Karl Pongyingpis v. Department of Defense

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided July 31, 2026·No. SF-1221-25-1424-W-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

KARL PONGYINGPIS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-1221-25-1424-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: July 31, 2026 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Karl Pongyingpis , San Diego, California, pro se.

Glenn Gray , Esquire, San Diego, California, for the agency.

BEFORE

Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman James J. Woodruff II, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for failure to prosecute. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND

The appellant is employed as a Clinical Psychologist at the Defense Health Agency. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1. On May 30, 2025, he filed the instant IRA appeal with the Board, asserting that the agency suspended his clinical privileges and “ha[d] intent to revoke” them after he reported several issues with, among other things, the agency’s new clinical practices and cyber security. Id. at 1, 18. In processing the appeal, the administrative judge issued a jurisdictional order, instructing the appellant to file a jurisdictional submission by June 12, 2025, the agency to file a response by June 23, 2025, and the appellant to file a reply to the agency’s response by July 2, 2025. IAF, Tab 3 at 1. The appellant did not respond to that order and did not file either an initial jurisdictional submission or a reply submission. After seeking and obtaining an extension of time to file to which the appellant did not consent, the agency filed its jurisdictional response on June 27, 2025. IAF, Tabs 6-8.

On July 8, 2025, the administrative judge issued an order to show cause, ordering the appellant to explain no later than July 17, 2025, why he should not dismiss the appeal for failure to comply with Board orders. IAF, Tab 9. He also ordered the appellant to explain why he failed to respond to the jurisdictional

order, and advised that, if the appellant intended to continue with his appeal, he must respond to the jurisdictional order. Id. The appellant did not respond to the order to show cause.

In a July 18, 2025 initial decision, the administrative judge set forth the Board’s authority to impose sanctions, and he explained that the appellant failed to respond to several orders and did not otherwise participate in the prosecution of his appeal. IAF, Tab 10, Initial Decision (ID) at 2-4. Accordingly, he dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute. ID at 1, 4.

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. He states that he did not discover any of the orders from the administrative judge until, at the earliest, July 17, 2025, because the “automated emails [were] being unknowingly sent” to his email’s junk/spam folder. Id. at 6. He also claims that, as a pro se appellant, he was confused and “did not fully understand [the] legal jargon” regarding jurisdiction. Id. at 7. He alleges that the agency acted in bad faith in not providing him with additional information on how to proceed with his appeal. Id. at 6-8. Finally, he states that he has been dealing with a personal family matter since June 13, 2025. 2 Id. at 8. The agency has responded to the appellant’s petition for review. PFR File, Tab 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW The Board’s regulations give administrative judges broad discretion in adjudicating appeals. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41. An administrative judge may impose the sanction of dismissal with prejudice if a party fails to prosecute or defend an appeal. Leseman v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 139, ¶ 6

2 With the appellant’s petition for review, he submits additional documentation, including his correspondence with the Office of Special Counsel and other related documentation regarding his underlying whistleblower reprisal claim, and his correspondence with the agency regarding the agency’s efforts to obtain an extension of time to file a jurisdictional response. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-55. We have reviewed these documents, and none are relevant to the question of whether the administrative judge abused his discretion in dismissing this appeal for failure to prosecute. As such, they do not provide a basis to disturb the initial decision.

(2015); Chandler v. Department of the Navy, 87 M.S.P.R. 369, ¶ 6 (2000); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.43(b). The imposition of such a severe sanction must be used only when necessary to serve the ends of justice, as when a party has failed to exercise basic due diligence in complying with an order, or has exhibited negligence or bad faith in his efforts to comply. Chandler, 87 M.S.P.R. 369, ¶ 6; see Leseman, 122 M.S.P.R. 139, ¶ 6. When an appellant’s repeated failure to respond to multiple Board orders reflects a failure to exercise basic due diligence, the imposition of the sanction of dismissal for failure to prosecute has been found appropriate. Turner v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 640, ¶ 16 (2016), aff’d per curiam, 681 F. App’x 934 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Williams v. U.S. Postal Service, 116 M.S.P.R. 377, ¶ 9 (2011); Heckman v. Department of the Interior, 106 M.S.P.R. 210, ¶ 16 (2007). Absent a showing of abuse of discretion, the Board will not reverse an administrative judge’s determination regarding the imposition of sanctions, including the sanction of dismissal with prejudice. See Holland v. Department of Labor, 108 M.S.P.R. 599, ¶ 9 (2008).

Here, the administrative judge did not abuse his discretion in imposing the sanction of dismissal for the appellant’s failure to prosecute his appeal. The appellant does not dispute, and the record supports, the administrative judge’s findings that the appellant filed no submissions furthering the adjudication of his appeal after filing his initial appeal, and that he failed to comply with at least two Board orders, including an order explaining that dismissal for failure to prosecute would result if he did not establish good cause for failing to respond to the orders. The Board has affirmed the dismissal of an appeal for failure to prosecute under similar circumstances. Benton v. Department of the Interior, 47 M.S.P.R. 200, 203 (1991) (finding no error in the administrative judge’s dismissal for failure to prosecute when the appellant repeatedly failed to comply with Board orders despite being placed on notice that his appeal might be dismissed on the continuing failure to comply with orders).

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Karl Pongyingpis v. Department of Defense, (Miss. 2026).

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