NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1765-24
KAREN MCDERMOTT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF PLAINFIELD and DANIEL LONGO, in his professional and individual capacity as an Inspector for the CITY OF PLAINFIELD,1
Defendants-Respondents. ____________________________
Submitted February 4, 2026 – Decided March 11, 2026
Before Judges Mayer and Vanek.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Docket No. L-1314-19.
Krakower DiChiara LLC, attorneys for appellant (Michael R. DiChiara, on the briefs).
1 Defendant Daniel Longo died during the pendency of this litigation. Plaintiff signed a February 19, 2025 stipulation of dismissal with prejudice as to her claims against Longo. Rainone Coughlin Minchello, LLC, attorneys for respondent City of Plainfield (Frank J. Dyevoich, on the brief).
Mason Griffin & Pierson, PC, attorneys for amicus curiae National Employment Lawyers Association of New Jersey (Elizabeth Zuckerman, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Karen McDermott appeals from a November 27, 2024 order
granting summary judgment to defendant City of Plainfield (City). We affirm.
The following facts are derived from statements made to officers with the
Plainfield Police Department related to an alleged sexual assault of plaintiff by
defendant Daniel Longo,2 the police reports following an investigation into the
incident, and deposition testimony.
Incident during electrical inspection of plaintiff's home
Residents are required to allow City inspectors into their homes to obtain
a certificate of compliance once they complete work for which the City issued a
permit. On April 17, 2017, Longo worked as a licensed electrical inspector for
the City's building and construction department. He conducted an electrical
inspection of plaintiff's home on that date.
2 Plaintiff's interaction with the police on April 17, 2017, and her responses to the officers' questions were captured video through a body-worn camera. A-1765-24 2 Longo arrived at plaintiff's home before noon on April 17. At the time,
plaintiff was on the phone with her boyfriend. According to plaintiff, Longo
stated she failed the inspection. Plaintiff's boyfriend allegedly overheard Longo
telling plaintiff that she failed the inspection.
Plaintiff said Longo requested her phone number, which plaintiff
presumed related to completion of paperwork associated with the inspection. At
her deposition, plaintiff was unable to remember many of the details regarding
the incident with Longo but specifically denied Longo propositioned her for
sexual favors in return for a passing inspection. However, plaintiff subsequently
claimed Longo conditioned the outcome of the inspection on her performing
sexual favors.
During the inspection, plaintiff remained on the phone with her boyfriend.
The boyfriend purportedly heard a struggle between plaintiff and Longo. He
testified that plaintiff said Longo sexually assaulted her. The boyfriend then
called the City's building and construction department to report the incident.
The supervisor for the City's building and construction department called the
police and requested they investigate a reported assault.
The police arrived at plaintiff's home and asked her questions regarding
the reported assault. Plaintiff explained that Longo conducted an electrical
A-1765-24 3 inspection as part of the City's issuance of a certificate of compliance. After the
inspection, plaintiff said she gave Longo a "friendly hug" and thanked him
because "he was a nice guy."
In her statement to the police, plaintiff said Longo assaulted her after he
completed his inspection. According to plaintiff, "Longo pushed [her] against
a [kitchen] countertop, bit her breast, and put his hand between [her] legs." She
did not recall having any conversation with Longo before, during, or after the
alleged assault. Plaintiff told the officers she rebuffed Longo by telling him
"no" and "stop." According to plaintiff, her dog chased Longo out of the house.
Plaintiff also told the police she knew her home passed the electrical
inspection. Longo issued a sticker confirming plaintiff's home passed the
electrical inspection before he left the house on April 17. In their report, the
police noted the presence of an inspection sticker reflecting the electrical
inspection approval.
Plaintiff further told the police that Longo called her twice after leaving
the house to apologize for making her feel uncomfortable. At her deposition,
plaintiff did not recall having any conversations with Longo after he left her
home.
A-1765-24 4 The police then spoke to Longo. The police also recorded their interaction
with Longo through a body-worn camera. Longo claimed plaintiff hugged him
tightly and kissed his neck after he completed the inspection. He denied
touching her breasts or placing his hand inside her pants. He admitted calling
plaintiff twice after he left the home to check on her because she appeared to be
under the influence or drunk during his inspection.
