Karen Estrada-Payes v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 9, 2026
• Docket: 16-71774
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 9 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KAREN SUCELY ESTRADA-PAYES; et No. 16-71774 al., Agency Nos. A206-036-648 Petitioners, A206-036-649 A206-036-647 v.

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 4, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges, and BROWN,*** District Judge.

Karen Sucely Estrada-Payes, Sammy Alexander Enriquez-Orantes

(“Enriquez”), and J.A.E.E. (collectively, “Petitioners”), natives and citizens of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Jeffrey Vincent Brown, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation. Guatemala, petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”) dismissing their appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their

petitions for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention

Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny

the petition for review.

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that

Petitioners’ proffered particular social groups (“PSG”) were not socially distinct.

See Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that the

BIA’s determination as to social distinction is reviewed for substantial evidence);

Akosung v. Barr, 970 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2020) (“To be socially distinct . . .

a group need not be seen by society; rather, it must be perceived as a group by

society.” (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 240 (2014)).

Petitioners’ theory of social distinction relies on conclusory testimony that their

community was aware they were being targeted by a local gang. Villegas Sanchez

v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1173, 1181 (9th Cir. 2021) (“‘[T]he social group must exist

independently of the fact of persecution’ because ‘the persecutors’ perception is

not itself enough to make a group socially distinct.’” (citation omitted)). We are

not compelled to conclude that the proffered PSGs are socially distinct.

2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Petitioners

failed to establish the requisite nexus to their proposed PSGs. Petitioners testified

2 credibly that they received multiple death threats from gang members and Enriquez

testified that he was beaten on one occasion. However, a noncitizen’s “desire to be

free from . . . random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected

ground.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010).

3. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Petitioners

failed to meet their burden of establishing that they face a more-likely-than-not risk

of future torture “by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence

of, a public official acting in an official capacity or other person acting in an

official capacity.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). Petitioners fail to meet their

burden of establishing a likelihood of future torture, and the testimony that the

police failed to send a patrol car as they promised they would after Enriquez

reported gang activity does not establish acquiescence. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.16(c)(2) (“The burden of proof is on the applicant . . . to establish that it is

more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed.”); Andrade-

Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A] general ineffectiveness

on the government’s part to investigate and prevent crime will not suffice to show

acquiescence.”).

4. “We generally review claims of due process violations in deportation

proceedings de novo.” Getachew v. I.N.S., 25 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 1994). “To

prevail on a due process challenge to deportation proceedings, [Petitioners] must

3 show error and substantial prejudice.” Lata v. I.N.S., 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.

2000). Petitioners fail to establish that they were “prevented from reasonably

presenting [their] case” or that they were prejudiced “by the alleged [due process]

violation.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation

omitted). Petitioners concede that they were “not prevented from presenting [their]

case,” and instead argue that “the IJ failed to properly consider all facts in

evidence, and misstated and omitted others in the Oral Decision.” But there is no

evidence that Petitioners’ contention is true, and “the BIA does not have to write

an exegesis on every contention.” Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th

Cir. 2010) (citation modified).

PETITION DENIED.1

1 Petitioners’ Motion to Stay Removal, see Dkt. 5, is DENIED as moot. The temporary stay of removal will dissolve when the mandate issues. See Dkt 1.