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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 KARIN B., 8 Plaintiff, CASE NO. C25-681-BAT 9 v. ORDER REVERSING THE 10 COMMISSIONER’S DECISION AND COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, REMANDING FOR FURTHER 11 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS Defendant. 12
13 Plaintiff appeals the denial of her application for Disability Insurance Benefits. She 14 contends the ALJ harmfully erred by (1) failing to give clear and convincing reasons for 15 discounting plaintiff’s testimony; (2) failing to evaluate the lay testimony of plaintiff’s spouse; 16 and (3) failing to give legally sufficient reasons for discounting the opinions of state agency 17 medical consultant Vincent Gollogy, Ph.D., and treating nurse practitioner, Danielle Waldron. 18 Dkt. 10. As discussed below, the Court REVERSES the Commissioner’s final decision and 19 REMANDS the matter for further administrative proceedings under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 20 405(g). 21 BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff is currently 53 years old, completed two years of college, and has worked as a 23 massage therapist. Tr. 75, 81. In 2020, she applied for benefits, alleging disability as of March 1 31, 2020. Tr. 75. After her applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, Tr. 55–82, 2 the ALJ conducted a hearing and found plaintiff not disabled in a 2022 decision, Tr. 12–54. The 3 Court reversed and remanded the 2022 decision because the ALJ erred in (1) discounting 4 plaintiff’s testimony by referring to relatively normal mental status examinations and without
5 discussing or addressing treatment notes that corroborated plaintiff’s allegations; (2) discounting 6 the lay testimony of plaintiff’s husband for the same reasons; and (3) discounting the opinions of 7 state medical consultant Dr. Waldron and ARNP Waldron for the same reasons. Tr. 842–49. In 8 doing so, the Court noted “while later treatment notes indicate an improvement in Plaintiff’s 9 symptoms, see, e.g., AR 605, 610, 682, 700, 724, 730, the ALJ did not discuss this improvement 10 or discount Plaintiff’s testimony on that basis.” Tr. 847. On review, the Court was obligated to 11 rely on the reasons articulated by the ALJ and could not fashion its own reasons to affirm. Id. 12 (citing Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017)). 13 On remand, the ALJ held a 2024 hearing and issued a 2025 decision. Tr. 781–811. The 14 ALJ found plaintiff met the insured status requirements through December 31, 2024, and has not
15 engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of disability of March 21, 16 2020. Tr. 766. The ALJ determined plaintiff has the severe impairments of migraine headaches, 17 depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder. Tr. 766–67. The ALJ found none of plaintiff’s 18 impairments, alone or in combination, met or medically equaled a listed impairment. Tr. 767–68. 19 The ALJ determined plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full 20 range of work at all exertional levels but with the following non-exertional limitations: plaintiff 21 is limited to performing simple tasks with no more than occasional interaction with the general 22 public, coworkers, and supervisors; and plaintiff can adapt to occasional changes in the 23 workplace. Tr. 768. The ALJ found although plaintiff cannot perform any past relevant work, she 1 can perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Tr. 775–76. 2 The ALJ therefore found plaintiff not disabled. Tr. 776. Plaintiff appealed this final decision 3 directly to this Court. 4 DISCUSSION
5 The Court will reverse the ALJ’s decision only if it is not supported by substantial 6 evidence in the record as a whole or if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard. Molina v. 7 Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012). The ALJ’s decision may not be reversed on account 8 of an error that is harmless. Id. at 1111. Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one 9 rational interpretation, the Court must uphold the Commissioner’s interpretation. Thomas v. 10 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court finds the ALJ did not cite specific, clear 11 and convincing reasons to discount plaintiff’s testimony about her inability to maintain 12 consistent attendance and inability to maintain full-time work without interruption from 13 psychological symptoms, which in turn led to the ALJ’s decision to discount the lay testimony 14 and the opinions of Dr. Gollogy and ARNP Waldron as unsupported by substantial evidence.
