Kaplan Products & Textiles, Inc. v. United States

70 Cust. Ct. 166, 1973 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 3445
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedMay 16, 1973
DocketC.D. 4425; Court No. 68/15673 and eight others
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 70 Cust. Ct. 166 (Kaplan Products & Textiles, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kaplan Products & Textiles, Inc. v. United States, 70 Cust. Ct. 166, 1973 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 3445 (cusc 1973).

Opinion

Maletz, Judge:

The merchandise involved in this action consists of nine shipments of water-repellent cotton suede fabric with a “Vulca” finish1 exported from West Germany and entered at the port of New York at various times between June 1966 and June 1968. The fabric was assessed with duty at rates ranging between 14.77 percent and 18.25 percent either under item 322.14 or 322.15 of the tarifi schedules, depending upon average yarn number,2 as—

Woven fabrics other than the foregoing,3 wholly of cotton:

Not fancy or figured:
* * Hs * * * *
Colored, whether or not bleached ....
or under item 325.15 as—
Woven fabrics other than the foregoing 4 wholly of cotton:
*******
Fancy or figured:
*******
Colored, whether or not bleached ....

Plaintiff claims that the merchandise, which has been treated with a water-repellant finish, is thereby “coated” within the meaning of headnote 2(a) of schedule 3, part 4, subpart C, and properly dutiable at either 10 or 9 percent ad valorem, depending upon the date of entry, under item 356.25,5 which reads as follows:

Woven or knit fabrics (except pile or tufted fabrics), of textile materials, coated or filled, not specially provided for:
* * * * * * *
[168]*168Other:
Of vegetable fibers_
Subpart C, headnote 2(a), supra, provides that—
2. For the purposes of the tariff schedules—
(a) the term “coated or filled”, as used with reference to textile fabrics and other textile articles, means that any such fabric or other article has been coated or filled (whether or not impregnated) with gums, starches, pastes, clays, plastics materials, rubber, flock, or other substances, so as to visibly and significantly affect the surface or surfaces thereof otherwise than by change in color, whether or not the color has been changed thereby; [Emphasis in original.]

The parties have agreed that the merchandise is woven fabric and that it is in chief value of a vegetable fiber, specifically cotton. Thus the single issue is whether, as claimed by plaintiff, the imported material is “coated” within the meaning of the foregoing headnote.

The record establishes that untreated cotton suede fabric, whether or not dyed, is “hydrophilic”, that is, it readily absorbs water. However, when the fabric, such as that in question here, is treated with a water-repellent finish or coating, it becomes “hydrophobic” or water repellent. Thus, water applied to the treated surface of the imported merchandise will not penetrate the fabric but will form round droplets which can be shaken off. The water-repellent finish was obtained by applying a high molecular weight material (which has a hydrophobic end grouping composed of long chain carbon atoms) to the entire surface of the individual fibers. This material, which is repellent to water, produces the hydrophobic surface on the cotton fibers.

While the hydrophobic effect of the finish is readily apparent when water is sprinkled on the treated suede fabric, the finish itself is transparent. As plaintiff’s expert witness explained (E. 41-42):

* * * In the instance of the water repellent fabric, you cannot see it with the naked eye; you can only see the effect of it. In fact, you cannot see it with a visual microscope. The coating is that finite. It is almost monomolecular in consistence on the surface of the cotton fiber.

Thus, the water-repellent finish used on the fabric in issue leaves the material unchanged in appearance from cotton suede fabric which has not been so treated.6

By contrast, other finishes such as rubber or plastic, which are ap[169]*169plied to a base fabric to be used, for example in the production of oilcloth, tracing cloth or window hollands, create a coated surface which is plainly visible on the fabric.7

Against this background, plaintiff contends that the effect of the water-repellent finish or coating on the imported fabric surface— changing it from water absorbent to water repellent — as demonstrated by sprinkling water on the cloth, brings the cotton suede fabric within the headnote definition of “coated”. We do not agree.

As used with reference to textile fabrics, headnote 2 (a) specifies that the “term '‘coated or -filled’ * * * means that any such fabric * * * has been coated or filled * * * so as to visibly and significantly affect the surface or swrfaces thereof otherwise than by change in color whether or not the color has been changed thereby.” [Emphasis added in part.]

As we construe this headnote, whether or not a textile fabric comes within its purview does not depend on the characteristics of the fabric with coating or on its intended use. Thus, the fact that the coating may render the cloth rot proof, vermin proof, water repellent or waterproof is immaterial. Eather, under the criteria set out in the definition, the fabric must be coated with a substance which will “visibly” affect the surface of the cloth. In short, if the surface has not been “visibly” affected, the textile is not “coated”.

It is quite true that the water-repellent finish has significantly affected the surfaces of the imported cotton suede fibers8 by making them hydrophobic; however, it is manifest from the testimonal evidence and exhibits that the finish has not visibly affected the surface of the fabric — indeed, the “coating” is undetectable not only to the naked eye but also under the microscope. In other words, the fact that the finish creates a water-repellent surface is entirely immaterial in the absence of any visible affect thereon. Accordingly, the imported cloth is not “coated” as that term is defined in headnote 2(a).

Although the language of headnote 2 ( a) is so clear and unambiguous in its meaning as to obviate any need 'to resort to legislative history to ascertain the Congressional intent,9 it is significant that the follow[170]*170ing excerpt from the Explanatory Notes to the Tariff Glassification Study, Schedule 3, November 15,1960, pp. 133-34, supports the court’s conclusion that the term “visibly” must be construed in its full literal sense:

Headnote 2 of subpart C defines the terms “coated or filled” and “nonwoven fabrics”. The definition of ucoated or filled” mahes an important, distinction 'between textile fabrics on the basis of the surface character thereof. Most fabrics advanced beyond the grey state have been bleached or colored. Some of these products may also have been treated for the purpose of rendering them more able to withstand water, or to repel fire, insects, rodents, mildew, or rot.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
70 Cust. Ct. 166, 1973 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 3445, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kaplan-products-textiles-inc-v-united-states-cusc-1973.