In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION III
KAREN HIDRITCH-HAMANN, ) No. ED100008 ) Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Franklin County vs. ) ) Honorable Robert D. Schollmeyer DAVID HIDRITCH and ) HIDRITCH PROPERTIES, LLC, ) ) Appellants. ) FILED: February 4, 2014
Introduction
David Hidritch (“Hidritch”) and Hidritch Properties, LLC (collectively, “Appellants”)
appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting Karen Hidritch-Hamann’s (“Respondent”)
Motion to Dismiss, dismissing Appellants’ Counter Petition, and denying Appellants’ Motion to
Enforce Settlement, Motion for Relief from Judgment, and Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. We
dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.
Factual and Procedural History
In 2008, Respondent filed a seven-count petition against Appellants alleging that
Appellants used undue influence and other illicit means to induce Hidritch and Respondent’s
mother to transfer cash, personal property, and the Hidritch family farm to Appellants.
1 Respondent alleged that Appellants’ conduct deprived her of her fifty percent interest in the cash,
personal property, and family farm to which she was entitled.
On January 9, 2012, Hidritch was deposed by counsel for Respondent. During the course
of the deposition, settlement talks began and on January 10, 2012, a settlement was reached. The
material terms of the settlement were stated by counsel for Respondent and transcribed by a
court reporter as follows:
The Defendant, David, has agreed to pay the Plaintiff, Karen, $437,500. And in exchange for that, she will execute a settlement agreement and general release of all claims arising out of the dispute over the family property, the farm, acreage that’s described in the petition, along with the other personal property that’s referred to there. And in addition to that she will quitclaim her interest by deed in five acres that were conveyed to her by her mother Irene to David Hidritch. ... Let’s agree then, have you agree, that this process will occur during the next 60 days which is the time that we agreed for you to apply for and receive a bank loan to pay the settlement proceeds. ... And then that the Defendants . . . agree to have judgment entered in the amount of the monetary settlement so that if the payment is not made within the time permitted, it will be filed of record and become a judgment lien against the farm for the settlement amount.
(emphasis added). Both parties agreed to the terms of the settlement on the record.
Thereafter, the parties attempted to reduce the settlement agreement to writing. Counsel
for Respondent prepared the initial draft (“draft settlement agreement”), incorporated a few
changes requested by Appellants, then sent the draft settlement agreement to Appellants for their
signatures. The draft settlement agreement was never signed by Appellants.
On February 15, 2012, counsel for Appellants notified Respondent that Appellants had
been denied a bank loan for the $437,500 in settlement proceeds. Shortly thereafter, on February
24, 2012, Respondent filed her Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and Enter Judgment
Against Defendants. Respondent asserted that she and Appellants had reached a settlement on
2 January 10, 2012, that required Appellants to make a cash payment of $437,500 to Respondent
on or before March 10, 2012. Respondent further claimed that Appellants had announced their
intention not to pay the settlement amount. Therefore, Respondent requested the trial court to
enter an order enforcing the settlement agreement and ordering Appellants to pay the settlement
amount plus interest and attorneys’ fees.
Respondent’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and Enter Judgment Against
Defendants was called up for hearing on March 12, 2012. At the hearing, Respondent argued
that Appellants and Respondent reached a settlement agreement on January 10, 2012, and that
the material terms of the agreement were reduced to a writing, which Appellant never signed. In
response, Appellants argued that the settlement agreement was conditioned upon Appellants
receiving a bank loan to pay the settlement proceeds, and because Appellants were unable to
secure a loan, no enforceable agreement existed between the parties.
The trial court granted Respondent’s motion, finding that there was a settlement
agreement between the parties. On March 19, 2012, the trial court filed an Entry of Judgment
ordering Appellants to pay Respondent the sum of $437,500 plus $5000 in attorneys’ fees for a
total of $442,500, plus interest. The judgment also allowed the sheriff to levy and execute on
Appellants’ farm to satisfy the judgment.
On or before July 12, 2012, Appellants sold the farm and used the proceeds to pay
Respondent $442,500, plus interest. Respondent accepted the payment. On December 27, 2012,
Appellants sent a letter to Respondent’s attorney requesting that Respondent deed Appellants the
five-acre tract identified in the settlement agreement and execute a mutual release of all claims in
accordance with the settlement agreement. Respondent refused to deed the five-acre tract to
Appellants or execute a mutual release. On February 21, 2013, Appellants then filed their
3 Motion to Enforce Settlement, Motion for Relief from Judgment, Counter Petition, and Motion
for Attorneys’ Fees. In their Motion to Enforce Settlement, Motion for Relief from Judgment,
and Counter Petition, Appellants averred that although the trial court found an enforceable
agreement between the parties and granted Respondent’s Motion to Enforce Settlement
Agreement, Respondent had not performed her obligations under the settlement agreement.
