Kara Jane Steinmeyer v. Tristan Couvares, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: December 18, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-00258
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 KARA JANE STEINMEYER, Case No. 3:25-cv-00258-MMD-CLB

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 TRISTAN COUVARES, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 I. SUMMARY 12 Plaintiff Kara Jane Steinmeyer brings this action against Defendant Tristan 13 Couvares (“Defendant”), asserting various state law claims arising from an allegedly 14 exploitative, non-monogamous dating relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant. (ECF 15 No. 9 (“FAC”).) Defendant, appearing pro se, filed a motion to dismiss.1 (ECF No. 14 16 (“Motion”).) For the reasons explained below, the Court grants the Motion. 17 II. BACKGROUND2 18 Plaintiff is a single mother of three living in Incline Village, Nevada, who was 19 diagnosed with Multiple Sclerosis (“MS”) as a teenager. (ECF No. 9 at 4.) Despite her 20 diagnosis, she scored in the 98th percentile of her GED, owned and operated a business 21 for seven years, and has now worked in tech recruiting for the last ten years. (Id.) She 22 and Defendant first met in 2019 while both parties were on contract working in technical 23 recruiting services. (Id. at 6.) That same year, Defendant witnessed a physical altercation 24 between Plaintiff and her ex-boyfriend. (Id.) In December 2021, Plaintiff and Defendant 25 encountered each other again, when Defendant applied for a HR job at Plaintiff’s then- 26 27 1Plaintiff responded (ECF No. 19 (“Response”)) and Defendant replied (ECF No. 28 20 (“Reply”)). Both parties additionally filed errata. (ECF Nos. 17, 22.) 2 had recently suffered a MS relapse that resulted in a month-long hospitalization between 3 December 2021 and January 2022. (Id. at 6-7.) Defendant asked Plaintiff to fast track his 4 application, and Plaintiff felt obligated to, given their prior interactions. (Id. at 7.) 5 Defendant began to correspond with Plaintiff daily about the open position, and 6 during their communications, Defendant disclosed that he was the primary agent and 7 executor for many of his relatives’ health care. (Id.) He falsely represented himself as the 8 owner of multiple expensive vehicles, the advisor to multiple businesses, and as being 9 involved in various companies from which he would receive commissions. (Id.) 10 In February 2022, Defendant flew to Reno, Nevada, claiming that he wished to 11 help her recover from her MS relapse. (Id.) After he arrived, he was informed by Plaintiff’s 12 employer that he was ineligible for the open position due to the results of his background 13 check. (Id. at 8.) From January 2022 through April 2024, Plaintiff and Defendant were 14 involved in a “non-monogamous dating relationship” and Defendant also served as a 15 caretaker during Plaintiff’s medical recovery at times. (Id. at 5.) Defendant lived with 16 Plaintiff for a few weeks at a time, and spent holidays, birthdays, and special occasions 17 with her. (Id.) During this time, Defendant allegedly manipulated, exploited, and defrauded 18 Plaintiff in various ways explained below. 19 In March 2022, Defendant drove Plaintiff to help her complete an errand, and they 20 got in an accident while he was driving. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff was only a passenger. (Id.) 21 Defendant asked Plaintiff to claim that she was driving the car, so that he would not be 22 arrested due to an outstanding felony charge. (Id.) Plaintiff submitted a report to her 23 insurance to confirm that she had reported herself as the driver. (Id. at 9.) Defendant 24 promised that he would pay for the deductible, repairs, any increase in Plaintiff’s 25 insurance, and other costs or fees, but he never did. (Id. at 8-9.) 26 In March 2022, Defendant called Plaintiff from Los Angeles, California multiple 27 times to complain that he didn’t have money for food or transportation. (Id. at 9.) Around 28 March 18, 2022, Defendant gained access to Plaintiff’s Chase Bank account, as Plaintiff 2 repeatedly used her account for various transactions over the next two years, sometimes 3 promising to reimburse her and sometimes denying that he made transactions (Id. at 10- 4 16.) 5 In May 2022, Defendant notified Plaintiff that he had a fungal infection on his scalp. 