Karen Elizabeth Morton v. Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC
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Opinion
In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-24-00525-CV ___________________________
KAREN ELIZABETH MORTON, Appellant
V.
LAKEVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC, Appellee
On Appeal from the 355th District Court Hood County, Texas Trial Court No. C2024243
Before Wallach, J.; Sudderth, C.J.; and Walker, J. Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellee Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC filed an application under Texas
Government Code Section 51.903 asking the trial court to determine the status of
documents purporting to create a lien or claims against real property. See Tex. Gov’t
Code Ann. § 51.903(a). The application asserted that Appellant Karen Elizabeth
Morton had executed a promissory note secured by a lien against property in Hood
County; that Appellee was the mortgagee of the deed of trust; and that in July and
August 2024, the county clerk had received, filed, and recorded three instruments that
purported to create a lien or claim on real property against Lakeview. On September
25, 2024, the trial court signed its “Judicial Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law
Regarding a Documentation or Instrument Purporting to Create a Lien or Claim,” in
which the court found that no valid lien or claim had been created by the instruments
filed against the property. See id. § 51.903(c), (g).
Appellant filed a motion to reinstate the case, or, alternatively, a motion for
new trial. On November 21, 2024—more than twenty days from the trial court’s
finding—she filed a notice of appeal. After the trial court denied Appellant’s motion
to reinstate on December 6, 2024, Appellant filed an amended notice of appeal and
provided this court with a copy of the trial court’s order denying her motion to
reinstate.
On December 12, 2024, we notified Appellant of our concern that we did not
have jurisdiction because her notice of appeal had not been timely filed. Section
2 51.903(c) provides that an appellate court must expedite review of a trial court’s
finding under that section. Id. § 51.903(c). Accordingly, a notice of appeal from the
trial court’s finding must be filed within twenty days of the trial court’s signing of its
finding. Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(b) (providing deadline for filing accelerated appeal),
28.1(a) (providing that appeals required by statute to be expedited are accelerated
appeals), 28.1(b) (providing how to perfect an accelerated appeal); see In re Mauer,
No. 02-19-00063-CV, 2019 WL 1829572, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 25,
2019, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.). Appellant’s November 21, 2024 notice of
appeal was therefore untimely. Consequently, we cautioned Appellant that her appeal
could be dismissed for want of jurisdiction unless, by December 23, 2024, she filed a
response showing grounds for continuing the appeal.
Appellant filed a response relying on this court’s opinion in In re Hai Quang La,
415 S.W.3d 561, 562 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet. denied), and arguing that her
motion to reinstate extended the deadline to file her notice of appeal, see Tex. R. App.
P. 26.1(a). However, posttrial motions do not extend the time to perfect an
accelerated appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 28.1(b). Thus, Appellant’s motion to reinstate
did not extend the notice-of-appeal deadline in this case. See Lasater v. Thompson,
No. 02-20-00290-CV, 2021 WL 386957, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 4, 2021,
no pet.) (mem. op.). Although a motion for new trial had been filed in Hai Quang La,
the opinion did not discuss the timeline for filing a notice of appeal in a proceeding
under Section 51.903, and it did not hold that the filing of a motion for new trial or
3 other posttrial motion extends the notice-of-appeal deadline.1 See Hai Quang La,
415 S.W.3d at 562–67. Thus, that case does not show any grounds for continuing
Appellant’s appeal.
Appellant also argues that, although this is an accelerated appeal, the notice-of-
appeal deadline ran from the trial court’s order denying her motion to reinstate. But
the notice-of-appeal timeline runs from when the trial court signs its judgment—or, in
this case, its finding—not from when the trial court overrules a posttrial motion. Tex.
R. App. P. 26.1; Naaman v. Grider, 126 S.W.3d 73, 74 (Tex. 2003).
Without a timely filed notice of appeal or extension request, we lack
jurisdiction. See Naaman, 126 S.W.3d at 74 Because Appellant’s appeal was untimely,
we have no jurisdiction over her appeal. See Mauer, 2019 WL 1829572, at *1.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a),
43.2(f).
Per Curiam
Delivered: January 16, 2025
1 This court’s records from that case indicate that, although the notice of appeal was filed outside the twenty-day deadline in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(b), it was filed within the fifteen-day extension period in Rule 26.3. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(b), 26.3. In this case, Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed outside of the time allowed for an extension under Rule 26.3.
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