Kapila v. Divney

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Kapila v. Divney

269 A.D.2d 127, 702 N.Y.S.2d 56, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 985

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 1, 2000

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 269 A.D.2d 127 (Kapila v. Divney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Kapila v. Divney, 269 A.D.2d 127, 702 N.Y.S.2d 56, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 985 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2000).

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Opinion

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Elliott Wilk, J.), entered October 21, 1998, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, but denied summary judgment on defendant’s counterclaims, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

In this employment discrimination case, plaintiff, a licensed architect, alleges that she was fired from her position as an associate, after 14 years of increasingly responsible employment with defendant engineering firm, because of her sex.

Viewing the evidence most favorably to plaintiff, we agree with the IAS Court that plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie case of sex discrimination in that she has presented no evidence that she was replaced by a male employee, a necessary element of such cause of action (see generally, Fisher v Vassar Coll., 114 F3d 1332, cert denied 522 US 1075). Even were we to find that plaintiff had met the minimal burden of establishing a prima facie case, defendant has clearly established that plaintiff was discharged for poor work performance, a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason (supra). Inasmuch as a trial is required on defendant’s counterclaims on the promissory note, plaintiff is entitled to raise any appropriate defenses asserted in her verified reply. Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Nardelli, Rubin, Andrias and Friedman, JJ.

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—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Elliott Wilk, J.), entered October 21, 1998, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, but denied summary judgment on defendant’s counterclaims, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

In this employment discrimination case, plaintiff, a licensed architect, alleges that she was fired from her position as an associate, after 14 years of increasingly responsible employment with defendant engineering firm, because of her sex.

Viewing the evidence most favorably to plaintiff, we agree with the IAS Court that plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie case of sex discrimination in that she has presented no evidence that she was replaced by a male employee, a necessary element of such cause of action (see generally, Fisher v Vassar Coll., 114 F3d 1332, cert denied 522 US 1075). Even were we to find that plaintiff had met the minimal burden of establishing a prima facie case, defendant has clearly established that plaintiff was discharged for poor work performance, a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason (supra). Inasmuch as a trial is required on defendant’s counterclaims on the promissory note, plaintiff is entitled to raise any appropriate defenses asserted in her verified reply. Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Nardelli, Rubin, Andrias and Friedman, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

269 A.D.2d 127, 702 N.Y.S.2d 56, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 985, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kapila-v-divney-nyappdiv-2000.

Opinion

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