NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1358-18T4
KARALYN ROSENBLUM,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MARK ROSENBLUM,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted May 12, 2020 - Decided July 13, 2020
Before Judges Accurso and Rose.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County, Docket No. FM-18-0824-17.
Siragusa Law Firm, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Lynette Siragusa, of counsel and on the briefs).
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Mark Rosenblum appeals from a final judgment of divorce,
contending the provisions of the judgment permitting his ex-wife, plaintiff Karalyn Rosenblum, to retain her 403(b) retirement account, denying him
alimony and awarding plaintiff $142,769 in attorney's fees "were so manifestly
unsupported by the relevant and credible evidence presented during trial that
they must be modified." Plaintiff, through counsel, has advised us of her
position that there was no error, and that she would not participate in the
appeal, being content to rely on the trial record. Having reviewed that record,
we find defendant's arguments to be entirely without merit, requiring no
extended discussion here. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Accordingly, we affirm,
substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge McDonald's thorough and
thoughtful opinion from the bench on October 15, 2018.
The relevant facts are set out at length in Judge McDonald's opinion and
there is no need to recount them here. We note only that the parties are both
college educated, married in their thirties when both were established in
careers and have no children. Their marriage lasted eight years and eleven
months. Besides seeking open duration alimony, defendant also asserted a
$10,000,000 Tevis1 claim arising out of a domestic violence incident that
ultimately ended in the parties' agreeing to civil restraints — running both
ways. Defendant dismissed his Tevis claim shortly before a scheduled
1 Tevis v. Tevis, 79 N.J. 422 (1979). A-1358-18T4 2 independent medical exam, but not before plaintiff was forced to hire personal
injury counsel and an expert to defend the claim.
The issues for trial centered on defendant's alimony claim, distribution
of their retirement accounts and counsel fees. Plaintiff, who had been living
with her parents during the divorce, also had several smaller claims related to
defendant's failure to maintain the marital home where he continued to live,
pay his share of its carrying costs and comply with court orders requiring its
sale. Defendant abandoned his claim that the parties owed $50,000 to his
parents after plaintiff issued subpoenas compelling their appearance at trial.
One of the parties' rare points of agreement in the case was that
defendant had a long-standing gambling problem. Plaintiff maintained she
only learned of it, however, a year into the marriage when defendant was
forced to confess he owed $30,000 to his bookie. Defendant claimed he'd told
her about his addiction long before they married. Defendant restarted his
attendance at Gamblers Anonymous meetings, and plaintiff got very involved
in a related program for the families of gamblers. There was no dispute that as
a result of advice they received in these programs, plaintiff became the one
primarily responsible for the parties' finances. Plaintiff's role in that regard
was central to two important disputes at trial, defendant's failure to file a
A-1358-18T4 3 meaningful case information statement, he claimed because he had had no
knowledge of the parties' finances and, more important, the losses in
defendant's retirement account.
In her opening, plaintiff's counsel acknowledged plaintiff's central role
in controlling the couple's money in an effort to protect their assets, but
contended those efforts were insufficient to preserve defendant's 401(k), which
he dissipated by engaging in risky options trading. Counsel catalogued what
she characterized as defendant's many bad faith actions "which have prolonged
this case unnecessarily, . . . caused the expenditure of literally $150,000 in
counsel and expert fees for [plaintiff] and which continue to . . . prevent the
reasonable resolution of the issues in this case." Chief among counsel's
complaints was defendant's pursuit of "open-durational alimony on an eight-
year marriage," when he was capable of maintaining himself at the standard of
the marriage and was "in a relationship that is tantamount to marriage" with
another woman "and, in fact, engaged in a religious ceremony" with her,
commemorated on the internet wedding site, "The Knot."
Defendant's counsel countered that plaintiff was using her and her
family's "financial might to whittle this man down to nothing." While
conceding defendant out-earned plaintiff in the early years of their marriage,
A-1358-18T4 4 counsel contended it was not true when they separated. Defense counsel
argued defendant needed alimony because of his inability to become
reemployed in the financial sector after he was fired for going to the FBI with
information that his employer was violating insider-trading laws.
As to plaintiff's claims that defendant dissipated his retirement account,
defendant's counsel contended it was "much to do about nothing." Defense
counsel argued in his opening that defendant "didn't intentionally throw away
the money," or take "it to Las Vegas and gamble[] it away at the craps table."
Instead, counsel argued defendant "actively traded with full working
knowledge of [plaintiff]." Counsel contended defendant "was trying to make
investments and you will hear testimony that he thought he was investing it
properly or wisely and the investments just didn't make money. They lost
money. That's what happens with investing."
But that was not the testimony the court heard. Instead, defendant
denied that he was responsible for the trading losses in that account. He
testified that plaintiff and her father traded in his 401(k), although providing
no proof of that, and swore he had "never traded [options] in [his] life."
Defendant also denied having married his girlfriend, although he identified
several photographs in evidence of himself, his girlfriend and her family at a
A-1358-18T4 5 formal function attended by over fifty guests, including one posted with a
caption congratulating them on their "great wedding." Defendant
acknowledged that he and his girlfriend had participated in a religious
ceremony on that occasion, which was presided over by a cleric, but claimed
he didn't understand Arabic and thus didn't "know what was said." He denied
"sign[ing] anything."