6 (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff later caught this fungal infection because of Defendant’s nontreatment. 7 (Id.) This caused her MS to flare up, resulting in hospital bills. (Id. at 18.) 8 In August 2022, Defendant represented to Plaintiff that his friend and business 9 advisor, Jordan Clancy, said that Defendant needed to add his name to Plaintiff’s bills to 10 demonstrate residency in Nevada. He then registered his business, The Startup 11 Accelerator, Inc., which was a shell limited liability company that had not actually officially 12 opened. (Id. at 13.) This company later opened in July 2023, and Defendant did not “share 13 his proceeds with her” as he had promised. (Id. at 15.) 14 In addition to Defendant’s misrepresentations detailed above, Defendant 15 misrepresented the following: if Plaintiff lost her job, Defendant would take care of her (id. 16 at 11); he would purchase her cryptocurrency and make her his beneficiary on “all of his 17 accounts” (id.); he was a day trader (id. at 12); and he would split gambling earnings with 18 her (id. at 13). 19 In April 2024, Plaintiff was laid off and reached out to Defendant to ask about 20 previous agreements and discussions about money owed to her. After a few interactions 21 and Defendant’s offer to give her his “NCAA winnings” Defendant stopped responding. 22 (Id. at 16.) Defendant’s conduct caused Plaintiff to suffer from emotional distress which 23 resulted in Complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and she was also later diagnosed 24 with autism. (Id. at 17.) 25 Arising from these events, Plaintiff asserts seven state law claims for relief: (1) 26 negligence/negligence per se; (2) fraudulent misrepresentation; (3) breach of oral 27 28 2 emotional distress; and (7) exploitation of a vulnerable adult in violation of state law. (Id. 3 at 18-15.) 4 III. DISCUSSION 5 Defendant, appearing pro se, moves to dismiss the FAC for failure to state a claim 6 under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(a). (ECF No. 14.) See Fed. R. Civ. 7 P. 8; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (holding that to withstand 8 a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a plaintiff must allege facts to “nudge[] their claims across the 9 line from conceivable to plausible”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) 10 (holding that a district court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in a 11 complaint, while legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth). The Court 12 will address Defendant’s arguments as to each time in turn. 13 A. Negligence/Negligence Per Se 14 Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to plead a claim because the FAC does not 15 identify a specific statute that the Defendant allegedly violated, and she fails to plead that 16 Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of care that would create liability for negligence. (ECF No. 17 14 at 3.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead facts to establish 18 that the fungal infection she caught exacerbated her MS. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff, in her 19 Response, argues that she sufficiently pled her claim because the FAC alleged that: 20 (1) Mr. Couvares knowingly had a fungal infection; (2) the fungal infection was contagious; (3) Ms. Steinmeyer was exposed to the fungal infection; (4) Mr. 21 Couvares owed Ms. Steinmeyer a duty of reasonable care to avoid foreseeable harm; (5) Mr. Couvares knew that Ms. Steinmeyer had a compromised immune 22 system and was vulnerable to infection; and (6) Ms. Steinmeyer contracted the 23 same type of fungal infection as Mr. Couvares, resulting injuries to her body and person requiring extensive medical treatment. 24 25

26 3Plaintiff’s FAC alleges detrimental reliance as a cause of action and Plaintiff’s Response states that Plaintiff “goes as far as making an entirely separate claim for relief 27 under detrimental reliance.” (ECF No. 19 at 21-22.) The Court can find no authority, and Plaintiff cites to none, to support detrimental reliance as a standalone cause of action 28 under Nevada law. 2 alleges Defendant violated and argues that she is “using negligence per se to establish 3 the elements of her claim.” (Id.) Plaintiff also argues, citing to a variety of cases but none 4 from Nevada or the Ninth Circuit, that even if Defendant had no heightened duty of care, 5 courts have “consistently found that negligent transmission of infections disease as well 6 as failure to disclose a disease” are sufficient for a cause of action. (Id. at 7.) 