Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Wood

1927 OK 272, 259 P. 262, 126 Okla. 275, 1927 Okla. LEXIS 134
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedSeptember 13, 1927
Docket17633
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 1927 OK 272 (Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Wood) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Wood, 1927 OK 272, 259 P. 262, 126 Okla. 275, 1927 Okla. LEXIS 134 (Okla. 1927).

Opinion

FOSTER, C.

This is an action filed in the district court of Adair County by the Kansas City Southern Railway Company against E. H. Wood, county treasurer of Adair county, to recover an alleged illegal payment of taxes made 'by the plaintiff for the year of 1925. The taxes were paid under protest, and suit brought to recover the same as provided by law.

The material parts of the petition which involve the question presented to this court are, in substance, as follows:

That a levy of 29.56 mills for the sinking fund of the city of Westville was made for the year ending June 30, 1925, and' that the same was illegal and void to the extent of 13.84 mills, for the reason that the board of trustees failed to comply with sections 4415 and 4507, C. O. S. 1921, in that they failed to fix a rate charged to consumers of water and electric lights sufficient to pay three per cent, of the principal and the interest on bonds issued in said city for the purpose of constructing a water system and light plant; that if the said rate had been fixed their taxes would have been reduced in said amount.

The same allegations apply to the city of' Stilwell, in said county, with the exception that if the rate had .been charged in that city as required by the sections above referred to, the levy against the property of the plaintiff would have been reduced in the sum of 12.98 mills, and that therefore said levy was illegal and void.

The defendant filed a general demurrer to the petition, which demurrer was by the district court of Adair county sustained, and the plaintiff elected to stand on its -petition,, and files its appeal in this court.

While the plaintiff in error relies upon many sections of the statute, and upon several different provisions of the Constitution for recovery in this case, it is only necessary, in our opinion, to consider sections-4507 and 4415, C. O. S. 1921.

Section 4507, C. O. S. 1921, is as follows •-

“Every municipal corporation within this state shall have the right to engage in any business or enterprise which may be engaged in by a person, firm or corporation by virtue of a franchise from said corporation. anti every city containing a population, of more than two thousand inhabitants shalL have the right and power to acquire, own and maintain, within or without the corporate limits of such city, real estate for sites and rights of way for public utility and public park purposes, and for the location thereon of waterworks, electric light and gas plants, hospitals, quarantine stations, garbage reduction plants, pipe lines for the transmission and transportation of gas, water and sewerage, and for any plant for the manufacture of any material for public improvement purposes, public buildings, and for all such purposes shall have the power to exercise the right of eminent domain, either within or without the corporate limits of such city, and to establish, lay and operate any. such plant or pipe line upon any land or right of way taken thereunder; and shall have and exercise the right to manufacture any material for public improvement purposes, and to 'barter or exchange the same for other material to be used in public improvements in such city, or to sell the same to other cities for like purposes and for any or all such purposes, in order to raise means to cariy out the same, shall have power to issue and sell bonds, bearing interest not to exceed six per centum, per annum, maturing in twenty-five years, and redeemable at will in not less than ten years, and whenever any such public improvement shall have been constructed by means derived from the sale of bonds, as above provided, it shall be the duty of such city, to *277 üx tlie rates cliaigetl for service to the public, as nearly as practicable, so as to pay tlie interest and not less than three per cen-tum, per annum, on the principal of such bonds in excess of the expenses of maintenance and operation: Provided, that whenever it shall be found impracticable to issue bonds as above provided for any improvement deemed by such city necessary for the public welfare, without increasing the total indebtedness of such city beyond the constitutional limit, it shall be lawful for such city to lease at a stipulated rental any public improvement or utility from any person, firm or corporation which will contract to furnish the same; provided, further, that any such rental contract shall reserve to such city the option to purchase such improvement or utility in future.” (Emphasis ours.)

The act. of which the above is a section, was passed by the Legislature in 1907, and the title of the same is as follows:

“An Act to enable all cities containing a population of more than 2,000 inhabitants to frame and adopt charters for their own government, and to extend and define their powers.” Session Laws, 1907, page 190.

Section 4115, C. O. S. 1921, is as follows:

“The city council of such city and the board of trustees of such town in connection with the mayor or president of said board shall have the power and authority, and it shall be their duty, to fix the rate of water rents or taxes to be paid by the consumer, and to ordain such rules and regulations. with appropriate penalties for the violation thereof, as such council or board of trustees may deem proper for the regulation and protection of said waterworks.” (Emphasis ours.)

Eroni a careful reading of the above statutes, it is our opinion that the provision contained therein, requiring cities to levy such a rate to the public for water and light sufficient to pay three per cent, per annum on the principal of the bonds issued for the-purpose of constructing water systems and electric light plants, and in addition thereto to pay the interest on said bonds, if constitutional, does not apply to municipal corporations of less than 2,000 inhabitants.

It is true that the first part of section 4507, above quoted, contains the provision that “Every municipal corporation within this state shall have the right to engage in any business or enterprise which may be engaged in by a person, firm or corporation -by virtue of a franchise from said corporation,” but immediately following this part of said section there appears the following:

“And every city containing a population of more than 2,000 inhabitants shall have the right,” etc.

This section then proceeds to set out the rights and powers of such cities to do certain things, and one of the duties that it sets out is to fix the rates which, in this case, it is admitted that the cities of Stil-well and Westville did not do. There is no paragraph nor even a period from this provision to the end of the entire section, and in each case the statute refers to “such city.” when, in our opinion, if the Legislature Jiad intended that it should refer to “all cities,” it would have used the word, “any,” “every,” or “all.”

This conclusion, we think, is supported by the terms of the title of the act as above set out:

“An Act to enable all cities containing a population of more than two thousand inhabitants,” etc.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1927 OK 272, 259 P. 262, 126 Okla. 275, 1927 Okla. LEXIS 134, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kansas-city-southern-ry-co-v-wood-okla-1927.