15 The Court declines, however, to remand for an award of benefits because the record contains 16 ambiguity about the extent, frequency, and duration of these limitations, and the ALJ failed to 17 evaluate over 200 pages of clinical notes. On remand for further administrative proceedings, the 18 ALJ shall supplement the record via updated medical opinions and/or expert medical testimony 19 about the extent of plaintiff’s ability to engage in fulltime work is disrupted by absences or 20 workplace interruptions based on psychological symptoms, and about whether such limitations 21 continue or have improved to a meaningful extent. The ALJ shall hold a new hearing, admit any 22 supplemental evidence, and issue a new decision that also considers whether autism spectrum 23 disorder (“ASD”) constitutes a severe impairment at step two of the sequential evaluation. 1 1. Plaintiff’s Testimony 2 Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to cite specific, clear and convincing reasons for 3 discounting plaintiff’s testimony about the severity of her mental impairments. See Garrison v. 4 Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2014). The Court agrees because the ALJ did not
5 adequately examine and reconcile the evidence consistent with plaintiff’s testimony that mental 6 impairments would interfere with her ability to perform fulltime work without an unacceptable 7 number of absences, as well as to remain on-task during a typical workday or workweek. 8 In the earlier remand order, the Court found the ALJ had harmfully erred in discounting 9 plaintiff’s testimony “by only relying on portions of treatment notes that supported finding 10 plaintiff not disabled and failing to discuss or address treatment notes that corroborated 11 Plaintiff’s allegations.” Tr. 848. Here the ALJ committed the same error by describing a record 12 that eschews discussion of those aspects of the record that contradict a conclusion plaintiff’s 13 mental condition has been stable from the outset and consistently improved from there. Tr. 769– 14 71. In doing so, the ALJ failed to discuss over 200 pages of medical notes from plaintiff’s
15 treating psychiatric provider ARNP Waldron from July 2022 to May 2024, Tr. 1058–1293, 16 nearly two years of treatment, including a period of decreased functional status that plaintiff later 17 described as having “lost a whole year” to depression and anxiety, Tr. 1350. 18 Plaintiff testified despite regular use of medications, she would be absent from work 19 about one time per week due to depression and anxiety, would take clonazepam as needed but 20 did so about once a day for severe anxiety, and would get so overwhelmed she sometimes left 21 work in the middle of the day. Tr. 38, 44, 791, 80. In 2021, treating psychiatric provider ARNP 22 Waldron opined plaintiff would be absent from work once per week, and plaintiff’s moderate 23 limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace meant she would be off task 25% or 1 more during a workday, would have difficulty sustaining an ordinary routine and regular 2 attendance at work, and would have difficulty working a full day without needing more than the 3 allotted number or length of rest periods during the day. Tr. 546–47. Although reviewing 4 psychologist Dr. Gollogy opined ARNP Waldron overestimated plaintiff’s limitations, Dr.
5 Gollogy nonetheless agreed plaintiff would have moderate restrictions in the ability to complete 6 a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms 7 and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. 8 Tr. 80. Also consistent with ARNP Waldron, Dr. Gollogy concluded plaintiff would have 9 occasional concentration, pace, and persistence interruptions due to psychological symptoms and 10 that plaintiff “may miss days of work intermittently.” Tr. 80. Plaintiff’s therapist from 2019 to 11 2021, Karen S. Keeton, M.A., LM.H.C., confirmed plaintiff’s testimony was consistent with her 12 statements during treatment. Tr. 626–27. Ms. Keeton noted: “The client reports having difficulty 13 maintaining focus and concentration most days, and I have observed this when attempting to 14 teach some mindfulness techniques and anxiety management strategies.” Tr. 626.