7 A claim for negligence under Nevada law requires a plaintiff to establish “(1) the 8 existence of a duty of care, (2) breach of that duty, (3) legal causation, and (4) damages. 9 Sanchez ex rel. Sanchez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 221 P.3d 1276, 1280 (Nev. 2009). 10 “[N]egligence and negligence per se . . . are in reality only one cause of action. Negligence 11 per se is only a method of establishing the duty and breach elements of a negligence 12 claim. Cervantes v. Health Plan of Nevada, Inc., 263 P.3d 261, 264 n.4 (Nev. 2011). To 13 prevail on a negligence per se claim, “a plaintiff must prove that (1) he or she belongs to 14 a class of persons that a statute is intended to protect, (2) the plaintiff's injuries are the 15 type the statute is intended to prevent, (3) the defendant violated the statute, (4) the 16 violation was the legal cause of the plaintiff's injury, and (5) the plaintiff suffered 17 damages.” Brochu v. Foote Enters., Inc., 381 P.3d 596 (Table), 2012 WL 5991571, at *3 18 (Nev. 2012). 19 The Court generally agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim 20 because she has failed to plead sufficient facts to show that any duty was breached. 21 Plaintiff cites to no legal authority to support her claim that Defendant owed her a special 22 duty of care because Defendant promised to help her recover from her MS relapse. 23 Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff argues that other jurisdictions have found that 24 “negligent transmissions of infectious disease as well as failure to disclose a disease” are 25 sufficient to state a cause of action, Plaintiff can cite to no binding legal authority to 26 establish such a duty in this jurisdiction. And in any event, Plaintiff alleges in her FAC that 27 Defendant warned her on or about May 2, 2022 that he acquired a fungal infection on his 28 scalp. (ECF No. 9 at 11.) 2 and fungal infections. (Id. at 16.) As Plaintiff argues in her Response, “In Nevada, 3 proximate cause is defined as ‘any cause which in natural [foreseeable] and continuous 4 sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury complained 5 of and without which the result would not have occurred.’” Taylor v. Silva, 615 P.2d 970, 6 971 (Nev. 1980). (ECF No. 19 at 8.) But nowhere in the FAC can the Court discern even 7 basic information, such as when Plaintiff acquired the fungal infection and when her 8 existing medical conditions were exacerbated, from which the Court could find causation. 9 As to Plaintiff’s negligence per se claim, Plaintiff suggests in her Response that 10 Defendant violated NRS § 441A.180 as the basis of her negligence per se claim. 11 Defendant argues in his Reply that this is “an improper attempt to amend the pleadings 12 through a response brief” and that the statute does not create a private right of action. 13 (ECF No. 20 at 3.) The Court agrees. Plaintiff has failed to mention any statute on the 14 face of the FAC. Moreover, as a matter of law, the Court finds it unlikely that Plaintiff can 15 successfully argue that NRS § 441A.180 can be used to assert her private civil action. 16 See Doe v. Mozer, No. 2:16-cv-00210-KJD-VCF, 2016 WL 3452489, at *4 (D. Nev. June 17 21, 2016) (granting motion to dismiss on negligence per se claim because “there is no 18 indication the legislature intended NRS 441A.180 to be enforced through private civil 19 actions.”). 20 The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for negligence or negligence 21 per se. 22 B. Fraudulent Misrepresentation 23 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim fails to meet 24 the heightened particularity standard required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 25 (ECF No. 14 at 4.) Plaintiff counters that she met her burden because she adequately 26 specified the time, location, specific content, and identities of the parties to the 27 misrepresentation. (ECF No. 19 at 9.) 28 2 defendant; (2) defendant's knowledge or belief that the representation is false (or 3 insufficient basis for making the representation); (3) defendant's intention to induce the 4 plaintiff to act or to refrain from acting in reliance upon the misrepresentation; (4) plaintiff's 5 justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation; and (5) damage to the plaintiff resulting 6 from such reliance.” Bulbman, Inc. v. Nevada Bell, 825 P.2d 588, 592 (Nev. 1992). 