After speaking with plaintiff and Longo, the investigating officers
concluded there was some type of "physical interaction." However, the officers
did not believe plaintiff was being "completely truthful" because of
"inconsistencies in [her] statement of events."
City's policies governing employees
The City has written policies applicable to its employees addressing
sexual harassment, harassment, discrimination and disability accommodation,
and violence prevention. The City also has a procedure for reporting employee
complaints and investigating employee complaints. Additionally, the City
mandates criminal background checks for its employees. Despite these policies,
plaintiff asserted the City lacked a policy specifying how its inspectors were
required to conduct themselves during home inspections.
A-1765-24 5 Approximately seven months prior to inspecting plaintiff's home, Longo
passed an extensive background check under the auspices of the New Jersey
Department of Community Affairs (DCA), qualifying him to serve as a licensed
construction official. Additionally, Longo completed the City's mandatory
sexual harassment training within the year preceding his inspection of plaintiff's
Other than the incident with plaintiff, Longo had no reports of any
misconduct with homeowners. The only disciplinary action against Longo
happened well after the incident with plaintiff. In that one instance, the City
disciplined Longo for using his personal cellphone at work and "taking too long
to perform inspections." Despite this disciplinary action, the City reported
Longo was "a model employee" and it "had zero cause for concern about his
competency, demeanor, and continued employment."
Plaintiff's complaint
In January 2023, plaintiff sued Longo and the City. In her complaint,
plaintiff alleged the City violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by failing to properly
supervise Longo and infringing on her constitutional right to bodily integrity
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Additionally, plaintiff asserted the City violated the New Jersey Law Against
A-1765-24 6 Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50, because the City's building and
construction department constituted a "place of public accommodation" and
Longo's misconduct was "sufficiently severe or pervasive to materially alter the
terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment and to create a discriminatorily
abusive environment." Plaintiff also claimed the City was negligent because it
"had a duty to take reasonable steps to protect [her] from foreseeable harm while
[Longo] entered her house to conduct an inspection" and "had a duty to exercise
reasonable care to prevent Longo from using his position as an employee, and/or
agent of the City . . . to target, assault, and/or sexually assault [her]." Plaintiff
further contended the City "negligently, carelessly, and recklessly, failed and
omitted to properly, hire, retain and failed to supervise Longo, giving him access
to residents, and failed to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety
to residents, and particularly to [her]."
At the close of discovery, the City moved for summary judgment.
Plaintiff opposed the motion.
A-1765-24 7 Summary judgment decision
On November 22, 2024, the judge heard argument on the City's motion.
In a November 27, 2024 amended order and written statement of reasons, the
judge entered summary judgment for the City.
Giving plaintiff every favorable inference, including that Longo said
plaintiff's home failed to pass the electrical inspection, the judge found Longo's
alleged misconduct conduct fell outside the scope of his employment with the
City. The judge rejected plaintiff's argument for expansion of liability beyond
situations between an employer-employee to hold the City liable for Longo's
purported intentional act. The judge concluded "there [wa]s no evidence to
support an assertion that . . . Longo's tortious act advanced an interest of the
City." To the extent there was a sexual assault, the judge found Longo's actions
served only his personal interest.
Regarding plaintiff's § 1983 claim, the judge, citing Monell v. New York
City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), noted plaintiff
"failed to show that a violation of 'her constitutional right to bodily integrity'
was a direct result of the City's policies or customs." Additionally, citing
Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990), the judge stated
plaintiff's "argument that a lack of a specific policy as to how inspectors should
A-1765-24 8 conduct themselves in a home at best amounts to 'proof of the mere existence of
an unlawful policy or custom,' which is insufficient to maintain a cause of action
under § 1983."
