Kaplan Rice Mill v. Texas N. O. R. Co.

26 So. 2d 42, 1946 La. App. LEXIS 417
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 14, 1946
DocketNo. 2802.
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 26 So. 2d 42 (Kaplan Rice Mill v. Texas N. O. R. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kaplan Rice Mill v. Texas N. O. R. Co., 26 So. 2d 42, 1946 La. App. LEXIS 417 (La. Ct. App. 1946).

Opinion

On August 25, 1942, the plaintiff shipped a carload of rice bran from its mill at Kaplan, Louisiana, over the Texas New Orleans Railroad Company, consigned to Mayronne Lumber Supply Co., Marrero, Louisiana. The shipment did not arrive at destination until five o'clock in the afternoon of August 31, 1942 and upon the car being opened the bran was found to be in a damaged condition and shipment was rejected *Page 43 by the consignee. The shipper was notified and as it contended that the bran had been delivered to it in good and sound merchantable condition, it advised the railroad company that it would hold it responsible for the loss which had been occasioned and that it would file claim for the invoice value which, it is not disputed, was $876.00 The railroad company refused to pay the claim and this suit was accordingly instituted against it to recover judgment for that amount.

In the petition shipment is alleged to have been made to the railroad company for immediate transportation and delivery to the consignee, and proper averment is made of the payment of freight and switching charges. The value of the shipment is stated and it is alleged also that demand was made for the damage which occurred while in transit and payment refused.

For answer, the defendant admits the shipment as alleged and that demand was made for the damage claimed but it otherwise denies all other averments made. Further answering, the defendant states that upon receiving the car on August 25, 1942, it promptly placed the same in a train which left Kaplan that afternoon at 1:25; that the car was handled with due and proper care and moved with due diligence and dispatch to the consignee's siding where it was placed on August 31, 1942 and proper notice given of its arrival. It denies any negligence in handling the shipment, avers that the car in which the bran was loaded was properly inspected and found suitable for the commodity and to be in first class condition. On information and belief it sets out the condition of the bran upon delivery and alleges that the damage done to the shipment was due to the inherent nature of the commodity; that the bran contained an excessive amount of moisture which caused it to heat and sweat upon being closed in the car during the warm weather that prevailed at the time; that the excessive moisture in the bran was due to the fact that it had not been kiln dried or was improperly kiln dried and was loaded in the car shortly after having been milled, as well as for other reasons inherent in the nature of the commodity.

Defendant then alleges that upon refusal of the consignee to accept the shipment and also the refusal of the consignor likewise to accept the same and because of the perishable nature of the commodity, after due notice given to the plaintiff, the bran was sold at public auction for the account of whom it may concern and the net proceeds of the sale amounting to the sum of $17.65 was offered to the plaintiff prior to the institution of this suit and that it now tenders to the plaintiff the said sum, together with legal interest, and costs accrued to this time. It deposited the amount of $23.45 in the registry of the court.

In the alternative defendant avers that in the event it should be found that there was an unusual delay in the movement of the shipment from Kaplan to Marrero, Louisiana, then, and in that event it pleads that the delay was due to the war emergency then existing; that the unprecedented amount of business which it was required to handle in connection with the national defense, the necessity of handling traffic which greatly increased the switching of cars under extreme difficulty and the necessity of concentrating its facilities on the traffic necessary and important to the war effort made the delay unavoidable.

After trial in the lower court there was judgment in the favor of defendant rejecting the plaintiff's demand. As appears from the transcript of the minutes of court the trial judge dictated a short statement in the record which is to the effect that he rejected plaintiff's demand on the ground that the bran shown to have been spoiled was damaged and spoiled as the result of the presence of excessive moisture in it when it was loaded and that the evidence showed complete freedom of negligence on the part of the railroad company in handling the shipment. Plaintiff has taken this appeal.

[1] Whatever law there is involved in the case does not seem to be controverted. The shipment was an intrastate shipment and all legal questions involved have to be determined under the law of Louisiana pertinent thereto. That is a proposition which seems to be recognized by the jurisprudence of this State, noticeably in the *Page 44 case of Dejean v. Louisiana Western Railroad Co., 167 La. 111,118 So. 822, and it is not disputed by counsel for the defendant. The liability, if any, of the railroad company, the common carrier which handled the shipment in this case, is specifically set out in Art. 2754 of the Civil Code. That Article provides that "carriers and waterman (watermen) are liable for the loss or damage of the things entrusted to their care, unless they can prove that such loss or damage has been occasioned by accidental and uncontrollable events."

[2, 3] The obvious inference to be drawn from this provision is that the moment the carrier accepts a shipment for transportation the burden of proof, in order to exonerate itself from liability for any damage occasioned to the shipment while in transit, is placed upon it and it will be held liable unless in carrying that burden it can show that the loss or damage was occasioned by some accidental or uncontrollable event which, as interpreted in the case of Dejean above cited is the equivalent of a fortuitous event or a "force majeure." As a matter of fact in the French text of the same Article which is Art. 2725 of the Code of 1825 the term "force majeure" is the one used and although a hidden defect or inherent vice in the commodity which may cause its loss or damage in transit may well be considered an uncontrollable event or a "force majeure," still, under the terms of the Article of the Civil Code itself it is up to the carrier to make proof of that fact when it is urged as a defense to an action as it is being used in this case.

In Lehman, Stern Co. v. Morgan's Louisiana T. R. S. S. Co., 115 La. 1, 38 So. 873, 875, 70 L.R.A. 562, 112 Am. St.Rep. 259, 5 Ann.Cas. 818, the court stated: "The carrier must prove the precise cause of the loss. It will not suffice to prove merely due diligence, but the carrier must prove, moreover, that the accident was occasioned by a fortuitous event, or by irresistible force, or by a defect of the thing itself, or by a fault of the shipper. Fuzier-Herman, Code Civil, Vol. 4, p. 419, No. 1." (Italics ours)

Our Supreme Court seems to have recognized that Article 2754 of the Civil Code imposes a rather harsh duty upon the carrier for in the case of McGinn v. New Orleans Railway Light Co.,118 La. 811, at page 820 of the decision, 43 So. 450, at page 453, 13 L.R.A., N.S., 601, it refers to the "rigidity of the rule as to the burden of proof in cases of this character." In assigning a reason why the rule is different when applied to the transportation of "things" instead of "persons," it states that "in the one the objects injured are inanimate, and can have nothing whatever to do with the injury they receive. Nothing intervenes to break the responsibility of the carrier for their safety.

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Related

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32 So. 2d 69 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1947)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
26 So. 2d 42, 1946 La. App. LEXIS 417, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kaplan-rice-mill-v-texas-n-o-r-co-lactapp-1946.