Karem v. Board of Trustees of the Judicial Form Retirement System

293 S.W.3d 401, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 62, 2009 WL 1347497
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedMay 15, 2009
Docket2007-CA-002035-MR
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 293 S.W.3d 401 (Karem v. Board of Trustees of the Judicial Form Retirement System) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Karem v. Board of Trustees of the Judicial Form Retirement System, 293 S.W.3d 401, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 62, 2009 WL 1347497 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Opinion

OPINION

MOORE, Judge.

Former State Senator David K. Karem appeals from an opinion and order of the Franklin Circuit Court denying his request for a declaratory judgment. His cause of action is based on a dispute with the Board of Trustees of the Kentucky Judicial Form Retirement System’s calculation of his retirement benefits. 2 He contends the circuit court and the Board erred in the application of law to his case. The facts of this matter are not disputed. Upon review, we affirm.

Senator Karem served in the General Assembly from January 1972 through December of 2004. When he began his public service, members of the General Assembly had no retirement plan unique to them. They were, however, eligible to participate in the Kentucky Employees’ Retirement System (KERS). Senator Karem elected to participate in the KERS.

In 1980, the General Assembly enacted Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 6.500 to 6.577, the Kentucky Legislators’ Retirement Plan (LRP). Senator Karem participated in the LRP at its inception and transferred his prior legislative service credit with KERS to the LRP. Senator Karem contributed to the LRP a sum equal to five percent of his assumed legislative salary of $27,500, pursuant to KRS 6.520(3).

During the 1994 session of the General Assembly, KRS 21.360, which was made applicable to the LRP by operation of KRS 6.525, was amended to provide that contributions would terminate once a member reached a benefit level of 100 percent of final compensation. Senator Karem reached the 100 percent benefit level set forth in KRS 6.520 on July 15, 1994. Consequently, at that time, his contributions to LRP ceased.

*403 Senator Karem’s personal contributions while he participated in KERS from January 1, 1972, through June 1980, were $4,486.00. These were transferred to the LRP once it was established in 1980. His personal contributions to the LRP from July 1, 1980, through July 15, 1994, were $18,592.50. Thus, his total personal contributions to the LRP were $28,078.50, which was the amount based on the 5 percent formula of his assumed legislative salary. The Commonwealth made contributions pursuant to the governing formula. 3

In July of 1994, Senator Karem became the Executive Director of the Waterfront Development Corporation, an affiliate of the City of Louisville, at a salary of $142,026.50. In this position, he was eligible to participate in the County Employees’ Retirement System (CERS), administered by the Kentucky Retirement System. At the same time, he continued to serve in the Senate but was no longer contributing to the LRP. 4 He worked in this position until his retirement on January 1, 2005. Senator Karem later returned to this position on February 1, 2005.

In the fall of 2004, Senator Karem made a request to the Executive Director of the Board, Donna Stockton-Early, for a description of his retirement benefits, including his monthly pension calculation. Early determined that based on the assumed salary of $27,500, as set forth in KRS 6.520, 5 for General Assembly members adjusted for cost-of-living, Senator Karem would receive a monthly pension of $2,825.26. Upon receiving this calculation, he requested that the Board reconsider his pension and specifically asked that his final compensation earned under CERS ($142,-026.50) be used for purposes of determining his pension. The Board declined to reconsider its calculation, deciding that Senator Karem’s pension should be calculated based the assumed salary of $27,500 for members of the General Assembly as his final compensation.

Senator Karem then sought relief in the Franklin Circuit Court in the form of a declaratory judgment. The court agreed with the Board’s calculation of benefits, and Senator Karem thereafter timely appealed the decision to this Court.

The statutes cited to us by the parties are certainly no model of clarity. Our having worked through the maze of statutes and amendments regarding the various retirement systems puts in perspective the parties’ contrary views of this case and the law. This is more evident given the deposition testimony of William P. Hanes, the Executive Director of the Kentucky Retirement Systems, as compared to the deposition testimony of Donna Stockton-Early. Hanes agrees with Senator Kar-em’s view of his pension benefit, while Early, who oversees the LRP, supplied the calculations upon which the Board relies.

Our obligation is to attempt to ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly’s intent from the language found in the statutes, if possible. KRS 446.080(1); Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 136 S.W.3d 442, 445 (Ky.2004). Generally, a statute is open to construction only if its language is *404 ambiguous. If the language is clear and the application of its plain meaning would not lead to an absurd result, then further interpretation is unnecessary. Overnite Transp. Co. v. Gaddis, 793 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Ky.App.1990). When, however, a statute is ambiguous and its meaning uncertain, the legislative intent should be determined by considering the whole statute and the purpose to be accomplished. Dep’t of Motor Transp. v. City Bus Co., 252 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Ky.1952). Additionally, when there is an apparent inconsistency between two statutes, the general rule of statutory construction instructs that the specific provision take precedence over the general. Commonwealth v. Phon, 17 S.W.3d 106, 107 (Ky.2000). “When a court construes statutory provisions, it must presume that the legislature did not intend an absurd result.” Workforce Development Cabinet v. Gaines, 276 S.W.3d 789 (Ky.2008) (internal marks and citations omitted).

No one disagrees that the LRP is a defined benefit plan. Pursuant to the LRP, Senator Karem was promised a specific monthly benefit at retirement based on an assumed salary. The Supreme Court of Kentucky described the LRP as:

a defined benefit plan because retired legislators are entitled to receive benefits based on a formula from a general retirement fund with no ownership right to an individually maintained retirement account.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
293 S.W.3d 401, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 62, 2009 WL 1347497, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/karem-v-board-of-trustees-of-the-judicial-form-retirement-system-kyctapp-2009.