Karina Gorbatyuk et al. v. Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc. et al.

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 KARINA GORBATYUK et al., CASE NO. 2:26-cv-01468-LK 11 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 12 v. AND DENYING IN PART STIPULATED REQUEST TO STAY 13 CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL INC. et al., CASE PENDING MEDIATION 14 Defendants. 15

16 This matter comes before the Court on the parties’ Stipulation to Stay the Case Pending 17 Mediation and to Reserve the Right to Remand. Dkt. No. 16. The parties “stipulate and agree to 18 respectfully request that the Court stay all proceedings in this matter, including all deadlines, 19 discovery briefings, and briefing schedules, and specifically including Plaintiff’s deadline to file a 20 remand motion, until after the parties’ scheduled mediation on June 22, 2026.” Id. at 1. The parties 21 also agree to file a joint status report within 30 calendar days after mediation, “i.e., no later than 22 July 22, 2026, which will inform the Court on the outcome of mediation and, if necessary, set forth 23 a briefing schedule for Plaintiff’s motion to remand.” Id. at 1–2. 24 1 “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to 2 control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for 3 counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). The Court “may order 4 a stay of the action pursuant to its power to control its docket and calendar and to provide for a

5 just determination of the cases pending before it.” Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 6 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 1979). In considering whether to grant a stay, courts consider several 7 factors, including “the possible damage which may result,” “the hardship or inequity which a party 8 may suffer in being required to go forward,” and “the orderly course of justice[.]” CMAX, Inc. v. 9 Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962). 10 A stay is appropriate here because the short delay in proceedings will not cause any 11 damage, nor any hardship or inequity to any party, and will promote the orderly course of justice. 12 If the parties resolve this matter through mediation, there will be significant savings of the parties’ 13 and the Court’s resources. The Court thus STAYS the case schedule in this matter until July 22, 14 2026—30 days after the scheduled mediation.

15 However, the Court DENIES the parties’ request to stay Plaintiff’s deadline to file a 16 remand motion. Dkt. No. 16 at 1. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), “[a] motion to remand the case on 17 the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days 18 after the filing of the notice of removal[.]” This is a “strict 30-day deadline” to raise issues with 19 removal that are not jurisdictional, Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel, 146 S. Ct. 1074, 1084 (2026), 20 and this Court has “no authority to remand the case to the state court on the basis of a defect in 21 removal procedure raised for the first time more than 30 days after the filing of the notice of 22 removal,” N. Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 69 F.3d 1034, 1038 23 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Feinstein v. First Republic Sec. Co., LLC, No. 24-5823, 2025 WL

24 3295114, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 26, 2025) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(B) “does not 1 allow the district court to enlarge ‘time periods set out in statutes’”; thus, the district court properly 2 denied a motion to remand filed after the 30-day deadline expired); Ariel Land Owners, Inc. v. 3 Dring, 351 F.3d 611, 616 (3d Cir. 2003) (reversing remand order because the district court 4 “exceeded its statutory authority to remand under § 1447(c)” when it granted an untimely motion

5 to remand based on a procedural defect in removal); Wright and Miller, 20 Fed. Prac. & Proc. 6 Deskbook § 43 (2d ed. Apr. 2026 Update). “[T]he thirty-day period may not be enlarged by act of 7 the Federal Court, by act of the State Court or by mere consent of the Plaintiff to extend the time for 8 removal.” Wright-Brown v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., No. CV-12-1099-PHX-GMS, 2012 9 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90335, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 29, 2012) (quoting Transp. Indem. Co. v. Fin. Trust 10 Co., 339 F. Supp. 405, 407 (C.D. Cal. 1972)).1 11 No later than July 22, 2026, the parties shall file a joint status report informing the Court 12 on the outcome of mediation and, if necessary, setting forth a proposed briefing schedule on any 13 motion to remand based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 14 Dated this 22nd day of June, 2026.

15 A 16 Lauren King United States District Judge 17 18 19 20

21 1 The 30-day deadline is not applicable to motions to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of 22 subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal.”) (emphasis added). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks 23 subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” Id. (emphasis added). And without subject matter jurisdiction, this Court cannot issue a dismissal with prejudice, even if the parties stipulate 24 to such dismissal following settlement.