After seven days of trial, in which the parties, plaintiff's father and her
employability expert all testified, and the court admitted hundreds of pages of
exhibits, the trial court placed a meticulously detailed decision on the record
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1358-18T4
KARALYN ROSENBLUM,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MARK ROSENBLUM,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted May 12, 2020 - Decided July 13, 2020
Before Judges Accurso and Rose.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County, Docket No. FM-18-0824-17.
Siragusa Law Firm, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Lynette Siragusa, of counsel and on the briefs).
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Mark Rosenblum appeals from a final judgment of divorce,
contending the provisions of the judgment permitting his ex-wife, plaintiff Karalyn Rosenblum, to retain her 403(b) retirement account, denying him
alimony and awarding plaintiff $142,769 in attorney's fees "were so manifestly
unsupported by the relevant and credible evidence presented during trial that
they must be modified." Plaintiff, through counsel, has advised us of her
position that there was no error, and that she would not participate in the
appeal, being content to rely on the trial record. Having reviewed that record,
we find defendant's arguments to be entirely without merit, requiring no
extended discussion here. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Accordingly, we affirm,
substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge McDonald's thorough and
thoughtful opinion from the bench on October 15, 2018.
The relevant facts are set out at length in Judge McDonald's opinion and
there is no need to recount them here. We note only that the parties are both
college educated, married in their thirties when both were established in
careers and have no children. Their marriage lasted eight years and eleven
months. Besides seeking open duration alimony, defendant also asserted a
$10,000,000 Tevis1 claim arising out of a domestic violence incident that
ultimately ended in the parties' agreeing to civil restraints — running both
ways. Defendant dismissed his Tevis claim shortly before a scheduled
1 Tevis v. Tevis, 79 N.J. 422 (1979). A-1358-18T4 2 independent medical exam, but not before plaintiff was forced to hire personal
injury counsel and an expert to defend the claim.
The issues for trial centered on defendant's alimony claim, distribution
of their retirement accounts and counsel fees. Plaintiff, who had been living
with her parents during the divorce, also had several smaller claims related to
defendant's failure to maintain the marital home where he continued to live,
pay his share of its carrying costs and comply with court orders requiring its
sale. Defendant abandoned his claim that the parties owed $50,000 to his
parents after plaintiff issued subpoenas compelling their appearance at trial.
One of the parties' rare points of agreement in the case was that
defendant had a long-standing gambling problem. Plaintiff maintained she
only learned of it, however, a year into the marriage when defendant was
forced to confess he owed $30,000 to his bookie. Defendant claimed he'd told
her about his addiction long before they married. Defendant restarted his
attendance at Gamblers Anonymous meetings, and plaintiff got very involved
in a related program for the families of gamblers. There was no dispute that as
a result of advice they received in these programs, plaintiff became the one
primarily responsible for the parties' finances. Plaintiff's role in that regard
was central to two important disputes at trial, defendant's failure to file a
A-1358-18T4 3 meaningful case information statement, he claimed because he had had no
knowledge of the parties' finances and, more important, the losses in
defendant's retirement account.
In her opening, plaintiff's counsel acknowledged plaintiff's central role
in controlling the couple's money in an effort to protect their assets, but
contended those efforts were insufficient to preserve defendant's 401(k), which
he dissipated by engaging in risky options trading. Counsel catalogued what
she characterized as defendant's many bad faith actions "which have prolonged
this case unnecessarily, . . . caused the expenditure of literally $150,000 in
counsel and expert fees for [plaintiff] and which continue to . . . prevent the
reasonable resolution of the issues in this case." Chief among counsel's
complaints was defendant's pursuit of "open-durational alimony on an eight-
year marriage," when he was capable of maintaining himself at the standard of
the marriage and was "in a relationship that is tantamount to marriage" with
another woman "and, in fact, engaged in a religious ceremony" with her,
commemorated on the internet wedding site, "The Knot."
Defendant's counsel countered that plaintiff was using her and her
family's "financial might to whittle this man down to nothing." While
conceding defendant out-earned plaintiff in the early years of their marriage,
A-1358-18T4 4 counsel contended it was not true when they separated. Defense counsel
argued defendant needed alimony because of his inability to become
reemployed in the financial sector after he was fired for going to the FBI with
information that his employer was violating insider-trading laws.
As to plaintiff's claims that defendant dissipated his retirement account,
defendant's counsel contended it was "much to do about nothing." Defense
counsel argued in his opening that defendant "didn't intentionally throw away
the money," or take "it to Las Vegas and gamble[] it away at the craps table."
Instead, counsel argued defendant "actively traded with full working
knowledge of [plaintiff]." Counsel contended defendant "was trying to make
investments and you will hear testimony that he thought he was investing it
properly or wisely and the investments just didn't make money. They lost
money. That's what happens with investing."
But that was not the testimony the court heard. Instead, defendant
denied that he was responsible for the trading losses in that account. He
testified that plaintiff and her father traded in his 401(k), although providing
no proof of that, and swore he had "never traded [options] in [his] life."