15 The ALJ acknowledged plaintiff’s statements to treatment providers was consistent with 16 her testimony but discounted the severity of her symptoms as “inconsistent with her statements 17 of improvement and providers consistent notation of stability and improvement supporting a 18 higher level of functionality tha[n] alleged.” Tr. 771 (citing exhibits 10F (Tr. 557–77), 12F (Tr. 19 625–43), 15F (Tr. 670–81), 16F (Tr. 682–749), 18F (Tr. 971–78), 23F (Tr. 1294–1397), 24F (Tr. 20 1398–1404)). The ALJ cited examples of this consistent stability and improvement: primary care 21 notes from 2020 that showed more stable mental status examinations and a suggestion that “at 22 least some of the claimant’s anxiety at the time was due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which 23 resulted in elevate anxiety for many,” Tr. 769; that after a period showing in which mental health 1 records showed increased symptoms of anxiety and depression and a corresponding increase in 2 dosage and frequency of medication, primary care records in 2021 noted, “she’s having a bit of 3 anxiety and stress, but in general psych meds are doing well, managed by Danielle Waldron,” Tr. 4 770 (citing Tr. 567–68) (internal quotation marks removed, typo corrected); a September 2021
5 therapy session referring to some improvement with addition of another medication, Tr. 770 6 (citing Tr. 642); March and April 2022 primary care records showing stable mental status exams, 7 Tr. 770 (citing Tr. 670–71, 675–78); a June 2022 appointment in which ARNP Waldron noted, 8 “Clinically [the claimant] is stable and tolerating current regimen will with sustained 9 improvement in target symptoms,” Tr. 770 (citing Tr. 743–47) (internal quotation marks 10 removed); a January 2024 neuropsychological consultative examination by Lee A. Kearns, 11 Psy.D., in which plaintiff’s “anxiety in the context of exam is consistent with prior anxiety 12 associated with significant events,”1 Tr. 770; 2024 primary care records noting that plaintiff was 13 a “well appearing woman in no acute distress well groomed, well dressed, makes good eye 14 contact, no agitation or sedation, speech fluent,” Tr. 771 (citing Tr. 1400); and 2024 records from
15 ARNP Waldron showing that plaintiff had intact memory, concentration, insight, and judgment, 16 had better control over anxiety and panic symptoms with a new medication, and remained 17 “stable and tolerating current regiment well with sustained improvement in target symptoms,” 18 Tr. 771 (citing Tr. 1299, 1308, 1315). 19 20
1 The ALJ did not, however, indicate how current events or the mere occurrence of the exam was 21 ‘consistent with prior episodes of anxiety associated with significant events.’” Tr. 770. Dr. Kearns did not suggest that plaintiff’s anxiety was being triggered by a significant event. In fact, 22 Dr. Kearns observed plaintiff was anxious, had taken her prescribed psychostimulant prescription, and the exam was “believed to be a valid reflection of her cognitive and emotional 23 functioning in the domains assessed.” Tr. 974. Dr. Kearns concluded, “[D]espite treatment, Depression (311) and Anxiety (300.00) appear to remain clinically problematic.” Tr. 978. 1 As in the reversed 2022 decision, the ALJ harmfully erred here by failing to state 2 specific, clear and convincing reasons for omitting a meaningful discussion of evidence that 3 supports plaintiff’s testimony her symptoms of depression and anxiety would interfere with her 4 abilities to maintain workplace attendance and work a full day without an unacceptable level of
5 disruptions. For example, the ALJ did not cite or address ARNP Waldron’s clinical notes for the 6 period July 15, 2022 to May 31, 2024. Tr. 1058–1293. On May 17, 2024, ARNP Waldron saw 7 plaintiff as a psychiatric follow up for nightmares, increased depression, and “mood melt 8 downs,” with the current psychological symptoms of irritability, mood lability, excessive 9 worrying, poor concentration, and not sleeping. Tr. 1209. Plaintiff stated her primary concern 10 was anxiety, which she rated at 8 out of 10 with 10 being the worst, dreaded leaving home 11 “[e]ven to go a block away,” and cancelled a post-operative appointment at the last moment for 12 that reason. Id. (internal quotation marks removed). She continued to struggle with daily 13 motivation and felt depressed most days. Id. Plaintiff reported that clonazepam was no longer 14 effective for her anxiety but wanted to continue taking it because this was “better than not having
