Kapshandy v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Arkansas
DecidedJanuary 29, 2024
Docket2:23-cv-02038
StatusUnknown

This text of Kapshandy v. Social Security Administration Commissioner (Kapshandy v. Social Security Administration Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kapshandy v. Social Security Administration Commissioner, (W.D. Ark. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS FORT SMITH DIVISION

DAVID K. KAPSHANDY, II PLAINTIFF

V. Civil No. 2:23-cv-02038-PKH-MEF

MARTIN O’MALLEY, Commissioner, Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff, David Kapshandy, II, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”) denying his claim for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (hereinafter “the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In this judicial review, the Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the Commissioner’s decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). I. Procedural Background Plaintiff filed his application for DIB on January 14, 2020, alleging disability since January 1, 2015, due to anxiety, degenerative disk disease (“DDD”), difficulty swallowing, breathing problems, migraines, carpal tunnel syndrome (“CTS”), sleep apnea, restless leg syndrome (“RLS”), and failed bunion surgeries on both feet. (ECF No. 7, pp. 77, 102, 210-216, 256-257, 274, 304-305, 315-316). An administrative hearing was held on December 22, 2021. (Id. at 42- 74). The Plaintiff was both present and represented by counsel. Born in March of 1966, Plaintiff was 48 years old on his alleged onset date and possessed a General Equivalency Diploma. (ECF No. 7, pp. 76, 101, 275). He had past relevant work (“PRW”) experience as a service writer, coal miner, and supply controller during the 15 years preceding his alleged onset date. (Id. at 261-268). And, although it did not rise to the level of substantial gainful activity, the Plaintiff continued to perform some work through 2018. (Id. at 19, 217-233, 283-295). On January 27, 2022, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Bill Jones determined that the Plaintiff met insured status requirements through June 30, 2022. (ECF No. 7, p. 19). The ALJ then identified Plaintiff’s DDD, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”), migraines,

anxiety, and depression as severe impairments, but concluded the Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id. at 20). Despite his impairments, ALJ Jones found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform medium work with no concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants such as fumes, odors, dust, gases, and poor ventilation. (Id. at 25). From a mental perspective, he further concluded the Plaintiff’s interpersonal contact must be incidental, the complexity of the tasks must be learned and performed by rote with few variables and little judgment, and the supervision required must be simple, direct, and concrete. With the assistance of a vocational expert (“VE”), ALJ Jones

determined Plaintiff could perform work as hand packager, machine tender, and conveyor off bearer. (Id. at 35). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on January 26, 2023. (ECF No. 7, pp. 6-11). Plaintiff subsequently filed this action on March 17, 2023. (ECF No. 3). Both parties have filed appeal briefs (ECF Nos. 9, 11), and the matter is ready for Report and Recommendation. II. Applicable Law This Court’s role is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s findings. Vossen v. Astrue, 612 F.3d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 2010). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). We must affirm the ALJ’s decision if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Blackburn v. Colvin, 761 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2014). If there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because

the Court would have decided the case differently. Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477 (8th Cir. 2015). In other words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, we must affirm the ALJ’s decision. Id. A claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of proving his disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one year and that prevents him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Act defines “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological

abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). A Plaintiff must show that his disability, not simply his impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months. The Commissioner’s regulations require him to apply a five-step sequential evaluation process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since filing his claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal an impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy given his age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The fact finder only considers Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in the light of his RFC if the final stage of the analysis is reached. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). III. Discussion Of particular concern to the undersigned is the ALJ’s determination that the Plaintiff could

perform a range of medium work with environmental restrictions. RFC is the most a person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. Although a disability claimant has the burden of establishing his RFC, the ALJ must base said RFC on all relevant evidence in the record, to include medical records, the perceptions of treating physicians and others, and the claimant’s subjective description of his impairments. Jones v. Astrue, 619 F.3d 963, 971 (8th Cir.

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Related

Vossen v. Astrue
612 F.3d 1011 (Eighth Circuit, 2010)
Jones v. Astrue
619 F.3d 963 (Eighth Circuit, 2010)
David Perks v. Michael J. Astrue
687 F.3d 1086 (Eighth Circuit, 2012)
Finch v. Astrue
547 F.3d 933 (Eighth Circuit, 2008)
Davidson v. Astrue
578 F.3d 838 (Eighth Circuit, 2009)
Robert Blackburn v. Carolyn W. Colvin
761 F.3d 853 (Eighth Circuit, 2014)
Charles Miller v. Carolyn W. Colvin
784 F.3d 472 (Eighth Circuit, 2015)
Biestek v. Berryhill
587 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 2019)

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Kapshandy v. Social Security Administration Commissioner, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kapshandy-v-social-security-administration-commissioner-arwd-2024.