Defendant also denied having married his girlfriend, although he identified
several photographs in evidence of himself, his girlfriend and her family at a
A-1358-18T4 5 formal function attended by over fifty guests, including one posted with a
caption congratulating them on their "great wedding." Defendant
acknowledged that he and his girlfriend had participated in a religious
ceremony on that occasion, which was presided over by a cleric, but claimed
he didn't understand Arabic and thus didn't "know what was said." He denied
"sign[ing] anything."
After seven days of trial, in which the parties, plaintiff's father and her
employability expert all testified, and the court admitted hundreds of pages of
exhibits, the trial court placed a meticulously detailed decision on the record
addressing each claim of both parties. The court took particular care in
explaining its credibility findings, noting those findings strongly influenced its
decision on several substantive claims. While finding plaintiff and her father
provided clear and credible testimony, the court found defendant "told one lie
after another, . . . [s]ome . . . so blatant that it was clear [defendant was]
making it up right as [he was] testifying." Critically, the court concluded
defendant "shifted [his] positions on the important issues in this case at each
and every turn."
Specifically, the court detailed six instances in which it found
defendant's testimony demonstrably, and deliberately, false, including his
A-1358-18T4 6 testimony about his gambling during the course of the marriage and the trading
losses in his 401(k). Regarding the 401(k), the court addressed defendant
directly, saying
[y]ou sat there while your lawyer . . . gave an opening statement after consulting with you where you said that it was your strategy, you did the trading, and it shouldn't be held against you because it was a good strategy but it was unfortunate you lost the money. You sat there while he said that. You went a couple days later and took the stand, swore to tell me the truth, and now you claimed that . . . your wife and her father traded in that account. There was absolutely no proof of that and it was very credible proof that you did it.
The court noted that account went from more than $200,000 to less than
$500 in less than two-and-one-half years, and that the percentage of traded
options grew from 9.3 to 92.9 over the same period. It referenced a monthly
statement for the same account, in evidence, consisting of over one hundred
pages, twenty pages of account positions on a day-to-day basis, and another
eighty pages of account activities, reflecting $570,000 traded in one month.
The court noted that "[n]obody else is listed on the account," and, that
although defendant "testified [he] had no knowledge of options," he worked in
the financial services industry and previously held a Series 7 general securities
representative license and a Series 63 uniform securities agent license.
A-1358-18T4 7 As for defendant's testimony regarding whether he had married his
girlfriend in a religious ceremony, the court found that while it could not make
a finding that defendant had actually married, "the bridal pictures and the rings
and the announcements, the religious ceremony," led it to conclude defendant
may well have "remarried" in some fashion prior to his divorce from plaintiff.
Underscoring the mutual duty divorcing spouses have "to deal fairly
with each other," see Tannen vs. Tannen, 416 N.J. Super. 248, 262 (App. Div.
2010), aff’d, 208 N.J. 409 (2011), the court found defendant had breached that
duty by acting "with utter contempt and complete disdain for his obligations as
a litigant." The court noted that while "[i]t is the very rare case when the need
for a trial is caused by one party alone, . . . [t]his is such a case." The court
pointedly found that plaintiff "was forced to endure the trial solely because of
the bad faith of . . . defendant" in taking "outrageous, unconscionable"
positions "devoid of legal and factual support," including his "specious" Tevis
claim, his "demand for open-durational alimony on a nine-year marriage," his
"fictitious claim of $50,000 in debt to [his] parents, and his claim that plaintiff
and her father "gambled away [his] $200,000 IRA."
There is no doubt that Judge McDonald resorted to very strong language
in condemning defendant's bad faith conduct in the litigation. But having now
A-1358-18T4 8 reviewed the entire record ourselves, we reject defendant's claim that the judge
"allowed his negative personal opinion" of defendant "cloud his judgment."
That the judge found defendant an unreliable witness who repeatedly offered
testimony the judge found not credible does not equate to bias. See Strahan v.
Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 318 (App. Div. 2008) (noting "[b]ias cannot be
inferred from adverse rulings against a party"). To the contrary, our review
convinces us the trial judge's findings have ample support in the credible
evidence in the trial record, and are thus binding on appeal. See Cesare v.
Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998) (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs
Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).
The court simply applied well-settled law to the facts as it found them.
We are satisfied that in dividing the parties' marital assets, the court properly
exercised its broad authority to make "the most equitable allocation between
the parties after analysis of the statutory factors set forth N.J.S.A. 2A:34 -
23.1." Genovese v. Genovese, 392 N.J. Super. 215, 225-26 (App. Div. 2007).
We, likewise, find no error in the court having denied defendant alimony on
the proofs presented at trial, see Reid v. Reid, 310 N.J. Super. 12, 22 (App.
Div. 1998), or in awarding plaintiff significant attorney's fees in accordance
A-1358-18T4 9 with Rule 5:3-5(c), see Eaton v. Grau, 368 N.J. Super. 215, 225 (App. Div.
2004).
In short, we affirm, substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge
McDonald's detailed and comprehensive opinion delivered from the bench on
October 15, 2018.
Affirmed.
A-1358-18T4 10