{¶9} Regarding requests for review, under Section 4146-25-01 of the Ohio
Administrative Code, “[i]f the appellant desires to submit additional evidence, the appellant
should so state and set forth a brief statement thereof.” Under Section 4146-25-03, “[t]he review
commission shall allow or disallow any request for review after an examination and
consideration of the entire record, and the request for review.”
{¶10} Mr. Karohl’s alleged sworn statement supports Ridge Tool’s assertion that Mr.
Karohl lied to his supervisors about his physical therapy appointments. Nevertheless, in light of
Mr. Karohl’s testimony to the hearing officer that he did not lie about his absences, which the
hearing officer found credible, we conclude that there was some competent, credible evidence in
the record to support the Commission’s determination that Mr. Karohl “was discharged by Ridge
Tool . . . without just cause in connection with [his] work.” See R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a). Ridge
Tool’s first assignment of error is overruled.
NOTICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING
{¶11} Ridge Tool’s second assignment of error is that the common pleas court
incorrectly upheld the Commission’s disallowance of its request for review even though it
demonstrated good cause for not being at the hearing. It has argued that the Commission
incorrectly failed to consider its assertion that it did not receive notice of the hearing. 6
{¶12} The record contains a “Notice of Hearing” that was purportedly sent to Mr.
Karohl, Ridge Tool, and Ridge Tool’s employer representative, U.C. Express, nine days before
the hearing. While it is impossible for us to determine from the record whether the notice was
actually mailed to Ridge Tool or U.C. Express, the Ohio Revised Code provides procedures for
parties to follow if they fail to attend an unemployment compensation hearing. Under Section
4141.28.1(D)(6), “[t]he [C]ommission shall vacate the decision [of the hearing officer] upon a
showing that written notice of the hearing was not sent to the [employer’s] last known address,
or good cause for the [employer’s] failure to appear is shown to the [C]ommission within
fourteen days after the hearing date.” Mr. Karohl’s hearing was on September 30, 2009, and the
hearing officer mailed his decision on October 2, 2009. Ridge Tool, therefore, had until October
14, 2009, to move to vacate the hearing officer’s decision based on its assertion that it had good
cause for not attending the hearing. R.C. 4141.28.1(D)(6).
{¶13} Ridge Tool did not move to vacate the hearing officer’s decision. Instead, on
October 23, 2009, it filed a request for review with the Commission. We conclude that, because
Ridge Tool failed to exhaust its administrative remedies regarding its alleged failure to receive
notice of the hearing, the common pleas court correctly refused to reverse the Commission’s
decision on that basis. R.C. 4141.28.1(D)(6); see Dworning v. Euclid, 119 Ohio St. 3d 83, 2008-
Ohio-3318, at ¶9 (“It is a well-established principle of Ohio law that a party seeking relief from
an administrative decision must pursue available administrative remedies before pursuing action
in a court.”). Ridge Tool’s second assignment of error is overruled.
CONCLUSION
{¶14} The Commission’s just cause determination is not against the manifest weight of
the evidence. Ridge Tool failed to exhaust its administrative remedies regarding its asserted 7
good cause for not attending the unemployment compensation hearing. The judgment of the
Lorain County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
CLAIR E. DICKINSON FOR THE COURT
CARR, P. J. WHITMORE, J. CONCUR 8
APPEARANCES:
MICHAEL L. WILLIAMS, and MARTHA VAN HOY ASSEFF, Attorneys at Law, for Appellant.
MIKE DEWINE, Ohio Attorney General, and LAUREL BLUM MAZOROW, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.
SCOTT W. KAROHL, pro se, Appellee.