The judge highlighted the City's "robust policies surrounding anti-
discrimination, general anti-harassment, anti-sexual harassment, violence
prevention, and prohibited behaviors," finding "no evidence indicating that there
were any previous complaints made against . . . Longo, that other residents were
assaulted by any City employees, or that any other course of conduct
surrounding sexual assault against homeowners was unofficially endorsed by
the City." Based on the City's "competent evidence of the policies and
procedures in place," the judge found plaintiff's "mere assertion that a lack of
policy, without more, is insufficient for a trier of fact to find [the City] is liable
The judge also rejected plaintiff's "state-created danger" argument. The
judge held the facts in plaintiff's case were distinguishable from the facts
presented in Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72 (2014). The Gormley case
involved a lawsuit by an attorney who was assaulted by a patient while visiting
a psychiatric facility. Id. at 89-90. The psychiatric facility had an extensive
history of assaults committed by patients against visitors and staff. Id. at 88.
A-1765-24 9 The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded the "defendants affirmatively used
their authority to create a danger that made [the plaintiff] more vulnerable to the
assault." Id. at 108-09. Unlike the plaintiff in Gormley, the judge found plaintiff
failed to show sufficient "severity or pervasiveness of a danger . . . to conclude
that the City created a danger that made plaintiff vulnerable."
Additionally, the judge dismissed plaintiff's intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim, finding "no evidence that . . . Longo was acting in the
scope of his employment when the tort occurred" and explaining "[s]uch
evidence [wa]s crucial to attaching liability to the City." Based on plaintiff's
statement to the police recorded on body-worn camera footage, the judge found
the alleged assault occurred "after the completion of the electrical inspection."
Regarding plaintiff's LAD claims, even accepting plaintiff's argument that
the City's building and construction department was a "place of public
accommodation" under the LAD, the judge concluded plaintiff's claims failed
on the merits. Under the Restatement (Second) of Agency (Am. L. Inst. 1958)
(Restatement), § 219, the judge explained the City could be liable for plaintiff's
quid pro quo or hostile work environment claims under the LAD if plaintiff met
any of the following tests:
A-1765-24 10 (1) A[n employer] is subject to liability for the torts of his [employees] committed while acting within the scope of their employment.
(2) A[n employer] is not subject to liability for the torts of his [employees] acting outside the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the [employer] intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the [employer] was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the [employer], or
(d) the [employee] purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the [employment] relation.
[Restatement, § 219(1)-(2).]
Under the first prong, the judge found "the record indicate[d] [Longo] was
not acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the alleged assault ."
She further held the City could not be liable because the alleged assault occurred
after completion of the inspection. The judge specifically concluded plaintiff
could not satisfy any of the prongs to hold the City vicariously liable because
"Longo was subject to and informed of anti-discrimination, harassment, sexual
harassment, and violent behavior policies." Therefore, the judge held the City
was not vicariously liable for Longo's purported actions under the LAD.
A-1765-24 11 The judge also rejected plaintiff's argument that the training Longo
received was insufficient because it did not include any policies specifically
addressing sexual harassment of homeowners. The judge found "it [wa]s plainly
apparent that . . . Longo's training was meant to encompass all persons whom
City employees encountered" and the City's "failure to include the phrase
'homeowners' in the various policies d[id] not create a genuine issue of material
fact."
Additionally, the judge dismissed plaintiff's hostile work environment
claim. The judge concluded plaintiff was never an employee of the City and,
therefore, could not assert a hostile work environmental claim. Further, even if
she were a City employee, the judge rejected plaintiff's contention that this
single incident rose to the requisite level of severity, from the perspective of a
reasonable person, to demonstrate the working environment was hostile. The
judge expressly found Longo's alleged assault "was a single and isolated
incident."
In dismissing plaintiff's negligence claims, the judge reiterated the City
could not be liable under traditional negligence theories because Longo was not
acting within the scope of employment at the time of the alleged assault.
A-1765-24 12 Regarding plaintiff's negligent hiring claim, the judge stated that the City
"did not know or have reason to know of . . . Longo's dangerous characteristics
at the time of hiring or during his employment." Based on evidence in the
record, the judge found there were "no previous complaints made by any
residents regarding . . . Longo." The judge also explained Longo "passed an
extensive background check" by the DCA prior to receiving his construction
official license and underwent "an additional mandatory background check
policy" by the City before he became an employee. Further, based on the facts
adduced in the record, the judge determined "Longo did not lack adequate
training" or "[need] additional supervision on the job." The judge explained that
Longo's being disciplined by the City for "taking too long to perform inspections
and . . . using his personal cellphone during work hours" did not create a genuine
issue of material fact regarding plaintiff's negligent supervision claim.