Accordingly, Appellants asked the trial court to order Respondent to deed the five-acre tract to
Appellants and to execute a mutual release pursuant to the settlement agreement.
On June 21, 2013, the trial court entered its Order and Judgment dismissing Appellants’
Counter Petition with prejudice and denying Appellants’ Motion to Enforce Settlement, Motion
for Relief from Judgment, and Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. The trial court found that its March
19, 2012 Entry of Judgment was a final judgment for purposes of appeal and deemed Appellants’
Counter Petition and Motion to Enforce Settlement improper collateral attacks on a final
judgment and barred by res judicata. Appellants appeal from the June 21, 2013 Order and
Judgment.
Discussion
Before we address the merits of an appeal, this Court has the duty to sua sponte
determine its jurisdiction. St. Louis Union Station Holdings, Inc. v. Discovery Channel Store,
Inc., 272 S.W.3d 504, 505 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008). A final judgment is a prerequisite to appellate
jurisdiction. Ndegwa v. KSSO, LLC, 371 S.W.3d 798, 801 (Mo. banc 2012). Accordingly, if
the trial court’s judgment was not a final judgment, we must dismiss the appeal. Id.
To be final for purposes of appeal, a judgment must dispose of all issues and parties in a
case, leaving nothing for future determination. Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Epstein, 200 S.W.3d
547, 549 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006). A motion to compel settlement adds a collateral action to a
4 pending action for specific performance of the settlement agreement. Precision Invs., L.L.C. v.
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In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION III
KAREN HIDRITCH-HAMANN, ) No. ED100008 ) Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Franklin County vs. ) ) Honorable Robert D. Schollmeyer DAVID HIDRITCH and ) HIDRITCH PROPERTIES, LLC, ) ) Appellants. ) FILED: February 4, 2014
Introduction
David Hidritch (“Hidritch”) and Hidritch Properties, LLC (collectively, “Appellants”)
appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting Karen Hidritch-Hamann’s (“Respondent”)
Motion to Dismiss, dismissing Appellants’ Counter Petition, and denying Appellants’ Motion to
Enforce Settlement, Motion for Relief from Judgment, and Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. We
dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.
Factual and Procedural History
In 2008, Respondent filed a seven-count petition against Appellants alleging that
Appellants used undue influence and other illicit means to induce Hidritch and Respondent’s
mother to transfer cash, personal property, and the Hidritch family farm to Appellants.
1 Respondent alleged that Appellants’ conduct deprived her of her fifty percent interest in the cash,
personal property, and family farm to which she was entitled.
On January 9, 2012, Hidritch was deposed by counsel for Respondent. During the course
of the deposition, settlement talks began and on January 10, 2012, a settlement was reached. The
material terms of the settlement were stated by counsel for Respondent and transcribed by a
court reporter as follows:
The Defendant, David, has agreed to pay the Plaintiff, Karen, $437,500. And in exchange for that, she will execute a settlement agreement and general release of all claims arising out of the dispute over the family property, the farm, acreage that’s described in the petition, along with the other personal property that’s referred to there. And in addition to that she will quitclaim her interest by deed in five acres that were conveyed to her by her mother Irene to David Hidritch. ... Let’s agree then, have you agree, that this process will occur during the next 60 days which is the time that we agreed for you to apply for and receive a bank loan to pay the settlement proceeds. ... And then that the Defendants . . . agree to have judgment entered in the amount of the monetary settlement so that if the payment is not made within the time permitted, it will be filed of record and become a judgment lien against the farm for the settlement amount.
(emphasis added). Both parties agreed to the terms of the settlement on the record.
Thereafter, the parties attempted to reduce the settlement agreement to writing. Counsel
for Respondent prepared the initial draft (“draft settlement agreement”), incorporated a few
changes requested by Appellants, then sent the draft settlement agreement to Appellants for their
signatures. The draft settlement agreement was never signed by Appellants.
On February 15, 2012, counsel for Appellants notified Respondent that Appellants had
been denied a bank loan for the $437,500 in settlement proceeds. Shortly thereafter, on February
24, 2012, Respondent filed her Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and Enter Judgment
Against Defendants. Respondent asserted that she and Appellants had reached a settlement on
2 January 10, 2012, that required Appellants to make a cash payment of $437,500 to Respondent
on or before March 10, 2012. Respondent further claimed that Appellants had announced their
intention not to pay the settlement amount. Therefore, Respondent requested the trial court to
enter an order enforcing the settlement agreement and ordering Appellants to pay the settlement
amount plus interest and attorneys’ fees.
Respondent’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and Enter Judgment Against
Defendants was called up for hearing on March 12, 2012. At the hearing, Respondent argued
that Appellants and Respondent reached a settlement agreement on January 10, 2012, and that
the material terms of the agreement were reduced to a writing, which Appellant never signed. In
response, Appellants argued that the settlement agreement was conditioned upon Appellants
receiving a bank loan to pay the settlement proceeds, and because Appellants were unable to
secure a loan, no enforceable agreement existed between the parties.