15 it.” Id. (internal quotation marks removed). With increasing depression symptoms, plaintiff “has 16 difficulty with starting and completing tasks.” Id. Nonetheless, “[m]ood reports some 17 improvement since last appointment.” Id. Although ARNP Waldron included the same language 18 included in nearly all of her assessments—“Clinically [plaintiff] is stable and tolerating current 19 regimen well with sustained improvement in target symptoms”—her more specific observations 20 painted a contradictory picture: “[Plaintiff] is experiencing increased anxiety, and has increased 21 difficulty leaving the home. . . . For now, we will increase Prazosin to 2 mg daily and continue 1 22 mg nightly. Adderall IR will be switched to XR 20 mg daily. Will resume 300 mg of Wellbutrin 23 as this is what [plaintiff] has been taking. Refill of Saphris for acute agitation/anxiety/panic.” Tr. 1 1214. The unexamined notes from ARNP Waldron contain numerous references that substantiate 2 plaintiff’s testimony her mental limitations affected her abilities to maintain sufficient attendance 3 or to complete workdays or workweeks without unacceptable disruptions. See, e.g., Tr. 1217 4 (reporting increased depression and “mood melt downs” despite improvement since last
5 appointment), 1224 (reporting increased depression and “mood melt downs”), 1231 (reporting 6 increased depression and “mood melt downs,” as well as intermittent passive suicidal ideation 7 and “worst days of my life since we last met,” and “can’t think straight, literally want to die”), 8 1237 (reporting increased depression and “mood melt downs,” as well as anxiety at 10 out of 10 9 and depression at 8 out of 10), 1252 (reporting continued, very difficult mood and anxiety 10 symptoms and “[h]as not been able to complete or engage in tasks without feeling tired, or 11 unmotivated or anxious”). 12 With mental health issues, “[c]ycles of improvement and debilitating symptoms are a 13 common occurrence, and in such circumstances it is error for an ALJ to pick out a few isolated 14 instances of improvement over a period of months or years and to treat them as a basis for
15 concluding a claimant is capable of working.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1017. Although “[i]t is an 16 error to reject a claimant’s testimony merely because symptoms wax and wane in the course of 17 treatment,” that is what the ALJ did here when determining that selective medical notes from 18 ARNP Waldron combined with benign mental status examinations during primary care visits 19 constituted proof positive that symptoms of depression and anxiety would have no impact on 20 plaintiff’s abilities to attend work or to complete a workday/workweek. Id. Plaintiff is correct to 21 note that ARNP Waldron typically included boilerplate language about plaintiff being “stable 22 and tolerating current regiment well with sustained improvement in target symptoms,” before 23 proceeding to indicate with more specificity that plaintiff was actually enduring greater 1 difficulties and reduced capacity, such as noting that “[r]ecent increase in anxiety has caused 2 some difficulty in [plaintiff’s] ability to complete activities of daily life and she has increasing 3 difficulty leaving the house.” Tr. 1265. ARNP Waldron referred to such “stability” and 4 “sustained improvement,” even when reporting that plaintiff reported worsening anxiety over
5 several months with anxiety lasting all day and rating as a 9 out of 10. Tr. 1271. Moreover, the 6 ALJ did not provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting the work impact of 7 plaintiff’s depression and anxiety when citing selectively to Dr. Kearns’s neuropsychological 8 testing and to primary care visits in which plaintiff’s mental status exams were benign. Dr. 9 Kearns’s examination was paid for by plaintiff’s health insurance company and so he was careful 10 not to evaluate plaintiff’s capacity to work. Tr. 979. Nonetheless, when queried about his 11 examination results, Dr. Kearns noted the data supported significant depression and anxiety and 12 that “the challenges we documented have clear negative impact on your ability to currently 13 manage a competitive work environment although we did not have those specific discussions.” 14 Id. Similarly, that plaintiff was not actively disoriented during a primary care visit or found
15 medications to be helpful do not contradict consistent statements made by plaintiff “she feels that 16 she is barely making it, and does not feel she could ever return to work,” Tr. 1403, or that she 17 reported being unable to work though she “is trying to stay functional at home with ADLs,” Tr. 18 1399. 19 The Court finds the ALJ erred by failing to state specific, clear and convincing reasons 20 for discounting plaintiff’s testimony about the limiting effects of her psychological limitations on 21 her capacity to maintain attendance at work and to complete a workday/workweek without 22 significant interruptions. This error was harmful because the vocational expert testified that an 23 employer would tolerate only five absences per year and being off task up to 10 percent. Tr. 1 808–09. On remand, the ALJ should supplement the record to evaluate whether plaintiff retains 2 the capacity to maintain fulltime work with fewer than five absences per year and being off task 3 less than 10 percent of the time, contrary to the limitations set forth in ARNP Waldron’s 2021 4 opinion; and, if so, on what dates plaintiff did or did not retain the capacity to perform such