After considering the evidence, the judge concluded plaintiff failed "to
establish that the City could have reasonably known that defendant Longo was
dangerous and capable of putting members of the public, such as plaintiff, at
risk of harm and failed to act on such knowledge." Thus, the judge entered
summary judgment in favor of the City and dismissed plaintiff's complaint with
prejudice.
A-1765-24 13 On appeal, plaintiff contends the judge erred in granting summary
judgment to the City because there were genuine issues of material fact
regarding the City's liability for Longo's purported misconduct. Plaintiff asserts
the City should be vicariously liable under § 219 of the Restatement even if
Longo was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the
alleged assault. Additionally, plaintiff argues the City's building and
construction department constitutes a "place of public accommodation" and,
therefore, should be vicariously liable for Longo's purported misconduct under
her theory of liability premised on quid pro quo or hostile work environment.
On October 22, 2025, the National Employment Lawyers Association
(NELA) moved to appear as amicus curiae in support of plaintiff's appeal. In a
November 7, 2025 order, we granted NELA's application. NELA submitted a
brief addressing the viability of plaintiff's harassment claim against the City
under the LAD.
We reject the arguments presented by plaintiff and NELA.
When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we apply the same
standard as the trial court. Boyle v. Huff, 257 N.J. 468, 477 (2024). A trial
court must grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
A-1765-24 14 that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." Gayles by
Gayles v. Sky Zone Trampoline Park, 468 N.J. Super. 17, 22 (App. Div. 2021)
(quoting Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, 244 N.J. 189, 199 (2016)). A genuine issue of material fact exists
"only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by
the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom
favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier
of fact." Ibid. (quoting Grande v. Saint Clare's Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1, 24
(2017)). "If 'the evidence is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter
of law,' summary judgment is proper." Meade v. Twp. of Livingston, 249 N.J.
310, 327 (2021) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520,
540 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We first consider whether the judge erred in finding the City could not be
vicariously liable to plaintiff for Longo's alleged misconduct. We find no error
in the judge's determination.
Plaintiff does not contend Longo was acting within the scope of his
employment when he purportedly assaulted her. Rather, plaintiff argues the City
is vicariously liable for Longo's conduct because "an employer may be held
A-1765-24 15 liable even under circumstances where it appears that an employee's misconduct
was not necessarily motivated by a desire to benefit the employer."
Employers may be held vicariously liable for an employee's misconduct
under § 219(2) of the Restatement. See also Griffin v. City of E. Orange, 225
N.J. 400, 414 (2016). Section 219(2)(b) of the Restatement provides: "A master
is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of
their employment, unless: . . . (b) the master was negligent or reckless." Section
219(2)(d) of the Restatement imposes vicarious liability against an employer if
the employee acted with apparent authority and was aided in accomplishing the
sexual assault through his position as the employee. We agree with the judge
that plaintiff's proofs are insufficient to establish vicarious liability against the
City under § 219(2)(b) or (d) of the Restatement.
Under § 219(2)(b) of the Restatement, to assert vicarious liability against
an employer, a plaintiff must establish "that an employer was negligent by its
failure to have in place well-publicized and enforced anti-harassment policies,
effective formal and informal complaint structures, training, and/or monitoring
mechanisms." Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 621 (1993). A court
should consider "[t]he means employed by an institution to deter harassment[]
and the enforcement of those means," such as policies and training programs,
A-1765-24 16 when "assessing that institution's vicarious liability for the actions of an
individual over whom the institution exercises control." Godfrey v. Princeton
Theological Seminary, 196 N.J. 178, 200 (2008).
Plaintiff asserts the City "failed to provide any training to employees such
as Longo concerning sexual harassment and homeowners[,] . . . failed to
implement any policies concerning how inspectors like Longo were to conduct
themselves inside of someone's home," and lacked a complaint procedure for
homeowners to report sexual harassment or sexual assault. Having reviewed the
record, we are satisfied the City produced documents evidencing policies
prohibiting discriminatory and harassing conduct by City employees when
interacting with the public.