7 Moreover, pleading fraud with particularity under Rule 9 requires “an account of the ‘time, 8 place, and specific content of the false representations, as well as the identities of the 9 parties to the misrepresentations.’” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 10 2007). 11 Here, the allegations in the FAC are not sufficiently particular to plead a claim for 12 fraudulent misrepresentation. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant and Clancy had falsely 13 represented a “business relationship that could serve as guarantor for [Defendant]” but 14 provides no further information.4 (ECF No. 9 at 19.) Nor does Plaintiff allege with 15 specificity what other false representations Defendant made, besides generally that “he 16 would share the proceeds” of the Startup Accelerator, Inc. and that he represented that 17 he has listed her as a beneficiary on “all accounts, payable on death.” (ECF No. 9 at 14.) 18 These allegations are overly general and do not address the “specific content” of the 19 representations—for example, what sort of proceeds or accounts. Plaintiff does not allege 20 the time these representations were made—to the best of its ability, the Court can only 21 tell that this may have happened sometime after August 2022—nor does Plaintiff allege 22 where these representations were made. The Court finds that Plaintiff has not met her 23 burden under Rule 9(a) and has failed to state a claim. 24 25 26 4Indeed, Plaintiff’s FAC is not even clear as to who is advising whom in this alleged 27 business relationship. In the same paragraph, Plaintiff alleges both that “Mr. Clancy became [Defendant]’s closest financial and legal advisor,” and also that “[Defendant] 28 advised Mr. Clancy. . .” (ECF No. 9 at 13.) 2 Defendant argues in his Motion that the terms of the alleged oral contract are 3 unenforceable because they are indefinite, and because they are barred by the Nevada 4 Statute of Frauds. (ECF No. 14 at 5.) Plaintiff counters that Defendant misunderstands 5 the total amount she claims and that the Statute of Frauds does not bar her claims 6 because she can invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel. (ECF No. 19 at 9-10.) 7 Here, the Court need not consider either of the parties’ arguments because the 8 Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim for relief is not cognizable. It is long established that 9 “Courts will not lend their aid to enforce illegal contracts or actions grounded upon immoral 10 or illegal acts.” Drexler v. Tyrrell, 15 Nev. 114, 131 (1880) (collecting cases); see also 11 Vincent v. Santa Cruz, 647 P.2d 379, 381 (Nev. 1982) (“Generally, contracts made in 12 contravention of the law do not create a right of action.”) Plaintiff’s claim for breach of oral 13 contract arises from the spring 2022 car accident, after which Plaintiff, at Defendant’s 14 direction, falsely reported to her insurance company that she was driving the car at the 15 time of the accident in exchange for Defendant’s promise to reimburse her for the cost of 16 the deductible, repairs, and any differential in the cost of insurance. (ECF No. 9 at 20-21.) 17 In asking the Court to enforce this oral agreement, Plaintiff effectively asks the Court to 18 enforce the parties’ oral agreement to commit auto insurance fraud. The Court finds that 19 even if such an agreement was formed, it would be void due to illegality. The Court thus 20 finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 21 D. Promissory Estoppel 22 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim fails because the FAC failed to allege a clear 23 and definite promise, and because any reliance Plaintiff put in Defendant was 24 unreasonable in light of the Defendant’s “red flags.” ECF No. 14 at 5.) Plaintiff counters 25 in her Response that the promise was sufficiently clear because “[Defendant] specifically 26 promised to repay the funds that he borrowed and to reimburse [Plaintiff] for vehicle 27 damages and increased insurance costs.” (ECF No 19. at 10). 28 2 estopped must be apprised of the true facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be 3 acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting estoppel has the right to believe it was 4 so intended; (3) the party asserting the estoppel must be ignorant of the true state of facts; 5 (4) he must have relied to his detriment on the conduct of the party to be estopped.’” 