5 fulltime work. 6 2. Lay Testimony by Plaintiff’s Husband 7 Plaintiff contends the ALJ violated the scope of the remand by not articulating why the 8 lay testimony of plaintiff’s husband was discounted. Dkt. 10, at 11. The Court directed the ALJ 9 to reevaluate the lay testimony on remand. Tr. 849. The ALJ took judicial notice of having 10 evaluated the lay testimony but declined to engage in any evaluation of the testimony of 11 plaintiff’s husband. Tr. 775. Given this is the second remand of this matter, the Court directs the 12 ALJ to articulate the reasons for accepting or rejecting the lay testimony of plaintiff’s husband. 13 The Ninth Circuit has not yet decided whether the new regulations regarding medical 14 evidence, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416. 920c, affect the requirement in the Ninth Circuit that an
15 ALJ must give germane reasons for rejecting lay witness testimony. See Stout v. Commissioner, 16 454 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2006). Some courts have concluded that the new regulations may 17 dispense with an ALJ's obligation specifically to address lay witness testimony, including any 18 obligation to articulate germane reasons for disregarding lay testimony. See, e.g., Evans v. 19 Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2023 WL 3570083, at *9 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2023) (“Under the new 20 regulations regarding nonmedical statements, the Commissioner is no longer required to 21 articulate ‘germane’ reasons for discounting a lay witness's testimony.”); Gretchen S. v. Saul, 22 2020 WL 6076265, at *8 (D. Or. Oct. 15, 2020) (“[T]here is an argument that the ALJ is no 23 longer required to provide ‘arguably germane reasons’ for disregarding such statements, as the 1 Ninth Circuit has traditionally required.”). The majority of district courts in this circuit, however, 2 conclude that the new regulations have not eliminated an ALJ's obligation to consider and 3 address lay witness testimony. See, e.g., Devan G. v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 2025 WL 4 1640176 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2025), at *10; Tracy Q. v. Kijakazi, 2024 WL 706963, at *8 (D. Or.
5 Feb. 21, 2024), at *; Jerald H. v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 2023 WL 6533477, at *4 (W.D. 6 Wash. Oct. 6, 2023); Gardner v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 2023 WL 6173220, at *6 7 (D. Ariz. Sept. 21, 2023); Joseph L. S. v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 5611408, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 8 2023); Sharon W. v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 246391, at *8 (D. Idaho Jan. 18, 2023). 9 To the extent the ALJ rejected the testimony of plaintiff’s husband for the same reasons 10 articulated for rejecting plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ harmfully erred by failing to adequately 11 examine and reconcile the evidence that mental impairments would interfere with her ability to 12 attend fulltime work without an unacceptable number of absences, as well as to complete a 13 workday or workweek. Given that the ALJ has twice failed to support the rejection of lay 14 testimony with substantial evidence, the Court makes clear that the scope of remand includes a
15 requirement that will ensure the ALJ’s decision will not run afoul of current and future Ninth 16 Circuit decisions on the articulation requirement for lay testimony. On remand, the Court directs 17 the ALJ to articulate the reasons for accepting or rejecting the lay testimony of plaintiff’s 18 husband. 19 3. Medical Opinions by Dr. Gollogy and ARNP Waldron 20 Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for discounting the 21 2021 medical opinions of Dr. Gollogy and ARNP Waldron. The Court agrees. 22 The ALJ discounted ARNP Waldron’s 2021 opinion because she failed to offer sufficient 23 narrative in support of the checkbox form and relied on plaintiff’s symptomatic reports; and 1 ARNP Waldron’s opinion was inconsistent with the longitudinal record that showed providers’ 2 consistent notations of stability and improvement were greater than alleged by plaintiff, 3 including statements in ARNP Waldron’s 2024 notes. Tr. 772–73. The ALJ discounted Dr. 4 Gollogy’s opinion because he did not examine plaintiff and did not review the updated record;
5 and the longitudinal record showed providers’ consistent notations of stability and improvement 6 were greater than alleged by plaintiff. Tr 772. The ALJ did not provide legally sufficient reasons 7 for discounting Dr. Gollogy’s and ARNP Waldron’s opinions because of ALJ failed to 8 adequately assess and evaluate the abnormalities and difficulties that supported both opinions 9 and plaintiff’s testimony. This harmful error included a failure to analyze nearly two-years’ 10 worth of ARNP Waldron’s clinical notes showing symptoms of severe depression and anxiety. 11 Tr. 1058–1293. 12 The Court finds the ALJ did not support the decision to discount the 2021 opinions of Dr. 13 Gollogy and ARNP Waldron with substantial evidence. 14 4. Autism Spectrum Disorder