Additionally, the judge found Longo received training on the City's anti-
discrimination and anti-harassment policies the same year as the alleged assault.
The judge found "a reasonable factfinder could not conclude that the City
intended for . . . Longo to allegedly commit sexual assault [and] that the City
was negligent or reckless in training Longo on these policies." Plaintiff failed
to present any evidence identifying City employees who violated the City's
policies regarding interactions with homeowners aside from her allegation
against Longo.
A-1765-24 17 On these facts, the judge did not err in finding Longo received anti-
discrimination and anti-harassment training from the City. Based on the
implementation of policies and training governing its employees, the City was
not negligent or reckless under Section 219(2)(b) of the Restatement to be
vicariously liable for Longo's alleged misconduct.
Nor is the City liable for Longo's actions under § 219(2)(d) of the
Restatement. Under that section, plaintiff argues an employer may be held liable
if the employee "could not perform the acts with[out] the aid of their employer."
She asserts the City should be held liable for Longo's actions because the alleged
assault occurred during a City-mandated inspection for the issuance of a
certificate of compliance.
Because the alleged sexual assault was unrelated to Longo's duties and
activities as a City electrical inspector, plaintiff's argument fails on its merits.
Based on the evidence, the judge concluded Longo was not acting within the
scope of his duties because the alleged assault occurred after Longo completed
the inspection. The judge held Longo's alleged misconduct did not act or speak
for the City under § 219(d)(2) of the Restatement. We are satisfied the judge
correctly concluded any alleged assault by Longo occurred after he completed
A-1765-24 18 the inspection and, therefore, the purported assault was unrelated to the City-
required inspection of plaintiff's home.
We next consider plaintiff's argument that the judge erred in concluding
the City could not be vicariously liable for Longo's alleged sexual harassment
under the LAD. We disagree.
The LAD's "overarching purpose is to eradicate discrimination in society"
and "was enacted 'to protect the public's strong interest in a discrimination -free
workplace.'" Savage v. Twp. of Neptune, 257 N.J. 204, 216 (2024) (citation
omitted) (quoting Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 600). "The LAD should be construed
liberally." Ptaszynski v. Uwaneme, 371 N.J. Super. 333, 345 (App. Div. 2004)
(citing Franek v. Tomahawk Lake Resort, 333 N.J. Super. 206, 217 (App. Div.
2000)).
Plaintiff, construing the LAD liberally, argues the City's building and
construction department qualifies as a "place of public accommodation." Based
on her assertion, plaintiff claims the judge erred in granting summary judgment
to the City on her quid pro quo and hostile work environment claims.
N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)(1) states "[i]t shall be . . . unlawful discrimination . . .
[f]or any . . . agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation directly
or indirectly to refuse, withhold from or deny to any person any of the
A-1765-24 19 accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof . . . on account of
the . . . sex . . . of such person." N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(l) identifies a non-exclusive
list identifying "place[s] of public accommodation." Importantly, the statute
states: "Nothing herein shall be construed to include or to apply to any
institution, bona fide club, or place of accommodation, which is in its nature
distinctly private." Ibid.
"To help decide whether an entity qualifies as a public accommodation,
courts examine 'whether the entity engages in broad public solicitation,
maintains close relationships with the government or other public
accommodations, or whether it is similar to enumerated or other previously
recognized public accommodations.'" Ptaszynski, 371 N.J. Super. at 346
(quoting Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 160 N.J. 562, 589 (1999)). "Interaction
with the public is a key factor in determining whether an entity qualifies as a
public accommodation under the statute." Ibid.
Here, giving plaintiff every favorable inference in opposition to the City's
motion, the judge presumed the City's building and construction department
constituted a "place of public accommodation" even though the alleged assault
occurred in a private home. Notwithstanding the judge's presumption that
plaintiff's private home could be deemed a "place of public accommodation,"
A-1765-24 20 the judge concluded the City was not vicariously liable for Longo's alleged
sexual harassment under the LAD.
