Kaplan Products & Textiles Inc. v. United States

51 C.C.P.A. 2, 1963 CCPA LEXIS 242
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedDecember 12, 1963
DocketNo. 5136
StatusPublished

This text of 51 C.C.P.A. 2 (Kaplan Products & Textiles Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kaplan Products & Textiles Inc. v. United States, 51 C.C.P.A. 2, 1963 CCPA LEXIS 242 (ccpa 1963).

Opinion

WoRley, Chief Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal is from the judgment of the United States Customs Court, Second Division, C.D. 2876, overruling the importer’s protest against the collector’s classification of merchandise described on the invoice as “Yam Dyed Jacquard Satin Brocade Cloth with metal gold yam.” The collector held the merchandise dutiable at 25 cents per pound and 22% per centum ad valorem under the provision of paragraph 1306 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by the Tor-quay Protocol of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 86 Treas. Dec. 121, T.D. 52739, providing:

Woven fabrics in the piece, wholly or in chief value of rayon or other synthetic textile, not specially provided for, whether or not Jacquard-figured, value not over $4 per pound_25$ per lb. and 22%% ad val.

Appellant contends that the merchandise is properly dutiable under one of the provisions of paragraph 385 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 82 Treas. Dec. 305, T.D. 51802, set out below:

Beltings and other articles made wholly or in chief value of tinsel wire, metal thread, lame or lahn, or of tinsel wire, lame or lahn and india rubber, bullions, or metal threads, not specially provided for_15% ad val.
Woven fabrics, ribbons, and tassels, made wholly or in chief value of any material provided for in any item 385 of this Part_20% ad val.

The nature of the merchandise is clear from the evidence of record which consists of a stipulation entered into between counsel, the testimony of one witness on behalf of appellant and seven exhibits submitted by appellant. The stipulation reads:

I offer to stipulate that the imported material is a woven fabric obtained and manufactured in the following manner:
A sheet of transparent cellophane, made from a compound of cellulose and less than 3 one-thousandths of an inch in thickness, is bonded to each side of a sheet of aluminum foil. Thereafter, this laminated article is slit or sliced into narrow widths and in such condition is woven with the rayon yam to make the imported brocade.
In the imported brocade the aluminum cellophane-laminated strip is of greater value than the rayon yarn.

During the testimony of the single witness, Kaplan, president of the appellant corporation, a sample of fabric agreed to be substantially similar to the imported merchandise was introduced in evidence along with a sample of cellophane-coated metal yarn.

The Customs Court held that appellant had not discharged the [4]*4burden on it to establish both that the collector’s classification of the merchandise is incorrect and that the classification sought by appellant is correct. In discussing that burden, the court stated:

* * * It is well established in the field of customs jurisprudence that the classification of the collector is deemed to be correct and that he found every factor necessary to support his classification. United States v. Victoria Gin Co., Inc., W. H. Morton, 48 CCPA 33, C.A.D. 759. In cases involving classification under a provision for component material in chief value, it is presumed that the collector has determined the component material in chief value. United States v. Mrs. S. Bacharach, 18 CCPA 353, T.D. 44612. In order to overcome this presumption, plaintiff has a twofold burden of establishing the incorrectness of the classification and the correctness of the claim. In the instant case, it has been stipulated that the involved merchandise is a woven fabric; hence, plaintiff must establish that said fabric is not wholly or in chief value of rayon or other synthetic textile and is not specially provided for. * * *

Appellant takes the position that tlie narrow widths or strips sliced from the aluminum-cellophane sheets referred to in the stipulation constitute lame. On the basis of that contention and the stipulation that those aluminum-cellophane strips are of greater value than the rayon yarn with which they are woven to form the imported brocade, appellant urges that “the imported fabric is in chief value of lame and responds to the language of Paragraph 385 either as a woven fabric or an article in chief value of lame.”

In summarizing the testimony, appellant states:

Tbe aluminum-cellopbane thread or yarn is a new product since tbe Tariff Act of 1930 was enacted. It bas superior qualities (non-tarnisbing, suitability for weaving) to metallic threads or yarns, lame, etc. on tbe market in 1930 and bas practically supplanted those items.
Tbe aluminum found in tbe aluminum-cellopbane thread is narrow and flat. Lame, in 1930 frequently was coated with wax or lacquer. Tbe aluminum strip is covered on both sides with cellophane. Tbe aluminum-cellopbane yarn is an improved type of lame.

Appellant further sets out the following as the questions presented:

1. Is tbe aluminum-cellophane strip found in tbe imported brocade lame ?

2. Is the lame provided for in Paragraph 385 required to be in chief value of metal?

The Government urges that the aluminum-cellophane strips are not lame and that the merchandise is not classifiable under either of the provisions of paragraph 385 asserted by appellant.

Although the Customs Court concluded that appellant had not proved the merchandise was improperly classified in paragraph 1306 by the collector, it did not make an express determination whether the aluminum-cellophane strips constitute lame. In the view we take of the case, the question whether such strips fall within the term “lame” is the basic issue in the determination of whether the goods are, in the [5]*5terms of paragraph 1306, “not specially provided for,” and hence, of whether classification in that paragraph is correct. Since the strips are a new product first produced after passage of the Tariff Act of 1930,1 the question is whether the meaning of lame at the time of the Act was such as to include the new product. See Davies Turner & Co. v. United States, 45 CCPA (Customs) 39, C.A.D. 669.

In arguing whether the aluminum-cellophane strips are lame, both parties rely on statements concerning the latter material in the 1929 Summary of Tariff Information and the 1948 Summaries of Tariff Information, which statements are quoted in appellant’s brief. The 1929 Summary states:

“Description and uses. — Tinsel wire, lame or lahn, and bullion:
The testimony discloses the fact that both lame or lahn and bullions begin their existence in the form of tinsel wire. This is round wire composed principally of copper or brass, and usually coated with a bright metal, such as gold, silver, bronze, or foil. The article in this form is well known under the name of tinsel wire in trade and commerce and also in tariff nomenclature, and is devoted to various distinctive uses.
Lame or lahn is produced by drawing the round tinsel wire through metal rollers, whereby it is flattened into various widths. At the same time it is generally subjected to an ornamental corrugating process, or to a coating or coloring process.

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51 C.C.P.A. 2, 1963 CCPA LEXIS 242, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kaplan-products-textiles-inc-v-united-states-ccpa-1963.