Karla Masias Castro De Vilchez v. U.S. Attorney General

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: October 28, 2025
• Docket: 24-14064
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-14064 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 10/28/2025 Page: 1 of 5

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-14064 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

KARLA CECILIA MASIAS CASTRO DE VILCHEZ, ABIGAIL ANGELICA DEL VILLAR MASIAS, ALONDRA MIKAELA KARLY M. VILCHEZ MASIAS, MIKAEL JARETH VILCHEZ MASIAS, Petitioners, versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. ____________________ Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Agency No. A246-778-092 ____________________

Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and WILSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 24-14064 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 10/28/2025 Page: 2 of 5

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Karla Cecilia Masias Castro de Vilchez (Masias), along with her husband, Guillermo Vilchez Huaman, and their three children (collectively, Petitioners), seek review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) final order affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) de- nial of Masias’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Pe- titioners contend that the record establishes that a criminal gang, Tren de Aragua, will persecute Masias on account of a statutorily protected ground if she returns to Peru, entitling her to asylum and withholding of removal, and that she is eligible for relief under the CAT. After careful review, we affirm. I. We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo and its fac- tual determinations under the substantial evidence test. Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 2006). The sub- stantial evidence test requires viewing the record in the light most favorable to the BIA’s decision and affirming if the decision is “sup- ported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Ortiz-Bouchet v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 714 F.3d 1353, 1355 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). The Attorney General may grant asylum to non-citizen ap- plicants who meet the Immigration and Nationality Act’s (INA) definition of a refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). A refugee is a per- son who is (1) outside the country of her nationality, (2) unwilling to return to that country, and (3) unable to avail herself of that country’s protection (4) because of persecution or a well-founded USCA11 Case: 24-14064 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 10/28/2025 Page: 3 of 5

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fear of persecution on account of one of five statutorily protected grounds. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The five protected grounds are race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, and political opinion. Sanchez-Castro v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 998 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2021). Both asylum and withholding of removal “contain a causal element known as the nexus requirement.” Id. The nexus require- ment compels the applicant to show “that a protected ground was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant. A reason is central if it is ‘essential’ to the motivation of the perse- cutor.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Demonstrating that crimi- nals targeted an applicant and were likely aware of the applicant’s political stance does not satisfy the nexus requirement. See Silva v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1234, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 2006). Also, when substantial evidence shows that criminals who allegedly per- secuted the applicant had a “pecuniary motive,” we will find the applicant has not satisfied the nexus requirement. See Sanchez-Cas- tro, 998 F.3d at 1286–87. Here, the BIA correctly determined that Tren de Aragua tar- geted Masias for financial gain rather than for her political beliefs or her success as a businesswoman, and since general criminal ac- tivity is not a protected ground, Masias failed to demonstrate that she was targeted due to a protected ground. The record does not compel reversal because substantial evidence in the record vali- dates the BIA’s determination that Tren de Aragua targeted Masias for a pecuniary motive. USCA11 Case: 24-14064 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 10/28/2025 Page: 4 of 5

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Masias testified to showing her political beliefs through dis- playing signs on her business, hosting campaign events, and keep- ing her business open when the government ordered businesses to close. Masias claims that this shows that Tren de Aragua targeted her due to her political opinion, but she did not provide evidence that Tren de Aragua members said anything that would imply they targeted her for political reasons. Masias testified that others in the area had also been targeted by Tren de Aragua, suggesting that she was not singled out. Further, Masias testified to being targeted be- cause Tren de Aragua wanted her husband’s income and the money resulting from her business, which supports the BIA’s find- ing that Tren de Aragua’s sole motive was pecuniary. There is also no evidence that would support a finding that Tren de Aragua’s actions were driven by another protected ground. Masias claims that she was targeted on account of her identity as a businesswoman, which she argues satisfies the require- ment of membership in a particular social group. But much like her argument on political opinion, the record lacks evidence to sup- port a finding that Masias was targeted because of this identity. Since substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Tren de Aragua targeted Masias for a “pecuniary motive,” the nexus requirement was not satisfied. See Sanchez-Castro, 998 F.3d at 1286–87. Thus, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determi- nation that Masias is ineligible for asylum and withholding of re- moval. USCA11 Case: 24-14064 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 10/28/2025 Page: 5 of 5

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II. To be eligible for CAT relief, an applicant must demonstrate that she will “more likely than not” be tortured if returned to the designated country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). An appli- cant must also demonstrate that a government official will likely conduct the torture or acquiesce to it. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). A government acquiesces to torture when it is aware of the torture and breaches its legal responsibility to intervene. Rodriguez Morales v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 884, 891 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7). Here, the BIA appropriately concluded that Masias was inel- igible for CAT relief because she was unable to demonstrate that the Peruvian government would consent or acquiesce to her being tortured. See Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Masias argues that the government acquiesced to Tren de Araua’s violence because the police declined to investigate Masias being robbed and held hostage by Tren de Aragua. But the record indicates that Peruvian authorities did not open an investi- gation after the robbery and hostage incident because it was un- likely that they could identify the perpetrators without any names or video. See Ruiz, 440 F.3d at 1254–55. As Masias has not met her burden to show that the Peruvian government will acquiesce to Tren de Aragua torturing Masias if she is removed, the BIA cor- rectly determined that Masias is ineligible for CAT relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). PETITION DENIED.