15 Neither party has argued the ALJ failed to examine whether plaintiff’s diagnosis of 16 autism spectrum disorder (“ASD”) constitutes a severe impairment at step two of the sequential 17 evaluation. Nonetheless, in his neuropsychological evaluation, Dr. Kearns unequivocally 18 diagnosed plaintiff with ASD and recommended plaintiff “work[] with a therapist who has 19 specific experience and training in assisting individuals in the autism spectrum.” Tr. 978; see Tr. 20 979 (Dr. Kearns’s follow-up statement “I clearly agree that there is significant mood distress 21 (plus the additional ASD diagnosis) that has an impact on your ability to function in a variety of 22 contexts (work being one of them)”). ARNP Waldron documented plaintiff’s diagnosis for ASD, 23 Tr. 1386; and plaintiff’s primary care providers acknowledged the ASD diagnosis, Tr. 1404. 1 Because this case is being remanded for further administrative proceedings, the Court directs the 2 ALJ to evaluate whether plaintiff’s ASD constitutes a severe impairment and what impact ASD 3 might have on plaintiff’s RFC. 4 5. Remand for Further Administrative Proceedings
5 Plaintiff contends this case should be remanded for an immediate award of benefits based 6 on the credit-as-true standard. The Court finds this matter should be remanded for further 7 administrative proceedings. 8 Under the Social Security Act, “courts are empowered to affirm, modify, or reverse a 9 decision by the Commissioner ‘with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.’” Garrison 10 v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11 405(g)). Although a court should generally remand to the agency for additional investigation or 12 explanation, a court has discretion to remand for immediate payment of benefits. Treichler v. 13 Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2014). Under the 14 Ninth Circuit’s credit-as-true rule, three elements must be satisfied in order for a court to remand
15 to an ALJ with instructions to calculate and award benefits: (1) the record has been fully 16 developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ 17 has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant 18 testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as 19 true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 20 1020. Nonetheless, when a claimant is otherwise entitled to an immediate award of benefits 21 under the credit-as-true analysis, the Court has flexibility to remand for further proceedings 22 “when the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled 23 within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Id. at 1021. 1 The Court finds the record is not fully developed such that further administrative 2 proceedings would be useful. As discussed earlier, the ALJ has yet to meaningfully evaluate over 3 two-hundred pages of ARNP Waldron’s clinical notes. Furthermore, years have passed since 4 ARNP Waldron’s and Dr. Gollogy’s 2021 opinions that plaintiff’s symptoms from depression
5 and anxiety might render her unemployable due to the frequency of absences and/or disruptions 6 in the workday/workweek. Plaintiff’s mental health history shows a waxing and waning of 7 symptoms such that the ALJ should evaluate whether and for what time periods and duration 8 plaintiff’s depression and anxiety rendered her unable to attend fulltime work with fewer than 9 five absences per year and/or caused her to be off task for more than 10% of the time during a 10 typical workday/workweek. On remand, the ALJ should take any necessary action to complete 11 the administrative record—including, if necessary, expert medical testimony and supplemental 12 medical opinions—offer plaintiff a hearing, and issue a new decision. 13 CONCLUSION 14 For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s final decision is REVERSED and this
15 case is REMANDED for further administrative proceedings under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 16 405(g). 17 On remand, the ALJ shall supplement the record via updated medical opinions and/or 18 expert medical testimony about the extent, frequency, and duration plaintiff’s ability to engage in 19 fulltime work are disrupted by absences or interruptions based on psychological symptoms, and 20 about whether such limitations continue or have improved to a meaningful extent. The ALJ shall 21 hold a new hearing, admit any supplemental evidence, and issue a new decision that also 22 considers whether autism spectrum disorder (“ASD”) constitutes a severe impairment at step two 23 of the sequential evaluation. Because the ALJ erred as discussed above, the ALJ shall also 1 reevaluate the testimony of plaintiff and lay witnesses, and the opinions of Dr. Gollogy and 2 ARNP Waldron. 3 DATED this 7th day of November, 2025. 4 A
5 BRIAN A. TSUCHIDA United States Magistrate Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23