The trial court granted Respondent’s motion, finding that there was a settlement
agreement between the parties. On March 19, 2012, the trial court filed an Entry of Judgment
ordering Appellants to pay Respondent the sum of $437,500 plus $5000 in attorneys’ fees for a
total of $442,500, plus interest. The judgment also allowed the sheriff to levy and execute on
Appellants’ farm to satisfy the judgment.
On or before July 12, 2012, Appellants sold the farm and used the proceeds to pay
Respondent $442,500, plus interest. Respondent accepted the payment. On December 27, 2012,
Appellants sent a letter to Respondent’s attorney requesting that Respondent deed Appellants the
five-acre tract identified in the settlement agreement and execute a mutual release of all claims in
accordance with the settlement agreement. Respondent refused to deed the five-acre tract to
Appellants or execute a mutual release. On February 21, 2013, Appellants then filed their
3 Motion to Enforce Settlement, Motion for Relief from Judgment, Counter Petition, and Motion
for Attorneys’ Fees. In their Motion to Enforce Settlement, Motion for Relief from Judgment,
and Counter Petition, Appellants averred that although the trial court found an enforceable
agreement between the parties and granted Respondent’s Motion to Enforce Settlement
Agreement, Respondent had not performed her obligations under the settlement agreement.
Accordingly, Appellants asked the trial court to order Respondent to deed the five-acre tract to
Appellants and to execute a mutual release pursuant to the settlement agreement.
On June 21, 2013, the trial court entered its Order and Judgment dismissing Appellants’
Counter Petition with prejudice and denying Appellants’ Motion to Enforce Settlement, Motion
for Relief from Judgment, and Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. The trial court found that its March
19, 2012 Entry of Judgment was a final judgment for purposes of appeal and deemed Appellants’
Counter Petition and Motion to Enforce Settlement improper collateral attacks on a final
judgment and barred by res judicata. Appellants appeal from the June 21, 2013 Order and
Judgment.
Discussion
Before we address the merits of an appeal, this Court has the duty to sua sponte
determine its jurisdiction. St. Louis Union Station Holdings, Inc. v. Discovery Channel Store,
Inc., 272 S.W.3d 504, 505 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008). A final judgment is a prerequisite to appellate
jurisdiction. Ndegwa v. KSSO, LLC, 371 S.W.3d 798, 801 (Mo. banc 2012). Accordingly, if
the trial court’s judgment was not a final judgment, we must dismiss the appeal. Id.
To be final for purposes of appeal, a judgment must dispose of all issues and parties in a
case, leaving nothing for future determination. Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Epstein, 200 S.W.3d
547, 549 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006). A motion to compel settlement adds a collateral action to a
4 pending action for specific performance of the settlement agreement. Precision Invs., L.L.C. v.
Cornerstone Propane, L.P., 220 S.W.3d 301, 303 (Mo. banc 2007). The pending action remains
open, and the trial court retains jurisdiction, until the pending action is actually dismissed by the
trial court. McKean v. St. Louis Cnty., 964 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998).
Accordingly, an order granting a motion to compel settlement is not a final, appealable
judgment. St. Louis Union Station Holdings, Inc., 272 S.W.3d at 505. Instead, it is interlocutory
and becomes final only after the trial court has entered a judgment on the settlement and
dismissed the underlying petition. Id.; see also Sw. Parts Supply, Inc. v. Winterer, 360 S.W.3d
349, 353 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012).
The record before us reveals that the underlying cause of action brought in this matter by
Respondent has never been dismissed. Respondent’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement
and Enter Judgment Against Defendants added a collateral action to her cause of action against
Appellants for specific performance of the settlement agreement. See Precision Invs.,
L.L.C., 220 S.W.3d at 303. When the trial court filed its March 19, 2012 Entry of Judgment
granting Respondent’s motion and ordering enforcement of the settlement agreement, it did not
dismiss Respondent’s seven-count petition against Appellants. Neither does the record contain a
voluntary memorandum of dismissal filed by the parties. The lack of a dismissal of
Respondent’s cause of action precludes the March 19, 2012 Entry of Judgment from being final
for purposes of appeal, and Respondent’s seven-count petition against Appellants remained
pending. See St. Louis Union Station Holdings, Inc., 272 S.W.3d at 505.
On June 21, 2013, the trial court entered its Order and Judgment dismissing Appellants’
Counter Petition and denying Appellants’ Motion to Enforce Settlement 1 on the ground that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider them because its March 19, 2012 Entry of Judgment 1 The judgment also denied Appellants’ Motion for Relief from Judgment and Motion for Attorneys’ Fees.