6 Torres v. Nev. Direct Ins. Co., 353 P.3d 1203, 1209 (Nev. 2015) (quoting Pink v. Busch, 7 691 P.2d 456, 459-60 (Nev. 1984)). The promise giving rise to a cause of action for 8 promissory estoppel must be “clear and definite, unambiguous as to essential terms, and 9 the promise must be made in a contractual sense.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 10 citation omitted). 11 The Court generally agrees with Defendant. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to 12 base her promissory estoppel claim on the parties’ alleged oral agreement to commit 13 insurance fraud, the Court dismisses this claim for reasons stated supra. And to the extent 14 that Plaintiff’s claim is based on Defendant’s promise to “be reimbursed and/or looked 15 after in the future,” the Court finds that Plaintiff has not stated a promise that is clear or 16 definite, nor unambiguous as to essential terms. (ECF No. 9 at 21-22.) For example, 17 Plaintiff alleges in her FAC that Defendant promise “he would take care of her” if she lost 18 her job (ECF No. 9 at 11) and that Defendant “repeatedly made promises to reimburse 19 [Plaintiff]” for various expenses made using Plaintiff’s Chase Bank account (id. at 10). 20 However, none of these promises are sufficiently clear or definite. The Court thus finds 21 that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. 22 E. Unjust Enrichment 23 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim fails because the FAC pleads an express 24 contract which renders quasi-contract claims implausible, and that the claim must also be 25 dismissed because it is duplicative of other claims. (ECF No. 14 at 5.) Plaintiff counters 26 in her Response that there was no written contract, so the claim is not barred. (ECF No. 27 19 at 11.) 28 2 the defendant appreciates such benefit, and there is acceptance and retention by the 3 defendant of such benefit under circumstances such that it would be inequitable for him 4 to retain the benefit without payment of the value thereof.” Korte Constr. Co. v. State on 5 Rel. of Bd. of Regents of Nevada Sys. of Higher Educ., 492 P.3d 540, 543 (Nev. 2021) 6 (en banc) (internal citation and quotation omitted). But “the person conferring the benefit 7 must have a reasonable expectation of payment and the circumstances are such that 8 equity and good conscience require payment for the conferred benefit.” Id. 9 Plaintiff is correct that she does not allege the existence of an express contract 10 and therefore Defendant’s argument that the claim must be dismissed is untenable. 11 However, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to show that she 12 had any reasonable expectation of payment from Defendant for these alleged loans. On 13 the contrary, the facts Plaintiff alleges seem to show that Plaintiff provided Defendant with 14 access to her bank account, and Plaintiff repeatedly gave him money for a business that 15 she knew did not exist and likely was improperly managed and money for basic living 16 expenses and sundries. 17 For example, in March 2022, Plaintiff changed her Chase Bank privacy and 18 security settings to allow Defendant access to her accounts, and Defendant “guaranteed 19 money would only be spent on food and Uber rides.” (ECF No. 9 at 9-10.) In April 2022, 20 Defendant was still using Plaintiff’s bank account and stated that he needed financial 21 assistance because he was not gainfully employed and had an outstanding felony 22 warrant. (Id. at 10.) Still in May 2022, he claimed that he was a day trader and investing 23 money obtained from her, while also requesting financial help for his day-to-day living 24 expenses. (Id. at 12.) Sometime in or after June 2022, he gambled money using funds 25 from Plaintiff and lost the winnings “somewhere in the neighborhood.” (Id. at 13.) At 26 another point in time, Defendant claimed his brother took his debit card, so he needed 27 money from Plaintiff. (Id. at 15.) 28 2 upon Defendant and Defendant appreciated such a benefit, the Court cannot find under 3 these circumstances that Plaintiff has adequately pled factual allegations to make 4 plausible that she had any reasonable expectation of the return of her funds. 5 However, the Court cannot find that amendment is futile because Plaintiff may 6 plausibly allege how her expectation of payment was reasonable despite Defendant’s 7 alleged repeated failures to repay her. Accordingly, the Court dismisses this claim without 8 prejudice and with leave to amend. 