"[S]exual harassment in a place of public accommodation constitutes
discrimination 'on account of . . . sex 'in the furnishing' of 'any of the
accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges' of 'any place of public
accommodation.'" C.V. by & through C.V. v. Waterford Twp. Bd. of Educ., 255
N.J. 289, 309 (2023) (quoting N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)). Under New Jersey law,
there are
two types of actionable sexual harassment: (1) "[q]uid pro quo sexual harassment," "when an employer attempts to make an employee's submission to sexual demands a condition of . . . employment"; and (2) "[h]ostile work environment sexual harassment," "when an employer or fellow employees harass an employee because of . . . sex to the point at which the working environment becomes hostile."
[Ibid. (alterations in original) (quoting Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 601).]
"[I]n cases of supervisory sexual harassment, whether the harassment is
of the quid pro quo or the hostile work environment type, the employer is
directly and strictly liable for all equitable damages and relief." Lehmann, 132
N.J. at 617.
A-1765-24 21 Quid pro quo sexual harassment "involves an implicit or explicit threat
that if the employee does not accede to the sexual demands, he or she will lose
his or her job, receive unfavorable performance reviews, be passed over for
promotions, or suffer other adverse employment consequences." Id. at 601.
While these actions traditionally involved employer-employee relationships,
New Jersey courts have expanded the scope of actionable quid pro quo conduct
to encompass general business relationships. See J.T.'s Tire Serv., Inc. v. United
Rentals N. Am., Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 236, 242 (App. Div. 2010) (finding quid
pro quo harassment claim proper where the defendant refused to buy from or
contract with the plaintiff absent the plaintiff's female owner acceding to sexual
demands from the defendant's branch manager).
Because the judge determined Longo was not acting within the scope of
his employment at the time of the alleged assault, the judge declined to address
plaintiff's quid pro quo claim. Even if the judge had addressed plaintiff's quid
pro quo claim on the merits, we are satisfied plaintiff is unable to prevail on
such a claim. Quid pro quo claims require an employer-employee work
relationship or refusal to enter into a contract or termination of a contract based
on sex. Here, the parties had no such relationship at the time of the alleged
A-1765-24 22 assault. Thus, the judge did not err in dismissing plaintiff's quid pro quo claim
Nor did the judge err in finding the City could not be vicariously liable
for creating a hostile work environment under the LAD. To succeed on a hostile
work environment sexual harassment claim, "a plaintiff must allege conduct that
'(1) would not have occurred but for the employee's gender'; and that 'was (2)
severe or pervasive enough to make a (3) reasonable woman believe that (4 ) the
conditions of employment are altered and the working environment is hostile or
abusive.'" C.V., 255 N.J. at 309 (quoting Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 603-04)
(emphasis omitted). "Severe or pervasive" means "whether a reasonable person
would believe that the conditions of employment have been altered and that the
working environment is hostile." Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr.,
174 N.J. 1, 24 (2002) (citing Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 604).
Plaintiff cannot prevail on her hostile work environment claim under the
LAD because she lacked a work relationship with the City or Longo at the time
of the alleged assault. To establish a hostile work environment claim, there must
have been a working relationship. Because there was no working relationship
between plaintiff and the City or between plaintiff and Longo, the judge did not
err in rejecting plaintiff's hostile work environment claim.
A-1765-24 23 To avoid rejection of her hostile work environment claim, plaintiff and
NELA suggest substitution of the term "work environment" with "place of
public accommodation." However, neither plaintiff nor NELA identified any
New Jersey case law to support their argument.
While New Jersey courts have expanded the Lehmann standard beyond
workplace relationships, the case law as expanded is expressly limited to school
settings. See C.V., 255 N.J. at 311 ("[T]he Lehmann standard should apply in
the workplace and in the school setting" because "[s]tudents in the classroom
are entitled to no less protection from unlawful discrimination and harassment
than their adult counterparts in the workplace.") (second alteration in original)
(quoting L.W. ex rel. L.G. v. Toms River Reg'l Schs. Bd. of Educ., 189 N.J. 381,
405-06 (2007)). Plaintiff and NELA cited no New Jersey cases expanding the
Lehmann test beyond the workplace and school settings. Thus, the judge did
not err in rejecting plaintiff's LAD arguments and granting summary judgment
in favor of the City.
To the extent we have not addressed any of the arguments presented by
plaintiff or NELA, they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-1765-24 24