Kansas-Lincoln, L.C. v. Arlington County Board

66 Va. Cir. 274, 2004 Va. Cir. LEXIS 320
CourtArlington County Circuit Court
DecidedDecember 10, 2004
DocketCase No. (Chancery) 04-326
StatusPublished

This text of 66 Va. Cir. 274 (Kansas-Lincoln, L.C. v. Arlington County Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Arlington County Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kansas-Lincoln, L.C. v. Arlington County Board, 66 Va. Cir. 274, 2004 Va. Cir. LEXIS 320 (Va. Super. Ct. 2004).

Opinion

By Judge Joanne F. Alper

This case comes before the Court on Kansas-Lincoln, L.C.’s Amended Bill of Complainant for Declaratory Judgment against the County Board of Arlington and Arlington County (“the County”). Kansas-Lincoln, L.C. (“Kansas-Lincoln”) claims that the “Affordable Housing Guidelines for Site Plan Projects” (“Guidelines”) and the amendment adding Note 19 to the “General Land Use Plan” (“GLUP Amendment”), both approved by the County Board on April 27, 2004, are invalid and unenforceable. Kansas-Lincoln alleges that the Guidelines and GLUP Amendment establish mandatory contributions for affordable housing in the form of cash or affordable housing units and that this requirement is not authorized by the General Assembly. The County argues that its written guidelines setting forth the “expected” contributions are merely aspirational and that all such [275]*275contributions and proffers are voluntary; hence, they do not exceed the County’s authority under state law.

Virginia is a “Dillon’s Rule” state; therefore, local governing bodies only have powers expressly granted by the state legislature, fairly and necessarily implied powers from the expressly granted powers, and essential and indispensable powers. The Virginia General Assembly has granted localities certain limited rights to adopt ordinances to address issues of affordable housing.

“Affordable Housing” is defined by the General Assembly as housing that is affordable to those with income at or below the median income. Local governments may establish individual definitions of affordable housing and affordable dwelling units and determine appropriate percent of area median income and percent gross income. Va. Code § 15.2-2201. Local governments also have the authority to establish a local housing fund to assist developers to develop/preserve affordable housing. The local government may also provide developers with money from the fund if the developer provides at least 20% of its units for low and moderate income persons for at least ten years. Va. Code § 15.2-735.

Further, the Legislature has given the County the right to adopt an affordable dwelling unit ordinance that allows for optional increases in density to reduce land costs. The statute specifically provides that any project subject to such an ordinance shall not be subject to additional requirements to contribute to a county housing fund. Va. Code § 15.2-2304.

Procedural History

The Amended Bill of Complaint1 for Declaratory Judgment contains four counts seeking a ruling from this Court that: (1) the Guidelines and GLUP Amendment are illegal; (2) the Guidelines and GLUP Amendment are not valid components of the Comprehensive Plan; (3) the Guidelines and GLUP Amendment constitute a piecemeal downsizing without following the process required for downsizing; and (4) the Guidelines and GLUP Amendment amount to a taking without just compensation.2

[276]*276The County demurred to the Amended Bill of Complaint on two grounds, (1) lack of standing as to The Northern Virginia Apartment Association, Inc., and The Apartment and Office Building Association of Metropolitan Washington as Complainants; and (2) lack of ripeness as to all Complainants. The Court sustained the demurrer as to the standing issue and dismissed the two Associations as Complainants.

With regard to ripeness, the County argued in its demurrer that there was no actual controversy involving antagonistic assertion and denial of right requiring redress and that an actual controversy may never arise since no site plan has yet been submitted by Kansas-Lincoln. The Court overruled the demurrer as to ripeness, finding that Kansas-Lincoln, L.C., had alleged an actual controversy that required redress because they planned to develop the Kansas-Lincoln parcel through the site plan process and the Bill of Complaint alleged that the new guidelines do not deviate from the County’s prior application of guidelines except for the amount of the contribution, therefore making evidence of the County’s past handling of affordable housing issues in the site plan process relevant evidence for the Court to consider at trial. Thus, the Court overruled the demurrer, finding that the Amended Bill of Complaint presented a justiciable issue for Declaratory Judgment.

The parties presented evidence and argument at trial before the Court on November 17 and 18, 2004.

Findings of Fact

The County has adopted a General Land Use Plan (“GLUP”) as part of its Comprehensive Plan enacted pursuant to Va. Code § 15.2-2223 of the Virginia Code. The GLUP sets forth the County’s vision for desired development and growth in the County.

Through its land use regulations, the County has planned for and encouraged the concentration of development within two corridors commonly referred to as the “Metro Corridors.” The Rosslyn-Ballston corridor refers to the area roughly coinciding with the Metro orange line from Rosslyn to Glebe Road. The County structured its Comprehensive Plan to allow the highest densities in the Metro corridors.

The County has also adopted “Sector Plans” for specific areas surrounding the Metro stations in the Rosslyn-Ballston Metro corridor. The Sector Plan provides a more detailed development plan for the particular area in order to implement the Comprehensive Plan. The County’s Sector Plan for the Virginia Square sector is the plan applicable to Complainant’s property which is the subject of this suit.

[277]*277While the GLUP and Sector Plans set forth the County’s vision and desired development, zoning establishes specific permitted uses and restrictions for particular properties. Each zoning classification has permitted, or “by-right” use, which allows a property owner to develop property in accordance with the restrictions and limitations set forth in the classification without further review by the County Board. A “by-right” development receives administrative review by County staff and, if the proposed development meets the zoning classification, approval is granted by the County Board.

The “by-right” uses of the existing zoning classification of parcels within the Rosslyn-Ballston corridor would not allow the development planned for and desired by the County in the GLUP. The GLUP envisions greater development and density than would be allowed “by-right” under the zoning classifications for the property.

Beyond the “by-right” uses, a property owner may seek a more dense development or greater uses of property by seeking approval of a site plan which calls for such a special exception use. In order to develop property in the Rosslyn-Ballston corridor in accordance with the County’s goals and desires planned for in the GLUP, a property owner must utilize the site plan process to obtain a special exception.

The basic elements of the site plan process used by the County require rezoning in order to develop according to the GLUP. The rezoning can only be accomplished through this process because the site plan allows significantly higher density and height than the underlying zoning. The special exception site plan process is a lengthy, comprehensive review because of the intensity of development allowed by site plan. The developer in this process has an incentive to rezone in order to obtain increased density; the County gets property in the corridor developed in accordance with the GLUP.

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Bluebook (online)
66 Va. Cir. 274, 2004 Va. Cir. LEXIS 320, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kansas-lincoln-lc-v-arlington-county-board-vaccarlington-2004.