9 F. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) 10 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s IIED claim fails because even accepting the 11 allegations as true, the conduct does not meet the “extreme and outrageous” level 12 required under Nevada law. (ECF No. 14 at 5.) Defendant argues that while the FAC 13 alleges a toxic and manipulative romantic relationship with financial disputes, Plaintiff has 14 not alleged facts sufficient to state an actionable IIED claim. (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff counters 15 in her Reply generally that Defendant attempts to “minimize the parties’ business 16 relationship.” (ECF No. at 11.) 17 To state a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) extreme and outrageous 18 conduct with either the intention of, or reckless disregard for, causing emotional distress, 19 (2) the plaintiff’s having suffered severe or extreme emotional distress, and (3) actual or 20 proximate causation.” Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Beckwith, 989 P.2d 882, 886 (Nev. 21 1999). Extreme and outrageous conduct is that which is “outside all possible bounds of 22 human decency and is regarded as utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Maduike 23 v. Agency Rent-A-Car, 953 P.2d 24, 26 (Nev. 1998). 24 The Court generally agrees with Defendant. As an initial matter, while the FAC 25 raises many factual allegations regarding Defendant, Plaintiff fails to specify which 26 allegations give rise to her IIED claim. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant engaged in 27 numerous acts, including crashing her vehicle, giving her a fungal infection, and making 28 a series of financial misrepresentations, but does not specify which caused her to suffer 2 was unsavory, none of the behavior Plaintiff alleges rises to the level as “outside all 3 possible bounds of human decency” or is “utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” 4 Maduike, 953 P.2d at 26. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim. 5 G. Exploitation of a Vulnerable Adult 6 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim brought under NRS § 200.5092(8). 7 Defendant argues that Plaintiff merely lists off diagnoses of MS, Autism, ADHD, and 8 PTSD without alleging any impairments during the relevant period. (ECF No. 14 at 6.) He 9 further argues that Plaintiff failed to plead “exploitation” under NRS § 200.5092(3) and 10 that the claim is time barred. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff counters that “MS isn’t just a one and done 11 kind of thing,” and that she sufficiently pled a relationship of “trust and confidence” for her 12 claim. (ECF No. 19 at 12.) Plaintiff also argues that due to the discovery rule, Plaintiff 13 could not have learned that she was exploited until April 2024, and equitable tolling should 14 apply. (Id. at 13.) 15 The Court generally agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for 16 which relief could be granted. Plaintiff has cited in an inapposite section of law. Plaintiff’s 17 cause of action—abuse of a vulnerable person under NRS § 200.5092—is improper 18 because Plaintiff cites to a criminal law that provides Plaintiff no private cause of action 19 and Plaintiff has cited to no legal authority stating otherwise. Because the Court agrees 20 that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted, the Court will 21 dismiss this claim. 22 IV. CONCLUSION 23 The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several 24 cases not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and 25 determines that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the 26 motions before the Court. 27 It is therefore ordered that Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 14) is granted. 28 The Court dismisses the claims with prejudice except as to the unjust enrichment claim. 1 || As to that claim, dismissal is without prejudice and with leave to amend. Plaintiff is given 2 || leave to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies of her unjust enrichment claim 3 || within 30 days. Failure to timely file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies of her 4 || unjust enrichment claim will result in dismissal of this claim with prejudice. 5 DATED THIS 18" Day of December 2025. 6

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