Kaplan v. Regions Bank

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedMarch 23, 2023
Docket8:17-cv-02701
StatusUnknown

This text of Kaplan v. Regions Bank (Kaplan v. Regions Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kaplan v. Regions Bank, (M.D. Fla. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

MARVIN I. KAPLAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:17-cv-2701-CEH-CPT

REGIONS BANK,

Defendant.

ORDER This cause comes before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 180), Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 183), and the associated responses and reply (Docs. 188, 189, 196). Both motions are ripe for the Court’s review. Upon careful consideration, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS A. The Underlying Lawsuit and the “Investment Deals” This malicious prosecution action stems from a case in the Middle District of Florida styled Regions Bank v. Kaplan, et al., No. 8:12-cv-01837-EAK-MAP (M.D. Fla.) (“Kaplan I”), in which Regions sued Kaplan and several of his companies for, inter alia, fraudulent concealment, civil conspiracy, conversion, and aiding and abetting.1 Doc. 113 ¶¶ 1, 48, 57. Regions initially brought its claims against several of Kaplan’s companies and claimed that his fraudulent transactions led to significant account overdrafts. Id. ¶ 48. Regions later amended its complaint to include several

other Kaplan-controlled companies as defendants and increased the damages sought. Doc. 181-5 at 7. After further investigation, litigation, and discovery, Regions filed a Second Amended Complaint and added claims against Kaplan individually (the “Tort Claims”). Doc. 181-17; Doc. 192-1. Kaplan now sues Regions for malicious prosecution based on those claims, asserting that they were wrongly brought against

him. Doc. 113. The underlying case involved numerous individuals, entities, banks, investment deals, and allegations of “check-kiting.”2 Kaplan controlled four entities with Regions accounts: R1A Palms, LLC; Triple Net Exchange, LLC; MK Investing, LLC; and BNK Smith, LLC. Doc. 181-4; Doc. 181-1 ¶ 7. Around 2008, he

began to invest with a company called Smith Advertising and Associates, Inc. (“SAA”), operated by Gary and Todd Smith. Doc. 181-1 ¶¶ 15–22. The “investment deals” operated as follows: Kaplan would make a short-term loan to SAA, so that

1 The Court has determined the facts, which are undisputed unless otherwise noted, based on the parties’ submissions, including the Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts (Doc. 187), declarations, depositions, filings and orders in Kaplan I, and other evidence in the record.

2 Check-kiting is “[t]he illegal practice of writing a check against a bank account with insufficient funds to cover the check, in the hope that the funds from a previously deposited check will reach the account before the bank debits the amount of the outstanding check.” CHECK-KITING, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). In other words, “check kiting, at root, is a plan designed to separate the bank from its money by tricking it into inflating bank balances and honoring checks drawn against accounts with insufficient funds. In essence, a check kite allows the schemers to trick the banks into giving them interest-free loans.” United States v. Yoon, 128 F.3d 515, 522 (7th Cir. 1997). SAA could take advantage of purported time-sensitive vendor discounts. Id. ¶ 21. SAA would then swiftly repay the loan, splitting the discount amount with Kaplan as interest. Id. ¶ 23. Between 2008 and 2011, Kaplan and SAA successfully

completed hundreds of similar transactions. Id. ¶ 24. These investment opportunities were completely fraudulent, as there were no vendors or vendor discounts, and SAA was nothing more than a Ponzi scheme designed to earn money for the company, its principals, and others associated with

the scam. Id. ¶ 75. The fraud was eventually uncovered, and numerous individuals were criminally prosecuted, including SAA’s principals. Id. at 3–4. Kaplan was not prosecuted, however, and the Kaplan I Court found, after a bench trial, that he had no actual knowledge that SAA was a fraudulent company or that the investment deals were part of a check-kiting scheme. Id. ¶¶ 97, 111, 114, 120, 122.

B. The Bundled Deals and the Scheme’s Collapse The Tort Claims focused on a series of deals from just a single week. Doc. 181-1 ¶¶ 44–75. SAA primarily used its Bridgeview Bank Group (“BBG”) account for the relevant deals. Id. ¶ 16. Between January 19, 2012, and January 24, 2012, Kaplan agreed to four “bundled deals” with SAA. Id. ¶ 44. SAA told him that,

although the deals were larger than previous ones, it hoped to take advantage of the same vendor discounts and needed short-term bridge loans to do so. Doc. 181-7 ¶ 72. SAA asked Kaplan to wire funds from his various Regions bank accounts to its BBG account, at which point SAA would ship repayment checks to Kaplan the same day. Id. ¶¶ 73–74. The deals initially went as planned. As part of the First Deal, SAA shipped

checks and promissory notes to Kaplan on January 19, to arrive on January 20. Doc. 181-1 ¶ 45. On the morning of January 20, Kaplan initiated transfers of $400,000 and $1,600,000 from his BNK and TNE Regions accounts to his R1A Regions account. Id. Later that morning, he wired $9,700,000 to SAA’s BBG account. Id. Kaplan received the First Deal checks and deposited a total of $10,061,375 into his various

Regions accounts that day. Id. The other deals were similarly structured, but the scheme began to unravel. Id. ¶¶ 46–75. On January 24, Smith and Kaplan agreed to a Fourth Deal, pursuant to which Kaplan wired $2,000,000 to SAA. Id. ¶ 51. That morning, however, Kaplan

learned that Regions had not credited the Second Deal Checks to him. Id. ¶ 53. He contacted Regions about these deposits, and a representative informed him that a hold had been placed on the Second Deal Checks. Id. ¶¶ 53–54. Kaplan called Todd Smith and informed him that the Third Deal could not proceed due to the bank hold. Id. ¶ 55. In hopes of completing the transaction, Smith sent Regions a falsified

screenshot showing a positive balance in SAA’s account, when in fact the account had a negative balance. Id. ¶ 56. Regions informed Kaplan that the screenshot would not be sufficient to release the hold on the Second Deal Checks. Id. ¶ 57. The same day, Kaplan received the Third Deal checks. Id. ¶ 58. Smith called Kaplan and suggested that he put a stop payment on the Second Deal checks in place of a wire transfer and deposit the Third Deal checks. Id. ¶ 59. Smith later changed his mind and told Kaplan not to deposit the Third Deal checks due to issues with SAA’s

account. Id. ¶ 60. On January 25, Regions advised Kaplan that the First Deal Checks had been returned unpaid. Id. ¶ 65. When Kaplan contacted SAA, he was told that BBG had frozen all of SAA’s accounts. Id. ¶ 66. SAA then sent Kaplan $10,550,000 worth of

checks by air courier drawn on a Wells Fargo Bank (“WFB”) account, which Kaplan deposited. Id. ¶ 66. On the same day, Kaplan met with three Regions officers, who asked him why SAA sent him checks instead of wire transfers. Doc. 181-55 at 21:17– 22:19; 24:11–22. Kaplan replied that it was because “we leverage the float.” Id. According to a Regions employee, Kaplan also stated that “Smith Advertising was

adamant [on] taking advantage of the float.” Id. at 55:17–25. On January 26 and 27, Regions provided Kaplan with written notice of dishonor of the First and Second Deal checks. Doc. 181-1 ¶¶ 70–71. A few days later, Regions notified Kaplan that the replacement checks had been dishonored. Id. ¶ 72. When the dust finally settled, nearly $33 million of checks had been returned,

resulting in over $9 million of overdrafts in Regions accounts. Doc. 180 at 2. C. Regions’ Initial Complaint and Subsequent Investigation Litigation began almost immediately.

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